Stark Holdings Inn Bike Leasing Pte Ltd v Pengarah Jabatan Pengangkutan Jalan Negeri Johor (JA-24NCvC-1976-12/2025)

This is an Originating Summons filed by the Applicant, Stark Holdings Inn Bike Leasing Pte Ltd ("Stark" or the "Applicant"), a company incorporated in Singapore (Registration No. : 201419069W), against the Director of the Road Transport Department, State of Johor ("JPJ" or the "Respondent"). The Applicant seeks two principal declarations : first, that the seizure and/or detention of its two vehicles bearing registration numbers SNT7085M (seized on 2.11.2025) and SNL8266T (seized on 5.11.2025) is unlawful and second, that the continued detention of the said vehicles for a period exceeding one month without any prosecution being instituted is unlawful.

Having considered the affidavit evidence, the written submissions of both parties, I now set out my decision and the reasons for my decision.

The material facts, as gleaned from the Afidavit Sokongan of Mahasaravanan S/O Sandra affirmed on 23.12.2025, the Afidavit Jawapan Defendan of Zulhalmi bin Darwis affirmed on 25.2.2026, and the Afidavit Balasan Pemohon affirmed on 9.3.2026, are as follows.

The Applicant is a Singapore-incorporated company carrying on the business of leasing vehicles for private hire. It is the registered owner of two Toyota Alphard vehicles : SNT7085M (approximately 2½ years old) and SNL8266T (approximately 3 years old), with a combined value approaching SGD400,000. Both vehicles are registered with the Singapore Land Transport Authority ("LTA") as "Private Hire (Chauffeur) Station" vehicles and are owned by the Applicant.

Both vehicles were leased to one Jahfri bin Abdullah ("Jahfri"), a Singapore citizen bearing identity card number S833038D, pursuant to Vehicle Leasing Agreements dated 11.8.2025 (for SNT7085M) and 3.11.2025 (for SNL8266T). The leases were for private hire use within Singapore only. Importantly, Jahfri executed Letters of Undertaking ("LU") dated 11.8.2025 and 13.8.2025 respectively, by which he expressly undertook not to –

use the vehicles as unlicensed taxis;

carry paying passengers; or

operate any cross-border chauffeur service. Copies of the leasing agreements and LUs were exhibited as Exhibit MS-1 to Enclosure 2.

On 2 November 2025, vehicle SNT7085M was stopped at the Inbound lane of Kompleks Sultan Abu Bakar ("KSAB") during an enforcement operation conducted by JPJ, Unit Operasi Cawangan KSAB, targeting Singapore-registered private hire vehicles operating in Malaysia without a valid operator's licence. At the material time, the vehicle was driven by Jahfri and carried four passengers, namely Tan Yquan Isaac, Yoon Wai Cheong Davier, Tan Cheng Quan (all Singapore citizens) and Leon Lim Jai Shern (a Malaysian citizen). The vehicle was seized under section 80(1) of the Land Public Transport Act 2010 [Act 715].

On 5 November 2025, vehicle SNL8266T was similarly stopped at the Laluan Kereta Inbound, Kompleks Bangunan Sultan Iskandar ("BSI") during another enforcement operation. At the material time, the vehicle was again driven by Jahfri and carried two passengers, Ahmed Alireza Abdul Rahman (a Saudi Arabian citizen) and Lee May Yin (a Malaysian citizen). This vehicle was likewise seized under section 80(1) of Act 715.

The Respondent deposed in the Afidavit Jawapan (Enclosure 8) that in respect of both incidents –

statements were recorded from the driver and passengers;

the passengers confirmed they were travelling from Singapore to Malaysia and that payment had been made for the service; and

the driver admitted to ferrying passengers from Singapore to Malaysia for a fee of SGD160 "atas alasan perlu bekerja".

On 6.11.2025, the Applicant's manager, Mahasaravanan S/O Sandra, attended an investigation session ("temu siasat") at JPJ's office. He appealed for the temporary release of the vehicles on the basis that the Applicant had expressly prohibited Jahfri from engaging in cross-border passenger transport. According to the Applicant, this appeal was cursorily rejected by the investigating officer, who stated that the detention was a "tit-for-tat" measure in response to actions taken by Singapore's LTA against Malaysian vehicle owners for similar offences. The Respondent denies this allegation and states that the detention was carried out pursuant to its statutory enforcement duties.

On 14.11.2025, the Applicant's solicitors, Messrs C. Sankaran & Co, wrote to the Respondent appealing for the release of the vehicles

Meanwhile, on 12.11.2025, the Izin Pendakwaan was obtained from the Timbalan Pendakwaraya. On 18.11.2025, summonses were filed and registered at the Johor Bahru Magistrate's Court against the Applicant under section 16(1) of Act 715, being cases numbered : JA- 87-3990-11/2025 (for SNT7085M) and JA-87-3992-11/2025 (for SNL8266T). The first mention date was fixed for 11.2.2026. Critically, the summonses were not served on the Applicant's solicitors until 14 January 2026, a full two months after they were filed and one month after the Applicant's solicitors had already written to the Respondent seeking release of the vehicles.

On 29.12.2025, the Applicant filed the present Originating Summons. On 11.2.2026, the Applicant appeared at the Johor Bahru Magistrate's Court, the charge under section 16(1) of Act 715 was read and the Applicant pleaded not guilty. The case management date for document service was fixed for 10.3.2026.

Notably, no charge or summon has at any time been preferred against Jahfri, the driver who was the person who actually operated the vehicles at the material times.

Having considered the pleadings and submissions, the issues that fall to be determined are – Issue 1 : Whether the seizure of the vehicles under section 80(1) of Act 715 was lawful; Issue 2 : Whether the Respondent's refusal to temporarily release the vehicles under section 80(2) of Act 715 was proper; Issue 3 : Whether the requirement under section 80(5) of Act 715, that prosecution be instituted within one calendar month of seizure, has been complied with; and Issue 4 : Whether the Applicant, as an innocent owner, can be made liable under section 16 of Act 715 and whether the continued detention of its vehicles is justified.

Section 80(1) of Act 715 provides that any vehicle which is connected with or there is reasonable cause to suspect that an offence under sections 16, 28, 36, 46, 51 or 63, subsections 22(3), 41(3) or 57(3), or paragraphs 23(1)(b), 42(1)(b) or 58(1)(b) of Act 715 has occurred, may be seized by a police officer of not lower than the rank of Inspector, a Road Transport Officer or a Land Public Transport Officer, at any place.

The operative standard is one of "reasonable suspicion" or "sebab yang munasabah". This is a lower threshold than proof of the commission of an offence. The Respondent has cited the Court of Appeal decision in Pengarah Pejabat Perdagangan Dalam Negeri, Koperasi dan Kepenggunaan Negeri Sabah & Ors v Multi Inrich Sdn Bhd [2019] 1 MLJ 818, wherein the court set out the following relevant principles – At paragraphs [15] to [19], the court adopted the definition of "reasonable and probable cause" as "an honest belief in the guilt of the accused upon a full conviction, founded upon reasonable grounds, of the existence of a state of circumstances, which, assuming them to be true, would reasonably lead any ordinarily prudent and cautious man, placed in the position of the accuser, to the conclusion that the person charged was probably guilty of the crime imputed". Importantly, at paragraph [18], the court held that "to establish reasonable or probable cause, the law does not require that an offence under the TDA must have been committed before the enforcement officers could proceed to seize the goods. It was sufficient for that purpose if they had an honest belief that an offence under the TDA had probably been committed".

On the facts before me, I find that at the point of seizure, the circumstances did objectively support a reasonable suspicion that an offence under section 16 of Act 715 was being committed. Both vehicles were intercepted at the Malaysia-Singapore border crossings with paying passengers on board. The vehicles were registered in Singapore as "Private Hire (Chauffeur) Station" vehicles. The driver and passengers were present and statements were said to have been recorded. This was sufficient to meet the threshold of reasonable suspicion required under section 80(1) of Act 715.

The Applicant's argument that the seizure was unlawful because the offence, if any, was committed by Jahfri and not by Stark does not, in my view, avail on this particular issue. Section 80(1) of Act 715 authorises the seizure of the vehicle connected with the suspected offence. It does not limit seizure to vehicles belonging only to the alleged offender. The section is concerned with the nexus between the vehicle and the suspected offence, not the ownership of the vehicle.

I also note the Applicant's contention that the Notices of Seizure were undated and therefore non-compliant with the mandatory requirements of section 80(1) of Act 715. While this is a procedural irregularity that is not to be treated lightly, I am not satisfied that it goes to the root of the validity of the seizure itself, which was otherwise carried out on reasonable grounds.

