An application for leave must be made ex parte to a Judge in Chambers and must be supported by a statement setting out the name and description of the applicant, the relief sought and the grounds on which it is sought, and by affidavits verifying the facts relied on. Binding principles from case law [25] These are the binding principles concerning the Order 53 Statement that I have to apply when considering the two objections. Page 12 of 22 [26] One—the Order 53 Statement in a judicial review proceeding is the equivalent of pleadings in a writ proceeding. It is the equipollent of pleadings. Just as parties in a writ action are bound by their pleadings, the applicant is bound by, and confined to, the averments in its Order 53 Statement—(1) Leftenan Kolonel Hafiz bin Haji Sulaiman & Ors v Zulkefli bin Mohamed [2023] 5 MLJ 548 (CA); [2023] 7 AMR 1; [2023] 8 CLJ 700; [2023] 6 MLRA 551; at paragraph [37]; (2) V Paul Raj Chelladurai v Jabatan Telekom (M) Bhd & Ors [2000] 3 MLJ 652 (CA) at MLJ page 656, at paragraphs G, H; [2000] 2 AMR 2435; [2000] 4 CLJ 882; [2000] 1 MLRA 726; (3) Ong See Teong & Anor v Tenaga Nasional Bhd [2008] 5 MLJ 717 (HC); [2008] 3 AMR 299; [2008] 8 CLJ 831; [2007] 4 MLRH 421; at paragraph [23]. [27] Two—to support its judicial review application, the applicant can only rely on the facts and grounds stated in its Order 53 Statement. The applicant cannot rely on the grounds stated in its affidavit(s) in support, or the grounds contained in its written submissions, which are not stated in its Order 53 Statement—(1) V Paul Raj (supra), at MLJ page 656, at paragraphs C, G, H; (2) Ong See Teong (supra), at paragraphs [20], [22]. [28] Three—to warrant a judicial review on its merits, the applicant is required to set out its grounds for review “clearly” in its Order 53 Statement, with “sufficient details and comprehensive particulars of the facts and matters” relied on. The applicant cannot merely set out general grounds for judicial review in its Order 53 Statement without the necessary particulars of the facts and grounds relied on—Sunway University College v Mahkamah Perusahaan Malaysia & Anor [2019] 3 MLJ 749 (CA); [2019] 3 AMR 68; [2019] 7 CLJ 55; [2019] MLRAU 80; at paragraphs [33], [34]. Page 13 of 22 The consequences of not pleading the ground relied on for judicial review [29] If Sime Darby’s grounds for this judicial review are not stated in its Order 53 Statement—even if the grounds are averred to in its affidavits in support of the judicial review application—the omission is fatal to its application. Sime Darby is not permitted to stray outside of, and rely on, the facts and grounds not stated in its Order 53 Statement. Sime Darby is not permitted to rely on additional grounds which are only averred to in its affidavits. Sime Darby is not permitted to enhance its case by relying on the facts and grounds beyond what is stated in its Order 53 Statement. [30] Sime Darby cannot sustain a judicial review application if it states merely general grounds without sufficient particulars to justify a review on its merits. Sime Darby cannot sustain a judicial review application on the grounds stated only in its affidavits, but not in its Order 53 Statement. [31] This Court cannot consider reviewing the decision sought to be reviewed on the facts and grounds not stated and not particularised in the applicant’s Order 53 Statement. ADDRESSING SIME DARBY’S ARGUMENTS [32] I now address Sime Darby’s pertinent arguments against the Respondent’s objections, and render my findings on them. [33] Firstly, Sime Darby argues that Order 53 Rule 3(6) of the ROC provides for two alternative triggers to compute the start of the three-month time limit, and hence two alternative cut-off dates to file this judicial Page 14 of 22 review application. The first alternative is the date when the grounds of the application first arose. The second alternative is the date when the decision sought to be reviewed was first communicated to the applicant. [34] The Respondents’ position is that in land acquisition judicial reviews, it is the second alternative that is applicable. The time limit begins on the service or receipt of the Form E. Either of those dates is the date that the decision sought to be reviewed was first communicated to the applicant: Sime Darby. That date was in October 2019. The evidence discloses that the date was either 7.10.2019 (when the Form E was posted at Sime Darby’s premises) or 18.10.2019 (when the Form E was acknowledged as received). [35] Sime Darby, however, argues that in this land acquisition judicial review, it is the first alternative that is applicable—the time