Stt Technologies Sdn. Bhd. v 1. ) Kerajaan Malaysia (WA-21NCvC-54-08/2019)

Government of Malaysia

Ministry of Communication and Multimedia

Ministry of Tourism, Arts and Culture …DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (After Trial) Introduction [1] This is the Plaintiff’s claim (“this Claim”) against the Defendants for compensation for services rendered by the former after the expiry of 2 contracts. Background facts [2] It is agreed that both parties had continuous contractual relationships since 2000 through numerous contracts entered into. The purpose of these contracts was as stated in the initial agreement as “Rudingan Terus Bagi Perolehan Sistem Pengurusan Keselamatan Bersepadu yang Komprehensif untuk Kementerian Penerangan Komunikasi dan Kebudaayan dan Agensi-Agensi di bawahnya Secara Sewa Beli Termasuk Penyelenggaran”. [3] A new agreement was entered into by the parties in 2012 (“the 1st Contract”). In continuation, another similar contract was entered between the parties on 07.10.2014 for, “Penyelengaraan Sistem Pengurusan 09/11/2023 12:27:11 WA-21NCvC-54-08/2019 Kand. 152 Keselamatan Bersepadu (SPKB) Secara Komprehensit untuk Fasa 1 hingga VIII Kementerian Komunikasi dan Multimedia” (the 2nd Contract”). Both contracts expired in October 2018, namely 23.10.2018 for the 1st Contract while the 2nd Contract ended on 31.10.2018. [4] Before the expiry, a way forward meeting was held and attended by both parties on 09.10.2018 (“the October 2018 Meeting”). After the expiry of both contracts, the Plaintiff contended that upon request of the Defendants, the Plaintiff had continued providing its service until September 2019 (“the Alleged Post Contract Period”). [5] On 20.09.2019, the 2nd Defendant issued a letter to the Plaintiff’s agents and employees to halt and to discontinue the Plaintiff’s access into the Defendants’ premises (“the Letter”). However, prior to the issuance of the Letter, the Plaintiff had sent several invoices to the Defendants. [6] Unsatisfied, the Plaintiff filed this Claim against the Defendants, in essence seeking the following payments from the Defendant:

RM31,075,55.05 as of 30.09.2019 including GST of RM1,641,986.10 (for invoices No. 23492, No. 23493, No.23495, No. 23519, No. 23516, No. 23494, No. 23518); And/or in the alternative

RM22,296,212.13 as of 30.09.2019 including GST of RM1,210,492.12 (for invoices No. 23492, No. 23493, No. 23495, No.23519, No.23516); and

RM8,780,342.92 as of 30/09/2019 to the Plaintiff including GST of RM431,493.98 (for invoices No. 23494, No. 23518). Trial [7] The Plaintiff called three (3) witnesses during the trial, while the Defendants called four (4) witnesses respectively. The trial was conducted based on the following agreed issues:

Whether the Defendants explicitly and/or impliedly have asked the Plaintiff to continue to prove services (the scope of services is the same as that which has been provided during the contract period between the plaintiff and the defendants after the expiration of the contract period;

Whether there are instructions and/or requests made by the government employees and/or officers of the Defendants

Whether there is a legitimate expectation for the alleged post contract;

Whether the Plaintiff has provided such services at 117 sites (as listed in paragraph 9 of the amendment to the amended statement of claim) after the expiry of the contract;

Whether the services provided by the Plaintiff for the Defendants (if any) were done voluntarily; and

Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to receive payment for the work done and if yes, how much can be claimed by the Plaintiff Findings and Decisions of the Court [8] After perusing the cause papers, the witnesses’ statements, the notes of proceeding and the written and oral submissions and replies by the parties, I dismiss the Plaintiff’s claim. Herein are my reasons. The Burden of Proof lies on the Plaintiff [9] In any civil action proceedings such as this Claim, the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff to prove his claim against the defendant. Only when the plaintiff makes his claim, the burden of proof shifted to the defendant to dispose the allegation. As cited by the Plaintiff’s counsel, in RHB Bank Berhad v Yung Chen Wood Industry Sdn Bhd & Ors [2019] MLJU 1845 the Court observed that, “[7] Let me also say something on the burden of proof as both parties have submitted on this. Let me refer to Juahir Sadikon v. Perbadanan Kemajuan Ekonomi Negeri Johor [1996] 4 CLJ 1 (CA) on the issue pertaining to sections 101 & 103 Evidence Act 1950, the Court of Appeal opined: “The other issue before us, was there such an offer. It is clear that it was the plaintiff who asserts that Tan Sri Dato’ Haji Basir who made the offer, the onus is on the plaintiff to satisfy the court that such an offer was ever made. This is clearly provided for by ss. 101 & 103 of the Evidence Act 1950. The sections read as follows:

Burden of Proof

Whoever desire any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that these facts exist;

When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof liens on that person.

Burden of proof as to particular fact The burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the court to believe in its existence unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person” Now in Tan Kim Khuan v. Tan Kee Kiat [1998] 1 CLJ SUPP 147; [1998] 1 BLJ 147; [1998] 1 MLJ 697 the court held: “It is settled law that the burden of proof rests throughout the trial on the party on whom the burden lies. The burden of proof on the person who has been appointed as plaintiff...Where a party on whom the burden of proof lies has discharged it, then the evidential burden shifts to the other party. What shifts is the responsibility of adducing evidence to discharge that burden. When the burden shifts to the other party, it can be discharged by cross-examination of witnesses of the party on whom the burden of proof lies or by calling witnesses or by giving evidence himself or by a combination of the different methods. No adverse inference can be drawn against the party for failure to give evidence himself. If he does not adduce any evidence when the burden has shifted to him, he will fail.” Thus, the plaintiff has to prove his case on a balance of probabilities that the transaction was one of a loan of RM60,000 and that the Property was to be used as a security for the said loan.” [Emphasis added] [10] Likewise, in Johara bt Abdul Kadir Marican v Lawrence Lam Kwok Fon & anor [1981] 1 MLJ 139 it was held that, “It was all a matter of proof and that until and unless the Plaintiff has discharged the onus on her to prove her case on a balance of probabilities, the burden did not shift to the Defendant and no matter if the Defendant’s case was completely unbelievable, the claim against him must in these circumstances be dismissed.” [Emphasis added] [11] Therefore, in our present case, the burden of proof is on the Plaintiff to show that there is an agreement between the parties about the post-contract services rendered by the Plaintiff pertaining to the SPKB system. The SPKB or what is also known as the Integrated Security Management System (ISMS) is essentially a management system that connects several security elements such as:

the access control system,

the time management system (TMS),

the closed-circuit television (CCTV); and

the visitor management system. [12] In my analysis, the following are the key issues of this Claim and I shall elaborate hereinafter my reason and findings under each of them:

