(5), and (6) of the LRA. [13] Moreover, the Court articulated the perspective that the marriage procedure in Malaysia has been instituted by Parliament in accordance with the requirements set forth in Sections 22(4), (5), and (6) of the Act. [14] The circumstances in the present case bear a close resemblance to the situation in which Counsel argues that this Court has the jurisdiction to issue an order pursuant to Section 107(3) of the LRA, and has further urged this Court to depart from the decision of the High Court in Re: Tan Joo Yen (supra). [15] Before this Honourable Court expresses its position on the intention to follow the said case, it is emphasized that this Court is neither required nor obligated to adhere to the judgments or rulings of other High Courts. This reflects that the doctrine of binding precedent is not applicable in this context. Nevertheless, this does not preclude the Court from exercising its discretion to follow such rulings or decisions of other High Courts where it deems appropriate. [16] In Am General Insurance Bhd v Sa' Amran a/l Atan & Ors and other appeals [2022] MLJU 1771, the Federal Court held that: “[86] As for the two leave questions, we shall deal with leave question 2 first before dealing with leave question 1 as it can be dealt with quite shortly. The answer to question 2 is in the judgment of this court in Dhalip Bhagwan Singh v Public Prosecutor [1997] 4 CLJ 645 where the Peh Swee Chin FCJ delivering the unanimous decision of the court made the following observations: The doctrine of stare decisis or the rule of judicial precedent dictates that a court other than the highest court is obliged generally to follow the decisions of the courts at a higher or the same level in the court structure subject to certain exceptions affecting especially the Court of Appeal.” [17] In the applications seeking the relevant orders in this matter, the Applicant’s Counsel drew this Honourable Court’s attention to Sections 26 and 31 of the LRA. Counsel contended that once the Registrar is satisfied that the marriage certificate issued in Indonesia is authentic and has been duly registered pursuant to Section 31 of the LRA, it follows that the Registrar has also confirmed that all requirements set out in Section 26 have been fully complied with. [18] Therefore, the Learned Applicant’s Counsel argued that the fact that the Registrar had certified and issued a certificate under Section 31 of the LRA showed that Section 26 of the LRA had been complied with by the Applicant. This Court refers to Section 26 which reads as follows: Registrar shall enter the prescribed particulars in the marriage register. [19] This Honourable Court, after careful consideration of the relevant provisions, does not concur with the submission of the Learned Applicant’s Counsel. This is because Section 26 applies exclusively to Sections 23 and 24, which govern the solemnisation of marriages within Malaysia, and therefore cannot be invoked in relation to marriages that take place abroad and are registered under Section 31 of the LRA. Notably, Sections 23 and 24 fall under Part III: Marriage — Solemnisation of Marriage, whereas Section 31 is situated under Part IV: Registration of Marriages. [20] The Counsel for the Learned Applicant’s Counsel also cited Section 22(4) of the LRA, which indicates that a marriage solemnized under Section 22 shall be considered void if it is not registered, unless a marriage certificate or a license has been issued by the Registrar or Chief Minister, or a statutory declaration as per Section 22(3) of the LRA has been submitted to the Registrar or Assistant Registrar, as applicable. Therefore, in this instance, since it was registered and a certificate was issued in accordance with Section 31 of the LRA, the marriage is deemed valid as stipulated in Section 22(4) of the LRA, and a divorce decree may be registered under Section 107(3) of the LRA. [21] Before proceeding with further remarks on this provision, this Honourable Court reviewed the case of Re: Tan Joo Yen (supra) and has reached a differing conclusion from that of the Court in that matter. In Re: Tan Joo Yen (supra), the Court held that: [13] Mahkamah