limit starts when the grounds of the application first arose. [36] Sime Darby asserts that it wrote to the Chief Minister of Penang by its letter dated 22.2.2021, asking the Chief Minister to consider withdrawing the 2019 wrongful acquisition. I note that this letter was written in February 2021, which is 18 months from when the Form E was served on, or received by, Sime Darby (in October 2019). The Chief Minister did not respond. [37] Sime Darby submits that the Chief Minister’s decision not to respond (or omission to respond), is the decision that it seeks to judicially review. Page 15 of 22 [38] Sime Darby argues that the process of judicial review is available to any person who is adversely affected by the exercise of public duty or function, which can include a non-decision, such as the Chief Minister’s silence in this case. So, Sime Darby relies on the first alternative to compute the start of the time limit to file a judicial review application. Sime Darby argues that the start-date for this judicial review application is the date that the grounds of the judicial review application first arose, which was when the Chief Minister did not respond to its 22.2.2021 letter. Sime Darby filed this judicial review application on 24.4.2021, well within the mandatory three months. My findings [39] In this land acquisition judicial review, Sime Darby is challenging the Chief Minister’s decision not to respond, or omission to respond, to Sime Darby’s 22.2.2021 letter of complaint. Sime Darby submits that that was when the grounds for the judicial review application first arose—the first alternative for the computation of the time limit to file for judicial review. [40] With respect, I find this argument untenable. Firstly, from Sime Darby’s Order 53 Statement, it is clear that it is seeking to challenge the State Authority’s decision to acquire its lands. Sime Darby is not seeking to challenge the Chief Minister’s decision not to respond, or omission to respond, to Sime Darby’s 22.2.2021 letter of complaint. [41] The decision to acquire Sime Darby’s lands took the form of the Form E, which is the notice served on, and received by, Sime Darby— notifying it about the list of lands that were to be compulsorily acquired. It Page 16 of 22 is rather unpersuasive for Sime Darby to say that the decision to acquire Sime Darby’s lands was related to the Chief Minister’s decision not to respond, or omission to respond to a letter of complaint sent to the Chief Minister a year and a half after the decision to acquire the lands. [42] Secondly, case law authority instructs and binds me that in a land acquisition judicial review, the date to compute the mandatory time limit under Order 53 Rule 3(6) is the date the Form E was served or received— Tunku Yaacob Holdings (supra); at paragraph [68]. [43] I should not depart from this principle. [44] Thirdly, Sime Darby endeavours to persuade me that the principle in Tunku Yaakob (supra) only applies to the second alternative of Order 53 Rule 3(6), i.e. the date the decision was first communicated to Sime Darby (in October 2019). Sime Darby argues that for this judicial review application, this Court must apply the first alternative of Order 53 Rule 3(6), i.e. the date the grounds for the application first arose—when the Chief Minister was silent on Sime Darby’s letter of complaint (in February 2021). [45] This is not cogent. I already said that case law authority binds me with the principle that in a land acquisition judicial review, the time limit to file the application starts from the date the Form E was served. If Sime Darby can trigger the time limit by writing to the Chief Minister, to ask him to do something, or to ask him to respond to a complaint—then there Page 17 of 22 would be, in my view, a real risk of undesirable disorder and uncertainty in our statutory land acquisition scheme. [46] There can easily exist circumstances such as the one facing this judicial review application—the Form E is issued and served; the land enquiry is held; but at some later material time, the applicant writes a letter to the Chief Minister, or to the relevant authorities, like the Respondents here—and the applicant would be able to re-set the clock for the computation of the time limit for the applicant to file a judicial review application. [47] Fourthly, section 3 of the LAA provides that it is the State Authority that statutorily acquires land. It is the State Authority that has the power to acquire land for the three purposes stated in section 3. [48] Section 3(1) of the LAA is set out below for reference (with my emphasis added)— Section 3. Acquisition of land.