South Ayrshire Council v Ung Eng Huat (W-02(IM)(NCvC)-1382-08/2024)

Court of Appeal of Malaysia3 Dec 2025

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18 July 2026 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF MALAYSIA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) CIVIL APPEAL NO: W-02(IM)(NCVC)-1382-08/2024 BETWEEN SOUTH AYRSHIRE COUNCIL ... APPELLANT AND UNG ENG HUAT … RESPONDENT CORAM: AZIZUL AZMI BIN ADNAN, JCA ALWI BIN ABDUL WAHAB, JCA EVROL MARIETTE PETERS, JCA GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT 20/07/2026 11:50:42 W-02(IM)(NCvC)-1382-08/2024 Kand. 35 18 July 2026 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Introduction [1] This appeal arises from the decision of the learned Judicial Commissioner in allowing the Respondent's application to set aside an Order registering a foreign judgment. The Order to register the foreign judgment was obtained by the Appellant pursuant to the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1958 to enforce a default decree against the Respondent that the Appellant had obtained from the Court of Session, Scotland. Factual background [2] The Appellant is the local government authority for South Ayrshire, one of the council areas in Scotland, responsible for providing local public services within the South Ayrshire area. The Respondent is a Malaysian citizen who owned a property in Scotland. [3] In 2010, the Respondent purchased the Station Hotel in Ayr, Scotland ("the Property"), with the intention of converting it into student accommodation. Those plans, however, never materialised, and during the Respondent's ownership, the Property gradually fell into a state of disrepair. [4] As the condition of the Property deteriorated and posed a safety concern, the Appellant undertook works to secure it, including the erection of scaffolding and protective coverings. [5] The Appellant subsequently commenced proceedings against the Respondent in the Court of Session, Scotland ("the Court of Session"), seeking to recover the sum of GBP616,738.95, being the costs it allegedly incurred in carrying out repair and remedial works 18 July 2026 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3 to the Property. The Respondent had not entered an appearance or otherwise participated in the action ("the Scottish Proceedings"). Consequently, on 19 October 2021, the Court of Session entered a default decree ("the Default Decree") in favour of the Appellant for the amount claimed. [6] Separately, following two fires at the Property in May and September 2023, the Appellant commenced emergency demolition works in April 2024 pursuant to the Building (Scotland) Act 2003. In May 2024, the Respondent had commenced proceedings in Scotland to challenge the demolition on the basis that it had been undertaken without adequate notice. The challenge, although ultimately unsuccessful, had temporarily halted the demolition works. [7] On 3 October 2023, the Appellant successfully applied to the Kuala Lumpur High Court, by way of Originating Summons, to register and enforce the Default Decree in Malaysia pursuant to the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1958 ("REJA"). Accordingly, a registration order ("the Registration Order") was granted. [8] In January 2024, the Respondent applied to set aside the Registration Order ("the Setting-Aside Application") and to transfer the proceedings to the Special Powers Division of the High Court in Kuala Lumpur (“Special Powers Division”). [9] The learned Judicial Commissioner allowed the Setting-Aside Application on the ground that the Respondent had not been properly served with the notice of the Scottish Proceedings. However, the learned Judicial Commissioner had also ordered that 18 July 2026 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4 the hearing of the Setting-Aside Application be transferred to the Special Powers Division. [10] Hence this Appeal. Issues [11] The primary issue was whether the learned Judicial Commissioner had erred by disregarding the Respondent’s failure in bringing his case within the ground specified in section 5(1)(a)(iii) of the REJA. [12] The following sub-issues were distilled as follows: a) Whether the learned Judicial Commissioner had erred in holding that the Respondent had not received notice of the Scottish Proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend such proceedings; b) Whether the learned Judicial Commissioner erred in law and in fact by failing to consider the Respondent's unexplained delay in filing the Setting-Aside Application, and whether such delay, in the absence of any satisfactory justification, ought to have militated against the grant of relief sought; and c) Whether the learned Judicial Commissioner had erred in ordering the proceedings to be transferred to the Special Powers Division. [13] We unanimously allowed this Appeal for the following reasons. 18 July 2026 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5 Contentions, evaluation, and findings Whether Judicial Commissioner erred by disregarding Respondent’s failure in bringing his case within section 5 of REJA [14] The starting point of this Appeal was section 5(1) of the REJA which provides for situations where registered judgments may be set aside. The provision reads: Section 5 – Cases in which registered judgments must, or may, be set aside

