Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia Berhad v Alwin Rajasurya A/L G Anthony (WA-24FC-1531-11/2025)

This is the Plaintiff’s application by way of Originating Summons pursuant to sections 256 and 257 of the National Land Code 1965 (“NLC”) and Order 83 rule 1 of the Rules of Court 2012 for an order for sale of the charged property.

After hearing submissions from both parties and perusing the affidavits filed, this Court allowed the Plaintiff’s application and granted an order for sale. The Defendant has since filed a Notice of Appeal against the whole of this decision.

These Grounds are now furnished for the benefit of the appellate court.

The material facts are largely undisputed.

The Plaintiff is a licensed banking institution in Malaysia. By a Letter of Offer dated 20.01.2020, the Plaintiff granted the Defendant a loan facility which the Defendant accepted.

As security, the Defendant executed a Memorandum of Charge over the property held under Hakmilik Strata PN24058/M1- A/8/58, located in Bandar Sunway, Selangor (“the said Property”). The charge was duly registered on 22.07.2020 under Gadaian Perserahan No. 26080/2020.

The Defendant subsequently defaulted in repayment of the loan facility.

Following such default, the Plaintiff issued a statutory notice under Form 16D pursuant to the NLC, demanding payment within the prescribed period.

The Defendant failed to remedy the default.

As at the relevant date, the amount outstanding was in excess of RM578,000.00, and continued to accrue interest.

In these circumstances, the Plaintiff commenced the present proceedings seeking an order for sale.

The central issue before this Court is whether the Defendant has shown “cause to the contrary” within the meaning of subsection 256(3) of the NLC so as to resist the Plaintiff’s application for an order for sale.

Section 256 NLC

Subsection 256(3) of the NLC provides: “…the Court shall order the sale of the land or lease to which the charge relates unless it is satisfied of the existence of cause to the contrary.”

The statutory language is clear and mandatory in nature. Once the statutory preconditions are fulfilled, the Court is bound to grant the order for sale unless a valid and recognised defence is established.

Case Law

The legal principles governing applications under section 256 NLC are well settled.

In Low Lee Lian v Ban Hin Lee Bank Bhd [1997] 1 MLJ 77 p. 85, the Court held that the chargor must show a bona fide dispute or some valid ground in law to resist an order for sale. “ It is thus clear that to fall the scope of the principle in Murugappa Chettiar’s case, the charger must be able to point a statury direction or some rule of the common law or doctrine of equity operating in his favour and against which an order for sale would militate. Anything that falls short of this requirement will not amount to cause to the contrary under section 256(3).”

In Ideal Multifeed (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v Ooi Chin Tiong [2012] MLJU 534, the Court reiterated that the burden lies on the chargor to demonstrate ‘cause to the contrary’ under section 256 of the National Land Code

Similarly, in Keong Soon Finance Bhd v MK Retnam Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor [1989] 1 MLJ 457 p.458, the Court affirmed that where default is established and no valid defence is shown, the chargee is entitled to an order for sale as of right.

These authorities collectively establish that the burden lies on the Defendant to demonstrate “cause to the contrary”, failing which the Court must grant the relief sought.

Whether the Plaintiff has established its case

Based on the affidavits before this Court, the Plaintiff has established the following:

the existence of a valid loan facility;

the creation and registration of a valid charge over the said Property;

default by the Defendant;

service of the statutory notice under Form 16D; and

the outstanding indebtedness.

These material facts were not disputed by the Defendant.

The Defendant’s position

The Defendant’s sole contention, as reflected in the affidavit and written submissions, is that the Defendant was in the process of negotiating a settlement with the Plaintiff and was making efforts to repay the outstanding sum.

There was no denial of liability, nor any challenge to:

the validity of the charge;

the occurrence of default;

the service of the statutory notice; or

the amount claimed.

Whether this constitutes “cause to the contrary”

In the judgment of this Court, the Defendant’s contention does not amount to “cause to the contrary” within the meaning of subsection 256(3) NLC.

A bare assertion of ongoing negotiations, without more, does not constitute a defence recognised in law.

There was no evidence placed before this Court to show:

any concluded settlement agreement;

any restructuring approved by the Plaintiff;

any payment sufficient to cure the default; or

any legal basis to challenge the Plaintiff’s entitlement.

In the absence of such evidence, the Defendant’s position amounts to no more than a request for indulgence, as can be seen from his Affidavit in Reply, the Defendant stated that: “6.1. Bahawa pada setiap masa yang material, saya adalah dalam cubaan untuk mencapai penyelesaian yang mampu dibayar kepada Plaintif bagi jumlah yang terhutang;

6.2. Saya turut telah menghubungi pihak Plaintif yang mana saya telah diarahkan untuk membuat bayaran dan rundingan telah dicapai dalam perbualan bersama wakil Plaintif tersebut; dan

6.3. Oleh itu, memandangkan pihak-pihak di dalam tindakan in imasih di dalam proses rundingan, tiada lelongan awam seharusnya berlaku.” In his submission, the Defendant also repeated the same as follows: “7. Defendan berhujah bahawa pada masa hujahan ini difailkan, Defendan adalah sedang dalam proses untuk mendapatkanpenyelesaian daripada pihak urusan bank Plaintif.

Defendan seterusnya berhujah bahawa Saman Pemula Plaintif tidak seharusnya diberikan memandangkan pihak Defendan sedang dalam usaha terbaik, membayar semula sebarang jumlah tertunggak yang telah membawa kepada tindakan Plaintif di sini.”

The authorities make clear that such a request, unsupported by a legal or evidential basis, cannot displace the statutory entitlement of the chargee.

Mandatory nature of the Court’s duty

The Court must give effect to the clear wording of subsection 256(3) NLC.

Once a default is established and no valid defence is shown, the Court is bound to order the sale.

To withhold such an order on the basis of mere negotiations would be inconsistent with the statutory framework and the established authorities.

Exercise of discretion

For completeness, this Court considered whether any equitable or discretionary basis existed to defer or refuse the order sought.

However, in the absence of any cogent evidence of an imminent or concluded settlement, there is no basis for the Court to deny the Plaintiff its statutory remedy.

This Court is mindful that nothing in this decision prevents the parties from negotiating or settling the matter at any stage, including prior to the completion of the sale process.

However, such a possibility cannot operate as a bar to the grant of an order for sale.

In light of the above, this Court finds that:

the Plaintiff has satisfied all the requirements under section 256 NLC; and

the Defendant has failed to demonstrate any “cause to the contrary”.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s application was allowed, and an order for sale was granted.

Costs of RM1,500.00 were awarded to the Plaintiff.

This is a case where the Defendant does not dispute the indebtedness but merely seeks time on the basis of ongoing negotiations. The law is clear that such a contention does not constitute a valid defence to an application under section 256

The decision of this Court is therefore grounded on settled principles and the undisputed facts of the case. Dated: 15th April 2026 ………………………………………………….. (YA PUAN MAHAZAN BINTI MAT TAIB) JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR Counsel for The Plaintiff : Nurin Humairah Messrs. Seow & Megat (Kuala Lumpur) Advocates & Solicitors Counsel for The Defendants : Yong Shu Xhuan & PDK Nur Salihah Messrs. Alwin Rajasurya (Kuala Lumpur) Advocates & Solicitors