Societe Generale v The Owners And/Or Demise Charterers Of And/Or Other Persons Interested In The Ship Or Vessel "Maple" (27NCC-30-04/2017)

This is an admiralty action in rem against a vessel called “MAPLE” (IMO NO. 9168477) filed by the Plaintiff via a writ WA-27NCC-30- 04/2017 (the Writ) filed on 5 April 2017. By virtue of Order 6 rule 7(1) of 2 the Rules of Court 2012 (RoC 2012), the validity of the Writ expires on 4 October 2017. The Plaintiff has yet to file its statement of claim.

On 20 October 2017 the Plaintiff obtained a court order for the extension of the validity of the Writ for six months from 5 October 2017. On 4 April 2018 the Plaintiff filed another application for an order that the validity of the Writ be further extended for another 6 months from 5 April 2018 (Enclosure 14).

On 11 April 2018, after considering the application and the affidavit in support of Enclosure 14, I dismissed the application. The Plaintiff appealed against the dismissal.

The Plaintiff, Societe Generale, is and was at all material times, a banking institution established or incorporated in France and registered to operate in Singapore.

The Defendant was at all material times, the registered owner of the vessel “MAPLE” (hereinafter referred to as “the Vessel”) and/or carrier and/or bailee of the cargoes which were shipped on board the 3 Vessel pursuant to nine (9) Bills of Lading (hereinafter referred to as “the Cargoes”).

The Plaintiff initiated the action in rem by filing the Writ which sets out its claim as endorsed on the Writ. As the Plaintiff has yet to file its statement of claim, the factual background related below is gathered from the Plaintiff’s affidavit (Enclosure 7) filed to support its application for a warrant of arrest against the Vessel (Enclosure 3). For the purpose of this judgment in respect of the application to extend the validity of the Writ, the facts narrated below only relate to the salient facts which transpired between the Plaintiff and Defendant.

The Plaintiff had granted a loan facility for trade of the Cargoes to Aavanthi Industries Pte Ltd. (Aavanti) and Tropical Grains and Feeds Industries Pte Ltd. (Tropical), (both collectively referred to as “the Borrowers”) pursuant to the terms of a Trade Finance Facility (Trade Facility) contained in a letter dated 23 July 2015 and the addendum dated 17 February 2016 thereto (the Facility Letter). The Trade Facility is also subject to the Plaintiff’s Standard Terms for Trade Finance dated 4 7 July 2011 and the amendments made thereto dated 12 August 2015 (the Standard Terms for Trade Finance).

In consideration and as security to the grant of the Trade Facility, Aavanthi agreed that the Plaintiff would have a pledge upon the Cargoes and the Trade Documents as a continuing security for the payment and discharge of Aavanthi’s liabilities to the Plaintiff.

The Cargoes which were on board the Vessel on 25 March 2016 were to be shipped by the Defendant from the port of Loading, Tanjung Bakau, Indonesia to the port of Discharge, JNPT, India.

It was an express and/or implied term of the Contracts of Carriage contained in the Bills of Lading and/or the Defendant’s duty thereunder and/or its duty as carriers and/or bailees that the Defendant would only deliver the Cargoes as described in each Bills of Lading against the surrender, production or presentation of the original of the particular Bills of Lading under which that portion of the Cargoes, as described in the Bills of Lading was shipped.

However the Cargoes had been released without the production of the Bills of Lading. 5

The Plaintiff is still in possession of the full set of three originals of each Bills of Lading and the Plaintiff has yet to receive any substantive response to the Plaintiff’s request made on 1 July 2016 in relation to discharge of the Cargoes and to confirm that the Cargoes would only be delivered to the Plaintiff upon production of the Bills of Lading.

The terms of the Trade Facility provides as follows:-

clause 12.1 of the said facility states that the Plaintiff shall have a pledge upon all goods which are now or which shall hereafter deliver by the customer or by any other person; and

clause 12.2 which states that the bank shall holds all bills of exchange drawn, accepted or endorsed by the customer and/or bills of lading, shipping documents relating to the goods as a continuing security by way of pledge for the payment and discharge of the liabilities. For the loan has been granted, the Plaintiff become the owner of the cargo until the loan is satisfied by the customer. 6 [14] By virtue of the aforesaid terms of the Trade Facility, the Plaintiff being the pledgee is the rightful owner of the Bills of Lading and also rightfully owned the Cargoes and successively become the party who is entitled to the delivery of the Cargoes. [15] Therefore, it is the Plaintiff’s case that the Defendant has acted in breach of the Contracts of Carriage and/or the Defendant’s duty thereunder and/or its duty as carriers and/or bailees, and/or negligently, when the Defendant delivered the Cargoes without production of any of the original Bills of Lading. [16] Alternatively, by reason of the matters aforesaid, the Plaintiff states that the Defendant has unlawfully converted the Cargoes and has wholly deprived the Plaintiff of them causing the Plaintiff to suffer loss and damage and incurred unnecessary expenses. [17] By the endorsement made on the Writ, the Plaintiff claims damages against the Defendant and to be indemnified by the Defendant for all losses, liabilities, costs and expenses incurred by the Plaintiff as a result of the Defendant’s breaches including breach of contract of carriage as contained in the Bills of ding under which the Cargoes were shipped. 7 Enclosure 14 [18] Enclosure 14 is filed pursuant to Order 6 rule 7(2) of the RoC 2012, seeking for, amongst other, that the validity of the Writ in rem dated 5 April 2017 which was earlier extended for six months vide order dated 20 October 2017 be further extended for another six months from 5 April 2018. Thus Enclosure 14 is the Plaintiff’s second application seeking for the renewal of the validity of the Writ from 5 April 2018 until 4 October 2018. The Law [19] Order 6 rule 7 of the RoC 2012 reads as follows –

Duration and renewal of writ (O 6 r 7)

For the purpose of service, a writ (other than a concurrent writ) is valid in the first instance for six months beginning from the date of its issue, and a concurrent writ is valid in the first instance for the period of validity of the original writ which is unexpired at the date of issue of the concurrent writ.

Subject to paragraph (2A), where efforts to serve a writ on a defendant have been unsuccessful, the Court may by order extend the validity of the writ twice (in Sabah and Sarawak thrice and in admiralty actions five times), not exceeding six months at any one time, beginning 8 with the day next following that on which it would otherwise expire, as may be specified in the order.

An application for a renewal of writ must be made before the expiry of the writ, ex parte by notice of application supported by affidavit showing that efforts have been made to serve the defendant within one month from the date of the issue of the writ and that efforts have been made subsequent thereto to effect service.

Before a writ, the validity of which has been extended under this rule, is served, it shall be marked with an official stamp in Form 3 showing the period for which the validity of the writ has been so extended.

Where the validity of a writ is extended by order made under this rule, the order shall operate in relation to any other writ (whether original or concurrent) issued in the same action which has not been served, so as to extend the validity of that other writ until the expiration of the period specified in the order.

A note of the renewal shall be entered in the cause book. [20] Based on the aforesaid provisions, the rules in respect of the validity of a writ is as follows –

a writ is valid in the first instance for a period of six months beginning from the date of its issuance;

in admiralty action the validity of the writ may be extended five times not exceeding six months at any one time; 9

an application for a renewal of writ may be made ex parte and must be made before the expiry of the writ;

the application for extension must be supported by an affidavit showing the efforts that have been made to serve the defendant within one month from the date of the writ was issued and the subsequent efforts made to effect service. Findings of the court [21] The Plaintiff’s Enclosure 14 is an ex parte notice of application to renew the validity of the Writ. The said notice was filed on 4 April 2018 which is one day prior to the expiry of the six months validity period of the Writ. The main reason forwarded by the Plaintiff seeking for the extension of the Writ is that the Vessel has yet to call on any ports in the Malaysian waters, thus service of the Writ could not be effected. The relevant paragraphs in the Plaintiff’s affidavit (Enclosure 15) supporting its application for extension of the validity of the Writ are as follows –

Saya menyatakan bahawa Writ bagi tindakan ini adalah satu Writ Dalam Tindakan In Rem di mana penyampaian writ itu hanya akan dianggap sempurna sekiranya Writ tersebut disampaikan dengan meletakkan Writ tersebut untuk suatu jangka masa yang singkat pada 10 mana-mana tiang layar Kapal atau Vesel “Maple” tersebut (“Kapal”) tersebut atau di sebelah luar mana-mana bahagian yang sesuai pada rangka binaan Kapal tersebut dan dengan meninggalkan satu salinannya pada bahagian terlindung, mudah dilihat di Kapal tersebut menurut Aturan 70 Kaedah 10 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012.

Oleh itu, saya selanjutnya menegaskan bahawa Writ tersebut hanyalah boleh disampaikan sedemikian sekiranya Kapal tersebut adalah di dalam bidangkuasa Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini dan berada di dalam perarian Malaysia.

Dalam pada ini, saya menyatakan bahawa pihak Plaintif telahpun cuba sedaya upaya untuk memerhati dan memantau gerak-geri Kapal tersebut sejak Writ tersebut dikeluarkan terhadap Kapal tersebut. Namun demikian, saya menyatakan bahawa sejak Writ tersebut dan satu Waran Penahanan bertarikh 6 April 2017 dikeluarkan, saya menyatakan bahawa pihak Plaintif tidak dapat dimaklumkan sama ada Kapal Vesel tersebut akan atau telah memasuki perairan Malaysia dengan cukup masa untuk membuat persediaan untuk menyampaikan Writ dan Waran Penahanan tersebut. Malahan, cubaan pertama pihak Plaintif untuk menyampaikan dan menahan Kapal tersebut pada 7 April 2017 dan 8 April 2017 telah gagal kerana Kapal tersebut tidak memasuki perairan Malaysia pada saat terakhir, walaupun telah dijangka untuk memasuki perairan Malaysia pada atau sekitar 6 April 2017. Kini dikemukakan adalah carian bagi Kapal tersebut melalui Seaweb yang menunjukkan pergerakan Kapal tersebut sejak 5 Oktober 2017 dan ditandakan sebagai ekshibit “DK-1”.

Namun demikian, carian bagi Kapal tersebut juga menunjukkan bahawa Kapal tersebut giat bergerak di dalam rantau ini dan masih berkemungkinan untuk memasuki perairan Malaysia. 11 [22] The Plaintiff avers that attempts made on the 7th and 8th of April 2017 (which was immediately after the issue of the writ on 5 April 2017) to serve the writ on the Vessel failed because the Vessel did not enter Malaysian waters on 6 April 2017 as expected. In this respect the data produced from the Seaweb in Exhibit DK-1 of Enclosure 15 in relation to the movement of the Vessel only cover a period from 1 October 2017 to 19 March 2018. Thus it does not show the whereabouts of the Vessel in April 2017. However it is noted from the Plaintiff’s first application to renew the validity of the writ (Enclosure 10), the data from the Seaweb produced in Exhibit DK-1 of Enclosure 11 (which cover a period from 19 March 2017 to 28 September 2017) indeed show the Vessel was not in Malaysian waters within a month of the date of the issue of the writ. [23] In so far as the movement of the Vessel in Malaysian waters is concerned, the data captured in the Seaweb (Exhibit DK-1 of Enclosure 15) is reproduced below – IMO/LR/IHS_No. LRNO1 Ship_Name Port_of_Call Country_of_Call Arrival_Date Sailed_Date 9168477 9168477 Johor North Eastern Anchorages Malaysia 10/29/2017 1:59:24 AM 10/29/2017 2:50:23 AM 9168477 9168477 Johor North Eastern Anchorages Malaysia 12/8/2017 8:59 12/8/2017 9:34 9168477 9168477 Johor North Eastern Anchorages Malaysia 12/23/2017 4:59:43 PM 12/23/2017 6:59:42 PM 9168477 9168477 Johor North Eastern Anchorages Malaysia 1/12018 7:59 1/1/2018 8:57 9168477 9168477 Johor North Eastern Outer Anchorages Malaysia 1/14/2018 1:59:35 AM 1/14/2018 2:59:08 AM 9168477 9168477 Johor North Eastern Outer Anchorages Malaysia 1/23/2018 2:58:22 AM 1/23/2018 3:45:03 AM 9168477 9168477 Johor North Eastern Outer Anchorages Malaysia 2/15/2018 2:29:35 AM 2/15/2018 3:59:45 AM 12 [24] It appears that between 29 October 2017 and 15 February 2018, the Vessel did enter into Malaysian waters and stopped at Johor North Eastern Outer Anchorages and subsequently sailed out of the said port of call. The data of the movement of the Vessel may be summarised as follows: Date Time of arrival at Johor North Eastern Outer Anchorages Time of sailed Approximate Duration/stay at Johor North Eastern Outer Anchorages 29 October 2017 1:59:24 AM 2:50:23 AM 50 minutes 8 December 2017 8:59 9:34 30 minutes 23 December 2017 4:59:43 PM 6:59:42 PM 2 hours 1 January 2018 7:59 8:57 1 hour 14 January 2018 1:59:35 AM 2:59:08 AM 1 hour 23 January 2018 2:58:22 AM 3:45:03 AM 45 minutes 15 February 2018 2:29:35 AM 3:59:45 AM 1 ½ hours The various dates identified in the table above will be collectively referred to as the “Specific Dates”. [25] In so far as the validity of the writ is concerned it span over a period from 5 April 2017 to 4 October 2017 (the first initial six months) and 5 October 2017 to 4 April 2018 (the second six-month period). This means during the validity period of the writ, the data on the Seaweb shows the Vessel had entered Malaysian waters on the Specific Dates 13 and the Vessel had berthed/harboured at a Malaysian port of call for a duration of as short as thirty minutes and as long as two hours. [26] As such the Plaintiff’s averment that the Vessel has not entered Malaysian waters is not true. As the Plaintiff’s application Enclosure 14 is on ex parte basis, the Plaintiff is duty bound to make full and frank disclosure of the relevant matters. On this ground alone Enclosure 14 ought to be dismissed. However for purpose of completeness, I will proceed to discuss the merits of Plaintiff’s Enclosure 14. [27] Although the Plaintiff had exhibited the Seaweb data, it completely ignore the Specific Dates which shows the Vessel had called on the port in Johor. The Plaintiff did not offer any information and/or explanation whether attempt was made by the Plaintiff to serve the writ on the Vessel on the Specific Dates. [28] If it is true that the Plaintiff had made all efforts to observe and monitor the movement of the Vessel (as averred by the Plaintiff’s solicitor on behalf of the Plaintiff), it would have known that the Vessel was in Malaysian waters on the Specific Dates and most probably the Writ (and warrant of arrest) could have been served on the Vessel, 14 particularly on 23 December 2017 when the Vessel was at the port of call for two hours. [29] In the case of Duli Yang Maha Mulia Tunku Ibrahim Ismail Ibni Sultan Iskandar Al-Haj Tunku Mahkota Johor v. Datuk Captain Hamzah bin Mohd Noor and another appeal [2009] 5 AMR 298; [2009] 4 MLJ 149; [2009] 4 CLJ 329, the Federal Court dealt with the interpretation and application of Order 6 rule 7(2) and (2A) Rules of High Court 1980 (RHC 1980) which is similar to Order 6 rule 7(2) and (2A) of the RoC

One of the question that had to be determined by the court was whether the requirement to show efforts have been made to effect service under Order 6 rule 7(2A) of the RHC 1980 is a mandatory prerequisite to the exercise of discretion under Order 6 rule 7(2) of the same. Zaki Azmi Chief Justice (as he then was) delivering the judgment of the Federal Court discussed in depth Order 6 rule 7(2) and

of the RHC 1980 and had this to say – [15] …There are three prerequisites under r 7(2A) of the RHC which an applicant for renewal of a writ must prove. They are that it must:

be made before the expiry of the writ;

be made ex parte by summons;

be supported by an affidavit identifying two salient points which are: 15

that efforts have been made to serve the defendant within one month of the date of the issue of the writ; and

(ii) such efforts have been made subsequent thereto to effect service. [31] In my opinion the object of the new O 6 r 7 was to make it really tight as to when a writ can be renewed. The word 'must' appearing in O 6 r 7(2A) is not usually used in Malaysian legislations. Normally the word used is 'shall'. So in this case, when the word 'must' is used, the intention is to fully ensure that it is complied with and no discretion is to be given as far as the compliance with the prerequisites is concerned. 'Must' is a very strong word; in my opinion it is stronger than the word 'shall'. [32] In Ting Hua Yiew v Ace Commercial Enterprise Sdn Bhd [1996] 2 MLJ 678, Abdul Kadir Sulaiman J (as he then was) considered the word 'must' in the context of O 32 r 13(2) which states, inter alia:

Save as otherwise provided in these rules – An affidavit intended to be used in support of an application must be filed and served on the other party within 14 days from the date of the filing of the application ... [33] In his judgment he stated: O 32 r 13(2)(a) use an imperative word 'must'. In its ordinary meaning it is a word of absolute obligation. Therefore for the failure of the plaintiff to have the affidavit in support served upon the defendant within the time limit allowed by the rule, I would agree with the submission of learned counsel for the defendant 16 that it renders the said affidavit inadmissible. Order 2 r 1 of the RHC would not be of any help to the plaintiff as no reason was put forward by the plaintiff for the delay in the service of the said affidavit. [34] See also Shell Chemicals UK Ltd & Another v Vinamul Ltd (formerly Vinyl Products Ltd) The Times 7 March; 1991 135 SJ 412 (Transcript Association); Mayhew v The Keepers and Governors of the Possessions Revenues and Goods of the Free Grammar School of John Lyon [1991] 2 EGLR 89;Battersby & Ors v Anglo-American Oil Company Ltd & Ors [1944] 2 All ER 387 was followed by Chan Min Tat FJ in Llyod Triestino Societa v Chocolate Products (M) Sdn Bhd [1978] 2 MLJ 27. [35] Even if the word 'must' is to be construed as having the same effect as 'shall', nevertheless it still make compliance with the prerequisites mandatory. [36] The words 'Subject to para (2A)' in the impugned O 6 r 7(2) further strengthens the argument that before the court could exercise its discretion to renew a writ, para (2A) must be satisfied. It must be further noted that in para (2A) the applicant must show, inter alia, that efforts had been made to serve the defendant within one month of the date of the issue of the writ. This all the more supports the argument that the applicant must use all due diligence to effect service at the earliest possible time. … [39] I strongly believe that O 6 r 7(2A) of the RHC was introduced to prevent abuse by the plaintiffs in filing writs and sleeping on them without making efforts to serve them. This practice of inactivity is something which courts loathe. It is against the administration of justice. It creates a backlog and results in a false number of pending cases. In my opinion, courts should take serious a view of such cases. If not, they 17 will continue to remain in the list of outstanding cases. As such, O 6 r 7(2A) of the RHC must be strictly enforced as required by the rule. [40] When the plaintiffs apply to extend the validity of writs, courts should examine closely the affidavits filed in support of applications for extensions. Before granting an extension, courts must be satisfied that serious efforts had been made to serve. A simple and plain statement that efforts had been made to serve cannot be a sufficient ground. The affidavits must provide detailed facts as to when, where and how attempts to serve were made. Otherwise O 6 r 7(2A) of the RHC will become a dead letter. The object of the rule will be defeated. … [43] Accordingly, I have no hesitation in answering the first question posed in the positive, that is to say, the requirements of O 6 r 7(2A) are mandatory prerequisites. This means that the applications for extension of time for service of the writs made by the respondents are defective as they do not show compliance with the RHC. [30] Being the apex court and by the stare decisis doctrine, this court is bound by the decision of the Federal Court in the case of Duli Yang Maha Mulia Tunku Ibrahim Ismail Ibni Sultan Iskandar Al-Haj Tunku Mahkota Johor [31] As such, for this court to exercise its discretion under Order 6 rule 7(2) of the RoC 2012, the requirement under Order 6 rule 7(2A) of the same must be satisfied. It is therefore incumbent upon the Plaintiff in 18 the instant case to show in its affidavit that serious efforts had been made by the Plaintiff to serve the Writ on the Vessel. [32] Based on the Plaintiff’s affidavit there is no evidence that serious efforts had been made by the Plaintiff to serve the Writ on the Vessel. All that the Plaintiff offered in its affidavit is, quoting the words of his lordship Zaki Tun Azmi, a simple and plain statement that it has made all efforts to observe and monitor the movement of the Vessel without making any attempt to explain the efforts that were made. [33] In particular, the Plaintiff did not at all mentioned about the efforts made, if any, to serve the Writ on the Specific Dates when the Vessel entered Malaysian waters. As such the Plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements under Order 6 rule 7(2A) of the RoC 2012. [34] As the requirement under Order 6 rule 7(2A) of the RoC 2012 is a mandatory prerequisite to the court exercising its discretion under Order 6 rule 7(2) of the RoC 2012 (which is equivalent to Order 6 rule 7(2) of the RHC 1980), the Plaintiff’s application is therefore defective and the Plaintiff’s application to renew the validity of the Writ was accordingly dismissed. 19 [35] Another case on point is Castle Inn Sdn Bhd v. Bumiputra-Commerce Bank Bhd [2008] 6 AMR 541; [2009] 1 ML 542; [2009] 2 CLJ 445 where Low Hop Bing JCA (as he then was), delivering the Court of Appeal decision, sets out the principles applicable in exercising the discretion under Order 6 rule 7(2A) of the RHC 1980 – [33] The principles governing the exercise of the discretion may be stated as follows:

The power to extend the validity of a writ should only be exercised for good reason;

The question whether good reason exists in any particular case depends on all the circumstances in each particular case. Difficulty in effecting service of the writ may well constitute good reason, but it is not the only matter which is capable of doing so;

The balance of hardship between the parties can be a relevant matter to take into account in the exercise of the discretion; and

The discretion is that of the judge and his exercise of it should not be interfered with by an appellate court except on special grounds the nature of which is well established. (See the speech of Lord Brandon of Oakbrook in Baly and Anor, supra, HL; and Llyod Triestino Societa v. Chocolate Products (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd [1978] 2 MLJ 27 FC) [34] In our judgment, it is quite impossible to define the circumstances which can constitute "good cause" or "good reason". This must therefore be left to the judgment of the first instance judge: see Jones, supra; and Kleinwort Bension, supra. 20 [36] This court recognise the fact that what amount to ‘serious effort’ (as decided in the case of Duli Yang Maha Mulia Tunku Ibrahim Ismail Ibni Sultan Iskandar Al-Haj Tunku Mahkota Johor) and ‘good reason’ (as decided in Castle Inn Sdn Bhd’s case) is a question of facts and therefore depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. [37] In the instant case it is noted that for the service of the Writ in action in rem to be considered as good service, the Vessel must be in Malaysian waters. It therefore follows that without the Vessel being in Malaysian waters, service would not be able to be duly effected. This reason may be a good reason for the validity of the Writ be extended if the Vessel had not entered Malaysian waters or has yet to enter Malaysian waters. [38] However as can be seen from the data in relation to the movement of the Vessel published in the Seaweb produced by the Plaintiff, the Vessel had in fact entered Malaysian waters on a number of occasions. Yet there is no evidence to show that serious efforts had been made by the Plaintiff to serve the Writ on the Specific Dates when the Vessel was in Malaysian waters. As such applying the test laid out in the case of Castle Inn Sdn Bhd, the Plaintiff’s affidavit supporting its ex parte 21 application to extend the Writ in action in rem provide no good reason to warrant this court to exercise its discretion to extend the validity of the Writ. In fact, except for some dates and the exhibit, the Plaintiff’s affidavit (Enclosure 15) supporting its application for extension (Enclosure 14), is almost identical to the Plaintiff’s affidavit (Enclosure 11) filed supporting the Plaintiff’s first application for extension (Enclosure 10). This essentially means after the order for extension of the Writ was obtained in October 2017, there is no new development and/or no effort done in so far as service of the Writ on the Vessel is concerned. [39] It would appear the Plaintiff is not concern with complying with the prerequisite mandatory requirement. The fact that writ in admiralty action may be extended five times does not mean Plaintiff is entitle to the extension without showing serious efforts (made to serve the Writ) and good reason why this court ought to exercise its discretion to extend the validity of the Writ. Such approach is fatal to the Plaintiff because Order 6 rule 7(2A) of the RoC 2012 was introduced to prevent abuse by plaintiffs in filing writs and sleeping on them without making efforts to serve them which is against the administration of justice. Thus the said Order 6 rule 7(2A) is meant to be complied strictly (Duli Yang Maha 22 Mulia Tunku Ibrahim Ismail Ibni Sultan Iskandar Al-Haj Tunku Mahkota Johor’s case). Conclusion [40] Premised on the aforesaid reasons, the Plaintiff’s ex parte notice of application Enclosure 14 was accordingly dismissed. ( KHADIJAH BINTI IDRIS ) JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER HIGH COURT (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) DATED 4 JUNE 2018 Counsel: Plaintiff : Tan Mei Fang of Messrs Rahmat Lim & Partners