ini berpendapat s. 107 (3) Akta itu secara jelas menyatakan "where a marriage which is solemnised in Malaysia....". [14] Mahkamah ini telah merujuk peruntukan s. 22 (1) Akta itu yang memperuntukkan bagaimana upacara perkahwinan perlu dilakukan. Peruntukan s. 22 (1) Akta itu memperuntukkan seperti berikut: "(1) Every marriage under this Act shall be solemnised- [22] This Honourable Court refers to Section 31 of the LRA, which clearly provides that any marriage solemnised outside Malaysia, but subsequently registered in Malaysia, shall be deemed “as if it were performed in Malaysia.” [23] This Honourable Court is of the view that once a marriage is solemnised outside Malaysia and subsequently registered in accordance with Section 31 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 (LRA), the issue of compliance with Section 22 (which governs marriages solemnised within Malaysia), as discussed in Re: Tan Joo Yen (supra), becomes immaterial. [24] In the case of Per: Tan Joo Yen (Supra), this Court holds the opinion that there is no mention of Section 104 of the LRA in the aforementioned case. It does not specifically address whether a marriage registered outside Malaysia is governed by the LRA and the Laws of Malaysia. In that instance, the Court referenced the phrase "contracted outside Malaysia" as not encompassing the eligibility to apply under Section 107(3) of the LRA (this matter will be elaborated upon later in this judgment). Whether there is a lacuna [25] In the case of Re: Tan Joo Yen (supra), the Court identified a lacuna which it held was not within the Court’s duty to remedy. The Court stated that: “[15] Mahkamah ini juga berpendapat tatacara perkahwinan di Malaysia telahpun ditentukan oleh Parlimen sebegitu rupa sebagaimana diperuntukkan di bawah s. 22 (4), (5) dan (6) Akta itu. Bagi kemudahan rujukan diperturunkan peruntukan tersebut sebagaimana berikut: Registrar or Assistant Registrar, as the case may be. [26] Coming back to the case of Per: Tan Joo Yen (Supra), this Court is of the view that Section 104 of the LRA was not considered at all. There is no specific reference to the issue of “whether once a marriage outside Malaysia is registered it is subject to the LRA and the Laws of Malaysia.” [27] In that case, the Court has referred to the words "contracted outside Malaysia" not including the eligibility to apply under Section 107(3) of the LRA because it is not “a marriage solemnized in Malaysia “under Section 22 of the LRA [28] Nevertheless, this Honourable Court holds that once the marriage is registered pursuant to Section 31 of the LRA, any issues relating to Section 22 of the LRA become irrelevant. This is because registration under Section 31 confers upon the Applicant rights equivalent to those that would have been granted had the marriage been solemnised within Malaysia. [29] This becomes evident when discussing the case of Tan Sai Hong v. Joremi Kimin & Anor [1997] 5 CLJ 614, in which the Court determined that: “Section 104 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 enacts, inter alia, that a marriage contracted outside Malaysia shall be recognised as valid if it was contracted in a form required or permitted by the law of the country where it was contracted. Factually, it was not disputed that both the plaintiff and the deceased were Malaysian citizens and this meant that the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 applies to them equally…” [30] In the present situation, it is indisputable that the Applicant resides in Malaysia, and the Respondent Husband holds Malaysian citizenship; therefore, the LRA is applicable. In the case of Nancy Kual v Ho Thau [1994] 1 CLJ 138, the Court held that: “The present marriage has to be recognised as valid as it is consistent with the provisions of section 104 of the Act. The section in effect recognises a marriage contracted outside Malaysia if such marriage was " contracted in a form required or permitted by the law of the country where it was contracted". [31] Consequently, once a marriage is duly registered under Section 31 of the LRA as is the case herein, Section 104 of the LRA becomes applicable. Section 104 explicitly empowers