Sidrey Shalod Dike v Pendakwa Raya (W-05(M)-596-12/2018)

The charge preferred against the Appellant/Accused person (“Appellant”) in this appeal reads as follows:- “That you 3 May 2017, around 2.30 pm, at Tepi Lorong, Lot 4072C, Setor Besi Buruk, Jalan Segambut, Kg Segambut Luar, 51200 Kuala Lumpur, in Sentul District, in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, were found distributing dangerous drugs namely Methamphetamine amounts to an estimated gross 1,050 grams, and thereby you have committed an offense under Section 39B (1) (a) Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 which is punishable under Section 39 B ( 2) of the same Act. ” (“the said Charge”)

At the end of the defence’s case, the High Court ruled that the Appellant had failed to raise a reasonable doubt in the Prosecution’s case and convicted the Appellant who was given the mandatory death penalty.

Being aggrieved by the High Court’s decision, the Appellant filed the present appeal which was heard by us. After perusing the appeal records and hearing the submissions of both parties, we came to a unanimous decision. We found no merits in the Appellant’s appeal and found that the conviction of the Appellant is safe. As such, we affirmed the Appellant’s conviction and sentence. Our reasons are set down below. S/N eilkoEWQHEOjx7hK9cqc2g

The Prosecution’s case can be summarized as follows:-

SP9 had received information and instructions to lead a raid for a drugs case involving a Nigerian national who will be claiming 2 packages marked as CS/NANA/NG which will be conveyed by Best Link Logistics Sdn. Bhd.;

On 3.5.2017, around 10.45 am, SP9 with several officers and members arrived at the Best Link Logistic Warehouse in Kajang Selangor. SP9 had met with the Warehouse Manager (SP3) regarding the purpose of the visit which is to detect 2 packages marked CS/NANA/NG, suspected to contain dangerous drugs;

Delivery will be made by SP2, the employee of Best Link Logistic Warehouse with the Delivery Order, and accompanying him was SP9 and other officers. Throughout the journey, there were a few incoming and outgoing calls between SP2, SP3, and the Appellant;

The packages were addressed to one, Mohamed Hassan. Upon reaching the place of incident, guided by the Appellant, SP7 confirmed the delivery with the Appellant, and the Appellant signed the Delivery Order, acknowledging receipt of the 2 packages in the name of Mohamed Hassan; S/N eilkoEWQHEOjx7hK9cqc2g

SP7 and SP9 witnessed the Appellant put down the 2 packages on the left side of the road and at the same time signaled a thumbs up to the rest of the raiding officers. This is when the Appellant attempted to flee and there was a hustle between the Appellant and the raiding party.

The Appellant was arrested and taken to Ibu Pejabat Narkotik Jabatan Kastam Diraja Malaysia along with the 2 packages.

On 2.5.2017, at the Customs office, the packages were opened and found to have contained teddy bears with drugs concealed inside.

The Appellant was subsequently charged with the said Charge and claimed trial. The High Court found the Appellant guilty and sentenced him to death by hanging. FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT AT THE END OF THE PROSECUTION CASE

The learned High Court judge (“learned HCJ”) accepted SP5, the Government Chemist's testimony that in the box marked as C, there were two plastic packages marked “A2 (1)” and “B2 (1)”. Inside each Plastic package, there was crystal clear material, and after analysis, it was determined that package “A2 (1)” contained 372.1 grams of net weight of methamphetamine type drug and package “B2 (1)” contained 355.0 grams of net weight of the same drug. S/N eilkoEWQHEOjx7hK9cqc2g

The results of the investigation into the Samsung phone (Exhibit P23) showed that the phone was only used to call SP3, the Manager of the Forwarding Agent, SP2, the lorry driver carrying the 2 packages and SP3’s offices. The results of the investigation also showed that the telephone number was registered in the name of James Emeka, and from the Immigration Department's investigation, there was no record of entry and exit of this person in the country. Meanwhile, the registered address of the phone belonged to a Malay, one Ahmad Aizat bin Ahmad Saifullah who has nothing to do with the case.

The address on the delivery order of the packages is the store address and the owner is one Raju a/l Rengathan. The email address showed that it is MOHAMMEDHASSAN62@yahoo.com and the account owner is in Cairo, Egypt.

