Siti Noorarina Binti Abdullah v 1. ) Majlis Agama Islam Selangor (Mais) (BL-24NCvC-35-02/2025)

KERAJAAN NEGERI SELANGOR ...DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Brief background [1] This OS relates to an application by a 35-year-old woman seeking for a declaration that she is not a Muslim and her conversion some 21 years ago is void ab initio. [2] By way of background, the Plaintiff was born on 9.12.1989 to nonMuslim parents, namely Karuppiah a/l Perumal ("Karuppiah") and Thana Letchumy a/p Kadappan ("Thana Letchumy"). Prior to the Plaintiff's birth, Karuppiah and Thana Letchumy were wedded in accordance with traditional Hindu rites at a temple in Kapar on 20.1.1982. [3] The Plaintiff's name was registered as Sutha a/p Karuppiah. At the time of the Plaintiff's birth, the Plaintiff's parents professed the religion of Hindu. [4] On or about 1999, the Plaintiff's parents separated, and the Plaintiff, along with her three sisters, lived with her maternal grandparents, who profess the Hindu faith. [5] On 16.2.2004 Thana Letchumy embraced the religion of Islam and subsequently on 1.9.2005 the National Registration Department ("NRD") approved her application to change the official name to Nurasiah binti Abdullah. [6] On 16.12.2004, she unilaterally took the Plaintiff to the Klang District Islamic Religious Office for a religious conversion to Islam ("Purported Conversion"). It is an admitted fact that Karuppiah was not present at the material time, and did not participate in the Plaintiff's conversion. Subsequently, on 23.3.2005, the Plaintiff was issued a Certificate of Conversion to Islam by the Klang District Islamic Religious Office. [7] In 2006 the Plaintiff sat for the Islamic Education (Pendidikan Islam) paper in the Malaysian Certificate Education (Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia or SPM). It has to be noted that under paragraphs (h) and (i) of the Schedule to the Education Act 1996, the Islamic Education paper is explicitly designated for pupils professing the religion of Islam, whereas the Moral Education paper is mandated for pupils who do not profess the Islamic faith. [8] After two years of her conversion, on 16.2.2006 Thana Letchumy married to a Muslim man, Alamgir bin Abdul Mannan. [9] Similar to Thana Letchumy, the Plaintiff filed an application to the NRD to change her name to Siti Noorarina binti Abdullah. In her underlying application, the Plaintiff had stated that the change was by reason of her conversion to Islam. Subsequently, on 11.1.2007, this application was approved. [10] On 11.12.2010, Karuppiah passed away. [11] On 28.7.2016, when the Plaintiff attained the age of 27, she commenced an action against the Majlis Agama Islam Selangor in the Shah Alam Syariah High Court under Summons No. 10400-043 0464-2016 ("Suit 43"). By the said action, the Plaintiff sought the following reliefs, inter alia:

(a) a declaration that the Plaintiff has ceased to be a Muslim under section 61(3)(b)(x) of the Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of Selangor) Enactment 2003 ("Selangor Islamic Enactment"); and

(b) an order that the item "Islam" in the Plaintiff's record at the NRD be expunged. [12] Nevertheless, for reasons undisclosed, the Plaintiff withdrew Suit 43 on 19.2.2025 without the merits of the case being heard and determined. [13] On 24.2.2025, the Plaintiff filed this OS seeking for the following reliefs, inter alia:

(a) a declaration that the Plaintiff acknowledges and practices Hinduism and not Islam;

(b) a declaration that the Plaintiff has never adhered to Islam and has always adhered to Hinduism since birth; and

(c) a declaration that the Plaintiff's conversion is void ab initio. [14] The Plaintiff's application is based on the following grounds, amongst others:

(a) the Purported Conversion was unlawful and void ab initio on the ground of unilateral parental consent; and

