Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes Rosliza bt Ibrahim v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Anor (supra) di mana di dalam penghakimanya, Tengku Maimun, Ketua Hakim Negara menyatakan seperti berikut: “[108] ... At the risk of repetition, if a matter concerns an ab initio case, that is, the question whether a person is in the first place a ‘person professing the religion of Islam’ it necessarily concerns a question regarding one’s identity under the FC which in turn necessitates constitutional interpretation. This is because the phrase ‘persons professing the religion of Islam’ is a constitutional term. Accordingly, the civil courts are empowered, indeed, duty-bound to adjudicate the matter. It is only in renunciation cases where one already professes or proclaims to profess the religion of Islam (irrespective of whether they actually practise the faith) with the subsequent decision to change what they profess, that the matter is removed to the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court. The distinction drawn from the cases of Lina Joy and Azmi illustrates the difference. Whether it is an ab initio case or a renunciation case will require a careful examination of the factual matrix of the case. [112] The respondents and the amicus curiae, the attorney general, argued that this is a renunciation case and accordingly, this court has no jurisdiction to determine the religion of the plaintiff under art 121(1A) of the FC. It is thus necessary to now examine the factual matrix of the case to determine whether the plaintiff is, on the evidence, a Muslim to begin with. If she is not, then in accordance with the principles established earlier, this court can grant her the declaration she seeks. If she is a Muslim by original faith, then the matter will be for the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court and this court would not have the jurisdiction to grant her the reliefs sought to the extent that they relate to renunciation.”