The learned HCJ ruled that the Prosecution had succeeded in proving the 3 essential elements of the offence as stated in the said Charge and that the Prosecution has proved a prima facie case against the Appellant, for drug trafficking, namely:

The drug proved to be the type of ‘methamphetamine’ listed in the first table and the drug weighed 50 grams or more;

The Appellant was proven to have real ownership, ie custody and control as well as knowledge of the contents of the 2 packages containing the drugs; and S/N eilkoEWQHEOjx7hK9cqc2g

The Appellant was proven to have committed the act of drug trafficking by way of a presumption under Section 37 (da)

(xvi) ADB 1952 when the weight and type of drug (a) and proof (b) are proved and the Court makes a finding of actual possession.

In the light of the learned HCJ’s above findings, the learned HCJ found that the Prosecution has proven a prima facie case against the Appellant and ordered the Appellant to enter his defence in respect of the said Charge preferred against him.

The Appellant chose to testify under oath. The Appellant testified that he lived in a church called Jesus Charitas Church in Kepong. A church member named Johnson John (“Johnson John”) had enlisted the Appellant’s assistance to pick up the 2 packages and in return, Johnson John would provide the Appellant with a return flight ticket to Nigeria. Johnson John also provided the Connect mobile phone to the Appellant for him to use, in connection with the collection of the 2 packages from the transportation agent.

The Appellant stated that he did not know the contents of the 2 packages and that he was merely collecting them, on behalf of Johnson John. S/N eilkoEWQHEOjx7hK9cqc2g FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT AT THE END OF THE DEFENSE

The learned HCJ court inter alia ruled the Appellant failed to raise reasonable doubt in the case of the Prosecution and failed to rebut the presumption of trafficking.

The learned HCJ further held that the Prosecution witnesses are accepted as truthful witnesses and there is no reason for them to fabricate stories to persecute the Appellant. The learned HCJ also held Johnson John was a fictional person created by the Appellant because SD2, the clerk of Jesus Caritas Church, Kepong, Victoria Benadicta a/p A.M Nathan had contradicted and denied the Appellant’s evidence and informed that he did not know the Appellant or Johnson John.

The Appellant was convicted on the said Charge preferred by the Prosecution and was sentenced to death by hanging.

Before us, the Appellant contended there are 3 main issues namely:-

That the Appellant never had possession of the drugs found in the 2 packages because he was arrested right after he had received the 2 packages; S/N eilkoEWQHEOjx7hK9cqc2g

That the Appellant did not have the opportunity to inspect the 2 packages and hence he neither had knowledge of the contents of the 2 packages received, nor the power of disposal over the drugs found in the 2 packages; and

SP10, the Superintendent of Customs, Muhamad Faiz bin Omar who is the Customs Investigating Officer of this case did not conduct a thorough investigation by failing to investigate all material aspects of the Appellant’s defence. THE RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS

Before us, the Respondent contended inter alia as follows:-

That the learned HCJ was correct in finding that Johnson John was a fictitious person;

That there is sufficient evidence that the Appellant knew about the content of the parcels to be collected; and

That the conduct of the Appellant before, during and after delivery of the parcels showed the intention and knowledge of the Appellant. DUTY OF AN APPELLATE COURT

It is a principle of law that when an appeal comes before an appellate court, the said appeal takes the form of a continuation of a trial and it is open to the appellate court to order or determine if S/N eilkoEWQHEOjx7hK9cqc2g the various findings of the trial court are correct. (see Public Prosecutor v. Maarif [1969] 2 MLJ 65; Ahmad Najib bin Aris v.

In the course of carrying out its appellate functions, the Court of Appeal is empowered to conduct an evaluation exercise. Since an appeal is a continuation of proceeding by way of rehearing and an appellate court may subject the evidence to a critical re-examination. In PP v Azilah Hadri & Anor [2015] 1 CLJ 579, the Federal Court held as follows: “We hold the view that even if the trial judge had failed to mention of any evaluation of common intention in his written grounds of judgment, the Court of Appeal, which in law reheard the case when exercising its appellate function, was empowered and also duty bound to carry out an evaluation exercise to determine whether common intention did exist. Here the Court of Appeal equally failed to do that. An appeal is continuation of proceedings by way of rehearing and an appeal court may subject the evidence to a critical re-examination (Ahmad Najib bin Aris v Public Prosecutor [2009] 2 MLJ 613; Mohamad bin Deraman v Public Prosecutor [2011] 3 MLJ 289.”

