a
(a) is issued by a person who is an authorized insurer within the meaning of this Part; and
/akn/my/judgment/court-of-appeal/2019/2ef424ae-e436-4c0d-a4b9-7b5a0ac1ca02
Court of Appeal of Malaysia30 Apr 2019J-04(IM)-250-06/2018
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“(g) The Plaintiff filed a suit against the 1st and 2nd Defendants as authorized driver and owner of motor vehicle WPW 4068 for the loss of support, bereavement and funeral expenses under section 7 Civil Law Act 1956.”
“RM10,000 and funeral expenses at RM3,000. It was further agreed that Plaintiff had claimed from Socso and was receiving RM1,000 per month. 4 [3] It was held by the Sessions Court that section 31 of Employees Social Security Act 1969 (Socso Act) does not prohibit Plaintiff's claim against Defendants. On appeal, this Cou”
“he Court) 3 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT [1] The appellant/plaintiff’s appeal against the decision of the High Court which overruled the decision of the Sessions Court whilst interpreting section 31 of the Employer Social Security Act 1969 (Socso Act) with sections 91(1) and 91(1)(aa) of the Road Transport Act 1987 (RTA 1987).”
“pondent. Accident took place between two vehicles owned by the 2nd respondent in consequence of the negligence of the drivers. [3] This judgment is delivered pursuant to section 42 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (JCA) as our sister Yeoh Wee Siam has since retired. This is a unanimous decision by the remaining mem”
“ision of the High Court which overruled the decision of the Sessions Court whilst interpreting section 31 of the Employer Social Security Act 1969 (Socso Act) with sections 91(1) and 91(1)(aa) of the Road Transport Act 1987 (RTA 1987). [2] The plaintiff, on behalf of the deceased is making the claim. The deceased was t”
“[1] The appellant/plaintiff’s appeal against the decision of the High Court which overruled the decision of the Sessions Court whilst interpreting section 31 of the Employer Social Security Act 1969 (Socso Act) with sections 91(1) and 91(1)(aa) of the Road Transport Act 1987 (RTA 1987). [2] The plaintiff, on behalf of”
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1 DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA (BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN SIVIL NO: J-04(IM)-250-06/2018 ... PERAYU [Mendakwa sebagai balu yang sah kepada Mohd Yusof bin Sahak, Simati]
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2. KORAKAN CORPORATION SDN BHD … RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN [DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI JOHOR BAHRU DALAM NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM, MALAYSIA RAYUAN SIVIL NO.: JA-12A-15-2017]
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2. KORAKAN CORPORATION SDN BHD … PERAYU-PERAYU 2 ... RESPONDEN [Mendakwa sebagai balu yang sah kepada Mohd Yusof bin Sahak, Simati] [DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI KOTA TINGGI DALAM NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO.: JA-A53KJ-11-2016] ... PLAINTIF [Mendakwa sebagai balu yang sah kepada Mohd Yusof bin Sahak, Simati]
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2. KORAKAN CORPORATION SDN BHD … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN Coram: Hamid Sultan bin Abu Backer, JCA Yeoh Wee Siam, JCA Hanipah binti Farikullah, JCA Hamid Sultan Bin Abu Backer, JCA (Delivering Judgment of the Court) 3 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT [1] The appellant/plaintiff’s appeal against the decision of the High Court which overruled the decision of the Sessions Court whilst interpreting section 31 of the Employer Social Security Act 1969 (Socso Act) with sections 91(1) and 91(1)(aa) of the Road Transport Act 1987 (RTA 1987). [2] The plaintiff, on behalf of the deceased is making the claim. The deceased was the employee of the 2nd defendant. He was also a passenger in the vehicle owned by the 2nd respondent. Accident took place between two vehicles owned by the 2nd respondent in consequence of the negligence of the drivers. [3] This judgment is delivered pursuant to section 42 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (JCA) as our sister Yeoh Wee Siam has since retired. This is a unanimous decision by the remaining members of the panel who heard the appeal. Preliminaries [4] The learned High Court judge summary of the decision read as follows: “[2] In the Sessions Court it was agreed that liability was 100% against Defendants and quantum for loss of support at RM57,120, bereavement at RM10,000 and funeral expenses at RM3,000. It was further agreed that Plaintiff had claimed from Socso and was receiving RM1,000 per month. 