Whether there is a post Contract between the Parties; and

Whether the Plaintiff successfully established the Quantum of the Claim. i) Whether the is a post Contract between the parties [13] The essential question here is whether there was indeed such a post contract (“the Alleged Post Contract’) between the parties. To support the Plaintiff’s claim, the Plaintiff contended that it is always the Defendants’ intention to integrate the SPKB system fully into the Defendants’ day-to-day operations. The Plaintiff submitted that such intention could be seen in an audit report in 2013 (‘the 2013 Audit Report’). The Plaintiff’s counsel cited a part of the 2013 Audit Report namely, Clauses 10.5.4.3 to support their point on this. [14] Next, the Plaintiff also premised that the intention of the Defendants may also be seen from the October 2018 Meeting. The Plaintiff argued that the intention to extend the contract can be seen in paras 6.2 to 6.2.5 of the minutes of the Meeting (“the Minutes”), where the 2nd Defendant requested for the said extension. Hence, the Plaintiff alleged that at all material times, the parties agreed that the 1st and 2nd Contracts would be extended for six months following the contracts' immediate expiry. To support the Plaintiff’s counsel’s contention, he cited the decision in Dae Hanguru Infra Sdn Bhd v Baldah Toyyibah (Prasarana) Kelantan Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2022] 4 MLRA 689 and MWE Properties Sdn Bhd v Saw Lip Kean [2011] 1 MLRA 553. [15] However, with due respect, I disagree with the Plaintiff’s contention. Firstly, it is important to highlight that no formal agreement was ever made between the Plaintiff and the Defendants after the expiry of the 1st and 2nd Contracts. The Plaintiff had alleged that it was always the Defendants' intention to fully integrate the SPKB by 2020 and consequently they deduced that the 1st and 2nd Contracts would be extended to serve their intended purpose. [16] As highlighted by the Court of Appeal in MWE Properties Sdn Bhd v Saw Lip Kean [2011] 1 MLRA 553, it is for the court to construe the correspondence exchanged between the parties as well as the conduct of the parties to determine the result intended by the parties. If the court finds that the parties intended to create a legal contract between them by referring to the exchange of correspondences and the conduct between them, and only in such case, the conclusion must be that there is a binding and enforceable contract between them. [17] Therefore, in our present case, in the absent of an express contract, I must now analyse the conduct of the parties and the correspondence between them. It is my finding that the Plaintiff fell short on their argument on this matter. I do not see any reason to accept the allegation that the intention to integrate the SPKB fully by 2020 constitutes an intention to create a legal relationship between the parties after the expiry of the 1st and 2nd Contracts. As submitted by the Defendants’ counsel, the 2013 Audit is merely a report and suggestion made by the Audit Department. Such suggestions cannot be said to have any contractual effect on the Alleged Post Contract. This notion is indeed agreed by PW1, the director and the anchor of the Plaintiff, during cross-examination: [Notes of Proceeding (NOP) at page 33] Mula-mula tadi saya cadangkan ini adalah pendapat audit negara untuk SPKB Betul. Untuk SPKB disepadukan dan you bersetuju. Lepas itu saya berkata dari segi ini audit negara bukanlah pihak dalam kontrak dan you pun setuju dan soalan seterusnya saya kata jabatan audit negara tidak boleh memaksa sesuatu kementerian atau jabatan untuk memasuki sesuatu kontrak, itu soalan saya. Betul. [18] I am also in agreement with the Defendants’ counsel’s submission that firstly, the Audit Department was neither privy nor authorised to enter into any contract with the Plaintiff. Secondly, no doubt, it is true that the objective and methodology of the 2013 Audit Report did mention about the full integration of the SPKB system. Nonetheless, it did not explicitly nor impliedly mention that the full integration will be or must be done by the Plaintiff. Nor had it mentioned that upon expiry of the any contracts, expired contracts with the existing contracts would or must be extended. Thus, the Plaintiff, without any basis, had only drawn their own conclusion