(b) the non-compliance of the provisions in the Selangor Islamic Enactment by the Defendants in carrying out the Purported Conversion without the Plaintiff's father's consent. Whether the Purported Conversion was unlawful and void ab initio on the ground of unilateral parental consent [15] The Plaintiff avers that at the material time, she was a minor of 15 years old who lacked the legal capacity and comprehension to understand the nature of the events. Her conversion to Islam was unilaterally decided by her mother, following the mother's own conversion a few months prior. Crucially, the father's consent was never obtained for the Purported Conversion. [16] The Plaintiff relies on Art. 12(4) of the Federal Constitution ("FC") which stipulates that the religion of persons under the age of 18 years shall be decided by their parents. In support of this contention, the Plaintiff cites a robust line of authorities including Indira Gandhi Mutho v. Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak & Ors And Other Appeals [2018] 3 CLJ 145, Rosliza Ibrahim v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Anor [2021] 3 CLJ 301, Pendaftar Mualaf Negeri Perlis & Ors v. Loh Siew Hong and another appeal [2025] 4 CLJ 351; [2025] 2 MLJ 324 and Pendaftar Muallaf Wilayah Persekutuan v. LCY & Ors And Another Appeal [2021] CLJU 2079; [2021] 1 LNS 2079 which collectively affirm that any unilateral conversion of a minor to Islam is unlawful, void ab initio, and unconstitutional. Consequently, the Plaintiff submits that the Purported Conversion is unlawful and void ab initio. [17] At the outset, I find instructive the Federal Court case of Rosliza Ibrahim (supra) where it was stated by Tengku Maimun Tuan Mat CJ in the following passage: [108] The case is no different here. At the risk of repetition, if a matter concerns an ab initio case, that is, the question whether a person is in the first place a 'person professing the religion of Islam' it necessarily concerns a question regarding one's identity under the FC which in turn necessitates constitutional interpretation. This is because the phrase 'persons professing the religion of Islam' is a constitutional term. Accordingly, the civil courts are empowered, indeed, duty-bound to adjudicate the matter. It is only in renunciation cases where one already professes or proclaims to profess the religion of Islam (irrespective of whether they actually practise the faith) with the subsequent decision to change what they profess, that the matter is removed to the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court. The distinction drawn from the cases of Lina Joy and Azmi illustrates the difference. Whether it is an ab initio case or a renunciation case will require a careful examination of the factual matrix of the case. [18] The aforementioned authority underlines a critical proposition - the mere fact that a unilateral minor's conversion does not, in and of itself, render that conversion invalid. The Court is a duty bound to adopt a holistic approach, evaluating all relevant factual circumstances to determine, as a threshold issue, whether the minor had never been a Muslim. This is fortified by the Federal Court case of Dahlia Dhaima Abdullah v. Majlis Agama Islam Selangor & Another Appeal [2024] 5 CLJ 855 where Abang Iskandar PCA held-Conclusion [63] An invalid legal status of conversion of a minor, who is legally in the care and custody of a Muslim-convert mother, does not by itself determine that the minor is factually "never a Muslim". An assessment of the facts and circumstances of a particular case as ruled by Rosliza is not to be restricted only to the point of conversion without evaluating the whole facts revolving around the life of a minor since his/her childhood right until the filing of the suit. [19] Again, the above authority underscores the fundamental principle that the invalidity of a minor's conversion does not ipso facto mean the minor is deemed never to have been a Muslim. [20] The aforementioned landmark authorities reiterate that it is incumbent upon the Court to examine the entire factual matrix, spanning from the minor's initial conversion up to the filing of the summons. [21] Before addressing the merits of this issue, it is pertinent to evaluate the cases of Indira Gandhi Mutho (supra) and Loh Siew Hong (supra) that form the cornerstone of the Plaintiff's submissions. [22] Upon perusal of the cause papers, I find the relevant facts in Indira Gandhi Mutho (supra) and Loh Siew Hong (supra) are distinguishable from the present. In those authorities, the applicants were one of the parents seeking to invalidate the unilateral conversion of their minor children. Conversely, the Plaintiff in the case at hand is an adult seeking to invalidate her own childhood conversion, a factual matrix that aligns with the circumstances in Dahlia Dhaima Abdullah (supra). [23] Further, Indira Gandhi Mutho (supra) centred on the textual interpretation of Art. 12(4) of the FC. There, the Federal Court in 2018 held that the word "parent" in the English version must be read as "parents", thereby establishing the requirement for joint parental consent. Nevertheless, a critical distinction arises as the Yang di-Pertuan Agong XII had, as early as 2003, prescribed that the national language text as the authoritative version of the Federal Constitution. Art. 160B of the FC explicitly vests the power in the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to affect such a prescription, thereby establishing the supremacy of the Malay text. The Article says-Authoritative text

Where this Constitution has been translated into the national language, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may prescribe such national language text to be authoritative, and thereafter if there is any conflict or discrepancy between such national language text and the English language text of this Constitution, the national language text shall prevail over the English language text. [24] In a warkah (royal letter) dated 16.1.2025 to the Attorney General, His Royal Highness the Raja of Perlis clarified that, acting as the Yang di-Pertuan Agong XII (as His Royal Highness then was), His Royal Highness prescribed the Malay text as the authoritative version of the Federal Constitution on 29.9.2003. This occasion took place during the Majlis Pelancaran Perlembagaan Persekutuan Teks Bahasa Kebangsaan. Below is the warkah for ease of reference- [25] Undoubtedly, the Malay text of Art. 12(4) of the FC, which employs the words "ibu atau bapa" (mother or father), expressly vests the right to determine a minor's religion in a single parent. Consequently, the consent of either the mother or father (the mother in the present instance) is statutory sufficient to validate a conversion. The Article reads-

(a) first, it is untenable to suggest that the Plaintiff was oblivious to her conversion to Islam at the material time. It defies logic that an individual at the age of sitting for the Lower Certificate of Education (Sijil Rendah Pelajaran or SRP) examination would fail to comprehend that she had embraced an entirely new faith and way of life. Instead, a young person like the Plaintiff who has no cognitive or mental disability at the material time, possesses the requisite intellectual maturity to recognize a fundamental change in her religious belief;

(b) second, by actively changing her name to a Muslim name, she evinced clear knowledge of her new religious status and raised no objection. In fact, the Plaintiff relied on her change of religion as the justification for her name change. This objective evidence completely dismantles her assertion that she was not aware of her transition to Islam during that period;

(c) third, the Plaintiff's willingness to sit for the Islamic Education paper instead of Moral Education during her SPM examinations confirms her acceptance of Islamic faith. Had the Plaintiff genuinely maintained her adherence to Hinduism at the time, she was fully at liberty to inform the school authority, or the Pendidikan Islam teacher for that matter, of her faith to avoid taking examination for the particular paper; and

(d) fourth, in Suit 43, the Plaintiff failed to plead that she had never been a Muslim or that the Purported Conversion was invalid. This critical omission in her own pleading constitutes an implied admission that the Purported Conversion was regular, orderly and perfectly valid at the material time. [31] It is observed that under the Selangor Islamic Enactment, a minor may convert to Islam with the consent of his parent or guardian. S. 117 of the Selangor Islamic Enactment reads-Capacity to convert to the religion of Islam 117. For the purpose of this Part, a person who is not a Muslim may convert to the religion of Islam if he is of sound mind and —

(a) has attained the age of eighteen years; or

(b) if he has not attained the age of eighteen years, his parent or guardian consents to his conversion. [32] Textually, s. 117(b) of the Selangor Islamic Enactment phrases the consent mechanism in the singular and separates the relevant parties disjunctively with the word "or" instead of "and". The clear import of the phrase "ibu, bapa atau penjaga" (mother, father or guardian) is that the statutory criteria are satisfied if any single qualifying party consents to the conversion. Consequently, as the Purported Conversion was grounded upon the valid consent of the Plaintiff's mother, the condition set out in s. 117(b) of the Selangor Islamic Enactment has been satisfied. [33] Another important point to observe is that the Selangor Islamic Enactment explicitly mandates that a person seeking to embrace Islam must utter the two kalimah syahadah voluntarily and without coercion, ensuring the conversion is a product of free will. S.107 of the Selangor Islamic Enactment says-Requirements for conversion to the religion of Islam

(1) The following requirements shall be complied with for a valid conversion of a person to the religion of Islam:

(a) the person must utter in reasonably intelligible Arabic the two clauses of the Affirmation of Faith;

(b) at the time of uttering the two clauses of the Affirmation of Faith the person must be aware that they mean "I bear witness that there is no god but Allah and I bear witness that the Prophet Muhammad S.A.W. is the Messenger of Allah"; and

(c) the utterance must be made of the person's own free will.

(a) she is capable of understanding the Malay language;

(b) she had in good faith and willingly converted to Islam and bear witness that there is no god but Allah and I bear witness that the Prophet Muhammad S.A.W. is the Messenger of Allah; and

(c) she vowed to commit to the religion of Islam. [35] The execution of the Conversion Form, in my view, serves as prima facie evidence that the Plaintiff strictly complied with the legal prerequisites for conversion to the religion of Islam under the Selangor Islamic Enactment. [36] To conclude this issue, based on the established factual matrix and statutory framework, undoubtedly, the legality of the Purported Conversion remains entirely intact. The Plaintiff's bare allegations of maternal coercion and total ignorance are fundamentally contradicted by her subsequent conduct. Hence, the Plaintiff's argument that her conversion is unlawful and void ab initio, is demonstrably without merit. Whether the civil court has jurisdiction to declare that the Plaintiff has ceased to be a Muslim [37] The Plaintiff asserts that she is seeking a declaration as to her religious status especially regarding the legality of her historic conversion. She emphasizes that she was not a Muslim by birth and that Islam is not her original religion: Instead, she is directly challenging the validity of the unliteral conversion executed by her mother during her minority. The Plaintiff submits that the civil courts must not abdicate their constitutional function as ultimate arbiters of the law. She draws a clear distinction between ab initio challenges to a conversion and cases of apostasy or renunciation, arguing the civil courts must first threshold determination. Consequently, the Plaintiff contends that the Syariah courts are ill-equipped and lack the requisite jurisdiction to determine the validity of a minor's conversion. [38] Regarding this issue, in light of my finding before that the Purported Conversion cannot be deemed a nullity ab initio, the question of the Plaintiff's religious identity shifts from a threshold issue of legality to a matter of renunciation. Accordingly, the correct and lawful forum for such a determination rests solely with the Syariah courts. S. 61(3)(b)(x) of the Selangor Islamic Enactment provides-

(a) ...

(b) in its civil jurisdiction, hear and determine all actions and proceedings if all the parties to the actions or proceedings are Muslims and the actions or proceedings relate to —

(i) ...

(x) a declaration that a person is no longer a Muslim; [39] The aforementioned statutory provision expressly vests the Syariah courts with the exclusive power to declare that a person has ceased to profess the religion of Islam. Since the Plaintiff's prayer in this court is for a declaration that she is not (or no longer) a Muslim, it falls squarely within the ambit of the Syariah court's jurisdiction. [40] In Kaliammal Sinnasamy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan (Jawi) & Ors [2011] 2 CLJ 165; [2010] 3 MLRA 355, Abdul Wahab Patail JCA held that- [12] Reverting to the issue at hand, a Shariah High Court has the power to hear and decide to make a declaration as to the status of a person as a Muslim. It is the court of competent jurisdiction for that purpose. This is established in Dalip Kaur v. Pegawai Polis Daerah, Balai Polis Daerah, Bukit Mertajam & Anor[1991] 1 CLJ 77 (Rep); [1992] 1 MLJ 1; [1991] 3 CLJ 2768 (SC); Soon Singh a/I Bikar Singh v. Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (PERKIM) Kedah & Anor [1999] 2 CLJ 5 [1999] 1 MLJ 489; (FC); Lina Joy lwn Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Lain-Lain [2007] 3 CLJ 557; [2007] 4 MLJ 585 (FC). In the light of these cases, Ng Wan Chan is no longer authority. [41] Similar approach was taken in Hj Raimi Abdullah v. Siti Hasnah Vangarama Abdullah & Another Appeal [2014] 4 CLJ 253; [2014] 3 MLRA 173; [2014] 3 MLJ 757. Arifin Zakaria CJ when delivering the judgment of the Federal Court held-Article 121 of the Federal Constitution ('the Constitution') clearly provided that the civil court shall have no jurisdiction on any matter falling within the jurisdiction of the Shariah Court. The matters that fall within the jurisdiction of the Shariah Court were as provided under art. 74 of the Constitution, inter alia, matters falling within the State List in the Ninth Schedule which were Islamic law, personal and family law of person professing the religion of Islam. Whether a person was a Muslim or not was a matter falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Shariah Court. It would be highly inappropriate for the civil court, which lacks jurisdiction pursuant to art. 121, to determine the validity of the conversion of any person to the religion of Islam as this is strictly a religious issue. Therefore, the question of the plaintiff's conversion in 1983 fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Shariah Court (see paras 16-18, 27 & 30). (emphasis added) [42] The consistency of the Federal Court in affirming that the Syariah court is the appropriate forum to determine an individual's religious status is illustrated in Rosliza Bt Ibrahim (supra). In the landmark decision, the apex court speaking through Tengku Maimun Tengku Mat CJ held- [87] Administratively, once one becomes a Muslim, and becomes subject to the jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts, the procedure to "leave" the religion also becomes subject to Islamic law. In this context, almost all States in Malaysia have a presumption provision and in Selangor it is s. 74(2) of the ARIE 2003 which provides: For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared that a Muslim shall at all times be acknowledged and treated as a Muslim unless a declaration has been made by a Syariah Court that he is no longer a Muslim. [88] Summarising the above, one cannot unilaterally on his own accord renounce the religion of Islam. Doing so would amount to an offence against the precepts of Islam. In such an instance, the Syariah Court would have both jurisdictions ratione personae and ratione materiae. This has long been canvassed and explained by the Federal Court in Kamariah Ali & Yang Lain Iwn. Kerajaan Negeri Kelantan & Satu Lagi [2004] 3 CLJ 409; [2005] 1 MLJ 197. [43] As alluded to earlier, the Plaintiff had previously filed a similar application in the Syariah High Court vide Suit 43 which was subsequently withdrawn. In my view, the Plaintiff ought to have pursued that action to its conclusion, as the Syariah court remains the competent forum to adjudicate upon whether she has ceased to be a Muslim or otherwise. Conclusion [44] It is an established principle of law that the burden of proof lies on the party asserting a claim. Based on the material facts and statutory framework evaluated above, the Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the legal threshold required to demonstrate that her childhood conversion is a nullity ab initio. Accordingly, this OS must be dismissed with costs. Such dismissal, however, does not deprive the Plaintiff of recourse as she maintains the right to seek a conclusive adjudication of her faith within the proper jurisdiction of the Syariah courts. (SHAMSULBAHRI BIN HAJI IBRAHIM) JUDGE, HIGH COURT OF MALAYA, KLANG For the Plaintiff:Nur Izyan binti Azimi Messrs. Raj & SachFor the 1st Defendant:Yusfarizal bin Yussoff Mujahid bin Mohamed Hadzri Messrs. Yusfarizal, Aziz & ZaidFor the 2nd Defendant:SFC Mohd Khairuddin bin Idris Pejabat Penasihat Undang-undang Negeri Selangor