Soo Yin Hock v 1. ) Timbalan Menteri dalam Negeri Malaysia (BA-44-16-01/2025)

1.

2.

PENGARAH, PUSAT PEMULIHAN SIMPANG RENGGAM, JOHOR … RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT

The Applicant filed a writ of Habeas Corpus to challenge the Detention Order (DO) dated 20.12.2024 issued by the first Respondent under section 6(1) of the Dangerous Drugs Act (Special Preventive Measures) 1985 (the Act) ordering the Applicant's detention for two years at the Pusat Pemulihan 13/10/2025 12:09:03 Kand. 58 Akhlak (PPA) Simpang Rengam, Johor starting from the date of DO.

Upon the direction of the YDPA, after considering the Advisory Board's recommendation, the YDPA has approved the Advisory Board's recommendation to continue the DO and suspend it for the Applicant to undergo the restrictions at Mukim Ampang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Selangor.

After hearing the Application and reviewing the written submissions of both parties, this Court found that the Respondents complied with the Act's mandatory statutory requirements. Accordingly, the Applicant's challenge to the DO lacks merit, and the Court dismissed the Application.

Dissatisfied with the Court's decision, the Applicant filed a notice of appeal to the Federal Court dated 10 September 2025.

Hence, the Court now prepares the full grounds of judgment for the dismissal of the Application, in addition to the broad judgment read by the Court at the time of the decision.

The Police arrested the Applicant under section 3(1) of the Act on 6 November 2024.

On 15 November 2022, Deputy Superintendent of Police Shaifulmuzir bin Abdul Rahman received the Report relating to the Applicant's arrest and detention and reported it to Assistant Commissioner of Police Mazleen binti Mohd Nasir, an officer appointed under s. 3(2)(c) of the Act.

On 18 November 2022, the Assistant Commissioner reported the arrest and detention to the Home Minister.

On 26 November 2022, the Police Investigation Officer (Police IO) prepared the Investigation Report pursuant to s.3(3) of the Act.

On 4 December 2022, the KDN's Inquiry Officer (KDN's IO), Nur Sakinah Binti Ahmad Sodikin, conducted a physical investigation of the Applicant.

On 12 December 2022, the KDN's IO submitted her Report to the Home Minister pursuant to s.5(4) of the Act.

On 20 December 2024, the Home Minister, having received and perused the reports from the investigating and inquiry officers, the Deputy Home Minister issued a detention order against the Applicant under Section 6(1) of the Act for a period of two (2) years, commencing from 20 December

On 20 December 2024, the Police served the DO, the Allegation of Facts, and Form 1 on the Applicant at 11:50 p.m.

On 21 December 2024, the Applicant was brought to the Simpang Renggam PPA, Johor, the next day, as the DO and related documents could only be handed over to the Applicant late at night, at 11:50 pm. Therefore, to manage security risks, logistical preparations, and the assignment of officers and escort personnel, the Applicant could only be sent on 21 December 2024.

The officer in charge of the Simpang Renggam PPA, Johor, Mohamad Nazeff Bin Mohamed Mazelan, met with the Applicant as soon as the Applicant was brought into the Simpang Renggam PPA, Johor.

The officer in charge of the Simpang Renggam PPA, Johor, sent two (2) copies of the Applicant's Form I to the Advisory Board.

The Advisory Board held a hearing on 23 January 2025, at PPA Simpang Renggam, Johor.

The Advisory Board convened to hear the Applicant's representation. Still, it was adjourned at the request of the Applicant's Counsel, on the grounds of making preparations, as the counsels were newly appointed counsels by the Applicant. The next meeting date was on 11.03.2025, and the Applicant was verbally informed of this by the Advisory Board. The Board issued Form II on the same day.

The Advisory Board is comprised of the Chairman, Puan Nor Hazani Binti Hamzah, together with two (2) members of the Advisory Board, namely En. Nadzir Bin Topimin and En. Mohd Hussin Bin Mat Rashid.

