Sime Darby Plantation (Peninsular) Sdn. Bhd. v Pentadbir Tanah Kuala Langat (BA-15-85-04/2022)

in respect of case No. BA-15-85-04/2022 (“Case No. 85”), all that piece of land held under title No. GRN 334133, Lot No. 18141, Mukim Jugra, Daerah Kuala Langat, Negeri Selangor;

(ii) in respect of case No. BA-15-86-04/2022 (“Case No. 86”), all that piece of land held under title No. GRN 334108, Lot No. 958, Mukim Jugra, Daerah Kuala Langat, Negeri Selangor;

(iii) in respect of case No. BA-15-87-04/2022 (“Case No. 87”), all that piece of land held under title No. GRN 339741, Lot No. S/N i7Cti7ty8kCWkcf5FVfm9w BA-15-88-04/2022 2601, Mukim Jugra, Daerah Kuala Langat, Negeri Selangor; and

(iv) in respect of case No. BA-15-88-04/2022 (“Case No. 88”), all that piece of land held under title No. GRN 334132, Lot No. 18283, Mukim Jugra, Daerah Kuala Langat, Negeri Selangor. (all the lands aforementioned shall collectively be referred to as “the Scheduled Lands”) [3] Upon the conclusion of the land inquiry by the respondent, Borang G being the written award in respect of the Scheduled Lands was issued on 29.09.2021 and Borang H to that effect was issued on 04.10.2021. Dissatisfied with the amount of compensation, the applicant lodged Borang N with the respondent on 09.11.2021 and through Borang O dated 29.04.2022, the respondent referred the matter to this court. [4] Upon being made aware of the objection made by the applicant and the reference being made to this court, the proposed intervener filed this application seeking leave to intervene the land reference proceedings. [5] In this grounds of judgement, the applicant of the Land References will be referred to as the applicant while the applicant in this application for intervener will be referred to as the proposed intervener. S/N i7Cti7ty8kCWkcf5FVfm9w Decision [6] The applicant objected to the application by the proposed intervener and submitted that this application by the proposed intervener ought to be dismissed by this court. The rationale is that this court should take the same approach as in Sime Darby Plantation Bhd v. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Klang (tenaga Nasional Bhd, Intervener) [2023] MLJU 769 (“Sime Darby”) which was decided earlier by this court that by virtue of the principle of stare decicis, this court is bound by Tenaga Nasional Bhd v. Unggul Tangkas Sdn Bhd & Anor and other Appeals [2018] 4 CLJ 285 and consequently the proposed intervener’s application ought to be dismissed. [7] In this regard, the question is whether a High Court is bound by the decision of another High Court. Reference could be made to the case of Sundralingam v. Ramanathan Chettiar [1967] 1 LNS 173, where the late Ong Hock Thye FJ (as His Lordship then was) sitting in the Federal Court found as follows: “Each Court, of course, is bound by the decisions of Courts above it, but "individual Judges are not bound by each other's decisions, although judicial Courtesy naturally requires that they do not lightly dissent from the considered opinions of their brethren": see Law in the Making (6th Edn.) p. 231. I do not think I can usefully add anything to what Sir Carleton Allen said, except to point out that, within the past decade and even the last lustrum, Judges in Malaya have, on several occasions respectfully agreed to differ, as may be seen from the reports in The Malayan Law Journal.” S/N i7Cti7ty8kCWkcf5FVfm9w [8] In Sime Darby, the proposed intervener in that case, Tenaga Nasional Berhad (“TNB”) objected to the award in land reference proceedings. The facts of Sime Darby are distinguishable from the facts of these instant land reference proceedings. [9] In these instant land reference, the proposed intervener expressly stated that they accepted the award made by the respondent. In Sime Darby, there is nothing in the TNB’s Affidavits which averred that TNB accepted the award of the respondent (“the Klang Land Administrator”). TNB had the opportunity to attend the case managements in respect of land reference proceedings in Sime Darby, and also to scrutinize/examine the valuation reports filed by the respective parties in that matter. It is upon having discovered that the applicant in that case included in its rebuttal claims which are not envisaged in the Government Valuation Report and/or Government’s Rebuttal that TNB applied for leave to intervene. This court is therefore of the considered view that the principles leading to the decision in Sime Darby could not be said to be equally applicable here, and is even far from what the applicant claimed this case to be “on all fours” of the Sime Darby. [10] Based on the principle of stare decisis the applicant further invited this court to follow the decision of Unggul Tangkas (supra). [11] What are the facts of Unggul Tangkas (supra)? The facts of Unggul Tangkas (supra) can be gleaned from the following excerpts: “Background Facts [1] These are four appeals filed by the appellant, Tenaga Nasional Berhad ("TNB") before this court originating from S/N i7Cti7ty8kCWkcf5FVfm9w two land reference proceedings in the High Court which were heard together. The respondent in these four appeals is Unggul Tangkas Sdn Bhd ("Unggul Tangkas"). Unggul Tangkas was the registered owner of two pieces of land ("scheduled land") which were acquired for TNB pursuant to s. 3(1)(a) of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 ('Act'). Unggul Tangkas was awarded RM12,593,196 ('award') as full compensation for its interest in the scheduled land, which was payable by TNB.” [Emphasis added] [12] In considering the interest of the proposed intervener in Unggul Tangkas (supra), the Federal Court stated: “[41] It should be noted that where the land is to be acquired for purposes under s. 3(1)(b) and/or s. 3(1)(c) of the Act, s. 3(2) and 3(3) of the Act require an application being made to the Land Administrator in the prescribed format. … It is our considered view that if the purpose of the acquisition of the land had been under ss. 3(1)(b) and/or 3(1)(c) of the Act, then it can be said the acquiring party and the paymaster is TNB. [42] For the present case, we found that the scheduled land was acquired under s. 3(1)(a) of the Act. This is evident from Form D issued by the State Authority pursuant to s. of the Act. There was therefore no requirement for the acquiring party to comply with the provisions of ss. 3(3), 3(4), 3(5), 3(6), 3A and 3F of the Act unlike if the scheduled land were to be acquired under s. 3(1)(b) or 3(1)(c) of the Act. In this regard, we agree with the contention of S/N i7Cti7ty8kCWkcf5FVfm9w Unggul Tangkas that the acquiring party and the paymaster is in fact the State Authority. This is notwithstanding any internal arrangement between the State Authority and TNB concerning the payment of the award.” [Emphasis added] [13] The documents exhibited on behalf of the proposed intervener through the Supplemental Affidavit, marked as “AAR-4” and “AAR- 5” make it evident that there was indeed an application made by the proposed intervener to the respondent under paragraph 3(1)(b) of the Act. This is unlike Unggul Tangkas (supra) where the land was acquired pursuant to paragraph 3(1)(a) of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 (“LAA”). [14] For ease of reference, paragraphs 3(1)(a) and (b) of the LAA reads:

“Acquisition of land

The State Authority may acquire any land which is needed—

for any public purpose;

by any person or corporation for any purpose which in the opinion of the State Authority is beneficial to the economic development of Malaysia or any part thereof or to the public generally or any class of the public; or (c) for the purpose of mining or for residential, agricultural, commercial, industrial or S/N i7Cti7ty8kCWkcf5FVfm9w recreational purposes or any combination of such purposes.” [15] In the case of Sistem Lingkaran Lebuhraya Kajang Sdn Bhd v. Inch Kenneth Kajang Rubber Ltd & Anor and Other Appeals [2011] 1 CLJ 95 (“Sistem Lingkaran Lebuhraya Kajang”) the background facts are stated as follows: “[2] The proposed intervener in the three Land Reference cases is Sistem Lingkaran Lebuhraya Kajang Sdn Bhd (“SILK”). It is the concessionaire appointed by the Government of Malaysia to undertake the construction of Lebuhraya Penyuaraian Trafik Jalan Lingkaran Kajang (“SILK Highway”) pursuant to a Privatisation Agreement dated 8 October 1997 and Supplementary Privatisation Agreement dated 1 August 2001.” [Emphasis added] [16] In Sistem Lingkaran Lebuhraya Kajang (supra), the Court of Appeal dismissed the application to intervene as the concessionaire’s liability to pay the compensation arose out of a Privatisation Agreement and not under the LAA. [17] Pertaining to stare decisis, this court alluded to the Federal Court case of PJD Regency Sdn Bhd v. Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah & Anor and other appeals [2021] 2 CLJ 441 as follows: “[16] Without getting into a lengthy exposition of the concept, we find it necessary to state that “ratio decidendi” is a legal S/N i7Cti7ty8kCWkcf5FVfm9w term of very elementary status. Ratio decidendi is different from the decision of the court in that it comprises the legal reasoning which forms the basis of the decision and it is this legal reasoning which ultimately finds its place in the doctrine of stare decisis and binding precedent.” [Emphasis added] [18] In event there are two conflicting decisions of the Federal Court or the Court of Appeal, as the case may be, the Federal Court in Dalip Bhagwan Singh v Public Prosecutor [1997] 4 CLJ 645 had this to say: “The doctrine of stare decisis or the rule of judicial precedent dictates that a court other than the highest court is obliged generally to follow the decisions of the courts at a higher or the same level in the court structure subject to certain exceptions affecting especially the Court of Appeal. … In this connection, it is interesting to refer to Cassell & Co. v. Broome [1972] AC 1027, 1054. It was held that courts in the lower tiers below the Court of Appeal could not rely on the per incuriam rule applied by Court of Appeal for itself, but could choose between two conflicting decisions. We may add that they may so choose, whatever the dates of the conflicting decisions, as such dates do not matter to the Court of Appeal itself. … S/N i7Cti7ty8kCWkcf5FVfm9w In this connection, the question of a “full court” or a panel of Federal Court comprising more than 3 members as compared with the ordinarily constituted quorum of 3 members of the same court, arises for consideration. In view of the reasons about departing from its previous decisions advanced above, the effect or weight of a decision of a “full court” and that of an ordinary quorum is the same by necessary implication. A full court or a panel larger than the ordinary quorum is usually indicated such as when an unusually difficult or controversial question of law is involved, or a question arises as to whether a previous decision of the Federal Court ought to be overruled. If the House of Lords, and by analogy, the Federal Court, departs from its previous decision when it is right to do so in the circumstances set out above, then also by necessary implication, its decision represents the present state of the law. When two decisions of the Federal Court conflict, on a point of law, the later decision therefore, for the same reasons, prevails over the earlier decision.” [Emphasis added] [19] From the above passages, this court is of the view that in the event there are two conflicting decisions in the Court of Appeal, the High Court is at liberty to choose irrespective of the date of the decision. This is not so in the context of the Federal Court. In the case of the Federal Court, the latest decision prevails over the earlier decision. [20] The question now arises is whether Spicon Products Sdn Bhd v. Tenaga Nasional Bhd & Anor [2022] 4 CLJ 195 is applicable, or S/N i7Cti7ty8kCWkcf5FVfm9w binding upon this court when deliberating on the intervening application by the proposed intervener. [21] The applicant submitted that Spicon (supra) is limited to the situation where there is an application to intervene by a landowner who accepts the award by the Land Administrator but which award was objected by the paymaster. [22] In Spicon (supra) the Federal Court stated as follows: “[10] The application was opposed with TNB citing abuse of the process prescribed under Act 486; that the filing of Form N was a “compulsory statutory Form N” and the only mode available under Act 486 for any interested person to be a party in the land reference; that the appellant’s nonfiling of Form N was fatal and precluded the appellant from taking part in the land reference proceedings. [11] TNB further took the position that any interest of the appellant is “sufficiently safeguarded by the respondent”; … … [14] The Court of Appeal agreed with TNB. The Court of Appeal found: …

(ii) (Order 15 r. 6(2)(b) of the Rules of Court 2012 “is not applicable in land reference proceedings”; … Summary of Submissions S/N i7Cti7ty8kCWkcf5FVfm9w … [19] In short, the Federal Court’s remarks in Unggul Tangkas on the resort to O. 15 of the Rules of Court 2012 as being an abuse of process of court was not of general application but is confined to the context where the application to intervene is made by a paymaster. In Unggul Tangkas, the application to intervene was by TNB, a party who had no legal interest in the land reference proceedings, was not claiming any compensation … … [30] TNB, however, does not stop there. Learned counsel for TNB made this interesting alternative argument. He invites this court to revisit the decision in Unggul Tangkas which is said to be irreconcilable with the various provisions of Act 486 and the established test for intervention. …” [Emphasis added] [23] In the later part of the grounds of Spicon (supra), the Federal Court went on to examine Unggul Tangkas (supra), and to the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Sistem Lingkaran Lebuhraya Kajang, Lembaga Lebuhraya Malaysia v. Semenyih Jaya Sdn Bhd (“Semenyih Jaya”) and Sistem Penyuraian Trafik KL Barat Sdn Bhd v. Kenny Heights Development Sdn Bhd & Anor (“Sistem Penyuraian”). The Federal Court in Spicon (supra) stated as follows: “[103] KN Segara JCA, writing on behalf of the Court of Appeal explained why the rules of procedure under the then Rules of the High Court 1980 could not be invoked, and S/N i7Cti7ty8kCWkcf5FVfm9w it is that explanation on the overall scheme and context of Act 486 which was picked up and endorsed by the Federal Court in Unggul Tangkas and which we cited earlier. [104] In the explanation of the overall scheme and operation of Act 486, we find that the observations were too general and with respect, His Lordship had not properly and comprehensively addressed quite a few critical and relevant aspects as we have done above. Amongst them is the matter of persons interested, that while a person may qualify as a person interested under s. 2 of the Act 486, such person may nevertheless not qualify to file an objection because of the conditions precedent in s. 37 of the Act 486. Such a person remains a person interested, except that this person cannot file a written objection to the award. [105] His Lordship has further not addressed or taken into account the function and role of the court in the conduct of reference proceedings, that it is the obligation of the High Court to notify all persons interested in the reference proceedings. … The presence or interests of the appellant as landowner was also amply indicated in Form O. This critical aspect was not considered in Inch Kenneth Kajang and consequently, not by the Federal Court in Unggul Tangkas. … [107] First, the decision in Lembaga Lebuhraya Malaysia v. Cahaya Baru Development Bhd is actually irrelevant for the purposes of this appeal as it concerned the question of whether paymasters were entitled as ‘persons interested’ S/N i7Cti7ty8kCWkcf5FVfm9w to lodge Form N. The Court of Appeal answered in the affirmative and this decision was affirmed by the Federal Court. The decision, however, does not concern the question of application of the rules of procedure in relation to a landowner who had accepted an award without any objection, which is the issue in this appeal. [108] Other than what we have set out above, no other reasons were proffered by the Court of Appeal in Inch Kenneth Kajang as to why it was departing from its own earlier decision of Sistem Penyuraian Trafik KL Barat Sdn Bhd v. Kenny Heights Development Sdn Bhd & Anor. That decision, though by majority, was nevertheless binding on the Court of Appeal then … [109] As for the Court of Appeal decision in Sistem Penyuraian Trafik KL Barat Sdn Bhd v. Kenny Heights Development Sdn Bhd & Anor, we find that decision relevant as the ratio decidendi concerned the application or otherwise of the Rules of the High Court 1980, whether a person interested may invoke these rules to intervene in the reference proceedings. We agree with the majority in that SPRINT, the concessionaire who had to pay compensation to the landowner, Kenny Heights, for the acquisition of its land for the construction of a highway, which we now know as the SPRINT Highway, was entitled to intervene in the reference proceedings initiated by Kenny Heights, invoking O. 15 r. 6 of the Rules of the High Court 1980. … … [111] For the same reasons that we have already discussed, the interests of such a person interested (that is, the S/N i7Cti7ty8kCWkcf5FVfm9w paymaster), if not already notified by the court under s. of the Act 486 to attend, surely will be affected one way or another in the reference proceedings in which case, such a person is indeed entitled to attend and participate through the mechanics of the Rules of Court

If a paymaster is entitled to so attend, more so a landowner who has legal and pecuniary interests under art. 13 of the Federal Constitution. … [116] It is unfortunate that the Federal Court decision of Perbadanan Kemajuan Pertanian Selangor v. JW Properties Sdn Bhd (supra) on how interests have since come to be construed by the Court was not cited to the Federal Court in Unggul Tangkas. Had these material considerations been examined, we are confident that the outcome would have been different. … [117] … To our mind, what is actually of greater importance is the issue of the rights of persons interested to be heard in that whole acquisition process, whether at the enquiry or at the reference proceedings before the High Court. There should be no injustice caused to any person interested in the name of speedy disposal … [118] … Since reference proceedings are original proceedings with parties cast in the respective roles, as explained in Collector of Land Revenue v. Alagappa Chettiar, and as envisaged under the Third Schedule, the Land Administrator does not really defend the award for anyone. S/N i7Cti7ty8kCWkcf5FVfm9w The Land Administrator merely explains its award and provides further justification if he chooses.” [Emphasis added] [24] In light of the foregoing, after due consideration of the findings of the Federal Court in Spicon (supra), this court is of the considered view that the proposed intervener being the paymaster is the person interested, who accepted the award by the Land Administrator and therefore is not entitled to file Borang N. Hence, this court is of the view that the proposed intervener is entitled to intervene in this land reference. Conclusion [25] For the aforementioned reasons, this court is satisfied that this application by the proposed intervener should be allowed. There is no order as to costs Date: 14 March 2024 (SHAHNAZ BINTI SULAIMAN) Judge High Court of Malaya, Shah Alam S/N i7Cti7ty8kCWkcf5FVfm9w Counsel: For the Appellant Chua Por Ron, Gan Ee Hock Tetuan Chua & Partners Advocates & Solicitors 46-01, Jalan Molek 1/28, Taman Molek, 81100 Johor Bahru, Johor. porronchua@ymail.com +6 07 351 0510 For the Respondent: Etty Eliany binti Tesno, Amelia binti Masran Kamar Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan, Tingkat 4, Podium Utara, Bangunan Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah 40512 Shah Alam, Selangor. +6 03 5544 7183 For the Proposed Intervener: Muhammad Faisal Moideen, Razeena Rahumathullah Tetuan Moideen & Max Advocates & Solicitors Suite B-05-12, Gateway Kiaramas, No. 1, Jalan Desa Kiara, Mont’ Kiara, 50480 Kuala Lumpur. general@moideenmax.com +6 03 6205 9288 S/N i7Cti7ty8kCWkcf5FVfm9w