Nothing in this section shall affect the case of any condition or warranty the fulfilment of which is excused by law by reason of impossibility or otherwise. The law on the breach of warranty was explained by Abdul Malek J (as he then was) in the case of Universal Cable (M) Bhd v. Bakti Arena Sdn Bhd & Ors [2000] 3 CLJ as follows: "Now, when there is a breach of warranty, the contract remains in force and the first defendant as the buyer is restricted to a claim in damages. Section 12(3) of the SGA defines a warranty as a stipulation collateral to the main purpose of the contract, the breach of which gives rise to a claim for damages but not to a right to reject the goods and treat the contract as repudiated. section 12(4) of the SGA enacts that whether a stipulation in a contract of sale is a condition or a warranty depends in each case on the construction of the contract. The stipulation may be a condition, though called a warranty in the contract. Section 12(1) of the SGA enacts that a stipulation in a contract of sale with reference to goods which are the subject thereof may be a condition or a warranty. Thus, in order to satisfy the definition of a warranty, there must,first, be an agreement between the parties, a promise that the representation is or will be true ( Behn v. Burness [1863] 3 B & S 751 at 755; Bentsen v.Taylor, Sons & Co. (2) [1893] 2 QB 274 CA; Heilbut, Symons & Co Ltd v. Buckleton [1913] AC 30, HL; Oscar Chess Ltd v.Williams [1957] 1 ALL ER 325; [1957] 1 WLR 370, CA; and Dick Bentley Productions Ltd v. Harold Smith (Motors) Ltd [1965] 1 WLR 623, CA). Secondly, the agreement must be collateral to the main purpose of the contract and it is for the purpose of transferring the property in and the possession of the goods of the description contracted for the buyer. The warranty is said to be collateral because the breach of it, unlike the breach of a condition, is not the breach of the whole consideration (Wallis, Son and Wells v. Pratt and Haynes [1910] 2 KB 1003 at 1012). Everything hinges on the contract. Whether a stipulation in a contract of sale is a condition the breach of which gives rise to a right to treat the contract as repudiated, or a warranty, the breach of which may give rise to a claim for damages, depends in each case on the construction of the contract itself (Cehave NV v. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft mbH, The Hansa Nord [1976] QB 44; [1975] 3 A11 ER 739, CA; Tradax International SA v. Goldschmidt SA [1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep604; Bremer Handelsgesellschaft mbH v.Vanden Avenne – I zegem PVBA [1978] 2 L LOYD'S Rep 109, HL; and Bnge Corpn v. Tradax SA [1981] 2 A11ER 513; [1981] 1 WLR 711 HL). As demonstrated, s. 12 of the SGA expressly provides that a term essential to the main purpose of the contract where a breach of which will entitle the injured party to terminate the contract, or that a term is collateral to the main purpose of the contract where its breach gives rise only to a claim for damages".