this Honourable Court to consider applications made under Section 107(3) of the LRA by recognizing a marriage registered under Section 31 as if it were solemnised in accordance with Section 22 of the LRA. Notably, Sections 104 and 107 fall under Part IX: Miscellaneous, underscoring their distinct operation, as affirmed in the case of Nor Hazliza Ismail & Anor v Mohamed Yusoff Shaikh Madar [2024] CLJU 281. [32] Nevertheless, this Court concurs with the ruling in the case of Per: Tan Joo Yen (Supra) in instances where no registration occurs under Section 31 of the LRA. This is due to the fact that a marriage performed outside of Malaysia, which is not registered in Malaysia, does not empower the Malaysian court to recognize and register a divorce obtained outside of Malaysia, as it is deemed "not solemnized in Malaysia" according to Section 22 of the LRA, nor contracted under Sections 31 and 104 of the LRA, which would allow the parties to seek the registration of a divorce decree in Malaysia under Section 107(3) of the LRA. [33] Section 104 of the LRA articulates that: “A marriage contracted outside Malaysia other than a marriage solemnised in a Malaysian Embassy, High Commission or Consulate under section 26, shall be recognised as valid for all purposes of the law of Malaysia if- Malaysia, both parties had capacity to marry according to this Act. [34] According to Section 104 of the LRA, a marriage that is entered into outside of Malaysia shall be considered valid, and in this instance, the Applicant has satisfied all three conditions outlined in Section 104 of the LRA. In Teo Ka Fook v Loo Chiat Hui [2010] MLJU 0636, held that: “[16] Recognition of a foreign judgment is part of the larger doctrine of comity of nations. It has been said in Anthinarayana Mudaliar v. Ajit Singh [1953] 1 LNS 2 that such a judgment or decree will be treated and acted upon by the Malaysian courts as final, notwithstanding any irregularity of procedure and the local law so long as the foreign court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the person brought before it and the proceedings do not offend against natural justice. Despite the passage of time, this principle to my knowledge, is applicable even today.” [35] In Hat v Pat [2024] MLJU 3425, the court held that: [82] In my view, the purpose of section 107 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act is not to facilitate the enforcement of an order from a foreign court but is limited solely to the registration of a decree of divorce for the purpose of maintaining a record of the parties’ marital status [36] Consequently, this Court cannot concur with the determination made in the case of Per: Tan Joo Yen (Supra) when the Court stated that: “[22] Mahkamah ini berpendapat pemohon tidak boleh bergantung kepada peruntukan s. 107 (3) Akta itu bagi memohon deklarasi agar perceraiannya di Medan didaftarkan oleh Pendaftar Besar. Mahkamah ini sedar berlaku lacuna dalam Akta itu bagi menggarap senario yang dialami oleh pemohon. Parlimen membenarkan perkahwinan di luar Malaysia didaftarkan di bawah s. 31 Akta itu. Sebaliknya Parlimen tidak menggubal peruntukan bagi perkahwinan di luar Malaysia untuk didaftarkan perceraiannya mengikut Akta itu. ………….. [24] Mahkamah ini sedar pemohon memfailkan saman pemula bagi mendapatkan perintah agar Pendaftar Besar mendaftarkan perceraiannya di Medan bergantung kepada peruntukan s. 107 (3) Akta itu. Mahkamah ini mengambil pendekatan yang sama dengan prinsip yang diputuskan dalam kes Robert Lee & Anor [supra], Parlimen hanya membenarkan peruntukan s. 107 (3) Akta itu untuk upacara perkahwinan yang diadakan di Malaysia dan bukannya perkahwinan di luar Malaysia tetapi didaftarkan mengikut peruntukan s. 31 Akta itu. [25] Mahkamah ini berpendapat terpulang kepada Parlimen selaku penggubal undang-undang untuk meminda peruntukan s. 107 (3) Akta itu bagi mengisi lacuna undang-undang yang sedang diperdebatkan ini.” [37] This Court, in interpreting the provision, adheres to the guidance given in the case Balakrishnan a/l Kaliappan v Shameena a/p Nathesan [2019] 5 MLJ 661: “In this regard, it is pertinent to refer firstly, to the preamble of LRA which states: