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TICKETSEARCH SDN BHD [Company No.: 201001031297 (915220-A)]
WA-22NCvC-541-09/2025
High Court of Malaysia7 May 2026
The written judgment as the court issued it, with the coram, case number, and source links. Every paragraph has its own anchor.
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TICKETSEARCH SDN BHD [Company No.: 201001031297 (915220-A)]
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PRIMUSE TICKETSEARCH SDN BHD [Company No.: 202401005603 (1551453-V)]
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DIRK EMIL SASS (Passport No.: C4K524C6K/C4K52XKLK)
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MARCO ANDRES RIOS PUEBLA (Passport No.: F38581125) … DEFENDANTS 23/07/2026 17:02:28 WA-22NCvC-541-09/2025 Kand. 161 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Order 14 Rules of Court 2012 - Summary Judgment)
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This was the Plaintiff's application for summary judgment pursuant to Order 14 of the Rules of Court 2012 against the 1st Defendant (D1) and the 2nd Defendant (D2) for the sum of USD450,000.00, together with interest and costs.
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Having carefully considered the Notice of Application, the affidavits filed by both parties, the written submissions together with the authorities relied upon, this Court allowed the Plaintiff's application and entered summary judgment against D1 and D2.
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On 1 April 2025, the Plaintiff and D1 entered into a Live Performance Contract for the organisation of two Mariah Carey concerts to be held in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. Pursuant to the agreement, the Plaintiff paid a deposit of USD450,000.00 to
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Subsequently, the Plaintiff discovered that Mariah Carey had already been scheduled to perform in Australia during the same period. Consequently, the concerts could not proceed as originally planned.
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Following the cancellation of the concerts, 3rd Defendant (D3) and 4th Defendant (D4), acting on behalf of D1 and D2, repeatedly assured the Plaintiff that the deposit would be refunded. Numerous WhatsApp communications were exchanged in which repayment was promised. In one such communication dated 26 June 2025, D3 even forwarded what was represented to be a bank remittance evidencing that the artist's management had refunded the deposit to D1.
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When repayment was still not forthcoming, D3 and D4 executed a Letter of Undertaking (LOU) dated 17 July 2025 on behalf of D1 and D2. The said LOU was exhibited as SBY-3. The LOU clearly stated the terms of the voluntary repayment agreement.
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Under the LOU, D2 expressly undertook to repay the Plaintiff the sum of USD450,000.00 on behalf of D1 by way of three equal instalments. The Plaintiff, in return, agreed to refrain from commencing legal proceedings against D1 and D2 pending the agreed repayment schedule.
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Despite the expiry of all agreed payment dates, no payment was made. Consequently, the Plaintiff commenced the present action and thereafter filed the present application for summary judgment.
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The applicable principles governing an application under Order 14 are well settled. It is applicable when the Defendant does not have a defence to the Plaintiff’s claim.
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The jurisdiction under Order 14 exists to prevent Defendants who have no genuine defence from delaying the inevitable by insisting upon a full trial. Once the Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the Defendant to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide triable issue.
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A Defendant cannot successfully resist summary judgment by merely asserting bare denials or speculative disputes. The Court must examine whether the alleged defence genuinely requires determination after a full trial.
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The governing principle was succinctly stated by the Supreme Court in Bank Negara Malaysia v. Mohd Ismail Ali Johor & Ors [1992] 1 MLJ 400, namely that a Defendant must show a real defence raising a genuine issue for trial. Mere assertions, unsupported denials or fanciful arguments are insufficient.
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Therefore, this Court is not concerned with determining whether the Defendant will ultimately succeed at trial. The question is whether the defence disclosed is genuine and a bona fide triable issue.
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Having considered the pleadings, affidavits and submissions of the parties, this Court is of the view that the present application gives rise to only two issues:
a
Whether the Letter of Undertaking constitutes a valid and enforceable contractual obligation binding upon the 1st Defendant (D1) and the 2nd Defendant (D2); and
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Whether D1 and D2 have disclosed any bona fide triable issue sufficient to resist the Plaintiff's application for summary judgment under Order 14 of the Rules of Court 2012. E. Issue 1: Whether the Letter of Undertaking constitutes a valid and enforceable contractual obligation
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Learned counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that the Plaintiff had established an unequivocal claim against D1 and D2 arising from the LOU. It was submitted that D1 and D2 never disputed the execution of the LOU and, accordingly, the obligation to repay the Plaintiff the sum of USD450,000.00 was expressly acknowledged.
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Counsel argued that the Plaintiff had paid the sum of USD450,000.00 as a deposit pursuant to the Live Performance Contract dated 1 April 2025 and that following the cancellation of the concerts, D3 and D4 repeatedly represented through WhatsApp communications that the deposit would be refunded. These repeated assurances eventually culminated in the execution of the LOU.
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It was further submitted that the LOU constituted a fresh and independent contractual undertaking supported by valuable consideration. In exchange for the Plaintiff agreeing not to commence immediate legal proceedings against D1 and D2, D2 expressly undertook to repay USD450,000.00 on behalf of D1 by way of three instalments. Accordingly, the enforceability of the LOU did not depend upon the underlying disputes relating to the original Live Performance Contract.
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Learned counsel further contended that D1 and D2 had admitted, both in the documentary evidence and in their pleadings, which can be found in paragraph 11 of the Defendants’ Defence in Enclosure 50, the existence of the repayment obligation. The subsequent failure to honour the repayment schedule constituted a clear breach of the LOU.
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Counsel submitted that the various matters now relied upon by D1 and D2 concerning the cancellation of the concerts, the venue, negotiations with Mariah Carey's management, alleged fraud involving D3 and D4, and other commercial disputes were entirely collateral to the Plaintiff's present cause of action under the LOU. Those matters neither extinguished nor qualified the contractual obligation undertaken by D1 and D2 to repay the Plaintiff.
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Counsel further submitted that the Plaintiff’s Cause of Action against D1 and D2 was based on breach of contract, i.e breach of LOU. Hence, the allegation of fraud which D1 and D2 raised is to mislead the Court.
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Learned counsel for D1 and D2 opposed the application on the ground that several genuine disputes of fact existed which could only be properly resolved at a full trial.
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Firstly, it was submitted that the Plaintiff's claim could not be viewed in isolation from the underlying Live Performance Contract. Counsel argued that there were substantial factual disputes concerning the organisation of the Mariah Carey concerts, including the agreed venue, the parties' respective obligations, and the events leading to the cancellation of the concerts.
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Secondly, counsel disputed the Plaintiff's contention that D1 had unequivocally admitted receiving USD450,000.00 from the Plaintiff. It was argued that the Plaintiff had failed to establish the factual basis for the alleged debt as asserted.
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Thirdly, learned counsel submitted that the WhatsApp communications relied upon by the Plaintiff did not amount to admissions of legal liability but merely reflected ongoing commercial discussions concerning possible repayment arrangements. Those communications, it was argued, ought not to be construed as unequivocal acknowledgements of indebtedness. F. Issue 2: Whether D1 and D2 have disclosed any bona fide triable issue
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For the reasons stated above, the Plaintiff’s counsel further argued that the defence disclosed no bona fide triable issue. Instead, the purported disputes were merely afterthoughts and raised to avoid a straightforward contractual obligation. Consequently, summary judgment ought to be entered in favour of the Plaintiff pursuant to Order 14 of the Rules of Court 2012.
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Counsel for D1 and D2 further submitted that allegations of fraud had since arisen involving D3 and D4 in Singapore. Those allegations, according to the Defendants, demonstrated that the surrounding commercial relationship was far more complex than portrayed by the Plaintiff and required proper ventilation at trial.
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It was also contended that questions surrounding the refund allegedly received from Mariah Carey's management, together with the circumstances under which the LOU was executed, gave rise to substantial factual disputes which ought to be determined through oral evidence rather than by way of summary judgment.
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Learned counsel therefore submitted that the cumulative effect of these disputed matters clearly established the existence of bona fide triable issues. Accordingly, it was argued that this was not a suitable case for disposal under Order 14 and that the matter should proceed to a full trial.
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The Plaintiff's claim in this application is founded on the LOU. Under the LOU, D2 expressly undertook, on behalf of D1, to repay the Plaintiff the sum of USD450,000.00 by way of agreed instalments in consideration of the Plaintiff refraining from commencing legal proceedings against D1 and D2.
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This Court finds that the terms of the LOU are clear, certain and unambiguous. The repayment obligation, the amount due and the agreed payment schedule are expressly set out therein. The Plaintiff's agreement to withhold legal proceedings constituted valuable consideration supporting the undertaking.
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Significantly, D1 and D2 do not challenge the validity or enforceability of the LOU on any recognised legal ground. There is no plea that the LOU is void, voidable, illegal, procured by fraud, executed under duress or otherwise unenforceable.
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Accordingly, this Court is satisfied that the LOU constitutes a valid and enforceable contractual obligation binding upon D1 and D2.
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D1 and D2 contend that the Plaintiff’s claim is founded on an allegation of fraud and also various disputes exist in relation to the Live Performance Contract, including the cancellation of the concerts, the venue, the refund arrangements and the surrounding commercial dealings between the parties. They submit that these disputes warrant a full trial.
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This Court believes that those matters relate to the background leading to the execution of the LOU. They do not affect the Plaintiff's present cause of action, which is founded upon the Defendants' express undertaking to repay the Plaintiff under the
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More importantly, none of the matters relied upon by D1 and D2 impeaches the validity or enforceability of the LOU. In the absence of any challenge to the LOU itself, the disputes relied upon by D1 and D2 do not constitute bona fide triable issues capable of defeating the Plaintiff's claim under Order 14.
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Having considered the Defence, the affidavits and the submissions of the parties as a whole, this Court is not persuaded that D1 and D2 have disclosed any genuine defence deserving of a full trial. The issues raised are collateral to the Plaintiff's contractual claim under the LOU and are insufficient to resist summary judgment.
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For the reasons stated above, this Court finds that the Plaintiff has established a clear contractual entitlement under the Letter of Undertaking. Conversely, D1 and D2 have failed to disclose any bona fide defence or triable issue sufficient to resist the Plaintiff's application for summary judgment under Order 14 of the Rules of Court 2012.
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In the circumstances, this is an appropriate case for the Court to exercise the summary judgment. The Plaintiff is therefore entitled to judgment without the necessity of a full trial.
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For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff's application for summary judgment is allowed. Judgment is entered in favour of the Plaintiff against the 1st Defendant and the 2nd Defendant, jointly and severally, in the following terms:
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payment of the sum of USD450,000.00;
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interest at the rate of 5% per annum on the judgment sum from the date of filing of the Writ until full realisation; and
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costs fixed at RM7,000.00, to be paid by the 1st Defendant and the 2nd Defendant to the Plaintiff. Dated: 7 May 2026 Sgd. (RIHAIDA BINTI RAFIE) Judicial Commissioner Civil High Court NCvC 5 Kuala Lumpur Plaintiff’s Counsel : Wee Choo Keong (Auni Izzati with him) Messrs Wee Choo Keong & Faaiz Kuala Lumpur Defendants’ Counsel : Gavin Jayapal (Neveetha with him)
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