after the SAR decided to allow the stay of the CP, the sum of approximately RM162K was paid to the JC as dividends. My findings S/N aofS8l3Pd0Wtk5F4zzUpPA Page 5 of 14 [17] I do not see how the facts that the JD presents are so unusual that they are tantamount to the “sufficient reason” required for a stay to be granted pending the completion of the Company’s liquidation. I do not find these facts unusual at all. I would expect that the process of liquidation will often yield the result that the company in liquidation has sufficient funds to pay its creditors, even if the payments only partially satisfy the debts owed. The JD was not informed and hence does not know the exact amount that he has to pay [18] The JD argues that because of the unusual facts, namely the JC was paid dividends from the Company’s liquidation, which reduced the judgment debt due from the JD to the JC—the JD was not notified and thus does not know the exact amount that he has to pay the JC. The JD argues that this very fact warrants a stay of the CP until the Company’s liquidation is finally concluded. My findings [19] I find this argument untenable. One—the judgment sum entered against the Company and the JD was for approximately RM780K, with interest accruing. The BN sum demanded was approximately RM852K. The initial dividend declared for the JC was approximately RM147K, which was later amended to approximately RM162K. The balance remaining, and still owing—approximately RM690K—is still a substantial portion of the BN sum demanded, based on the judgment debt. [20] I do not see this partial recovery of the judgment debt against the Company as sufficient reason to stay the CP. The judgment sum due from the JD to the JC is still substantially outstanding. I find that it would not be S/N aofS8l3Pd0Wtk5F4zzUpPA Page 6 of 14 just to stay the JC’s recovery or execution pursuits on the ground that the JC has recovered a portion of the judgment debt that the Company and the JD owe the JC. A stay will delay or hinder the JC’s enjoyment of the fruits of its successful litigation. On the contrary, I find that it is just to permit the JC’s bankruptcy action (the CP) to continue to be pursued against the JD on its merits. [21] Two—if a bankruptcy order is ultimately made against the JD, the Director General Of Insolvency (DGI) can ensure that the proper and correct amount is distributed to the JC from the JD’s estate, calculated from the judgment sum, and verified with the JC’s proof of debt. [22] Three—the BN contained the exact amount that the JD had to pay to avoid committing an act of bankruptcy. When the BN was served on the JD, he was notified of the exact amount that he had to pay. [23] Also, he applied to set aside the BN. Surely, he knew or would have known the entire content of the BN, including the amount that he had to pay. But instead of paying the amount demanded, the JD chose to litigate by applying to set aside the BN. [24] Four—as the JD did not satisfy the demand contained in the BN, he committed an act of bankruptcy. The JC is then, with the leave of Court (which the JC obtained), entitled to present the CP to pray for a bankruptcy order against the JD, and for the DGI to administer and distribute the bankrupt’s estate to satisfy the judgment debt due to the JC. [25] Five—when a judgment sum is entered against more than one debtor, it is only when the successful plaintiff (the judgment creditor) fully recovers the judgment sum from any or more of the judgment debtors, S/N aofS8l3Pd0Wtk5F4zzUpPA Page 7 of 14 will the judgment creditor then be prohibited from recovering more than what is due to him under the judgment. This principle is propounded in the case law authority of Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja v Edwin Cassian a/l Nagappan @ Marie [2021] 5 MLJ 253 (FC); [2021] 6 AMR 429; [2021] 7 CLJ 823; [2021] 5 MLRA 178. [26] In Edwin Cassian (supra), which is a bankruptcy action case about the joint liability of two judgment debtors, the Federal Court held as follows— [41] One final point remains to be made. The Court of Appeal in Sumathy was concerned that the judgment creditor would be ‘very much overpaid’ if both defendants were to be liable for the amounts in the bankruptcy notices. To address this, guidance can be gleaned from Tang Man Sit (decd) (personal representative) v Capacious Investments Ltd [1996] AC 514, where Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead delivering the Privy Council judgment at p 522 said that: ... a plaintiff cannot recover in the aggregate from one or more defendants an amount in excess of his loss. Part satisfaction of a judgment against one person does not operate as a bar to the plaintiff thereafter bringing an action against another who is also liable, but it does operate to reduce the amount recoverable in the second action. However, once a plaintiff has fully recouped his loss, of necessity he cannot thereafter pursue any other remedy he might have and which he might have pursued earlier. Having recouped the whole of his loss, any further proceedings would lack a subject matter. This principle of full satisfaction prevents double recovery. [emphasis added] [27] In our case, there is no evidence that the judgment debt due to the JC is fully recovered. There is evidence of the approximately RM162K dividend payout to the JC from the Company’s liquidation, but a substantial portion of the judgment debt is still due and unpaid. [28] Six—I am also guided and bound by the case law authority of Moscow Narodny Bank Ltd v Ngan Ching Wen [2005] 3 MLJ 693 (FC); S/N aofS8l3Pd0Wtk5F4zzUpPA Page 8 of 14 [2004] 4 AMR 177; [2004] 2 CLJ 241; [2004] 1 MLRA 119, where the Federal Court propounded that where, after the CP is filed, the amount owing is reduced—the CP is not rendered bad. So long as the amount still owing is more than the statutory monetary limit of RM100K, the CP is sustainable. And a sustainable CP should not be stayed without sufficient reason. [29] In Moscow Narodny (supra), the Federal Court held— 61 Malaysian courts have, on many occasions, followed Re Patel and took a similar view, ie where after the filing of the creditor’s petition the amount owing by the debtor is reduced, the petition is not bad as long as the amount remaining owing at the date of hearing of the petition is more than the statutory limit. [emphasis added] The facts of this matter adequately meet the “sufficient reason” threshold [30] The JD argues that the facts surrounding this bankruptcy action adequately meet the “sufficient reason” threshold required under section 97 of the IA 1967. The JD cites and relies on the Court Of Appeal’s judgment in Chen Ying @ Chin Ying v Export-Import Bank of Malaysia Berhad [2016] 4 MLJ 324 (CA); [2016] 4 AMR 274; [2016] 7 CLJ 475; [ [2016] 5 MLRA 283. [31] The JD argues that the facts in Chen Ying (supra) are similar to the facts in this bankruptcy action, and as such, this bankruptcy Court should follow the reasoning and decision in Chen Ying (supra). These are the facts in Chen Ying (supra) that are relevant to this bankruptcy action—