The Applicant has also submitted that the Respondent failed to adduce any credible evidence to support the seizure, pointing to the absence of any recorded statements from the driver or passengers, and the lack of documentary proof of the alleged fare of SGD160. While I accept that the Respondent's Afidavit Jawapan does not exhibit the recorded statements it claims to have taken, this does not, in my view, vitiate the lawfulness of the initial seizure. The standard under section 80(1) of Act 715 is one of reasonable suspicion at the point of seizure, not proof of the commission of an offence. The objective circumstances at the point of interception were Singapore-registered private hire vehicles at the border crossings with passengers on board, and statements said to have been recorded at the scene were sufficient to ground a reasonable suspicion. The question of whether the evidence ultimately proves the offence is a matter for the trial court, not for the assessment of the lawfulness of the initial seizure.

Accordingly, on Issue 1, I find that the initial seizure of the vehicles was lawful. However, as I shall elaborate below, the lawfulness of the initial seizure does not ipso facto render the continued detention of the vehicles lawful.

Section 80(2) of Act 715 provides – "Apabila suatu kenderaan yang berkaitan telah disita di bawah subseksyen (1), seorang pegawai polis yang berpangkat tidak rendah daripada Inspektor, seorang pegawai pengangkutan jalan atau seorang pegawai pengangkutan awam darat, mengikut budi bicaranya, mengembalikan kenderaan itu secara sementara kepada pemunyanya, apabila jaminan yang memuaskan hati pegawai itu diberikan bahawa kenderaan itu akan diserahkan balik kepada pegawai itu apabila diminta".

The operative words are "mengikut budi bicaranya" (in the exercise of his discretion). This is a discretionary power, not a mandatory obligation. The Respondent has submitted that the officer has the discretionary power to refuse temporary release and that whether such discretion was properly exercised is not the relief sought in the present proceedings.

This Court observed that there is some force in the Respondent's procedural point. The Originating Summons seeks declarations that the seizure and detention are "tidak sah" (unlawful), not judicial review of the Respondent's exercise of discretion under Order 53 ROC 2012. Nevertheless, the manner in which the discretion was exercised or rather, the apparent failure to exercise it at all, is a relevant consideration in assessing the overall conduct of the Respondent and the bona fides of the detention.

The evidence shows that the Applicant made at least two attempts to secure the temporary release of the vehicles : first, through its representative Mahasaravanan on 6.11.2025 during the temu siasat; and second, through its solicitors' letter dated 14.11.2025. Both were rejected. The Respondent's letter of 18.12.2025 rejecting the application was, by the Applicant's account, bereft of any reasons. No explanation was offered for the refusal. No consideration appears to have been given to the Applicant's evidence of innocence, the Letters of Undertaking expressly prohibiting the very conduct that occurred.

While I accept the Respondent's position that the detention was "semata-mata bagi maksud penguatkuasaan undang-undang Malaysia", the complete absence of reasons for the refusal to exercise discretion in the Applicant's favour is troubling. A discretion conferred by statute must be exercised genuinely and not fettered or exercised mechanically. The failure to provide any reasons, particularly in circumstances where the Applicant had tendered contemporaneous documentary evidence of its innocence, raises legitimate concerns about whether the discretion was genuinely exercised.

I return to the Applicant's allegation of bad faith set out at paragraph 9 above. In the absence of independent evidence corroborating the "tit-for-tat" allegation, I make no finding on this specific point. However, the Respondent's conduct in failing to disclose the existence of the summons filed on 18.11.2025 to the Applicant's solicitors, despite the solicitors' letter of 14.11.2025 expressly requesting release under sections 80(2) and 80(5) of Act 715 and despite the Respondent's reply dated 18.12.2025 making no mention of the pending prosecution, is, at the very least, conduct that falls short of what might reasonably be expected of a public authority acting in good faith. While I do not go so far as to make a finding of mala fides, the Respondent's failure to inform the Applicant of the summons for nearly two months after filing and to respond to the solicitors' letter without any reference to the pending prosecution, is a relevant consideration in the overall assessment of the Respondent's conduct of this matter.

However, as the relief sought in the present proceedings is in the nature of declarations rather than judicial review, I shall confine my observations on this issue and proceed to the central and determinative issue in this case, the question of prosecution within one calendar month under section 80(5) of Act 715.