On an application in that behalf duly made by any party against whom a registered judgment may be enforced, the registration of the judgment—

shall be set aside if the registering court is satisfied-

that the judgment is not a judgment to which this Part applies or was registered in contravention of this Act;

(ii) that the courts of the country of the original court had no jurisdiction in the circumstances of the case;

III

(iii) that the judgment debtor, being the defendant in the proceedings in the original court, did not (notwithstanding that process may have been duly served on him in accordance with the law of the country of the original court) receive notice of those proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend the proceedings and did not appear;

(iv) that the judgment was obtained by fraud;

that the enforcement of the judgment would be contrary to public policy in Malaysia; or

(vi) that the rights under the judgment are not vested in the person by whom the application for registration was made; and [Emphasis added.] 18 July 2026 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6 [15] The grounds in section 5(1) of the REJA are exhaustive. They are not illustrative, nor are they merely factors to be weighed. They are the exclusive gateway through which a judgment debtor, in this case the Respondent, must pass to set aside a registration. If a judgment debtor cannot prove any of these grounds, the court has no discretion to refuse enforcement on other grounds. [16] Before the High Court, the Respondent invoked only one provision, namely section 5(1)(a)(iii) of the REJA. He claimed that he had not received notice of the Scottish Proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend, and hence, had not appeared. That was his sole statutory basis for the Setting-Aside Application which the learned Judicial Commissioner had allowed. [17] To succeed under section 5(1)(a)(iii) of the REJA, the Respondent would have to prove two essential elements on a balance of probabilities. First, he would have to prove that he had not received notice of the Scottish Proceedings. Secondly, the Respondent would have to prove that lack of such notice had resulted in his inability to defend those proceedings in sufficient time. [18] In our view, the Respondent had failed to prove either element, and our reasons are as follows. Whether Judicial Commissioner erred in holding that Respondent had not received notice of Scottish Proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend such proceedings [19] The Respondent contended that he had no knowledge of the Scottish Proceedings, and that he had never been served with the summons. Consequently, the Respondent claimed that he had been 18 July 2026 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7 denied the opportunity to be heard, in breach of the principles of natural justice. [20] The Appellant, on the other hand, contended that the learned Judicial Commissioner had fundamentally erred by failing to give proper weight to the uncontroverted documentary evidence which demonstrated that the Respondent had, in fact, been duly served with the summons. Instead, the learned Judicial Commissioner was said to have placed undue reliance on the Respondent's bare and self-serving denial of service, notwithstanding the objective evidence to the contrary. [21] In our view, the learned Judicial Commissioner had erred in holding that the Respondent had not received notice of the Scottish Proceedings. That finding was unsustainable for several reasons. [22] First, the Appellant had placed before the High Court, a Certificate of Personal Service confirming that the summons dated 1 July 2021, issued by the Court of Session, was served on the Respondent on 24 August 2021. Having been served with the summons on 24 August 2021 meant that the Respondent had 56 days to enable him to defend the Scottish Proceedings which was scheduled on 19 October 2021. The Respondent, however, had failed to attend such proceedings. [23] Secondly, the learned Judicial Commissioner had misapplied the burden of proof. The test under section 5(1)(a)(iii) of the REJA requires the registering court to be satisfied that the judgment debtor “did not (notwithstanding that process may have been duly served on him in accordance with the law of the country of the original court) 18 July 2026 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8 receive notice of those proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend the proceedings and did not appear.” [24] In the present case, the Appellant had adduced sufficient evidence to establish that the summons was duly served on the Respondent in accordance with the law of Scotland. The burden, therefore, shifted to the Respondent to demonstrate that he had not received notice of the Scottish Proceedings. The Respondent, however, had failed to place any material before the learned Judicial Commissioner beyond his bare denial that he was unaware of the Scottish Proceedings. It was crucial to note that the Respondent had not denied that he maintained an address at Suite B-26-1 F026, Pavilion Residences Tower 2, Jalan Raja Chulan, 55100, Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, where the summons was served at; and had also not denied that he was acquainted with one Mr Zahari, his personal assistant on whom the summons was served. [25] We were of the view that the learned Judicial Commissioner ought to have been satisfied with the evidence before the Court that, in the absence of any corroborative material or credible explanation from the Respondent, his bare assertion of non-receipt of the summons was insufficient to satisfy the requisite burden of proof. [26] Notwithstanding the contemporaneous documentary evidence adduced by the Appellant, the learned Judicial Commissioner had, in error, discounted or overlooked such evidence without adequate justification. In fact, undue weight was placed by the Judicial Commissioner on the Respondent's unsupported assertion that he was "not aware" of the Scottish Proceedings. 18 July 2026 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9 [27] It is trite that a mere assertion in an affidavit, standing alone and contradicted by contemporaneous documentary evidence, does not suffice to discharge the burden of proof. The irresistible inference, therefore, was that service of the summons had been effected accordingly, and that notice of the Scottish Proceedings was, in fact, received by the Respondent. Consequently, the ground pursuant to section 5(1)(a)(iii) of the REJA had clearly not been made out. [28] The Respondent had also not attempted to prove that the lack of notice of the Scottish Proceedings had resulted in his inability to defend. Even if he had proved non-receipt of the summons, the Respondent would still need to show that he had a defence that he could have raised had he received such notice. Instead, the Respondent had made vague references to a "meritorious defence" concerning wrongful confiscation of property and disputed repair bills, alleging, for instance, that the Appellant had wrongfully taken possession of the Property, had failed to adequately secure it, thereby exposing it to arson and fire, and that the sums claimed for the repair works had been disputed by the Respondent. [29] The Respondent, however, provided no particulars; no explanation of how the Court of Session would have ruled differently; no witness statements or expert evidence; and not even a draft defence. Mere assertions of a defence, without more, are insufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 5(1)(a)(iii) of the REJA. In our view, the Respondent should have, at least, demonstrated a real prospect of success on the merits, which he had failed to do. [30] In her Grounds of Judgment, the learned Judicial Commissioner, however, found, that "on balance of probabilities, the JD as the 18 July 2026 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10 Defendant in the proceedings at the Court of Session, Scotland, did not receive notice of those proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend the proceedings and he also did not appear in Court." In our view, that finding by the learned Judicial Commissioner was not supported by the evidence. [31] Finally, we were of the view that the learned Judicial Commissioner had misdirected herself in invoking the court's inherent powers under Order 92 rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 (“Rules of Court”) in allowing the Setting-Aside Application "as it was obtained in the absence of the JD so as to prevent injustice." The provision reads: Order 92 – Miscellaneous Rule 4 – Inherent powers of the Court For the removal of doubt it is hereby declared that nothing in these Rules shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the Court to make any order as may be necessary to prevent injustice or to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court. [32] Order 92 rule 4 of the Rules of Court preserves the court's inherent jurisdiction as a residual source of procedural power to prevent injustice and abuse of process. However, it was never intended to confer an unfettered or arbitrary discretion upon the court. If invoked indiscriminately, the provision would undermine the certainty, predictability and orderly administration of justice embodied in the Rules of Court and in legislation enacted by Parliament. The inherent jurisdiction exists to supplement, not supplant, the established procedural framework, and may only be exercised where the rules are silent or inadequate to address a particular situation. 18 July 2026 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11 [33] Accordingly, Order 92 rule 4 of the Rules of Court must be applied cautiously and sparingly, ensuring that it is not used to circumvent express statutory provisions, create substantive rights, or achieve outcomes inconsistent with the governing legal framework. This has been expounded in several cases including Tan Beng Sooi v Penolong Kanan Pendaftar Mahkamah Tinggi, Pulau Pinang [1995] 2 MLJ 421 and Permodalan MBF Sdn Bhd v Tan Sri Datuk Seri Hamzah Abu Samah & Ors [1988] 1 CLJ 31. [34] Section 5(1) of the REJA is a complete code governing the setting aside of registered foreign judgments; it specifies exactly when a registration may be set aside. To invoke inherent powers on a ground not found in section 5(1) of the REJA would be to subvert the legislative scheme. The court cannot, under the guise of preventing injustice, create new grounds for setting aside that Parliament has not provided. If the Respondent could not prove any of the statutory grounds, the learned Judicial Commissioner had no power to allow the Setting-Aside Application, however sympathetic she might have been to the Respondent's position. The invocation of inherent powers in this context was, in our view, a misdirection in law. [35] We, therefore, concluded that the learned Judicial Commissioner had erred by allowing the Setting-Aside Application. 18 July 2026 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12 Whether Judicial Commissioner erred in failing to consider absence of justification for Respondent's unexplained delay in filing the Setting-Aside Application [36] The Appellant contended that the learned Judicial Commissioner had erred in hearing the Setting-Aside Application despite it being filed well out of time. [37] The express terms of the Registration Order afforded the Respondent a clear and unambiguous period of 14 days pursuant to Order 67 rule 5(2) of the Rules of Court within which to file the Setting-Aside Application. The provision reads: Order 67 – Reciprocal enforcement of judgments Rule 5 – Order for registration …

Every such order shall state the period within which an application may be made to set aside the registration and shall contain a notification that execution on the judgment will not issue until after the expiration of that period. [Emphasis added.] [38] The Appellants tendered evidence to show that the Registration Order was served on both 6 December 2023 and 18 December 2023 to the Respondent’s last known addresses as evidenced in the Affidavit of Service. The Appellant had filed Affidavits of Service dated 4 January 2024 and 9 January 2024 to confirm service of the Registration Order and Notice of Registration on the Respondent's last known addresses. 18 July 2026 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13 [39] Since the Registration Order was served on the Respondent on 18 December 2023, this meant that the Respondent had, until 1 January 2024, to file the Setting-Aside Application, but he did so only on 15 January 2024. [40] The Respondent maintained that he had only become aware of the Registration Order on 4 January 2024, when he purportedly received the Notice of Registration for the first time. According to the Respondent, it was only upon receipt of that notice that he had become aware of the existence of the registration proceedings, and that such notice had come as a complete shock to him. [41] The learned Judicial Commissioner, however, allowed the Setting-Aside Application to proceed “in the interest of justice”. [42] In our view, the Respondent's attempt to excuse the late filing of the Setting-Aside Application was fundamentally flawed and ought to have been rejected by the learned Judicial Commissioner, for the following reasons. [43] First, the Respondent's Setting-Aside Application was filed out of time, yet it contained no prayer seeking an extension of time. Equally significant, the affidavit in support of the Setting-Aside Application was entirely devoid of any explanation for the delay. The Respondent merely asserted that he had no knowledge of the proceedings. He did not claim that illness had prevented him from acting, or that he had been absent from the jurisdiction, or that he had encountered difficulties in obtaining legal advice, or that he was mistaken as to the applicable deadline, or that the relevant documents had been served late. Indeed, no reason of any kind was 18 July 2026 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 14 advanced to justify his failure to comply with the prescribed time limits under the Rules of Court. In effect, the Respondent invited the High Court to disregard his non-compliance without offering any explanation whatsoever — a course which, it appeared, the learned Judicial Commissioner was prepared to adopt. [44] The Respondent then attempted to deflect by arguing that the Appellant had raised the delay objection too late, only in written submissions and not in an affidavit. In our view, that argument missed the point entirely. The burden to justify the delay never rested on the Appellant, but rested squarely on the Respondent as the party in breach of the Rules of Court. In our view, the Respondent could not be allowed to shift that burden to the Appellant. Nor could he now complain that the objection was raised late when he himself failed to address the delay proactively in his own application, as he was duty-bound to do. A party who files an application out of time must, at the very least, acknowledge the delay and place before the court some material upon which its discretion can be exercised. The Respondent did neither. [45] The established legal principles are clear. To have allowed the Setting-Aside Application to proceed in these circumstances would send a dangerous message, namely, that deadlines are optional, and that parties may disregard the Rules of Court with impunity, so long as they can later invoke the vague and amorphous notion of "the interest of justice." That is not, and cannot be, the law. [46] To fortify our view that the receipt of the Notice of Registration could not have shocked the Respondent as he had claimed, we took note of the fact that the Appellant had also duly served the Default Decree 18 July 2026 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15 on the Respondent. The records showed that on 21 October 2021, the Default Decree was transmitted by email directly to the Respondent and, contemporaneously, to his Scottish solicitors, D & F Lawyers. [47] Service on D & F Lawyers was neither incidental nor speculative, since as early as April 2021, the law firm had been corresponding directly with the Appellant on the Respondent's behalf in relation to the Property. The Appellant, therefore, had every reason to regard D & F Lawyers as the Respondent's solicitors on record in respect of the Scottish Proceedings. Service upon that firm on 21 October 2021 accordingly constituted further evidence that the Respondent had been duly notified of the Scottish Proceedings as well as the Default Decree. [48] In our view, the learned Judicial Commissioner should have appreciated the significance of the Respondent's legal representation by D & F Lawyers, and that the Default Decree was served on that firm on 21 October 2021. If the Respondent had genuinely wished to defend the claim, his solicitors could have entered an appearance, but they had not done so. That failure was attributable to the Respondent himself, not to any deficiency in service. He cannot and should not now claim ignorance of the Scottish Proceedings when his own personal assistant as well as legal representatives were served on his behalf. [49] Viewed against the totality of the evidence, the Respondent's assertion that he was entirely ignorant of the Scottish Proceedings until 4 January 2024, and was shocked upon receiving the Notice of Registration, was simply untenable. 