Reference is also made to the case of Ahmad Najib Aris v PP [2009] 2 CLJ 800, wherein the Federal Court held as follows: “[20] As regards the first main ground of appeal raised by the appellant, I am of the view that the Court of Appeal has the power to revise or re-evaluate all the evidence available as adduced by the prosecution. The Court of Appeal is in a position to do so in the present case even though the grounds of decision of the trial judge as appearing in the appeal records is found lacking in S/N eilkoEWQHEOjx7hK9cqc2g specific findings and with no reasons for the findings. In a case involving purely a question of fact, the Court of Appeal is free to determine whether or not the various findings of the trial court are correct (see Mohamed Mokhtar v PP [1972] 1 MLJ 122).” (Emphasis Added)

It is an established principle that an appellate court should be slow to interfere with the finding of fact by a lower court as an appellate court does not have the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses and therefore of assessing their credibility. (See Public Prosecutor v. Wan Razali Kassim [1970] 1 LNS 121; [1970] 2

Further guidance can be found in the Court of Appeal case of Mohd Yusri bin Mangsor & Anor v. Public Prosecutor and Another Appeal [2014] 7 CLJ 897; [2014] 4 MLJ 875, where Zawawi Salleh JCA (as he then was) held as follows: [4] ... We have also scrutinised the records available before us. We are mindful that this is a factual based appeal. It is trite that an appellate court will be slow to interfere with the findings of facts and judicial appreciation of the facts by the trial court to which the law entrusts the primary task of evaluation of the evidence. However, there are exceptions.

the judgment is based upon a wrong premise of fact or of law; S/N eilkoEWQHEOjx7hK9cqc2g

there was insufficient judicial appreciation by the trial judge of the evidence of circumstances placed before him;

the trial judge has completely overlooked the inherent probabilities of the case;

that the course of events affirmed by the trial judge could not have occurred;

the trial judge had made an unwarranted deduction based on faulty judicial reasoning from admitted or established facts; or

the trial judge had so fundamentally misdirected himself that one may safely say that no reasonable court which had properly directed itself and asked the correct questions would have arrived at the same conclusion, then an appellate court will intervene to rectify that error so that injustice is not occasioned (see Perembun (M) Sdn Bhd v. Conlay Construction Sdn Bhd [2012] 1 LNS 1416; [2012] 4 MLJ 149 (CA); Sivalingam a/l Periasamy v. Periasamy & Anor [1995] 3 MLJ 395; [1996] 4 CLJ 545 (CA)).” OUR ANALYSIS AND DECISION

Bearing the above guidance and principles in mind, we will proceed to consider the appeal.

As regards the Appellant’s contention that the Appellant never had possession of the drugs found because the Appellant was arrested S/N eilkoEWQHEOjx7hK9cqc2g right after he had received the 2 packages and that the Appellant did not have the opportunity to inspect the packages and hence he neither had knowledge of the contents of the packages received, nor power of disposal over the drugs found, we are of the considered view that there are no merits in these 2 issues raised by the Appellant.

The conduct of the Appellant before, during and after delivery of the 2 Packages showed that the Appellant had the requisite intention, possession and knowledge.

In Chan Pean Leon v PP [1956] 22 MLJ 237, the Court held inter alia:- "Possession itself as regards the criminal law is described as follows in Stephen's Digest (9th Ed) p304: A movable thing is said to be in the possession of a person when he is so situated with respect to it that he has the power to deal with it as owner to the exclusion of all other persons, and when the circumstances are such that he may be presumed to intend to do so in case of need. To put it otherwise, there is a physical element and mental element which must both be present possession is made out. The accused must not only be situated that he can deal with the thing as if it belonged to him, for example have it in his pocket or have it lying in front of him on a table. It must also be shown that he had the intention of dealing with it as if it belonged to him should he see any occasion to do so, in other words, that he had some animus possidendi. Intention is matter of fact which in the nature of things cannot be proved by direct evidence. It can only be proved by inference from the surrounding circumstances ...” (Emphasis Added) S/N eilkoEWQHEOjx7hK9cqc2g