The Applicant was present and represented by lawyers, namely Dato' Micheal K.L. Chee and Cik Dzvuriyah Binti Velayit Hussein.

The Applicant's Lawyer has called the following witnesses: 1) The Police Investigating Officer for the Applicant's case, Police Inspector Shakinah Binti Mohamad Saleh, but was unable to appear because she was taking care of her sick mother; and 2) Detective Corporal Cheow Chee Kin, but was not present because he was detained under Section 78(1) of the Police Act 1967, effective from 19.01.2025.

The Applicant did not plead guilty to all the Allegations of Fact, and the Applicant's Counsel has appealed for the DO to cease or for a restriction order to be issued.

The Advisory Board submitted a recommendation to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (YDPA) in accordance with s. 10(1) of the Act.

After considering the Advisory Board's recommendation, the YDPA has approved the Advisory Board's recommendation to continue the DO and suspend it for the Applicant to undergo the restrictions.

On 9 May 2025, the Respondent issued a suspension of the DO. ISSUES RAISED BY THE APPLICANT TO CHALLENGE THE

The Applicant raised five (5) contentions to challenge the DO as follows: i. The discrepancy in the date of the Police IO Investigation Report, where the KDN's IO, in her Affidavit, mistakenly stated that she received the Police Investigation Report dated 12 December

In contrast, the police Investigation Report, prepared by Police Inspector Shakinah binti Mohamad Saleh, was actually dated 26 November 2024. ii. Non-compliance with Section 10 read together with Section 7(1) of the Act - failure to comply with the YDPA's decision and recommendation at a convenient speed, and the order suspending the detention order is defective; iii. There was an unreasonable delay of fourteen (14) days for Police Inspector Shakinah Binti Mohamad Saleh in commencing the investigation and submitting the Report to the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs and the Inquiry Officer of the Ministry of Home Affairs. iv. Failure by the Respondents to forward the recorded statement in compliance with section 4 of the Act. v. Failure of witnesses, Police Inspector Shakinah Binti Mohamad Saleh and D/Cpl Cheow Chee Kin, to attend the hearing of the Applicant's representation. Therefore, the Respondents failed to comply with Section 12 of the Act.

The apex court in Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors v Nasharuddin Nasir [2004] 1 CLJ 81 decided that habeas corpus is a remedy to assist the release of a person from unlawful custody, as decided by Steve Shim FCJ: "It is a trite law that the remedy of habeas corpus is intended to facilitate the release of a person actually in unlawful custody. It is the fact of detention and nothing else which gives the Court its jurisdiction."

The principles of law derived from the apex Court regarding the challenges to the DO are settled. This Court is mindful of the judicial pronouncements by the apex court, which emphasised that an applicant can only challenge the DO on the grounds of procedural non-compliance with the Act.

Historically, the Parliament amended the Act in 1989, where section 11C was inserted into the Act by the amendment Act A738. With the amendment, the parameter to challenge the DO is limited to non-compliance with procedural requirements relative to previous challenges, including issues such as mala fide detention.

The apex Court decided a landmark decision in Lew Kew Sang v. Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2005] 3 CLJ 914, where Abdul Hamid FCJ (as he then was), in delivering the judgment of the Federal Court, held as follows:

Subsequently, the decision in Lew Kew Seng (supra) has been followed by another landmark decision, as seen in Chua Kian Voon v. Menteri Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Ors [2020] 1 CLJ 747, where the Federal Court held: "[67] Section 5(4) of the 1985 Act allows the Minister to prescribe regulations stipulating time but as apparent from the above, the Minister has not done so. We then turned to s. 54(2) of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 which stipulates that where no time is prescribed within which anything shall be done, that thing shall be done with all convenient speed and as often as the prescribed occasion requires. Simply put, for any matter where time has not by law been prescribed, such matter ought to be completed as soon as practicable and without inordinate delay. [68] As the burden to prove the detention was lawful lies on the detaining authority, whether the Report was completed with convenient speed or without inordinate delay remains a matter for the detaining authority ie, the respondents, to establish. It is trite that where there is delay on the part of the respondents to complete the Report with "convenient speed", it is incumbent upon the respondents to discharge the burden of proffering a satisfactory explanation for the delay. Thus, as we have alluded to earlier, if there is no explanation given, the Court will assume that there are no reasons. [69] We accordingly examined the evidence on record particularly the affidavits deposed by the inquiry officer, Nadia binti Mohd Izhar. We found none of her affidavits nor do any other affidavits from the respondents provide any credible reasons for the 21-day delay. The only reasons she gave in paras. 7 and 8 of her Affidavit in reply dated 13 September 2018 were that she could only conduct physical examination on the appellant because she needed to read the file, examine the documents and the other subjects (witnesses). These, with respect, hardly constitute reasons because they are procedural matters which every other inquiry officer in her place would have to perform. The Court cannot simply accede to the inquiry officer's plea of heavy workload as basis for the delay to conduct inquiry against the appellant under s. 5(2) of the 1985 Act. If this plea were to be accepted, it would become a source of justification for prolonged and unacceptable delay in conducting the inquiry and this would impair the interest of the appellant."

The burden then is on the Respondent to prove compliance with the law and procedures of the Act as decided in SK Tangakaliswaran Krishnan v. Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia [2010] 1 MLJ 149, where Gopal Sri Ram FCJ held: “[5]...It is settled law that on an application of "habeas corpus" the burden of satisfying the Court that the detention is lawful lies through the detaining authority. See, Chng Suan Tze v. The Minister of Home Affairs & Ors and Other Appeals [1988] 1 LNS 162. In Mohinuddin v. District Magistrate, Beed AIR [1987] SC 1977, the Supreme Court of India observed as follows in the context of art. 22 of the Indian Constitution from which is draw our art. 151: It is enough for the detenu to say that he is under wrongful detention, and the burden lies on the [2023] 1 LNS 2587 Legal Network Series 4 detaining authority to satisfy the Court that the detention is not illegal or wrongful and that the petitioner is not entitled to the relief claimed. This Court on more occasions that one has dealt with the question and it is now well settled that it is incumbent on the state to satisfy the Court that the detention of the petitioner / detenu was legal and in conformity not only the mandatory provisions of Act 316 but also strictly in accord with the constitutional safeguards embodies in Ar. 22(5)”.

Bearing in mind the above fundamental principles of law, this Court must determine, based on the issues raised by the Applicant and the documents before the Court, whether the Respondent has successfully discharged the onus of proving compliance with the procedural requirements of the Act.

This is especially crucial because preventive detention is the most basic deprivation of personal liberty, and the burden lies solely on the Respondents, who must prove that the detention was lawful under the Act. In Zaidi bin Kanapiah v ASP Khairul bin Rozduan and other cases [2021] 3 MLJ 759, YAA Tengku Maimun (CJ) held as follows "[4] I remind myself of the cardinal principles on habeas corpus that the burden to justify the legality of a detention rests on the detaining authority (see the pronouncements of this Court in Chua Kian Voon v Menteri Dalam Negeri & Ors [2020] 1 CLJ 747 ('Chua Kian Voon') at paragraph 14 and SK Takaliswaran Krishnan v Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia [2009] 6 CLJ 705, at paragraph 5). [5] The above principle is in accord with the very language of Article 5(2) of the FC having regard to the words 'unless satisfied that the detention is lawful'. The burden is constitutionally thrusted upon the detaining authority to establish to the Court's satisfaction that any given detention is lawful." THE COURT ANALYSIS AND FINDING Issue (i) - The alleged discrepancy in the date of the Police IO Investigation Report.

The Applicant essentially raised the issue when the KDN's IO, Nur Sakinah binti Ahmad Sodikin, at paragraph 6 of her Affidavit dated 26 February 2025, stated that she received the Investigation Report prepared by the Police IO dated 12 December 2024.

On the contrary, the Investigation Report prepared by the Police IO, Inspector Shakinah binti Mohamad Saleh, was actually dated 26 November 2024. The date 12 December 2024 is the date of the KDN's IO Inquiry Report.

As the Inquiry Officer did not file any Affidavit to rectify the alleged mistake in her Affidavit, the Applicant takes the opportunity to raise the technical issue in respect of the Inquiry Officer's Affidavit, citing the decisions, inter alia, Ng Hoon Choon v. Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri & Anor [1994] 4 CLJ 47, SK Tangakaliswaran Krishnan (supra), Jayaganesan Ramakrishnan v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri & Anor [2019] 1 LNS 1059 and Lim Kah Seng v. Menteri Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Ors [2024] CLJU 1524.

Following that, the Applicant's counsel argued that there was a critical discrepancy in the date of the Police IO's Investigation Report. The counsel further argued that the KDN IO is expected to base her Inquiry Report on the actual Police Investigation Report.

The Applicant's counsel submitted that, if she relied on a document dated 12 December 2024, it either does not exist or postdates the actual Report dated 26 November 2024. In that case, it raises serious doubts about whether the Deputy Home Minister had considered the Reports in their entirety and correctly. The counsel submitted that there was a procedural defect and the Respondent's failure to comply with the Act was therefore fatal.

The Applicant's counsel further argued that the Applicant is entitled to rely on his version as decided in SK Tangakaliswaran Krishnan (supra). Therefore, the Applicant's crux of argument is that the DO is defective and illegal; accordingly, the Restriction Order(RO) is also unlawful.

The Applicant's counsel also referred particularly to the decision made by this Court in Lim Kah Seng (supra) in allowing a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the facts of the case are similar to the facts of the instant case, and urged the Court to follow the same route as in Lim Kah Seng (supra).

The Federal Counsel (FC) representing the Respondents, on the other hand, contended that when the Applicant submitted the Affidavit in Reply, affirmed on 18 April 2025 after the contested Affidavit by KDN's Investigating Officer (IO), the Applicant failed to object to the error made by the KDN's IO.

Moreover, the Applicant did not even challenge the Affidavits submitted by the Police IO and the Deputy Minister, both of which referred to the accurate Police IO Investigation Report. See Ng Hee Thong & Anor v Public Bank Berhad [1995] 1

The FC further argued that there was no discrepancy regarding the Police IO Investigation Report, as the Police IO had prepared only one Investigation Report, which the Deputy Home Minister had also considered before issuing the DO. See paragraph 15 of the Police IO's Affidavit, affirmed on 27.2.2025 and paragraph 6 of the Affidavit averred by the Deputy Home Minister, affirmed on 19.2.2025.

Now, to determine the issue raised by the Applicant's counsel, the Court's duty in hearing an Application for a writ of Habeas Corpus is to inquire into the complaint by the Applicant to determine the legality of the detention. See the most recent Federal Court decision in Noor Kayes Hashim Ullah @ Noor Kayes Binti Hasmullah (UNHCR No: 354-23- 1882646) v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia, Komandan Depoh Tahanan Imigresen Tanah Merah, Kelantan Darul Naim & Kerajaan Malaysia, Criminal Appeal No. 05(HC)-140-10/2024(D).

Bearing in mind the fundamental judicial propositions in Timbalan Menteri Keselamatan Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors v Ong Beng Chuan [2006] 4 CLJ 703, which outlines the judicial principle that it is essential for this Court first to determine the procedural requirements under the Act, specifically whether the requirements are mandatory or directory.

Compliance with the mandatory requirement is a significant consideration in this matter, and failure to comply would render the DO invalid. The breach of a directory procedural requirement would not be crucial, provided that there is substantial compliance with the rules and that the Detainee suffers no prejudice.

The Applicant's counsel also strongly urged the Court to follow the approach taken by the Federal Court in allowing the writ of Habeas Corpus as decided in S K Tangakaliswaran a/l Krishnan (supra).

However, the facts of the case are significantly different from the facts of the instant case. In the case referred by the counsel, there was a serious conflict regarding compliance with s. 6(2) of the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance. The Deputy Home Minister stated in his Affidavit that the YDPA did, in fact, consider the Advisory Board's recommendation. But the Board's secretary contradicted this, saying there had been no response from the YDPA. In the face of the apparent conflict, the Federal Court decided that the Home Minister had failed to discharge the onus upon him of compliance with the mandatory procedure under section 10(1) of the Act.

Nevertheless, the present case did not involve a similar issue to that in S K Tangakaliswaran a/l Krishnan (supra). In this case, there is no issue of non-compliance with section 10(1) of the Act. Therefore, the Court is of the view that the case referred to by the Applicant's counsel is distinguishable and does not apply to the facts of the present case.

As stated earlier, the Court is mindful of its earlier decision in Lim Kah Seng (supra), referred to by the Applicant's counsel. The Court explicitly rejects counsel's attempt to draw parallels between Lim Kah Seng (supra) and the present case, as the facts in the former are substantially different from those in the instant case.

The material difference in the present case is that the Police IO prepared only one Investigation Report; therefore, there is no issue of a conflicting Investigation Report, unlike in Lim Kah Seng (supra).

The Applicant in that case raised a pertinent issue regarding two conflicting investigation reports prepared by the same Police IO, which the said IO failed to explain through an Affidavit. Relying on the judicial proposition by the apex court that the onus is on the Respondents to clarify the conflicts, the failure to do so had caused an adverse inference to the Respondents that the Respondents had failed to prove their compliance with the Act.

Returning to the issue raised by the Applicant's counsel, in addressing the problem not in isolation but based on the totality of the evidence from the Affidavits filed herein, the Court is of the view that, for all intents and purposes, the parties did not dispute that there was no Investigation Report dated 12 December 2024.

The apparent "mistake" by the KDN's IO (as rightly referred to by both counsels) is considered trivial and did not go to the root of the DO. In other words, it does not amount to a fatal flaw of the DO as contended by the Applicant's counsel and most importantly, it does not cause prejudice to the Applicant.

The Court also adopted a similar approach to that previously decided in Ali Fikri Mohamad Jelani v. Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri & Ors [2024] CLJU 2827, which the Federal Court had affirmed on 3 January 2025.

Based on the above, the Court decides that there is no merit regarding issue (i) as raised by the Applicant. Issue (ii) - Non-compliance with Section 10 read together with Section 7(1) of the Act - failure to comply with the YDPA's decision and recommendation at a convenient speed, and the order suspending the detention order is defective;

The Applicant's counsel's main contention was the alleged 55-day delay in the Minister's execution of the direction issued by the YDPA pursuant to Section 10 of the Act. To the Applicant's counsel, there was non-compliance with Section 10, read together with Section 7, of the Act.

Nevertheless, the Applicant's counsel did not dispute that the Advisory Board had complied with the statutory procedural requirement of section 10(1) of the Act. The only complaint by the Applicant was the alleged delay by the Respondent in issuing the RO.

The counsel further interpreted section 10(2) of the Act to mean that, in the absence of a specified timeframe for the first Respondent to issue the RO, it is implied that the RO should be issued at a convenient period, consistent with the approach adopted under sections 3(3) and 5(4) of the Act.

The FC argued that the test that the Deputy Home Minister must act at a convenient speed is inapplicable to section 10(2) of the Act, as the provisions of section 10(2) of the Act are not similar to sections 3(3) and 5(4) of the Act.