4 [3] It was held by the Sessions Court that section 31 of Employees Social Security Act 1969 (Socso Act) does not prohibit Plaintiff's claim against Defendants. On appeal, this Court decided otherwise and held that section 31 of Socso Act prevents Plaintiffs claim. This is the appeal by the Plaintiff.” [5] The Memorandum of Appeal of the appellant inter alia read as follows: “1. Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah gagal mempertimbangkan kemalangan yang menyebabkan kematian simati adalah kemalangan jalanraya dan proviso Seksyen 31 Employees Social Security Act 1969 diterimapakai. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi yang bijaksana terkhilaf dari segi undang-undang apabila membenarkan rayuan Perayu-perayu (Defendan-Defendan) dengan memutuskan bahawa tuntutan Plaintif dihalang oleh Seksyen 31 Akta Keselamatan Sosial Pekerja 1969 (AKSP 1969). Sebaliknya di sini adalah suatu kemalangan jalanraya dan bukanlah 'employment injury' dan 'proviso' Seksyen 31 AKSP 1969 di terima pakai. Sila lihat kes Pelita Rasa Sdn Bhd & Qrs v Theeban Vengadesh Govintarau [2015] 2 CLJ 593 dan Indah Water Konsortium Sdn Bhd v Govindarajan Alagar [2014] 9 CLJ 812.
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2. Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah tersilap menggunapakai Seksyen 91(1)(aa) Akta Pengangkutan Jalanraya 1987 dan memutuskan bahawa simati sedang in the course of employment dengan Defendan Kedua pada masa material.
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3. Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah gagal menerimapakai Seksyen 91(1)(bb) Akta Pengangkutan Jalanraya 1987 seperti yang diputuskan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen Bahawa simati adalah seorang penumpang. Oleh itu simati adalah seorang "passenger carried by in pursuance of contract of employment" pada masa material Seksyen 91(1)(bb) Akta Pengangkutan Jalanraya 1987 seharusnya diterimapakai. 5
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4. Yang Arif Mahkamah Tinggi telah tersilap dan terkhilaf apabila tidak mempertimbangkan bahawa halangan dalam Seksyen 31 Akta Socso tidak terpakai dalam kes semasa kerana kemalangan yang menyebabkan kematian simati adalah satu kemalangan jalanraya dan motokar yang dipandu oleh Defendan Pertama dan di miliki oleh Defendan Kedua adalah motokar yang dikehendaki diinsurans menurut Akta Pengangkutan Jalan
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1987. Proviso s31 Socso Act mengatakan ...where the employer or servant of the employer is required to be insured against Third Party Risks (di mana polisi insuran pihak ketiga telah diambil oleh Defendan dalam kes semasa) manakala s91(1) RTA mengatakan ...provided that such policy shall not be required to cover …….(yang berkaitan dengan skop liability pihak insuran).
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5. Yang Arif Mahkamah Tinggi telah tersilap dan terkhilaf apabila mengatakan 'proviso" seksyen 31 AKSP 1969 tidak terpakai dalam kes di sini dengan mengatakan fakta di sini tidak diwajibkan untuk menginsurankan berdasarkan seksyen 91(aa) Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987 terpakai dan seksyen 91(bb) APJ 1987 tidak terpakai. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi tersilap dan terkhilaf kerana seksyen 91(1)(bb) APJ 1987 adalah specific, as it is specifically covers the scenario for passengers. As the scenario falls into s91(1)(bb) RTA 1987 then the motor vehicle is required to be insured against Third Party Risks under Part IV of the RTA 1987 and therefore the proviso applies. S91(1) RTA 1987 states...Provided that such policy shall not require to cover ... s91 (1)(bb) RTA 1987 states except in the case of a motor vehicle in which passengers are carried ... or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment liability in respect of the death of ... to persons being carried ... It is clear that the motorjeep No WPW 4068 is required to be insured as Mohd Yusof is travelling as a passenger in motorjeep No. WPW 4064 and s91(1)(bb) RTA 1987 will prevail over s91(1)(a) RTA 1987 as it is a specific provision which prevail over s91(1)(aa) as it is a general provision. 6
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6. Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah tersilap dan terkhilaf apabila gagal mempertimbangkan bahawa Defendan Pertama adalah pemandu yang dibenarkan (authorized driver) oleh Defendan Kedua dan polisi insurans yang melindungi motokar Defendan juga melindungi Defendan Pertama (selaku authorized driver) dan Defendan Pertama bukanlah majikan kepada simati pada masa material dan oleh itu Sekyen 31 Akta Socso dan Seksyen 91(l)(aa) Akta Pengangkutan Jalanraya 1987 tidak terpakai.
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7. Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi tersilap dan terkhilaf kerana tidak mengikut doctrine stare decisis as Tirumeniyar Singara Veloo (2017) 8 CLJ 682 is the case of Court of Appeal. "... the purported tortfeasor is the first defendant who is the authorized driver of the second defendant (the insured). Under the general law of negligence, the first defendant (insured driver) will be liable to the third defendant (Plaintiff) if he is found liable. The policy terms specifically state that it will indemnify the authorized driver. That is to say, not only the policy covers the relationship between the second defendant (the insured) and the insurer but over above it extends the coverage also to an authorized driver. In the case here Mohd Yusof Bin Sahak deceased is not the employee of the authorized driver Raden Benni Bin RS Tanuwidjaja (1st Respondent) and hence s91(1)(aa) RTA 1987 did not apply. Oleh yang demikian, Perayu memohon agar Rayuan dibenarkan dengan kos dan keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi diketepikan.” [6] Section 31 of the Socso Act read as follows:
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31. “Liability of employer and his servant An insured person or his dependants shall not be entitled to receive or recover from the employer of the insured person, or from any other person who is the 7 servant of the employer, any compensation or damages under any other law for the time being in force in respect of an employment injury sustained as an employee under this Act: Provided that the prohibition in this section shall not apply to any claim arising from motor vehicle accidents where the employer or the servant of the employer is required to be insured against Third Party Risks under Part IV of the Road Transport Act 1987 [Act 333].” [7] Section 91(1) of the RTA 1987 read as follows:
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91. “Requirements in respect of policies
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(1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Part, a policy of insurance must be a policy which—
a
(a) is issued by a person who is an authorized insurer within the meaning of this Part; and
b
(b) insures such person, or class of persons as may be specified in the policy in respect of any liability which may be incurred by him or them in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person caused by or arising out of the use of the motor vehicle or land implement drawn thereby on a road: Road Transport 117 Provided that such policy shall not be required to cover— (aa) liability in respect of the death arising out of and in the course of his employment of a person in the employment of a person insured by the policy or of bodily injury sustained by such a person arising out of and in the course of his employment; or (bb) except in the case of a motor vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, liability in respect of the death of or 8 bodily injury to persons being carried in or upon or entering or getting onto or alighting from the motor vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event out of which the claims arise; or
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(cc) any contractual liability.” [8] At the outset, we must say that the plaintiff’s claim is related to the deceased who was a passenger. Section 91(1) of RTA 1987 principally deals with a third party risks. We do not see how the third party risk will involve a passenger to attract section 91(1) of RTA 1987 and its jurisprudence. The facts of the case has no relevance to the facts related to the Court of Appeal’s decision in Tirumeniyar a/l Singara Veloo v Malaysian Motor Insurance [2017] 8 CLJ 682. In addition, it is trite that the Socso Act as well as the RTA 1987 are social legislation and in consequence, any judicial interpretation of these statutes must necessarily lean in favour of the employee as opposed to the employer unless the clear terms of the statute is not in favour of the employee. [9] The confusion in this case arises in consequence of the collision of two vehicles owned by the 2nd defendant itself. If both the vehicles are owned by two different parties, section 91(1) of the RTA 1987 will be a non-issue. That is to say, the insurer for the 2nd defendant must indemnify the deceased in respect of the plaintiff’s claim. [10] Section 31 of the Socso Act relates to employment injury. In a strict sense, the deceased being a passenger cannot be accused of having being injured in consequence of an employment injury when the collision was between two vehicles. In addition, it was a finding of fact of the learned 9 sessions judge that it was not an employment injury but a motor vehicle accident. Brief Facts and Issues Raised in this Appeal [11] The brief facts of this case and issues raised in this appeal had been summarized by the appellant as follows: “1. Brief Facts
a
(a) This is a dependency claim by the Plaintiff the widow of Mohd Yusof Bin Sahak (deceased).
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(b) An accident occurred on 5.2.2015 at a public road involving 2 motorjeeps WPW 4064 and WPW 4068.
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(c) The deceased was a passenger in Motorjeep No. WPW 4064 which was driven by Ismail Bin Muhamat who has also passed away in the accident.
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(d) Motorjeep No WPW 4068 was driven by Raden Benni Bin R.S. Tanuwidjaja (deceased). (1st Defendant)
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(e) Both motorjeeps are owned by Korakan Corporation Sdn Bhd (2nd Defendant) which are insured by Zurich Insurance Malaysia Berhad (formerly Malaysian Assurance Alliance).
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(f) At the material time all three deceased i.e. the Plaintiffs husband, the driver of motorjeep WPW 4064 and 1st Defendant are employees of Korakan Corporation Sdn. Bhd. (2nd Defendant). The deceased occupation is as a driver for the 2nd Defendant. 10
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(g) The Plaintiff filed a suit against the 1st and 2nd Defendants as authorized driver and owner of motor vehicle WPW 4068 for the loss of support, bereavement and funeral expenses under section 7 Civil Law Act 1956.
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(h) Consent judgment with regards to liability was recorded which was 100% against the Defendant and quantum was agreed at RM 66,040.00.
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(i) The Defendants however submit that the claim was barred by Section 31 Socso Act.
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(j) The Sessions Court allowed the Plaintiffs claim stating that the Plaintiff’s claim was not barred by Section 31 of the Socso Act.
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(k) The Defendants filed an appeal with the High Court wherein the High Court Judge allowed the Appeal and reversed the findings of the Sessions Court Judge.
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(l) Hence this appeal.” “2. Issues raised in the Appeal
a
(a) Whether the Plaintiff’s claim is prohibited by Section 31 Socso Act.
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(b) Whether the proviso in Section 31 Socso Act applies to the present claim.
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(c) Whether Section 31 Socso Act should be read together with Section 91 of the RTA with regards to the meaning of insured against third party risk.
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(d) Whether the proviso in Sec 91 (1)(aa) RTA applies to the Plaintiffs claim. 11
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(e) The relation between the proviso Sections 91(1) (aa) RTA and 91(1) (bb) RTA when read together.
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(f) Whether there is double compensation in the plaintiff claim i.e. whether the Socso claim by the deceased is deductible / taken into account in the present claim.” [12] We have read the appeal records and the able submissions of the parties. After giving much consideration to the submissions of the respondents, we take the view that the appeal must be allowed. Our reasons, inter alia, are as follows:
a
(a) It is important to note before dwelling into the provision of the RTA 1987, it is a strict test that it is for the defendants to establish that indeed it was an employment injury as well as it was sustained as an employee under the Act. By no sense of imagination will any reasonable tribunal appraised of the fact will come to the conclusion that it is indeed an employment injury sustained as an employee. Courts have over the years, strictly construed in the course of employment narrowly to favour the employee rather than the employer.
b
(b) We do not think this is a fit and proper case to discuss section 91
subsection
(1)(aa) of RTA 1987 or the case of Tirumeniyar. Section 91(1) of RTA 1987 is relevant to third party risk. Third party risk can only be applicable generally to the owner of the vehicle as well as the driver of the vehicle. This was clearly explained in the case of 12 Tirumeniyar. In addition, it is also the finding of the trial court judge that it was not an employment injury.
c
(c) Further, it is arguable whether section 31 of Socso Act will cover situation of death as opposed to injury. We do not wish to dwell on this issue as there was no submission, save to say a dictionary meaning of injury does not generally refer to death. [13] For reasons stated above, we take the view that the appeal must be allowed in limine, with costs to the appellant. We hereby order so. Dated: 30 April 2019 sgd (DATUK DR. HAJI HAMID SULTAN BIN ABU BACKER) Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia. Note: Grounds of judgment subject to correction of error and editorial adjustment etc. Counsel for Appellant: Mr. Tay Cho Sing Messrs. YP Tan & Ong Advocates & Solicitors No. 595-A, Jalan Melaka Raya 75000 Melaka. [Ref: MRZ/240/2015] 13 Counsel for Respondents: Mr. Ong Chee Yong Messrs C. Y. Ong & Co Advocates & Solicitors Suite 805, 8th Floor, City Plaza Jalan Tebrau 80250 Johor Bahru Johor. [Ref: OCY 7344/ZT/tira]
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