18 July 2026 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 16 Whether Judicial Commissioner erred in allowing proceedings to be transferred to Special Powers Division. [50] In the Setting-Aside Application, the Respondent had also sought to transfer the case from the Civil Division to the Special Powers Division, both courts in Kuala Lumpur, arguing that the Appellant had filed the action in the wrong division from the outset. [51] According to the Respondent, the REJA requires that matters involving the registration of reciprocal judgments to be assigned to the Special Powers Division, and not the Civil Division. The Respondent contended that this was not a minor technical error but a fundamental misclassification. The learned Judicial Commissioner, therefore, granted an order to transfer these proceedings to the Special Powers Division. [52] We found that the learned Judicial Commissioner had erred in doing so, for the following reasons. [53] It is settled law that the movement of proceedings between divisions of the same High Court station is merely an administrative reallocation and does not constitute a transfer in the legal sense. In Kerajaan Negeri Kelantan v Petroleum Nasional Berhad & Anor [2011] 6 CLJ 649, the Court of Appeal observed that the reassignment of a case from one division to another within the Kuala Lumpur High Court did not amount to a transfer of proceedings between different High Courts as contemplated by the relevant statutory provisions. At most, it was an administrative matter falling within the court's internal case-management framework. 18 July 2026 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 17 [54] Hence, judges sitting in the Civil Division, Commercial Division, and Special Powers Division at the Kuala Lumpur High Court exercise the same co-ordinate jurisdiction as judges of the High Court. A matter assigned to one division does not thereby become incapable of being heard by a judge sitting in another. [55] Accordingly, if the learned Judicial Commissioner was of the view that the matter should have been handled by the Special Powers Division, the appropriate course would have been to refer the issue administratively to the managing judge. [56] Consequently, there was no legal impediment preventing the learned Judicial Commissioner in the Civil Division from hearing and determining the Respondent's Setting-Aside Application. Practice Direction No. 7 of 2013 (Amendments and Additions to Practice Direction No. 6 of 2013 on the Classification of Case Codes), relied upon by the Respondent, concerned internal case management and allocation; it did not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. [57] In any event, having set aside the Registration Order, thereby removing the Default Decree from the register of the court, the learned Judicial Commissioner then proceeded to order that the matter be transferred to the Special Powers Division. [58] In our view, both orders were inherently incompatible. The learned Judicial Commissioner could not simultaneously bring the proceedings to an end and direct that those same proceedings be transferred elsewhere for further management. If her Ladyship was of the view that the matter ought properly to have been heard in the Special Powers Division, the appropriate course would have been 18 July 2026 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 18 to direct a transfer before hearing the Setting-Aside Application, thereby allowing a judge in the Special Powers Division to hear and decide the matter. That would have preserved both procedural logic and judicial coherence. Conclusion [59] For the aforesaid reasons, we were unanimously of the view that the learned Judicial Commissioner had erred in allowing the Respondent’s Setting-Aside Application and transfer of proceedings. Consequently, this Appeal was allowed with costs of MYR30,000 here and below, such costs to be subject to an allocatur. The Order of the High Court was, therefore, set aside. Dated: 18 July 2026 ………….…SIGNED…………… (EVROL MARIETTE PETERS) Judge of the Court of Appeal Malaysia Counsel: For the Appellant – Shaikh Abdul Saleem, Nurul Ameerah Natasya binti Ismail Ridha; Messrs Shaikh David & Co 18 July 2026 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 19 For the Respondent – Dato’ Seri Rajan Navaratnam, Sheena Sebastian, Aswath A/L Ramakrishnan, Nur Irdina Syahirah bt. Mohammad Wardi; Messrs Ahmad Deniel, Ruben & Co

