Singer(Malaysia) Sdn.Bhd v LIM Kean Boon (JA-29PB-19-01/2023)

Menurut perenggan 8 Laporan Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai Laporan KPI) Penghutang Penghakiman (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai JD) telah bekerja sebagai agen kepada majikan untuk menjual barangan Singer dan akibat kegagalan pembeli membuat pembayaran hutang, tindakan diambil terhadap JD.

Pada 14.5.13, satu Penghakiman Ingkar telah diperolehi terhadap JD di Mahkamah Tinggi Alor Setar atas permohonan Pemiutang Penghakiman (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai JC). Pada 14.5.13, JC telah memfailkan tindakan Kebankrapan di Mahkamah Tinggi Alor Setar.

Pada 3.9.14, Perintah Penerimaan dan Perintah Penghukuman telah diperintahkan terhadap JD di Mahkamah Tinggi Alor Setar di mana JD tidak hadir semasa perbicaraan tersebut.

Seterusnya, JD telah memfailkan Penyata Hal Ehwal JD pada 11.1.15. Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai KPI) telah memperakui dua

bukti hutang iaitu hutang JC berjumlah RM215,878.39 dan hutang Malayan Banking Berhad berjumlah RM15,782.10.

Seterusnya, JD memfailkan permohonan untuk pelepasan menurut seksyen 33 Akta Insolvensi 1967 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai Akta Tersebut) pada 12.1.23. KPI mengemukakan Laporan KPI bertarikh 7.6.23. Menurut Laporan KPI tersebut, baki kredit estet terkini berjumlah RM30,567.87 yang memungkinkan pengisytiharan dividen sebanyak 10.95% secara pari passu kepada kesemua pemiutang.

JC membantah permohonan untuk pelepasan oleh JD tersebut dan memfailkan Afidavit Jawapan bertarikh 2.2.23 untuk membantah permohonan JD. Analisis dan keputusan Mahkamah

Seksyen 33(1) Akta Insolvensi 1967 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai Akta Tersebut) memperuntukkan bahawa:- “(1) A bankrupt may at any time after being adjudged bankrupt apply to the court for an order of discharge, and the court shall appoint a day for hearing the application…”

Dalam hujahan bertulis JC, JC berhujah bahawa jumlah wang yang telah dibayar JD kepada JC adalah cuma RM18,899.63 setakat 14.2.19 dan terdapat jumlah baki tuntutan berjumlah RM149,146.39 yang masih belum dijelaskan oleh JD. Maka, JC berhujah bahawa JC akan diprejudis sekiranya permohonan ini dibenarkan dan akan mewujudkan precedent yang tidak baik.

Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada Laporan KPI yang merumuskan bahawa permohonan JD tidak wajar dibenarkan kerana dividen pertama yang boleh dibayar kepada pemiutang adalah hanya 10.95% dan bankrap masih boleh membuat pembayaran demi kepentingan pemiutang.

Mahkamah dalam hal ini bersetuju dengan hujahan JD bahawa jumlah keberhutangan yang masih belum ditunaikan JD tidak boleh menjadi faktor utama dalam menentukan permohonan JD menurut seksyen 33 Akta Tersebut dan Mahkamah tidak seharusnya memberi penekanan yang tinggi terhadap faktor tersebut. Perkara ini ada dijelaskan dalam kes Re Mohana Sundari M Subramaniam Ex P United Prime Corporation Bhd [2004] 5 MLJ 227; [2004] 1 CLJ 624; [2003] 3 MLRH 719; [2004] 2 AMR 141 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “I am also of the view that the amount of the debt still owing to the creditor is not a factor which the court should place too much reliance on when considering an application to be discharged from bankruptcy… Another factor which is altogether not to be taken into account is the fact of whether or not the bankrupt is in a position to afford and continue paying the monthly installments. Nowhere is it stated in the provisions of the Act or in the case law analysis cited hereinabove that such a factor is to be taken into account and the court should be slow in accepting such an argument.”

Prinsip kes Mahkamah Tinggi tersebut telah disahkan Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Dato’ Lim Huah Leong v Engtex Marketing Sdn Bhd [2016] 5 MLRA 457 seperti berikut:- “[42] The creditors also took issue with the appellant's substantial amount of debt which remained unpaid. With respect, we find that this issue is irrelevant to the present discharge application. It is trite that an application for a discharge is not to be rejected on the grounds that all of the creditor's debt have yet to be settled. The very promulgation of a discharge procedure is a statutory expression that a bankrupt may be released even before satisfying all the debts (see The Law and Practice of Bankruptcy in Malaysia by Khoo Kay Ping; Re: Ang Ah Kang [1993] 4 MLRH 488; [1994] 2 CLJ 738). The wisdom of the Parliament in enacting s 33 and in not stating a fix limit upon which discharge may be accorded echoes well with the rational for bankruptcy law which is not so much that of punishing but rather of providing an orderly administration of the bankrupt's estate so that the creditors may be paid (see Re: Chong Kim Far; Ex-Parte Danaharta Urus Sdn Bhd [2013] 6 MLRH 493; [2013] 10 MLJ 500). Applying this to the present case, as far as the amount of debt is concerned, it is undoubtedly a very large sum. But then again one must be mindful of the fact that there is no limit set under the Act which discharge is barred. The huge amount of debt reflects the fact that a big business, when it fails, tends to fall in a big way. The fact that a judgment debtor is in a position to afford and continue paying the monthly instalments is also of no consequence as it is not provided for in the Act, nor has been decided judicially that it is a factor to be considered (see Ng Kok Wah v. UMW Industries (1985) Sdn Bhd [1995] 1 MLRH 616; [1995] 2 CLJ 284.”

Seterusnya, undang-undang adalah mantap bahawa bagi maksud “telah melakukan kesalahan” (has committed any offence) dalam seksyen 33(4) Akta Tersebut, kedua-dua elemen pertuduhan di Mahkamah dan sabitan terhadap JD perlu dipenuhi. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Rayuan Dato’ Lim Huah Leong (supra) di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[27] Further, one can be said to be guilty of committing an offence under the Act only if the bankrupt is charged in court by the DGI for that offence. The meaning of the words "committed any offence" in s 33(4) of the Act has been duly considered in the case of Development & Commercial Bank Bhd & Ors v. Loke Theen Fatt [2009] 4 MLRH 118; [2010] 5 CLJ 583. David Wong Dak Wah J (as he then was) had this to say: "The word committed in s 33(4) of the Act meant that the bankrupt must have been charged in court by the DGI for that offence. Since the respondent had not committed any offence under the Act as specified under s 33(4) of the Act, it followed that the application for the respondent's discharge must be dealt with pursuant to s 33(3) of the Act." In the case of In Re: Zanuldin Ahmad; Ex-Parte: Wong Siay Patt & Anor [2007] 5 MLRH 183, it was held that the twin elements of a charge and a conviction must be had before a bankrupt is said to have committed an offence under the Act or under the Penal Code. Similar stance was reiterated in the case of In Re Joshua Tan Pin Pin; Ex P William Jacks & Co (M) Sdn Bhd [2007] 1 MLRH 622; [2007] 4 MLJ 534; [2007] 3 CLJ 153 where it was held that for so long as a bankrupt has not been charged in court for any of the offences referred to in s 33(4) of the Act and that no contempt proceedings have been taken against the bankrupt, to that extent the bankrupt is not required to pay at least 50% of the dividend as required under s 33(4) of the Act. Reverting to the appeal at hand, to reiterate our views aforesaid, based on the DGI's report, it is clear that there is no suggestion that the appellant had committed any of the offences referred to in s 33(4) of the Act. The breach, if any, was pertaining to non-adherence to the timeline in filing the statement of affairs pursuant to s 16 of the Act…Be that as it may, as we have alluded to earlier, the particular breach committed by the appellant was not serious enough for the DGI to cite him for contempt of court. As the appellant had not been cited for contempt of court by the DGI, he had not committed any offence, as specified in s 33(4) of the Act. Thus, our inevitable conclusion on this issue is that the appellant's discharge application falls squarely within the ambit of s 33(3) of the Act.”

Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Rayuan Quek Siew Eng v Malayan Banking Berhad [2023] 1 MLJ 99; [2023] 1 CLJ 884; [2023] 2 MLRA 209; [2023] 1 AMR 413 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[27] Having perused the Act and the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the considered opinion that the learned judge's presumption that the appellant/judgment debtor had committed an offence is also erroneous as the appellant/judgment debtor was not never charged in court for the offence of not disclosing his co-ownership of the said land and convictedof the same. [28] We are inclined to hold that the phrase "that the bankrupt has committed any offence under this Act or under any written law repealed by this Act or under ss. 421, 422, 423 or 424 of the Penal Code (Act 574) " as contained in s. 33(4) of the Act meant that the bankrupt must have been charged in court of law by the DGI for that offence and was convicted accordingly… [33] Thus, in the light of the above, we are of the considered view that the learned judge's finding that the appellant/judgment debtor had committed an offence under s. 16 of the Act is erroneous. The learned judge cannot summarily and arbitrarily convict the appellant/judgment debtor, without the right to be heard. The appellant/judgment debtor may have an "reasonable excuse" or defence and he should be allowed to advance sucha defence. [35] In the present case, the appellant/judgment debtor was never tried or charged for any bankruptcy offence and this was acknowledged by the DGI in para. 39 of the DGI's statutory report which states that the appellant did not commit any offence under ss. 421, 422, 423 and 424 of the Penal Code… [39] Since the appellant/judgment debtor has not committed any bankruptcy offence, the learned judge's decision to consider the appellant/judgment debtor's application under s. 33(4) of the Act for an order of discharge, is also without basis and erroneous. Thus, the appellant/judgment debtor's application for discharge should fall under s. 33(3) of the Act.”

Mahkamah dalam kes ini merujuk kepada perenggan 22 Laporan KPI yang mengesahkan bahawa JD tidak melakukan sebarang kesalahan di bawah seksyen 421, 422, 423 dan 424 Kanun Keseksaan. Maka, permohonan JD perlu dipertimbangkan Mahkamah menurut seksyen 33(3) Akta Tersebut dan sebarang kriteria pelepasan menurut seksyen 33(4) Akta Tersebut termasuk keperluan untuk JD memenuhi pembayaran sekurang-kurangnya 50% dari jumlah keberhutangan adalah tidak terpakai dalam kes ini.

Maka, Mahkamah perlu menilai fakta kes secara menyeluruh dan membuat kesimpulan sama ada wajar untuk melepaskan JD dari kebankrapan menurut seksyen 33(3) Akta Tersebut. Dalam menjelaskan perkara ini, Mahkamah dalam kes Development & Commercial Bank Bhd & Ors v Loke Theen Fatt [2010] 5 CLJ 583; [2009] 4 MLRH 118; [2011] 1 BLR 696 memutuskan bahawa:- “[6] This section provides the court some guidelines as to how to exercise its discretion whether or not to grant an order of discharge. These guidelines require the court to look at the totality of the evidence or circumstance of the bankrupt and then ask itself the question whether it is fair or just to grant a discharge…”

Manakala, dalam kes Dato’ Lim Huah Leong (supra) pula, Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa:- “Since the application for discharge by the appellant falls squarely within s 33(3) of the Act under which when a bankrupt applies to court for a discharge form bankruptcy, the court should take into account and consider the following facts: The report of the DGI as to the bankrupt's conduct and affairs including the bankrupts conduct at the time of the bankruptcy proceedings; and The case of the bankrupt's insolvency, the bankrupt's conduct relevant to his bankruptcy, the conduct of the bankrupt subsequent to his insolvency, interest of the public at large and commercial morality. The above should have been the only guiding considerations to the High Court Judge when hearing an application under s 33(3) of the Act which with respect, we find that the learned High Court Judge failed to do but instead erroneously imported the additional requirements under s 33(4) of the Act…”

Dalam hujahan JC, JC berhujah bahawa Laporan KPI wajib dipertimbangkan oleh Mahkamah sebelum membuat sebarang keputusan dalam mempertimbangkan permohonan JD untuk pelepasan. JC berhujah bahawa Laporan KPI adalah keterangan prima facie untuk menunjukkan kelakuan seorang JD dan keperluan untuk mengambil kira laporan tersebut adalah mandatori kecuali terdapat apa-apa kesilapan atau ketinggalan dalam laporan tersebut.

Mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan JC bahawa Laporan KPI memainkan peranan yang penting dalam memutuskan sesuatu permohonan di bawah seksyen 33 Akta Tersebut. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Rayuan Lim Hun Swee v Malaysia British Assurance Bhd & Ors and Other Appeals [2011] 2 MLJ 218; [2010] 8 CLJ 680; [2010] 2 MLRA 392; [2011] 1 AMCR 157 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[12] In dealing with the application for discharge the court shall take into consideration a report of the DGI as to the bankrupt's conduct and affair, including a report as to the bankrupt's conduct during the proceedings under his bankruptcy. This is a mandatory requirement. Thus, in an application of this nature, a report of the DGI is very vital, in fact the most important consideration… [42] In an application for a discharge, each case has to depend upon its own individual circumstances (see: Re Matheson [1862] 31 LJ Bcy 23). The DGI's report is very essential to assist the court in its consideration and determination. Without a proper and complete report on all the relevant issues the court will not be able to exercise its judicial discretion. Thus, in preparing the report, the DGI must appreciate the importance of his investigations and report, failing which the report would be unreliable and the application by the bankrupt for a discharge would ultimately be refused…”

Walaupun kandungan dalam Laporan KPI adalah keterangan prima facie menurut peruntukan seksyen 33(8) Akta Tersebut, namun sekiranya Mahkamah mendapati laporan yang disediakan adalah tidak lengkap dan mengelirukan, maka Mahkamah tidak berkewajipan menerima laporan tersebut. Dalam menjelaskan perkara ini, Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Lim Hun Swee (supra) memutuskan bahawa:- “[30] The court is aware that on the hearing of an application for an order of discharge, the court shall take into consideration a report by the DGI. This is a mandatory requirement. However, it does not mean that the court is bound to accept the statements therein contained. No doubt sub-s. (8) of s. 33 provides that for the purpose of an application for a discharge the DGI's report shall be prima facie evidence of the statements contained therein; but the court is duty bound to scrutinise the truth and reliability of the statements and in appropriate case, when the court is satisfied that the report is incomplete and misleading, the court is not bound to accept the statements contained in the report…”

Menjelaskan perkara yang sama, Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Public Bank Bhd v Choong Yew Wah [2014] 4 MLJ 559; [2014] 5 CLJ 695; [2014] 6 MLRA 706; [2014] AMEJ 0602 memutuskan bahawa:- “[14] In an application of this nature, the DGI's report plays an important part in that the court relies heavily on it to exercise its discretion. That said the court is also duty-bound to examine the DGI's report and determine whether the recommendation made is one made based on a thorough investigation of the affairs of the bankrupt and the interests of the creditors. In short, the Court's role cannot be a rubber stamp of the DGI's recommendation. If the court finds that DGI's report to be lacking in details or reasonable justifications, the court is duty-bound to ignore it and cannot allow the bankrupt to take advantage of such deficiencies…

Berdasarkan garis panduan dalam kes-kes yang dinyatakan di atas, Mahkamah akan menilai Laporan KPI dan afidavit JD dalam mempertimbangkan permohonan JD. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah dapati Laporan KPI langsung tidak menyentuh sama ada JD masih bekerja pada masa kini dan memperolehi sebarang pendapatan hasil pekerjaan tersebut. Laporan tersebut juga tidak menjelaskan sama ada JD mempunyai apa-apa tanggungan. Kesemua faktor-faktor pendapatan JD, tanggungan JD dan aset yang dimiliki JD adalah faktor-faktor penting bagi Mahkamah menilai kemampuan sebenar JD untuk membayar hutang-hutang yang perlu diselesaikan JD. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Re Kelvin Lee See Fooi, Ex P BSN Commercial Bank Malaysia Bhd [2006] 3 MLJ 683; [2006] 6 CLJ 65; [2005] 4 MLRH 201 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[7] If the court minded to grant the application for discharge the court must surely know the financial situation of the JD in order to determine how the balance of the debt could be settled. Furthermore, the OA in his report failed to disclose the monthly salary of the JD and whether he has any other means of income besides what he had disclosed. The monthly expenses of the JD was also not indicated in the report. Furthermore, what other assets owned by and in possession of the JD, either in his name or in his nominee/s, failed to find its place in the report. I would thus hold that the OA has failed to produce a competent report receivable by this court under s 31(1) of the Act. I would thus hold that the OA's report is not sufficient to support the JD's application for discharge, as it fell far short of disclosing the actual financial situation of the JD and the report must be disregarded.”

Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes Re Tan Sie Kiong v Ex-P Delta Finance Company Bhd [2014] 8 CLJ 678; [2013] MLRHU 172 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[14] In addition, the judgment creditor submits that the judgment debtor should not have been discharged because the DGI had not carried out a proper and complete report. The DGI's report failed to disclose whether the judgment debtor has other means of income besides the monthly salary. The monthly expenses of the judgment debtor were also not indicated in the report. Furthermore, a statement of whatever assets owned by and in the possession of the judgment debtor either in his name or nominee's name, failed to find its place in the report. The judgment creditor thus submits that the DGI's report is insufficient to support the judgment debtor's application for discharge as it fell short of disclosing the actual financial situation of the judgment debtor. [15] With respect, I also agree with the contention of the judgment creditor on this issue…”

Mahkamah dapati keperluan untuk maklumat-maklumat tersebut didedahkan dalam Laporan KPI menjadi lebih mustahak kerana JD dalam afidavit sokongannya mendeposkan bahawa JD tidak bekerja dan tidak mempunyai pendapatan. JD juga mendeposkan bahawa perbelanjaan untuk menyara JD ditanggung sepenuhnya oleh anak-anak JD. Namun, perenggan 18 Laporan KPI menunjukkan bahawa JD telah diberi kemudahan ke Singapura di bawah seksyen 38(1)(c) Akta Tersebut sebanyak 4 kali dari tempoh 2017 hingga 2023 dan tujuan lawatan-lawatan tersebut adalah untuk bekerja. Kelulusan yang terbaru adalah pada 15.3.2022 bagi tempoh di antara 28.3.2022 hingga 27.3.2023. Malah, Laporan KPI membuat saranan untuk permohonan JD ditolak kerana “bankrap masih boleh membuat bayaran demi kepentingan pemiutang”. Pernyataan KPI menimbulkan keraguan sama ada JD masih bekerja dan memperolehi pendapatan, yang jelas bercanggah dengan deposisi JD.

Selain itu, Mahkamah juga dapati JD mendeposkan bahawa JD mempunyai penyakit darah tinggi dan masih menerima rawatan daripada Hospital Kerajaan. Pernyataan JD ini telah dicabar JC dalam perenggan 7 Afidavit Jawapan JC. Namun, JD telah gagal membalas afidavit tersebut dan gagal mengemukakan sebarang keterangan dokumentari bagi membuktikan pernyataan JD tersebut bagi pertimbangan Mahkamah. Berdasarkan undang-undang mantap, memandangkan pernyataan keadaan kesihatan JD telah dicabar JC, maka JD yang mempunyai beban membuktikan fakta tersebut di atas imbangan kebarangkalian. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada seksyen 103 Akta Keterangan 1950 yang memperuntukkan bahawa:- “The burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person.”

Dalam mentaksirkan peruntukan tersebut, Mahkamah dalam kes Kumar Subramaniam @ Balasubramaniam v Punitha Thiagarajan [2023] MLJU 697; [2023] 1 LNS 628; [2023] MLRHU 538; [2023] AMEJ 0648 memutuskan bahawa:- “[31] At this juncture, it was important to remind parties that since it was the Respondent who made the claim, it was she who had to first prove the existence of the jewellery, and that such jewellery belonged to her. This is trite law as prescribed by section 103 of the Evidence Act 1950, which reads:… Not only does the Respondent have the legal burden to prove, she had to prove it on a balance of probabilities, which is the civil standard of proof. The Respondent insisted that the jewellery was hers but, except for some ambiguous photographs and pawn receipts which she could not account for, she was unable to convince this Court of ownership of such jewellery.”

Maka, dalam hal ini, pernyataan JD kekal tidak terbukti di hadapan Mahkamah. Seterusnya, Mahkamah merujuk kepada perenggan 6 Laporan KPI yang menyatakan bahawa KPI telah mengambil tindakan mengeluarkan surat awalan bertarikh 16.11.2014 kepada semua jabatan dan agensi kerajaan dan telah membuat pengiklanan untuk mengesan bankrap dan harta yang mempunyai kaitan dengan bankrap. Namun, tiada sebarang keterangan lanjut dalam laporan tersebut berkenaan sebarang maklum balas yang diterima oleh KPI berkenaan surat tersebut, terutama berkenaan aset-aset dalam milikan JD atau ada kaitan dengan JD. Mahkamah dapati pernyataan “Aset: Tiada” dalam perenggan 12 Laporan KPI adalah pernyataan yang amat ringkas dan samar-samar (vague) dan tidak memberi gambaran penuh kepada Mahkamah. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Lim Tee Keong v HLG Securities Sdn Bhd [2016] 3 MLJ 201; [2016] 4 CLJ 840; [2017] 3 MLRA 127; [2016] AMEJ 0894 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa:- “[16] We agree with learned counsel for the supporting creditor AmBank (M) Bhd that the DGI could have and in fact should have undertaken a more thorough investigation into the assets of the bankrupt; especially assets which the bankrupt owned in his name say within five years before the date of RO was pronounced. This would enable the DGI to make more realistic assessment of the bankrupt's financial situation… In this respect we agree with learned counsel when he submitted that the DGI report 'should have gone further by highlighting all properties which had been previously owned by the bankrupt and the current owners of the property now (if any). The report should also highlight whether the current owners are in a close relationship with the bankrupt and whether there are evidences showing that the current owners are holding the properties as nominees for the bankrupt?' The DGI had failed to address all these issues in the report.”

Seterusnya, Mahkamah merujuk kepada perenggan 13 Laporan KPI yang menyatakan bahawa “Mesyuarat Pertama Pemiutang tidak direkodkan dan dengan demikian, Mesyuarat Pertama Pemiutang dalam tindakan”. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada seksyen 15(2) Akta Tersebut yang perlu dibaca bersama Jadual A kepada Akta Tersebut yang memperuntukkan prosedur perjalanan Mesyuarat Pemiutang.

Dalam hal ini, Laporan KPI adalah senyap berkenaan alasan kelewatan memanggil Mesyuarat Pemiutang Pertama dan sama ada sebarang tindakan susulan diambil untuk mendapatkan perintah lanjutan masa dari Mahkamah. Penjelasan KPI adalah penting untuk Mahkamah menilai sama ada kes kebankrapan JD telah ditadbir dengan sewajarnya memandangkan 9 tahun telah berlalu dari tarikh perintah Penerimaan dan Perintah Penghukuman diperintahkan terhadap JD namun isu Mesyuarat Pemiutang Pertama yang perlu dilaksanakan dalam tempoh tiga bulan dari Perintah Penerimaan dan Perintah Penghukuman masih belum dilaksanakan.

Seterusnya, Mahkamah juga dapati Laporan KPI juga adalah senyap berkenaan kelewatan JD dalam memfailkan penyata hal ehwalnya. Walaupun KPI membutirkan bahawa JD telah memfailkan penyata hal ehwalnya pada 11.1.2015, KPI gagal mendedahkan kelewatan JD dalam memfailkan penyata tersebut yang perlu difailkan dalam tempoh 21 hari dari tarikh perintah (sek.16(2)(b) Akta Tersebut). Laporan KPI juga senyap sama ada sebarang permohonan untuk lanjutan masa ada difailkan JD untuk kelulusan KPI. Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa fakta-fakta ini adalah penting untuk penilaian Mahkamah berkenaan kelakuan JD setelah perintah kebankrapan direkodkan terhadap JD, yang merupakan faktor penting sebagaimana dinyatakan dalam kes Dato’ Lim Huah Leong (supra).

Berdasarkan perbincangan-perbincangan di atas, Mahkamah mendapati Laporan KPI langsung tidak memuaskan dan tidak dapat membantu Mahkamah dalam membuat keputusan berkenaan permohonan JD. Sebagaimana undang-undang mantap, JD tidak seharusnya dibenarkan untuk mengambil kesempatan atas kekurangan laporan tersebut. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Lim Hun Swee (supra) memutuskan bahawa:- “[16] The bankrupt in an application for a discharge cannot be allowed to obtain undue advantage of the weaknesses in the DG1's incomplete report. To borrow the words of Ian Chin J in the case of Re Lau Kah Lay & Tang Kuong Tiew; ex p Cold Storage (Malaysia) Bhd [2001] 3 CLJ 960, "the OA carries the onerous task of ensuring that a bankrupt has no hidden assets stashed away, whether in his name or in the name of his wife or children, as otherwise people will be imbued with the message that money borrowed could be stashed away and need not be repaid and such horde can be enjoyed even when one is a bankrupt. If the office of the OA does not show itself equal to the task of preventing such rip-off of the creditor then cases of borrowers not repaying and not minding to be made bankrupt would be the rule rather than the exception. Then, business morality would decline" .

Malah, Mahkamah dalam kes tersebut memutuskan bahawa apabila Laporan KPI adalah tidak lengkap, Mahkamah seharusnya menolak permohonan JD untuk pelepasan. Dalam menjelaskan perkara tersebut, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[46] Based on the above considerations, this court finds that it is unsafe to adopt and rely on the reports prepared by the DGI especially when there seems to be no proper and complete investigation as to the assets, income and expenses of the bankrupt. The reports contain contradictions, brief in nature and thus unreliable. To allow an order for a discharge of the bankrupt in the present circumstances would make a mockery of the provisions of the bankruptcy law available to safeguard the interest of creditors. It will not only lead to a decline in business morality but will also result in great injustice to legitimate creditors.”

Mahkamah dalam hal ini tidak terlepas pandang dengan hujahan JD yang memohon Mahkamah mempertimbangkan usia JD yang mencecah 64 tahun dan tempoh JD berada dalam kebankrapan selama lebih kurang 9 tahun. Mahkamah tidak menafikan bahawa faktor-faktor tersebut adalah faktor relevan dalam pertimbangan permohonan pelepasan oleh JD. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Re Rajangam Marimuthu Mudalliar; Ex P Parkash Singh Wasawa Singh [2010] 3 CLJ 858; [2009] 2 MLRH 200 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “By now the bankrupt would have been about 65 years old. Admittedly, at that age he is more a liability than an asset now…Equally, by now his bankruptcy would have lasted for more than 22 years. In my view on the uncontroverted facts, it would serve no purpose whatsoever to prolong his bankruptcy any further. He could no longer contribute effectively to the estate even if the KP could now catch up with him based on the information given by the applicant. The Act was enacted not with the object of punishing him for his failure to comply with the terms of the judgment sum nor was Jabatan Insolvensi created to act as the applicant's debt collector. In all the circumstances of the case I am in full agreement with the views expressed by his Lordship in Re Ang Ah Kang [1994] 2 CLJ 738 at p. 740: Pada pendapat saya adalah bertentangan dengan kepentingan awam sekiranya seseorang itu terus kekal sebagai seorang bankrap sedangkan keadaan itu tidak memberi guna kepada sesiapa.”

Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes Re Mohana Sundari (supra) di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “The judgment debtor has been a bankrupt for almost 14 years and that 14 years is a long period of penance by any measure. The judgment debtor is now currently 45 years of age and humbly desires to spend the remainder of her mortal life free from the shackles and stigma of bankruptcy that has plagued her for so many years…”

Namun, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa faktor-faktor tersebut tidak seharusnya dilihat secara isolasi dan perlu diimbangi dengan faktor-faktor lain sebagaimana dibincangkan di atas. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Dato’ Lim Huah Leong v Engtex Marketing Sdn Bhd [2015] 9 MLJ 639; [2014] 1 LNS 1401; [2014] MLRHU 948 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “It is only in deserving cases that a Bankrupt may be discharged from his bankruptcy, but not at the expense of commercial morality and public perception on bankruptcy law in the country. In allowing a discharge, the Court must be very cautious in balancing between the interest of the Bankrupt as an individual and the interest of the public and commercial reality at large…”

Di dalam kes ini, disamping kekurangan Laporan KPI, Mahkamah juga mempunyai keraguan sama ada KPI telah mentadbir estet JD dengan sewajarnya dengan mengambil tindakan administratif yang dikehendaki di bawah Akta Tersebut memandangkan KPI masih belum menjalankan Mesyuarat Pemiutang yang merupakan tindakan terawal dalam pentadbiran estet JD. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Re Benny Ong Swee Siang; Ex-P United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Bhd [2016] 8 MLJ 805; [2016] 3 CLJ 1001; [2015] MLRHU 1107 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[20] I am aware that the JD who is now 61 years of age has been a bankrupt for the past 17 years… In the circumstances, this is the situation of an unadministered estate in bankruptcy by reason that the procedures such as meeting of creditors, public examination of debtor and other administrative tasks as laid down in ss. 15 to 17 and 40 to 69 of the Bankruptcy Act 1967 have not yet been undertaken to date. This can easily be contrasted with the s. 33A case of Re Endon Tamseran; Ex p Parkash Singh Wasawa Singh (supra ) relied by the DGI where all the assets of the bankrupt who was then 65 years old had been realised and there was no longer any more contribution pursuant to the administration of the estate.”

Berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang dinyatakan di atas, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa memandangkan Laporan KPI langsung tidak memuaskan dan tidak dapat membantu Mahkamah dalam membuat keputusan berkenaan permohonan JD, dan Mahkamah mempunyai keraguan sama ada KPI telah mengambil tindakan-tindakan administratif sebagaimana dikehendaki dalam Akta Tersebut, maka Mahkamah menolak permohonan pelepasan oleh JD dalam lampiran 1. Mahkamah menggunakan budi bicara Mahkamah dalam memerintahkan tiada perintah terhadap kos. Bertarikh: 2 Ogos 2023 Disediakan oleh, ………………………………….

Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi Jabatan Insolvensi Malaysia Cawangan Johor Bahru Tingkat 12, Menara Tabung Haji, Jalan Ayer Molek, 80720 Johor Bahru, Johor …

Tetuan Haikal & Co Peguambela & Peguamcara Penghutang Penghakiman No.60, Jalan Laksamana 2, Taman Ungku Aminah, 81300 Skudai, Johor …

Tetuan Sarmila Theviga & Co Peguambela & Peguamcara Peguamcara bagi Pemiutang Penghakiman B-5-8, Sunway Business Park, Pusat Bandar Seberang Jaya, 13700 Prai, Penang (Ruj:SV/LIT/SMSB/LKB/7/2012(A)) …Ms Sarmila Vani A/P Arumugam Kes-kes yang dirujuk:

Re Mohana Sundari M Subramaniam Ex P United Prime Corporation Bhd [2004] 5 MLJ 227; [2004] 1 CLJ 624; [2003] 3 MLRH 719; [2004]

Dato’ Lim Huah Leong v Engtex Marketing Sdn Bhd [2016] 5 MLRA 457

Quek Siew Eng v Malayan Banking Berhad [2023] 1 MLJ 99; [2023] 1 CLJ 884; [2023] 2 MLRA 209; [2023] 1 AMR 413

Development & Commercial Bank Bhd & Ors v Loke Theen Fatt [2010] 5 CLJ 583; [2009] 4 MLRH 118; [2011] 1 BLR 696

Lim Hun Swee v Malaysia British Assurance Bhd & Ors and Other Appeals [2011] 2 MLJ 218; [2010] 8 CLJ 680; [2010] 2 MLRA 392; [2011] 1 AMCR 157

Public Bank Bhd v Choong Yew Wah [2014] 4 MLJ 559; [2014] 5

CLJ 695; [2014] 6 MLRA 706; [2014] AMEJ 0602 Re Kelvin Lee See Fooi, Ex P BSN Commercial Bank Malaysia Bhd [2006] 3 MLJ 683; [2006] 6 CLJ 65; [2005] 4 MLRH 201

Re Tan Sie Kiong v Ex-P Delta Finance Company Bhd [2014] 8 CLJ 678; [2013] MLRHU 172

Kumar Subramaniam @ Balasubramaniam v Punitha Thiagarajan [2023] MLJU 697; [2023] 1 LNS 628; [2023] MLRHU 538; [2023]

AMEJ 0648 Lim Tee Keong v HLG Securities Sdn Bhd [2016] 3 MLJ 201; [2016] 4 CLJ 840; [2017] 3 MLRA 127; [2016] AMEJ 0894

Re Rajangam Marimuthu Mudalliar; Ex P Parkash Singh Wasawa

Singh [2010] 3 CLJ 858; [2009] 2 MLRH 200 Dato’ Lim Huah Leong v Engtex Marketing Sdn Bhd [2015] 9 MLJ 639; [2014] 1 LNS 1401; [2014] MLRHU 948

Re Benny Ong Swee Siang; Ex-P United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Bhd [2016] 8 MLJ 805; [2016] 3 CLJ 1001; [2015] MLRHU 1107 22