Further, in Parlan Dadeh v. Prosecutor Raya [2008] 6 MLJ 19 on p. 39, Augustine Paul FCJ held inter alia as follows:- "Proof of knowledge is very often a matter of inference which varies from case to case. It would be sufficient for the prosecution to prove facts from which it could properly be inferred that the accused had the necessary knowledge." And further at p 45 held:- "The inference to be drawn from the evidence of conduct of the appellant against the background of the other evidence is that he knew what he was carrying (see Deputy Public Prosecutor v

In our case, the evidence adduced showed that the Appellant received the 2 packages, to wit Exhibits P7 and P8 respectively from SP2, he then signed the Delivery Order (Exhibit P12) for the 2 packages using the name of “Mr. Mohammad Hassan” and before taking delivery of the 2 packages, he pretended to be “Hassan”. Further, when the Appellant signed the Search List (Exhibit P39), he used another person’s name. If the Appellant claimed to be innocent and was merely collecting the 2 packages for Johnson John, there would be no necessity to utilise false identities to sign various documents.

When the raiding party wanted to apprehend him after he accepted the delivery of the 2 packages, he resisted arrest and tried to escape and struggled with the raiding party. This S/N eilkoEWQHEOjx7hK9cqc2g showed that the Appellant knew about the existence of drugs in both the 2 packages.

In order to prove the element of knowledge on the part of the Appellant, the Prosecution relied on inferences from a set of proven circumstances.

In Surentheran Selvaraja v PP [2006] 1 MLJ 641, the Court of Appeal held at page 646 as follows:- “There is, if at all, very seldom available direct proof of the knowledge that is necessary to constitute possession. In almost every case, proof of knowledge has to be by way of inference from the proven circumstances. One set of circumstances different from another. In any given case, whether knowledge is inferable depends on the particular circumstances of the case and a proper appreciation of them. We have to look at the particular circumstances of this case and assess them independently, without being influenced by what may have been decided in some other cases under a different set of circumstances.”

As to the Appellant’s contention that the Appellant has no idea as to what the 2 packages contained as he was collecting them for Johnson John and thus only had momentary possession and no power of disposal. We find no merit in this contention as the learned HCJ found that Johnson John is a fictitious person. Since Johnson John is a fictitious person then the Appellant’s entire defence collapsed and he cannot be heard to contend that he had no knowledge of the content of the 2 packages and no power of disposal of the same. The Appellant’s possession of the 2 packages was only interrupted by his arrest. S/N eilkoEWQHEOjx7hK9cqc2g

We are however in agreement with the finding of the learned HCJ that Johnson John was a fictitious person. The Appellant did not even have the telephone number of Johnson John or his address for him, to contact Johnson John to hand over the 2 parcels after collecting them. In normal circumstances, we would expect the Appellant to have the contact number or address of Johnson John. Without such contact number or address, in the light of evidence that no one from the Jesus Caritas Church where the Appellant met Johnson John can confirm the existence of Johnson John and any other evidence showing the existence of Johnson John, we are constrained to agree that Johnson John is a fictitious person created by the Appellant, to shift or push the liability of the offence to him.

SP10, the Investigating Officer during cross-examination explained that he interviewed SD2 and was told that after 10.30pm, no one is allowed sleep at church. SP10 also investigated whether the Appellant left any of his belongings or clothes of the Appellant in the Church but no one recognize or know Johnson John or the Appellant.

In Tobechi Chinonso Honey v PP [2015] 1 LNS; [2015] MLJU 2038, the Court of Appeal held as follows: "[11] It was further submitted that Ossy is a real person and that it was SP7's duty as Investigating Officer to investigate whether he was the passenger who sat next to the appellant on the same flight to Malaysia. S/N eilkoEWQHEOjx7hK9cqc2g [15] As to the question of the role played by Ossy the only evidence before the court was the appellant's bare assertion that Ossy asked for his favour to carry the 27 boxes of soap. Other than that there is no evidence that Ossy even exists. There was this person by the name of Omatu Chine Ostia seated next to the appellant in the same flight but it was not established that Ossy and Omatu Chine Ostia are one and the same person. [16] The mere fact that Ossy's name was mentioned during the police investigation is not evidence that Ossy actually exists. How were the police to investigate the existence of this person when the appellant did not even give his full name and his residential address? The poor investigating officer may end up chasing a wild goose. We therefore found no merit in the appellant's argument that the police's failure to investigate the existence of Ossy must be held against the prosecution. [17] In any event, since the appellant had a legal burden to discharge (to disprove knowledge) it was his duty to call Ossy to give evidence and not for the police to investigate if it was true that Ossy had asked him to carry the soap boxes: Baharom v PP [1960] 1 LNS 9; [1960] MLJ 429; Liew Siew & Anor v PP [1969] 1 LNS 90; Chu Tak Fai v PP [1998] 4 CLJ 789. Hence, since Ossy was not called to give evidence there was no way the court could verify the truth of what Ossy told him at Lagos Airport. Infact the evidence is hearsay and inadmissible as the object was to prove the truth of what Ossy told him: PP v Subramaniam [1956] MLJ 220 P.C.” (Emphasis Added) S/N eilkoEWQHEOjx7hK9cqc2g