This is the central and most critical issue in the present application. Section 80(5) of Act 715 provides – "Jika tidak ada pendakwaan berkenaan dengan mana-mana kenderaan yang berkaitan yang disita di bawah subseksyen (1), kenderaan itu hendaklah dilepaskan apabila habis tempoh satu bulan kalendar dari tarikh penyitaan itu melainkan jika kenderaan itu telah dilepaskan sebelum itu".

The provision is clear on its face: if no prosecution is instituted in respect of the seized vehicle within one calendar month from the date of seizure, the vehicle "hendaklah dilepaskan" (shall be released). The use of "hendaklah" (shall) indicates a mandatory requirement. The vehicles were seized on 2.11.2025 and 5.11.2025 respectively. The one-month deadlines therefore fell on 2.12.2025 and 5.12.2025.

The critical question, as the Respondent itself has framed it at paragraph 72 of Enclosure 13, is : "Bilakah dikira 'pendakwaan' berlaku?" (When is 'prosecution' deemed to have been instituted?).

The Respondent submits that prosecution was initiated within one month, relying on the following chronology –

the Izin Pendakwaan was obtained on 12.11.2025;

the summonses were filed and registered at the Magistrate's

the court took cognisance of the offence on that date by issuing the summonses.

The Respondent relies principally on the High Court decision in Reza Kianmehr v. PP [2013] 7 CLJ 265, wherein the court held – "[17] Learned DPP submitted that the consent in writing from the PP to prosecute the appellant under s. 241 of Act 715 (p. 16 Record of Appeal) was issued on 6 April 2012 and the summons was issued by the Magistrates' Court on 17 April 2012. Therefore there was prosecution initiated within one month against the appellant..." "[18] Under Chapter XVI and ss. 136 and 137 of the CPC provides provisions regarding commencement of proceedings before a Magistrate Court. In respect of proceedings by summons, under s. 136(1) of the CPC the proceedings for indictment of the person summoned of starts after the Magistrate take cognizance of the offence complained of and there is sufficient ground for summons to be issued to the person ... When the summons is issued and if it is so required, the sanction, consent or requisition of the PP is issued, then the proceedings for the prosecution of the person so summoned starts to commence..."

The Respondent further argues that the word "prosecution" in section 80(5) of Act 715 should not be interpreted to mean only when the accused is called upon to plead. The Respondent contends that the principles laid down in Perumal v Public Prosecutor [1970] 2 MLJ 265 and Gan Kok Shang & Anor v Public Prosecutor [2025] 3 MLJ 174 should be distinguished on the basis that those cases concerned specific statutory provisions. Section 26 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1961 [Act 57] (this Act has been repealed by the Anti-Corruption Act 1997 [Act 575], which was itself repealed by the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2009 [Act 694]) and section 39B of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 [Act 234] respectively, which contain express requirements for the Public Prosecutor's consent before prosecution may be instituted. The Respondent argues that since section 16 of Act 715 does not contain such a requirement, the principles in those cases should not be applied here.

The Applicant's position, articulated in its Written Submission and Reply Submission, is that a prosecution is only "instituted" when the accused is called upon to plead before the court. The Applicant was only called to plead on 11.2.2026, well beyond the one-month statutory window. In support, the Applicant relies on a body of appellate authority that I shall now consider in turn.

The jurisprudence on the meaning of "institution of prosecution" in Malaysian law is well-developed. I begin with the Federal Court decision in Perumal v Public Prosecutor [1970] 2 MLJ 265. In that case, the Federal Court considered the meaning of "institution of prosecution" under section 26 of Act 57 and held – "But we agree that the proviso to sub-section (1), and the new sub-section (2) of section 26 of the Act limit the meaning of the phrase 'institution of prosecution' and that for the purposes of this section a prosecution is instituted is when the accused is called upon to plead to the charge. In other words, irrespective of what happened prior to that stage, there must be a consent of the Public Prosecutor when the accused is called up to plead".

Significantly, the Federal Court in Perumal also articulated a general principle on the meaning of "institution of prosecution" before limiting its application to the specific statutory provision before it. The court stated – "We agree that in the light of the above authorities a prosecution is normally instituted when a complaint is laid or an arrest made".

The Applicant has also relied on the Court of Appeal decision in Hazrin Izzuddin bin Jamaluddin danlain-lain lwn Pendakwa Raya [2019] 5 MLJ 545. In that case, the Court of Appeal considered the meaning of "institution" of prosecution under section 93 of the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 [Act 613], and held – "[42] Pada hemat kami, pendakwaan di bawah Akta 'dimulakan' apabila mahkamah 'take cognisance' kesalahan terhadap seseorang. Dapatan kami ini selari dengan keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Dato' Yap Peng (supra) bahawa suatu prosiding jenayah dimulakan apabila mahkamah 'take cognisance' kesalahan yang dipertuduhkan terhadap seseorang". "[43] Setelah mempertimbangkan keseluruhan proses pendakwaan dan autoriti-autoriti yang dikemukakan di atas, kami berpandangan bahawa seseorang itu 'dituduh' apabila prosiding jenayah atau pendakwaan 'dimulakan' terhadapnya. Oleh itu, kami bersetuju dengan dapatan Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman bahawa perayu-perayu dalam rayuan ini telah 'dituduh' apabila mahkamah 'take cognisance' kesalahan terhadap mereka melalui izin mendakwa yang dikemukakan oleh responden ke mahkamah".

This was further affirmed by the Federal Court in Raqeem Rizqin Enterprise dan lain-lain lwn Ketua Polis Negara dan satu lagi [2019] 5 MLJ 693, where the Federal Court held – "[54] Kami bersetuju dengan kesimpulan Mahkamah Rayuan bahawa bagi tujuan, seseorang itu dikatakan 'dipertuduhkan' apabila mahkamah telah mengambil perhatian terhadap kesalahan berkenaan".

Most recently, the Court of Appeal in Gan Kok Shang & Anor v Public Prosecutor [2025] 3 MLJ 174 reiterated the principle in unequivocal terms – "[45] ...a prosecution only commences when a charge is read to an accused and he enters his plea in relation thereto..."

I now turn to the Respondent's attempt to distinguish these authorities. The Respondent submits that Perumal and Gan Kok Shang were both decided in the context of specific statutory provisions, section 26 of Act 57 and section 39B of Act 234 respectively, which contain express requirements for the Public Prosecutor's consent before prosecution. The Respondent argues that the principle should not be "dipanjangkan secara am" (extended generally) to all other statutes that do not contain similar provisions.

With respect, I am unable to accept this submission for several reasons.

First, the Court of Appeal in Hazrin Izzuddin itself acknowledged and addressed this very point. The court observed that Act 613 does not contain a provision equivalent to section 26(2) of Act 57, yet the court still applied the same principle and held that prosecution is instituted when the court takes cognisance of the offence against a person. The court stated – "[41] Fakta dalam rayuan ini boleh dibezakan dengan fakta dalam kes Perumal (supra). Izin dalam rayuan ini telah dikeluarkan oleh responden menurut s. 93 AMLATFAPUA. Namun, tiada peruntukan seperti sub-s. 26(2) APR dinyatakan dalam mana-mana bahagian AMLATFAPUA. Oleh itu, kami berpandangan bahawa pemakaian prinsip ini adalah terhad kepada peruntukan yang serupa dalam undang-undang bertulis yang lain".

Despite this observation, the Hazrin Izzuddin court went on to apply the general principle derived from Perumal, that prosecution is "dimulakan" when the court takes cognisance of the offence to the Act 613 context, which has no equivalent consent requirement. This directly undermines the Respondent's attempt to confine Perumal to statutes with consent provisions.

Second, the Federal Court's endorsement of this principle in Raqeem Rizqin Enterprise was stated in broad terms, "bagi tujuan" s.52A of the relevant Act and was consistent with the general position that a person is "charged" when the court takes cognisance of the offence. The Federal Court did not limit this principle to statutes requiring the PP's consent.

Third, even the Respondent's own authority, Reza Kianmehr, in fact supports rather than undermines the Applicant's position. In Reza Kianmehr, the High Court held that proceedings commence "after the Magistrate take cognizance of the offence complained of". The court in that case found compliance because the consent was issued on 6.4.2012, the summons was issued on 17.4.2012, and the vehicle had been seized on 18.3.2012, all within one month. The key factual distinction is that in Reza Kianmehr, the court was satisfied that the Magistrate had taken cognisance of the offence when the summons was issued with the PP's consent. In the present case, however, the situation is materially different.

In the present case, the chronology set out at paragraph 11 above reveals serious irregularities. The Respondent's own submission records the date of the izin pendakwaan as "12.22.2025", which appears to be either a typographical error or, more troublingly, a date after the summons was filed. If this is read as 22 December 2025, it would mean the consent was obtained more than a month after the summons was filed on 18.11.2025, raising obvious questions about the regularity of the prosecution. The Respondent has not addressed or clarified this discrepancy. In fairness, this may well be a typographical error for 12.11.2025, which is the date stated elsewhere in the Afidavit Jawapan (Enclosure 8). I proceed on the assumption that the Izin Pendakwaan was in fact obtained on 12.11.2025. The summonses were not served on the Applicant's solicitors until 14.1.2026. The charge was not read to the Applicant until 11.2.2026. At no point was Jahfri, the actual operator of the vehicles, charged or summoned.

Even if I were to adopt the Respondent's interpretation that prosecution commences upon the filing and registration of the summons (which I do not, for the reasons stated above), the Respondent would still face the difficulty that the prosecution was directed against the wrong person. The summonses were filed against Stark, the owner, under section 16(6). No prosecution was ever initiated against Jahfri under section 16(1) or 16(5). Section 80(5) refers to "pendakwaan berkenaan dengan mana-mana kenderaan yang berkaitan" (prosecution in respect of the vehicle that was seized). The logical reading is that this refers to prosecution of the offence for which the vehicle was seized, which in this case was the offence of operating a public service vehicle without a licence, allegedly committed by Jahfri.

I am fortified in my conclusion by the weight of appellate authority. The Federal Court decisions in Perumal and Raqeem Rizqin Enterprise, and the Court of Appeal decisions in Hazrin Izzuddin and Gan Kok Shang, all point in the same direction : prosecution is instituted when the court takes cognisance of the offence and the accused is called upon to plead. This occurred on 11.2.2026, well beyond the one-month statutory deadline.

Accordingly, I find that the Respondent has failed to comply with the mandatory requirement under section 80(5) of Act 715. No prosecution, within the meaning of the established case law, was instituted within one calendar month from the dates of seizure (2.11.2025 and 5.11.2025). The vehicles ought to have been released by 2.12.2025 and 5.12.2025 respectively. The continued detention of the vehicles beyond those dates is unlawful.

While my finding on Issue 3 is sufficient to dispose of this application, I consider it appropriate to address the Applicant's submissions on the innocent owner question, as these raise important considerations of principle.

The Applicant submits that it is an innocent owner that had no knowledge of, consent to, or participation in the alleged offence. In support, the Applicant relies on the case of Cheng Kee Huat And Anor v. Public Prosecutor [1947] 1 MLRH 675 where Russell J held– "The first appellant was found to be completely innocent... and no knowledge that his car was being used in connection with an offence... can be attributed to him. I do not consider that the forfeiture of the property of a completely innocent person can act as a deterrent to wrong-doers. I therefore ordered the order of forfeiture to be quashed".

The Applicant has further relied on the Federal Court case of Karthiyayani & Anor v Lee Leong Sin & Anor [1975] 1 MLJ 119, where the Federal Court held – "It has never been the law tha the owner of a car is responsible in law for damage done by the negligence of a person to whom the car is lent or whom he has permitted to use it... The mere fact of consent by the owner to the use of the chattel is not proof of agency... He is not liable just because he has given permission to use the car".

The Applicant also relies on the Court of Appeal case of Periasamy Sinnappan v. Pendakwa Raya [1996] 3 CLJ 187, as cited in Ling Hang Tsyr v Public Prosecutor [2019] MLJU 1182 for the proposition that where the principal offender has not been charged, it is difficult to sustain a charge of abetment against another party. The court held – "The offence of abetment, when it consists of instigation, constitutes a separate and distinct offence. Consequently, an abettor who instigates the commission of an offence or conspires to commit it, may be convicted of abetment, notwithstanding that one who is charged with the principal offence has been acquitted. It is otherwise, where the abetment consists of intentional aiding; in such a case, acquittal of the principal offender must result in the acquittal of the abettor".