Having considered the Affidavits filed in this case, the Court noted that the Applicant did not dispute that the first Respondent had suspended the DO and that the restriction order with the conditions imposed had been issued. Therefore, only the operation of the DO was suspended, not the DO itself, and the DO remained in place and was never revoked, as decided by the Federal Court in Peter Chang Nyuk Ming v. Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri & Ors [2023] 7 CLJ 521. Therefore, the FC argued that the DO remained valid and that the RO is akin to a stay of the DO pending the issuance of the RO by the first Respondent.

The Court is also of the view that section 10 did not impose any timeframe for the Minister to execute YDPA's direction. Thus, the test that the Minister must execute the YDPA's direction at a convenient speed is irrelevant to the reading of that provision, unlike sections 3(3) and 5(4) of the Act.

Moreover, section 11C of the Act explicitly provides that there shall be no judicial review in any court, and that the Court has no jurisdiction in respect of any act done by the Minister in the exercise of the Minister's discretionary power under the Act, subject to any issue on the compliance of procedural requirements. See Lee Kew Sang (supra).

As the first Respondent had executed the YDPA's direction and the DO remained valid, the Court is of the view that there is no merit in the issue raised by the Applicant. Issue (iii) - There was an unreasonable delay of (14) days for Police Inspector Shakinah Binti Mohamad Saleh in commencing the investigation and submitting the Applicant's written Report to the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs and the Inquiry Officer of the Ministry of Home Affairs.

The Applicant raised a typical non-compliance issue with section 3(3) of the Act. The Applicant did not raise any novel issue in that matter. Instead, they are settled principles of law binding on this Court under the doctrine of stare decisis.

The Applicant raised a common challenge to the DO on the basis that there was an inordinate delay of fourteen (14) days in preparing the Investigation report by the Police IO. The Applicant's counsel urged this Court to follow the decision in Chua Kian Voon (supra) to allow this Application.

Thus, the approach this Court takes in addressing the issue at hand is to apply the propositions laid down in the recent Federal Court decision in Muhammad Redzuan Omar v. Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Anor [2023] 2 CLJ 859, which had shed light on the interpretation of section 3(3) of the Act and in light of section 54(2) of the Interpretations Act.

Section 3(3) of the Act provides that an Investigation Officer must submit the Report to the Minister within the period prescribed by the Minister. Section 22 of the Act further empowers the Minister to prescribe, by regulation, a specific period within which the Inquiry Officer must submit the Report to the Minister.

The Minister has issued no regulation to operate section 5(4) of the Act. In the absence of the prescribed period under section 5(4) of the Act, the reference to the Interpretation Acts becomes relevant to facilitate the operation of section 3(3).

Applying section 54(2) of the Interpretation Acts to section 3(3) of the Act means that where there is no time prescribed for the Inquiry Officer to submit the Report to the Minister, the officer must prepare the Report with all convenient speed. Hence, what constitutes "convenient speed" depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and is open to significant dispute by the Applicant, who may challenge the conduct of an investigating officer in preparing the investigation reports in an application for a writ of habeas corpus. Whether there was a lackadaisical attitude on the part of the investigating officer in attending to the investigation report, and the excuses given were weak (e.g., heavy workload).

The Federal Court after having analysed the provisions of the Act holistically made it more evident that in the absence of any regulation issued by the Minister to prescribe a specific period for the submission of the inquiry reports, the DO is legal and valid so long as the investigating officers prepared the reports (investigation and inquiry reports) within 60 days before the issuance of the DO.