In Yee Win Chin v PP [2008] 6 MLJ 233, the Court of Appeal held as follows:- “He must first determine as a fact whether that other is a real person or a mere figment of the accused's imagination invented for the purpose of the trial. Next, if he finds that other person to be real the judge must then determine that other person is the real trafficker. This is called the Radhi direction and must be administered by a court unto itself when such a defence is taken.”

The Appellant also contended that he had given advance and sufficient notice when he was arrested that the 2 parcels were Johnson John’s, that the 2 packages do not belong to him and that he was merely collecting the 2 parcels for Johnson John. The Appellant maintained this in his cautioned statement and this showed that his defence was consistent and credible.

We are of the considered view that such advance notification of his defence does not in any way assist the Appellant when the evidence adduced showed that Johnson John does not exist and the Appellant acted and behaved in a manner inconsistent with innocence and defence.

We find that even though the Appellant, had no opportunity to inspect the 2 packages because he was arrested almost immediately and had no access to the 2 packages up till the time he received them, we are in agreement with the learned HCJ’s decision, in inferring a guilty mind from the Appellant’s conduct of trying to flee and evading arrest. Even though the Customs S/N eilkoEWQHEOjx7hK9cqc2g Officers were not in uniform and hence were strangers to the Appellant, there was still no necessity to flee and resist arrest when confronted by the Customs Officers.

The Appellant contended that he did not run when the Customs Officers tried to apprehend or arrest him and that he was merely struggling with the arresting officers as he did not know that they were Customs officers at that material time. Thus, the Appellant contended that the learned HCJ erred in finding that the Appellant was running away from the Customs officers and had exclusive possession of the 2 parcels.

We are of the considered view that the learned HCJ having heard the testimonies of all witnesses especially the witnesses for the Prosecution was correct in finding and holding that the Appellant was in fact running away and evading arrest. Further, the Appellant’s actions in misrepresenting himself and using false identities to collect the 2 packages showed that the Appellant knew the nature of the contents of the 2 packages and received the same before he was arrested.

We are of the considered view that the testimonies of the various prosecution witnesses namely SP2, the driver and SP9, the leader of the raiding party are consistent and did not support the testimony of the Appellant that he was not trying to escape and that he merely struggling with the Customs Officers. S/N eilkoEWQHEOjx7hK9cqc2g

In Samundee Devan a/I Kerishnan Muthu [2009] 1 MLJ 697; [2008] MLJU 417 [2009],1 MLJ 697 the Court of Appeal held as follows; "In the instant case, the evidence of conduct on the part of the accused in attempting to run away from the scene when PW7 identified himself as police even before the discovery of the drugs in the red plastic package and the drugs in the boot of the said car clearly showed prior knowledge of the drugs. There was no other evidence for the court to make an inference other than the inference that the accused was aware of the drugs in the red plastic package and had knowledge of the same."

The sole defence of the Appellant is that he was asked by Johnson John whom he met at Jesus Caritas Church, Kepong to collect some packages for him. In return, Johnson John will buy an air ticket to go home to Nigeria. In addition, Johnson John gave him, a Samsung Mobile Phone to contact the transportation company regarding the collection of his packages.

The Appellant’s final contention was that SP10 - the Customs Department’s Investigating Officer did not conduct a thorough investigation, by failing to investigate all material aspects of the Appellant’s defence.