While the present case does not involve a charge of abetment per se, the underlying principle is instructive. The complete absence of any prosecution against Jahfri, the person who was at all material times in physical control of the vehicles, means that the Applicant is being made to answer for an offence that has not been established against the person who allegedly committed it. The continued detention of the vehicles in these circumstances raises serious questions of fairness and proportionality.

On the evidence before me, the Applicant has tendered contemporaneous documentary evidence, the Vehicle Leasing Agreements and the Letters of Undertaking, expressly prohibiting Jahfri from engaging in the very conduct that is now alleged. The Respondent, on the other hand, has not exhibited any of the recorded statements it claims to have taken from the driver or passengers. As the Applicant correctly observes, the Respondent's case on this point rests on bare assertions in the Afidavit Jawapan, unsupported by any documentary proof.

The Applicant has also referred to the magistrate's court cases of Public Prosecutor (Pengarah Jabatan Pengangkutan Negeri Selangor) v Seng Hup Enterprise Sdn Bhd [2024] MLJU 580 and Public Prosecutor (Pengarah Jabatan Pengangkutan Negeri Selangor) v Virvin Trading and another case [2024) MLJU 581, both of which were upheld on appeal to the High Court. In both cases, applications for forfeiture under sections 80(3) and (4) were dismissed, with the court holding that the penalty provisions do not constitute offences in themselves, and that the four-pronged test under sections 80(3) and (4) must be strictly satisfied before forfeiture can be ordered.

I also note the Applicant's reference to the older but instructive case of Lee Chiang Seng & 9 Ors. V. Public Prosecutor [1967] 2 MLJ 32, concerning section 50 of the Road Traffic Ordinance 1961, where the court identified three prerequisites to an order of forfeiture –

the vehicle was used in the commission of an offence;

the vehicle was seized under the relevant provision; and

the Public Prosecutor made a written application for forfeiture. The court emphasised that "these must be strictly proved".

The case of Perfect Mix Portfolio Sdn. Bhd. v China Construction Yangtze River (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd. [2020] MLJU 1375, citing Halsbury's Laws of England, also reminds us that a statute imposing forfeiture is to be regarded as penal for purposes of construction and must therefore be construed strictly in favour of the person proceeded against.

These authorities, taken together, underscore the need for strict compliance with the statutory prerequisites before forfeiture may be ordered. While these considerations are ultimately matters for the Magistrate's Court to determine in the pending prosecution, they reinforce the Applicant's contention that its continued prosecution is misconceived.

For the reasons set out above, I make the following findings and orders –

On the first prayer, a declaration that the Respondent's act of seizing and/or detaining the Applicant's vehicles is unlawful. I decline to grant the declaration in the terms sought insofar as it relates to the initial seizure. The initial seizure on 2.11.2025 and 5.11.2025 was, in my finding, carried out lawfully under section 80(1) of the Act 715 on the basis of reasonable suspicion. However, the continued detention of the vehicles beyond the one-month statutory period is a different matter altogether, and I address this under the second prayer;

on the second prayer, a declaration that the Respondent's continued detention of the vehicles for a period exceeding one month without any prosecution being instituted is unlawful, I grant this declaration. I find, on the strength of the Federal Court decisions in Perumal and Raqeem Rizqin Enterprise, and the Court of Appeal decisions in Hazrin Izzuddin and Gan Kok Shang, that prosecution is instituted only when the accused is called upon to plead or when the court takes cognisance of the offence. In the present case, the Applicant was only called to plead on 11.2.2026, which is well beyond one calendar month from the dates of seizure. As for Jahfri, the actual alleged offender, no prosecution has ever been instituted against him. The Respondent has therefore failed to comply with the mandatory requirement under section 80(5) of Act 715, and the vehicles ought to have been released.

Accordingly declare that the continued detention of vehicles SNT7085M and SNL8266T beyond one calendar month from their respective dates of seizure (i.e. beyond 2.12.2025 and 5.12.2025) without prosecution having been instituted within the meaning of section 80(5) of the Land Public Transport Act 2010 is unlawful. The Respondent is directed to release both vehicles to the Applicant forthwith.

And cost of RM 5,000.00. Dated 30 March 2026 -signed-Dr. Noradura binti Hamzah Judicial Commissioner High Court Civil 2 Johor Bahru Solicitor for the Applicant : : Maithily a/p Manoher Messrs. C Sankaran & Co. Solicitor for the Respondent : : Suhana binti Sabil