The Federal Court also highlighted a critical point, specifically section 3(2) of the Act, which the earlier Federal Court in Chua Kian Voon (supra) did not consider. Hasnah Mohammed Hashim FCJ, on page 877, delivering the judgment of the Federal Court, held as follows: "[43] It is our observation that unfortunately in Chua Kian Voon (supra) s. 3(2) of the Act was not addressed. A similar observation was made by this Court in Tamilarasan Subramaniam v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2021] 10 CLJ 163; [45] The detention order of the Minister pursuant to section 6 of the Act must be made within the prescribed 60-days as prescribed by subsection 3(2). Hence, if the number of days taken for investigation, inquiry and submission of the reports of the IO and Inquiry Officer totalled to more than the prescribed 60-days the Minister cannot issue the detention order as the detention order issued beyond the prescribed 60-days for the purposes of the investigation and inquiry is illegal. [46] In respect of s. 5(4) of the Act and the delay in submission of the Report, s. 54(2) of Act 388 was referred to and relied upon by the Federal Court. Section 54(2) of the aforesaid Act provides where no time is prescribed within which anything shall be done, that thing shall be done with all convenient speed and as often as the prescribed occasion requires. Section 54 of Act 388 reads:

In computing time for any written law: (2) Where no time is prescribed within which anything shall be done, that thing shall be done with all convenient speed and as often as the prescribed occasion arises. [47] For any matter where time has not been prescribed by written law, such matter ought to be completed as soon as practicable and without inordinate delay. However, we find it necessary to emphasise that the provision of s. 5(4) of the Act must not be read in isolation from the other provisions in the Act in the determination of non-compliance with the procedure as set out under the Act. Section 3(2) of the Act prescribed the period of detention of 60 days must be taken into consideration in determining the compliance or non-compliance with the procedures as provided under the Act. One cannot and must not turn a blind eye to the existence and the importance of the maximum period of detention without warrant of arrest for the purposes of investigation and inquiry as provided under s. 3(2) of the Act in the Application of the other provisions of the Act. The provision of s. 3(2) of the Act gives the police power to conduct an investigation and inquiry within the prescribed 60 days period" (emphasis added)

Having perused the Affidavit, the Court is satisfied that the Police investigation officer had given a proper explanation in her Affidavit to justify the time taken to prepare the Report. It is not for this Court to question the manner in which the Police Officer investigated the case. In fact, the Federal Court, on appeal, had accepted the reasons given by a Police IO in a similar case before this Court as credible. See Ali Fikri (supra).

Hence, applying the decision in Muhammad Redzuan Omar (supra) to the facts of the instant case, there is no dispute that the Investigating officer prepared her Report within the 60-day time frame.

The Court ruled that the Respondents had complied with the procedural requirement under the Act. The Court found no merit in the Applicant's challenge to the issue raised. Issue (iv) - Failure by the Respondents to forward the recorded statement in compliance with section 4 of the Act

Based on the Affidavit of Police Inspector Shakinah binti Mohamad Saleh, the Police sent the statement to the Applicant's counsel on 7 March 2025; however, the Applicant's counsel denied receiving it.

Considering the circumstances of the case and the judicial principles established by the apex Court in similar matters, this Court finds no basis to question the Affidavit made under oath by the Police Inspector. As a public officer performing his official duties, he is presumed to have acted without personal motive or intent to misuse the process against the Applicant, and the police officer had discharged his duty as stated in his Affidavit. See Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Noor v Ketua Polis Negara & other appeals [2002] 4 MLJ 449.

Therefore, the Court accordingly dismissed the issue raised as devoid of merit. Issue (v) - Failure of witnesses, Police Inspector Shakinah Binti Mohamad Saleh and D/Cpl Cheow Chee Kin, to attend the hearing of the Applicant's representation. Therefore, the Respondents failed to comply with Section 12 of the Act.

Lastly, on the alleged failure by witnesses Shakinah binti Mohamad Saleh and D/Kpl Cheow Chee Kin to attend the hearing of the representation. The Applicant submits that there was non-compliance with section 12 of the Act.

The Court decides that there is no merit to the issue raised by the Applicant, as both witnesses had affirmed in their affidavits the reasons for not attending the representation, which the Court finds to be reasonable and justified explanations. See paragraph 5 of the Affidavit of Police Inspector Shakinah binti Mohamad Saleh and paragraph 4 of D/Corp Cheow Chee Kin, respectively.