From the evidence adduced, we are of the considered view that adequate, substantial and extensive investigation of the material aspects of this case including the Appellant’s defence have been carried out by SP10 namely:- S/N eilkoEWQHEOjx7hK9cqc2g

there was an investigation and determination of the existence of Johnson John;

there was an interview with SD2, a clerk at the Jesus Caritas Church, Kepong where the Appellant allegedly stayed and/or slept and SD2 testified that he does not even know the Appellant or about the existence of Johnson John;

there was an inquiry into the phone number that was used by the Appellant which resulted in the finding that it was registered in the name of James Emeka who does not have any record of entry and exit into the country;

there was an investigation into the address of the registered telephone number found that it was a house rented by a Malay man named Ahmad Aizat bin Ahmad Saifullah who had nothing to do with this case; and

that there was also an investigation into the email address of Mohammed Hassan which found to be an account owned by a man who lives in Cairo, Egypt.

SP10, the Investigating Officer in this case also investigated and even brought the Appellant to confirm whom the Appellant said he knew at the Church. However, all those who worked at the Jesus Caritas Church did not know the Appellant or Johnson John. S/N eilkoEWQHEOjx7hK9cqc2g

In the light of the above, we are of the considered opinion that this contention of the Appellant is without basis and merits.

In such circumstances, we are of the considered view that the Appellant's defense is nothing more than mere denial. The Appellant when testifying, denied possessing and knowledge of the seized drugs as he was merely accepting the 2 packages which contained the drugs for Johnson John. However, from the evidence adduced, the existence of Johnson John was very much doubted. Thus, this substantial and sole defence of the Appellant is without basis and a bare denial.

Guidance can be found in D. A Duncan v PP [1980] 2 MLJ, the court held inter alia as follows:_ “The defence was, in effect, a simple denial of the evidence connecting the appellant with the four boxes. We cannot see any plausible ground for saying that the four boxes were not his. In the circumstances of the prosecution evidence, the High Court came, in our view, to the correct conclusion that this denial did not cast a doubt on the prosecution case against the appellant.”

We are of the considered view that the learned High Court Judge chose to believe the testimonies of the witnesses for the Prosecution over that of the Appellant and in such a situation, an appellate court would be most reluctant to disturb such reliance on the credibility of the witnesses for the Prosecution. S/N eilkoEWQHEOjx7hK9cqc2g

In Herchun Singh & Ors v. Public Prosecutor [1969] 2 MLJ 209 at p. 211, HT Ong (CJ (Malaya)) said: “This view of the trial judge as to the credibility of a witness must be given proper weight and consideration. An appellate court should be slow in disturbing such finding of fact arrived at by the judges, who had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witness, unless there are substantial and compelling reasons for disagreeing with the finding: see Sheo Swarup v. KingEmperor AIR [1934] PC 227.”

Further, in Chung Tain Kong v PP [2010] 2 CLJ 397, the Federal Court held inter alia at p. 404 as follows:- “It is trite that a finding on the credibility of a witness by a trial judge should not be disturbed by an appellate court. (See Ahmad Shah Hashim v. PP [1979] 1 LNS 4 FC”

The absence of this motive should be considered by the Court in evaluating the testimony of those witnesses who are indeed probable to be believed its existence. In Mr Too Cheh v PP [20061 2 SLR 220, Yong Pung How CJ held at p. 229 as follows:- “Since the defence did not adduce sufficient evidence of Ponirah's alleged motive to frame the appellant, it was unnecessary for the prosecution to prove a lack of motive in the present case... “ S/N eilkoEWQHEOjx7hK9cqc2g

In the light of our above findings after having considered the findings and reasons given by the learned HCJ in convicting the Appellant for the charge preferred, we are of the considered opinion that the learned HCJ did not made errors in material findings of facts which warranted appellate intervention. We could not say that the learned HCJ had erred in anyway in the findings and reasoning made in respect of the conviction. We are of the respectful view that there are no merits in the Appellant’s appeal and that the conviction is safe. In the premises, we unanimously dismiss the appeal.

The Order of the High Court dated 30.11.2018 is affirmed. Dated this 17th day of January, 2023. -SGD-LEE HENG CHEONG JUDGE COURT OF APPEAL Appellant’s Counsel : Mr. Afifuddin Bin Ahmad Hafifi Messrs Salehuddin Saidin & Associates Shah Alam Respondent’s Counsel : Mr. Mohd Fairuz Bin Johari DPP Jabatan Peguam Negara Putrajaya S/N eilkoEWQHEOjx7hK9cqc2g