SRI MEENAL CONSTRUCTION GROUP SDN BHD v Chellappa A/l K. Kalimuthu (Sebagai Pengerusi Untuk Jawatankuasa Pengurusan Kuil Sri Maha Mariamman Hicom-shah Alam, Selangor) (BA-12BC-4-08/2025)

This is an appeal by the Appellant/ Plaintiff against the decision of the learned Sessions Court Judge delivered on 18 July 2025, wherein the Appellant’s/ Plaintiff’s claim was dismissed after a full trial. The Respondent’s/ Defendant’s counterclaim was likewise dismissed, however the Respondent/ Defendant did not lodge a cross appeal thereto.

Having considered the Record of Appeal, the Grounds of Judgment, and the respective written and oral submissions of parties, this Court finds no merit in the appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed and the decision of the Sessions Court is affirmed.

I set below my grounds for dismissal. The parties herein shall be referred to in their respective capacity as they were in the Sessions Court.

The facts of this case are simple and straightforward, but made unique due to the protracted dispute over the occupation, management and administration of the Sri Maha Mariamman Temple Hicom (“the Temple”). S/N mwDQPgzQa0md0tkgee77hA

The Plaintiff’s case is that it has entered into a construction contract dated 21.3.2022 (“the Contract”) in respect of new and upgrading works at the Temple (“the Project”).

The Defendant is sued in his capacity as Chairman and public officer of the “Jawatankuasa Pengurusan Kuil Sri Maha Mariamman Hicom Shah Alam, Selangor”, a society registered with the Registrar of Societies on 24.12.1993. In that capacity, the Defendant was responsible for the management and administration of the Temple.

The Defendant’s defence is, in essence, one of complete denial. The Defendant contends that the Defendant together with the other office bearers of the Defendant, had been ousted and expelled from the Temple in 2001 by a group led by one Nagaraju a/l Merganathan (“Nagaraju”), which group thereafter assumed control and management of the Temple.

The following chronology of events involving the occupation, management and administration of the Temple are undisputed:-

2001 : Defendant and all its office bearers were ousted by Nagaraju and Nagaraju’s group;

(b)

17.7.2001 : vide MT5-22-491-2001 (“Suit 2001”), an Order was granted that the management and possession of the S/N mwDQPgzQa0md0tkgee77hA Temple be handed back to the

(c)

25.7.2014 : in Suit 2001, an Order for the following was granted:-

a declaration that Nagaraju and Nagaraju’s group had wrongfully occupied and wrongfully managed the Temple since 2001;

(ii) that Nagaraju and Nagaraju’s group are to forthwith hand over possession of the Temple to the Defendant being the appointed body for 2000/2002;

(iii) a mandatory injunction against Nagaraju and Nagaraju’s group, agents, employees to hand over possession of the Temple upon service of the Order.

(d)

23.2.2022 : one Regu a/l Vedy Kaundan, who was the Plaintiff’s witness during trial (SP 2), affirmed an affidavit to intervene in BA- 24NCVC-608-05/2019 (“OS 2019”) in which he has unequivocally stated that he has been administering and managing the Temple since 2017. S/N mwDQPgzQa0md0tkgee77hA

(e)

19.5.2022 : vide BA-24NCVC-586-04/2022 (“OS 2022”), an ad interim order was granted to restrain Nagaraju and Nagaraju’s group, including one Regu a/l Vedy Kaundan who was the Plaintiff’s witness during trial (SP 2), from carrying out any renovation and/or construction works at the Temple until the disposal of OS 2022;

(f)

20.5.2022 : in Suit 2001, an Order was obtained by the Defendant against Nagaraju and Nagaraju’s group to hand over possession of the Temple within one month;

(g)

22.7.2022 : in OS 2022, the Court declared, inter alia, that Nagaraju and Nagaraju’s group were trespassers and/or interlopers to the Temple and had administered and/or managed the Temple illegally;

August 2022 : the Defendant regained possession and management of the Temple. [Emphasis added] S/N mwDQPgzQa0md0tkgee77hA [for completeness, the following persons were named as defendants together with Nagaraju a/l Merganathan and is referred to in this judgment as “Nagaraju’s group” for easy reference :- Suit 2001 : Merganathan a/l Nallo Sangguletchumi isteri kepada Sanggu Thanabalan a/l Murugaiah Low Kok Beng Mohan a/l Muniandy Subramaniam Subramaniam a/l Muthan Velloo S. OS 2022 : Ramachandran a/l Meyappan S. Krishnan a/l Subramaniam Regu a/l Vedy Kaundan]

The Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendant at the Sessions Court was for the balance of RM294,563.50 said to be outstanding under the Contract.

The learned Sessions Court Judge (“the SCJ”), in her Grounds of Judgment dated 30.9.2025, comprehensively set out the factual matrix and the respective arguments advanced by the parties. The SCJ carefully considered all material aspects of the dispute, including the nature of the relationship between the parties. This was a necessary exercise, as the threshold issue before the SCJ was whether a contractual relationship existed S/N mwDQPgzQa0md0tkgee77hA between the Plaintiff and the Defendant before any question of liability for payment on the part of the Defendant could arise.

At the conclusion of the trial, the SCJ found that no contractual relationship existed between the parties. In arriving at that conclusion, the SCJ referred to the various court orders mentioned above, which established and the SCJ so found that the Defendant was neither in possession nor in control of the Temple from 2017 until August 2022, when possession was restored to the Defendant pursuant to the Order dated 22.7.2022 in OS 2022.

The SCJ thus made a finding of fact, based on the evidence adduced at trial, that the Plaintiff had failed to establish that it had dealt with the Defendant in relation to the Project at any material time so as to give rise to a contractual relationship between them.

Accordingly, the SCJ dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim and hence, this appeal by the Plaintiff.

The law governing appellate intervention is settled. An appellate court will not interfere with the findings of a trial judge unless it is shown that the decision is plainly wrong. S/N mwDQPgzQa0md0tkgee77hA

This principle has been authoritatively stated by the Federal Court in Gan Yook Chin (P) & Anor v Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors [2005] 2 MLJ 1 where the “insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence” test is held to be consistent with the established plainly wrong test.

The Federal Court recently in Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v Wendy Tan Lee Peng & Ors [2020] 6 MLRA 193 clarified that the "plainly wrong" test is not a matter of the appellate court simply reaching a different conclusion. A decision is "plainly wrong" only if it cannot reasonably be explained or justified and is one that no reasonable judge could have reached. It was held that: “[71] From the aforesaid authorities, there appears to be a difference in approach taken and applied by the UK Supreme Court and the approach taken by the Malaysian Courts. Whilst Lord Reed in Henderson (supra) separated the four non-exhaustive identifiable errors of a trial judge from the plainly wrong test:

a material error of law;

a critical finding of fact which has no basis in the evidence;

demonstrable misunderstanding of relevant evidence; and

a demonstrable failure to consider relevant evidence; (all of which justifies appellate intervention of a trial judges decision), this Court in Gan Yook Chin (supra) effectively included them under what amount to the trial judge as being "plainly wrong".

The principle of the plainly wrong test has been consistently reaffirmed in subsequent decisions and hence, the recognised S/N mwDQPgzQa0md0tkgee77hA instances warranting appellate intervention where the trial judge was plainly wrong include the following (non-exhaustive):-

a material error of law;

findings unsupported by evidence;

a demonstrable misunderstanding of the evidence;

failure to consider material evidence;

insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence.

It is equally trite that it is not sufficient that another conclusion could be reached on evidence. The question is whether the conclusion reached by the trial court is one that no reasonable tribunal, properly directing itself, could have arrived at.

The Appeal, properly analysed, turns on three central issues :-

Whether the SCJ erred in finding there was no contractual relationship existed between the parties;

Whether the Defendant’s conduct gave rise to an implied contract; and

Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to relief on a quantum meriut basis under s. 71 of the Contracts Act 1950.

I shall deal with each issue in turn. S/N mwDQPgzQa0md0tkgee77hA

Whether the SCJ erred in finding there was no contractual relationship existed between the parties.

In Sulisen Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Malaysia (2006) MLJU 341, the High Court has reiterated the elements of a contract : “A contract may be written; it may be partly written and partly oral; it may be wholly oral and may even be implied from the actions of the parties. The essentials of any contract are the rights, duties and liabilities that arise from the promise or promises made by the parties. The law of contract is concerned with the mechanics involved in and the principles regulating the formation, performance, continuance and discharge of the parties individually created obligations. The essential elements of any contract are:

offer;

(ii) acceptance;

(iii) consideration (not required for contracts underseal);

(iv) intention to be bound;

(iv) mutuality;

capacity; and

(vi) legality. The offer and acceptance when taken together would form the “agreement” and that agreement must be supported by consideration in order to establish the obligation. It is the parties that must intend that the agreement to have legal force and the courts will only enforce what the parties intend should be enforced. The parties too must agree on the same thing and this would be known as mutuality. The parties too must have the capacity of reaching a binding agreement and the subject matter of the S/N mwDQPgzQa0md0tkgee77hA agreement must be legal. Briefly, these are the seven essential elements that must be present before a contract is said to be in existence. There are always some commercial flavour to a contract. Of significance would be this. Behind all forms of contract, there is the basic idea of assent. A contracting party is bound to the contract because he has agreed to be bound by it.” [Emphasis added]

It is trite law that a contract cannot impose obligations on a person who is not a party to it. Abdul Malik Ishak JCA in Boustead Naval Shipyard Sdn Bhd v Dynaforce Corporation Sdn Bhd (2015) 2 MLRA 348 held as follows: “[63] The law is clear A person who is not a party to a contract has no right to sue on a contract (see Kepong Prospecting Ltd & Ors v. Schmidt [1967] 1 MLRA 426; [1968] 1 MLJ 170 and s 2(d) of the Contracts Act 1950; Oversea Chinese Banking Corp Ltd v. Woo Hing Brothers (M) Sdn Bhd [1992] 1 MLRH 66; [1992] 2 MLJ 86; [1992] 3 CLJ Rep 171 and Badiaddin Mohd Mahidin & Anor v. Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd [1998] 1 MLRA 183; [1998] 1 MLJ 393; [1998] 2 CLJ 75; [1998] 1 AMR 909). [64] Section 2(d) of the Contracts Act 1950 provides that consideration for a promise may move from the promisee or any other party. It cannot be denied that the scope of the section is wider than the English rule that requires consideration to move from the promisee (see the speech of Lord Wilberforce in Kepong Prospecting Ltd & Ors v. Schmidt (supra) at p 431). It is a correct proposition of law to say that in Malaysia, the doctrine of privity is confined to the rule that only a party to a contract may sue on it.” [Emphasis added] S/N mwDQPgzQa0md0tkgee77hA

In deciding that there was no contractual relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, the SCJ has relied on testimonies of SP 1 and SP 2 and the documents produced at trial.

In finding that the admission made by the Plaintiff that instructions and/or dealings were with SP 2, the SCJ held at paragraph 26 of her Grounds of Judgment as follows : “SP-1 semasa diperiksa balas telah mengakui bahawa beliau tidak pernah berurusan dengan Defendan tetapi hanya dengan SP2 yang dirujuknya sebagai Pengerusi Jawatankuasa Kuil. SP 1 telah membeli borang tender dan berurusan sepanjang waktu pembinaan dengan SP2 dan bukannya Defendan. SP2 sendiri tidak mengakui dirinya sebagai Pengerusi Defendan ataupun mempunyai apa-apa kaitan dengan Defendan.”

The SCJ further made a finding of fact that the Defendant was not in possession or management and control of the Temple during the period the works were carried out by virtue of the chronology of events set out at paragraph 8 above, in particular sub-paragraph (d), and held at paragraph 28 as follows : “Dari kronologi peristiwa yang berlaku seawal tahun 2017 sehingga tahun 2022, adalah jelas Defendan tidak menduduki kuil tersebut dan hanya memasuki semula kuil tersebut pada bulan Ogos 2022 berdasarkan perintah injunksi yang bertarikh 22.7.2022. Kronologi ini sekali gus memberi gambaran bahawa Defendan tidak pada bila-bila masa terlibat sepanjang pengeluaran tender, memberi arahan mengenai pembinaan S/N mwDQPgzQa0md0tkgee77hA kuil tersebut dan membuat apa-apa sebahagian bayaran kepada Plaintif yang berlaku di antara Mac 2022 sehingga Mei 2022.”

The SCJ has also referred to the tender documents purchased by the Plaintiff and all subsequent quotation, variation orders and invoices were issued under or to an entity named “Badan Pengurusan Kuil Sri Shakti Maha Mariamman Old Seafield c/o Hindu Organisation Temple and Association Forum” and “Temple committee Seafield Sri Maha Mariamman Temple”, and not the Defendant. At paragraphs 30 and 31 of her Grounds of Judgment, this is what the SCJ said : “Mahkamah juga dirujuk dengan dokumen penawaran tender kepada Plaintif di mukasurat 2 dan 3 Ikatan B1 di mana tender tersebut Mahkamah dapati ia Adalah di bawah entiti dengan nama named “Badan Pengurusan Kuil Sri Shakti Maha Mariamman Old Seafield c/o Hindu Organisation Temple and Association Forum (Hota)” dan bukanlah Defendan. Manakala dokumen Quotation dan kerja-kerja tambahan serta invois-invois yang dikeluarkan oleh Plaintif juga seperti di mukasurat 23- 65, Ikatan B1 adalah dibuat ke atas nama “Temple Committee, Seafield Sri Maha Mariamman Temple” yang juga bukan pihak Defendan sedangkan pihak pengurusan yang sah ke atas kuil tersebut Adalah JAwatankuasa Pengurusan Kuil Sri Maha Mariamman Hicom Shah Alam Selangor iaitu Defendan di dalam Tindakan ini seperti yang dilihat di mukasurat 1 Ikatan B3 yang juga disahkan oleh perintah Mahkamah Tinggi di dalam Tindakan berlainan seperti yang disenaraikan di perenggan 27 di atas.” S/N mwDQPgzQa0md0tkgee77hA

On these facts, the SCJ concluded that there was no offer, acceptance or meeting of minds between the Plaintiff and the Defendant.

The Plaintiff now advances a further argument that the SCJ has failed to consider that the Temple was managed by an “earlier management” and that the Defendant was the successor to the “earlier management” and was therefore liable for the debt owed by the “earlier management” to the Plaintiff as the Defendant, as trustee or manager of the Temple, became responsible for liabilities relating to the renovation works which benefitted the Temple.

If I understand Counsel correctly, the Plaintiff’s argument is that as the Defendant took over the management of the Temple from the “earlier management”, all rights, interest and liabilities of the “earlier management” would be assumed by the Defendant.

The Plaintiff’s argument that the Defendant was a “successor” or “trustee” is fundamentally flawed, as it runs contrary to the following Orders:

the Order dated 25.7.2014 in Suit 2001, where the Court has declared that Nagaraju and his group were in wrongful occupation of the Temple and had wrongfully managed the Temple since 2001; and S/N mwDQPgzQa0md0tkgee77hA

(ii) the Order dated 22.7.2022 in OS 2022, where the Court has declared that Nagaraju and his group were trespassers and/or interlopers, and had unlawfully administered and/or managed the Temple.

The learned SCJ accepted that the Defendant only regained possession and control of the Temple in August 2022. As such, this was not a case of the Defendant “taking over” or “succeeding” an earlier management of the Temple.

In the present case, I am prepared to hold that, as trespassers and/or interlopers, Nagaraju and his group — or any person other than the Defendant — cannot legally enter into a valid contract to renovate the Temple. It is trite that to form a binding contract, one of the fundamental legal requirements is that the person offering or authorizing the work must have the legal right, title, or authority to possess and manage the Temple.

The SCJ at paragraphs 33 of the Grounds of Judgment dealt with the issue as follows : “Mahkamah berpendapat, di atas dasar kebarangkalian, Plaintif dianggap tidak boleh mewujudkan satu perhubungan kontraktual dengan Defendan dan/atau kuil tersebut memandangkan perintah Mahkamah adalah jelas bahawa Defendan adalah pihak pengurusan kuil yang sah pada masa tersebut sehingga kini. Kegagalan Plaintif untuk menunjukkan bahawa, segala persetujuan, arahan dan bayaran sebahagian adalah dari Defendan, menunjukkan bahawa secara jelas tidak terlibat di dalam memberi arahan kepada renovasi kuil tersebut dan atas alasan tersebut S/N mwDQPgzQa0md0tkgee77hA Mahkamah berpendapat tiada hubungan kontraktual di antara Plaintif dan

This Court finds no error in that conclusion. It is a finding firmly grounded in the evidence before her. The Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the SCJ misunderstood or failed to consider any material evidence or that there has been insufficient judicial appreciation by the SCJ.

Whether the Defendant’s conduct gave rise to an implied contract

The Plaintiff relied on the Defendant’s post August 2022 conduct to prove that a contractual relationship can be implied between parties.

Central to the Plaintiff’s contention was that the Defendant did not initially deny the debt. In fact, according to the Plaintiff the following conduct further gave rise to an implied contract :-

the Defendant’s request for supporting documents;

(ii) the inspection of alleged defects by parties; and

(iii) the filing of a Counterclaim by the Defendant.

Although the SCJ has dealt with the above facts at paragraphs 10, 11, 22 and 23 of her Grounds of Judgment, the SCJ did not dwell on this as it was not the Plaintiff’s pleaded case that there was an implied contract between parties. S/N mwDQPgzQa0md0tkgee77hA

In RHB Bank Bhd v Kwan Chew Holdings Sdn Bhd (2010) 1 CLJ 665, the Federal Court has issued a caution in the following manner : “[33] Second, the proposition of the Court of Appeal was not even pleaded by the respondent. The respondent’s cause of action against the appellant was for breach of contract. Nowhere in the respondent’s pleading, expressly or by implication, can we detect a claim for breach of a joint venture agreement arising out of a fiduciary duty placed upon the appellant in the capacity as principal of an agent. It is a cardinal rule in civil litigation that the parties must abide by their pleadings. This is trite as can be seen from the decision of this court in Menah Sulong v. Lim Soo & Anor [1983] 1 CLJ 26 where Ong Hock Thye CJ said: I think it is necessary in this case to emphasise once again that the Courts should give their decision in strict compliance with the pleadings. As Lord Radcliffe said in Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v. Southport Corporation [1956] 2 WLR 81, 91 If an Appellate Court is to treat reliance as pedantry or mere formalism I do not see what part they play in our trial system. [34] In fact, the Court of Appeal itself has reiterated this in Amanah Butler (M) Sdn Bhd v. Yike Chee Wah [1997] 2 CLJ 79 where Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) said: It is trite law that a party is bound by its pleadings. [35] On this, we would like to add that it is not the duty of the court to invent or create a cause of action or a defence under the guise of S/N mwDQPgzQa0md0tkgee77hA doing justice for the parties lest it be accused of being biased towards one against the other. The parties should know best as to what they want and it is not for the court to pursue a cavalier approach to solving their dispute by inventing or creating cause or causes of action which were not pleaded in the first place. Such activism by the court must be discouraged otherwise the court would be accused of making laws rather than applying them to a given set of facts.”

In the upshot, I find that the Plaintiff has pivoted at the appeal stage to now bring the Plaintiff’s case within the principle of implied contract.

The Plaintiff cannot be allowed to do this as it was neither pleaded nor was it a live issue before the SCJ. Suffice for me to merely state the oft-quoted principle that parties are bound by pleadings. If it is not pleaded, there is no basis in law for the court to allow the claim.

For completeness, I am of the view that the occurrence of events stated in paragraph 36 above was consistent with :-

the Defendant’s role as the lawful manager of the Temple upon regaining possession;

(ii) the Defendant’s need to assess and rectify works carried out without its authority. S/N mwDQPgzQa0md0tkgee77hA

I am also of the view that the mere requesting and receiving of documents and/or reviewing claims cannot create contractual liability where none existed.

Further, the filing of the Counterclaim by the Defendant, in particular, is a procedural step taken to assert its rights in respect of the condition of the Temple pursuant to the Plaintiff’s works, after the Defendant regained possession of the Temple.

This is fortified by the prayers in the Counterclaim which, inter alia, included general damages for the renovation works undertaken by the Plaintiff without approval from the local authority and contrary to the injunction order.

It must be emphasised that the Injunction Order dated 19.5.2022 in OS 2022 restraining the renovation works was obtained by the Defendant, and that SP2 (the individual who dealt with the Plaintiff in relation to the renovation works) was represented by counsel in OS 2022.