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Case metadata

Court: Court of Appeal of Malaysia
Decision date: 3 Dec 2025
Case number: W-02(IM)(NCvC)-1382-08/2024
Coram: YA Dato' Azizul Azmi Bin Adnan; YA Dato' Dr Alwi Bin Abdul Wahab; YA Datin Paduka Evrol Mariette Peters
Practice area: Civil procedure – Registration of foreign judgment – Whether Respondent had brought his case within ground specified in section 5(1)(a)(iii) of the REJA - Whether Judicial Commissioner had erred in holding that the Respondent had not received notice of Scottish Proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend such proceedings Civil procedure – Registration of foreign judgment – Application to set aside order granting registration of foreign judgment – Delay in filing setting aside application – Whether Judicial Commissioner erred by failing to consider Respondent's unexplained delay in filing Setting-Aside Application – Whether such delay, in absence of satisfactory justification, ought to have militated against grant of relief sought Civil procedure – Registration of foreign judgment – Application to set aside order granting registration of foreign judgment – Whether Judicial Commissioner had erred in ordering the proceedings to be transferred to Special Powers Division
Version: Alasan Penghakiman 1
Published: 20 Jul 2026
Source ID: 3da83495-b402-4b1f-b6e4-227cbca69e7a

Catchwords

Civil procedure – Registration of foreign judgment – Whether Respondent had brought his case within ground specified in section 5(1)(a)(iii) of the REJA - Whether Judicial Commissioner had erred in holding that the Respondent had not received notice of Scottish Proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend such proceedings Civil procedure – Registration of foreign judgment – Application to set aside order granting registration of foreign judgment – Delay in filing setting aside application – Whether Judicial Commissioner erred by failing to consider Respondent's unexplained delay in filing Setting-Aside Application – Whether such delay, in absence of satisfactory justification, ought to have militated against grant of relief sought Civil procedure – Registration of foreign judgment – Application to set aside order granting registration of foreign judgment – Whether Judicial Commissioner had erred in ordering the proceedings to be transferred to Special Powers Division

Parties

SOUTH AYRSHIRE COUNCIL - appellant - ejudgment_parties
Ung Eng Huat - respondent - ejudgment_parties

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South Ayrshire Council v Ung Eng Huat (W-02(IM)(NCvC)-1382-08/2024)

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