As such, this Court is unable to agree that the SCJ was plainly wrong when she declined to grant a relief that was not pleaded.

Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to relief on a quantum meriut basis under s. 71 of the Contracts Act 1950. S/N mwDQPgzQa0md0tkgee77hA

The Plaintiff further relies on the doctrine of quantum meriut, contending that the Defendant has benefited from the works and ought to compensate the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff contends that it has fulfilled the four conditions laid down in the case of Siow Wong Fatt v. Susur Rotan Mining Ltd & Anor [1967] 1 MLRA 53 where it was held: “It has been common ground before their lordships that four conditions must be satisfied to establish a claim under s. 71. The doing of the act or the delivery of the thing referred to in the section:

must be lawful

must be done for another person

must not be intended to be done gratuitously

must be such that the other person enjoys the benefit of the act or the delivery.” [Emphasis added]

The Plaintiff’s argument faces 2 insurmountable difficulties.

Failure to Plead

It is trite that a claim in quantum meriut constitutes a substantive cause of action and must be specifically pleaded. The Plaintiff did not plead such a claim in its Statement of Claim and as such, based on RHB Bank Bhd v Kwan Chew Holdings Sdn S/N mwDQPgzQa0md0tkgee77hA Bhd (supra.), there is no basis for the Court to allow the Plaintiff’s claim for quantum meriut.

Further, in the case of Pembinaan SPK Sdn Bhd v Jalinan Waja Sdn Bhd [2014] 2 MLJ 322, the Court of Appeal held at paragraph 27 : “In our view, a claim for quantum meruit here related to more than a claim based on the legal effects of pleaded material facts; it was a cause of action in itself, which was substantive in nature and therefore required express pleading and the adduction at trial of a sufficient foundation of facts derived from evidence tendered through witnesses’ testimony or relevant, cogent documentary evidence.” [Emphasis added]

Thus, the Plaintiff's failure to plead quantum meriut is fatal.

Absence of Factual Foundation

In any event, the factual substratum necessary to sustain a claim in restitution is conspicuously absent.

From the evidence made available at trial, it is undisputed that:-

vide Order dated 25.7.2014, the Temple was illegally occupied and run by Nagaraju and Nagaraju’s group;

(ii) vide Order dated 22.7.2022, Nagaraju and Nagaraju’s group were declared as trespassers and/or interlopers; S/N mwDQPgzQa0md0tkgee77hA

(iii) the Plaintiff undertook works pursuant to instructions from parties who were not authorised by the Defendant;

(iv) vide Order dated 19.5.2022, the Defendant took legal steps to restrain the Plaintiff’s works;

the works continued notwithstanding the said Order.

In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the Defendant accepted or voluntarily accepted or even "enjoyed the benefit" in a legal sense when the works were forced upon the Temple against the Defendant’s express will and in violation of a court order.

As such, again this Court is unable to agree that the SCJ was plainly wrong when she declined to grant a relief on a basis that was neither pleaded nor supported by evidence.

Having considered the totality of the evidence and submissions, this Court is satisfied that :-

the SCJ correctly identified the central issue, namely the existence of a legal nexus between parties;

(ii) the SCJ has properly evaluated the evidence presented at trial;

(iii) the conclusions reached by the SCJ were reasonably open on the evidence. S/N mwDQPgzQa0md0tkgee77hA

From the above analysis, this Court finds no demonstrable error of law, no misunderstanding of the evidence and no failure to consider or appreciate material evidence.

The Plaintiff has not discharged the burden of showing that the decision is plainly wrong.

For the reasons above, this Court finds that the appeal is devoid of merit.

Thus, the appeal was dismissed and the decision of the Sessions Court was affirmed. Costs of RM10,000.00 to the Defendant, subject to the payment of the allocator fee. Dated : 30th May 2026 t.t ………………………………………… Shahriza Zalina Binti Abdul Shukor Judicial Commissioner Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Shah Alam For the Appellant: Mr. Vijayasundra Thevar (Messrs Vijay Thev & Co For the Respondent: Mr. Balamurali Ramusamy (Messrs R.B. Murali & Associates) S/N mwDQPgzQa0md0tkgee77hA