that their contracts i.e., the 1st and 2nd Contracts would be renewed post-contract and had unilaterally and arbitrarily enforced this unfounded belief. [19] Similarly, in the October 2018 Meeting, it was never agreed or concluded that the Plaintiff’s contracts with the Defendants would be extended. As confirmed by PW1 in his testimony during cross-examination by the Defendants’ counsel: [NOP at page 41] Soalan saya, saya cadangkan teruslah kalau Encik Suhaimi tak nak jawab. Saya cadangkan Encik Suhaimi tidak pernah menerima kebenaran daripada Kementerian Kewangan untuk kontrak ini dilanjutkan setuju atau tidak? Setuju. [20] Also, during re-examination, DW4 explained candidly about the alleged extension of the contract: [NOP at pages 456-457] Tentang perlanjutan kontrak tadi ada ditanyakan yang Encik Khairim ada sebut tiada perlanjutan kontrak boleh jelaskan lebih lanjut tak sebab tadi dia merujuk kepada dua keadaan satu di dalam minit mesyuarat dan satu selepas itu. Boleh jelaskan. DW4: Itu lar bila saya memegang jawatan setiausaha bahagian komunikasi, bila saya selidik tengok teliti balik dokumen-dokumen itu, memang tiada satu bukti yang menunjukkan ada pelanjutan kontrak diberikan kepada pihak syarikat. Malahan dalam pengetahuan saya pada tahun 2008 memang terdapat satu surat pekeliling dikeluarkan oleh pihak perbendaharaan ataupun Kementerian Kewangan bahawa semua kontrak-kontrak tidak dibenarkan dilanjutkan kecuali semua perolehan perlu dibuat secara terbuka. Maknanya sebut harga dan tender perlu dibuat secara terbuka. Maknanya sebut harga dan tender perlu dibuat secara biasa. Tiada perlanjutan kontrak dibenarkan. Itu membuatkan keputusan kerajaan pada masa tersebut tidak melanjutkan kontrak dan membuat perolehan baru. Itu arahan daripada Kementerian Kewangan pada Jun 2018” [Emphasis added] [21] Furthermore, even if it was the intention of the Defendants to integrate the SPKB fully by 2020, this ‘intention’ has never been transformed or materialised in any documentary evidence before me. I also agree with the Defendants’ counsel’s submission that just because the Plaintiff had a contract or contracts with the Defendants since 2000, it does not in any way constitute a promise that such contract(s) will be deemed to be extended up until or even beyond 2020. The terms in the 1st and 2nd Contracts are very clear: the expiry of both contracts was on 23.10.2018 and 31.10.2018, respectively and that both of them came to an end by then. [22] PW1 himself averred this when questioned by the Defendants’ counsel regarding the terms of the 1st and 2nd Contracts: [NOP at pages 47-48] Dua-dua kontrak itu tiada terma yang mengatakan kita akan bekerjasama untuk fully integrated pada tahun 2020, tiadakan? Tiada. So saya cadangkan untuk peluang mendapat sambungan kontrak untuk fully integrated pada tahun 2020 ini hanya la dalam harapan dan anggapan Plaintiff sahaja, setuju atau tidak? Dengan anggapan kita akan memasuki kontrak baru, boleh saya terang sikit tuan? Tetapi jawab dulu lah, setuju atau tidak. Saya akan beri peluang untuk terangkan Setuju Terangkan Ok, dia berkisah kepada fully integrated tadi tuan. Sebanyak tuan pun sebut ada dua kontrak yang berlainan di bawah fasa 1-8 dan juga di bawah fasa 9. Yang keseluruhan tapak yang saya sebutkan tuan itu ada 175 tapak makna berakhir pada oktober 2018. Bermakna sistem itu telah dibangunkan secara holistic tetapi tidak ada link-up. Bermakna dia tidak ada the last month untuk mereka hubungkait untuk mereka dapat optimum punya benefit. Jadi di situ pertama tuan. Yang kedua dulu cerita yang sama juga kalau tuan tengok pada tahun 2014 pada 7 haribulan 10, 2014 tuan.

7.10.2014 muka surat 401, jilid 1(2). Muka surat 401 2.2a. Ada dinyatakan di situ situ dengan tindakan defendan sewaktu kontrak 2 kontrak yang kita mention pada 2014 itu. Kita hanya memasuki kontrak pada 2014. Tetapi Kementerian Kewangan meluluskan balik yang kita buat 2013 sehingga September 2014. Bermakna di situ memang ada perundingan makna perundingan bermakna saya yakin dengan harapan akan memasuki kontrak baru sebab itu yang pertama tuan. Tuan rujuk balik pada 2003, 2003 muka surat 1(1) 76 antara defendan juga dalam perkara yang sama , muka surat 76. Di situ ada dinyatakan ada dinyatakan supaya pihak Plaintiff meneruskan walaupun kontrak itu tidak keluar. Sebab ini saya terangkan tadi itu adalah kesinambungan sistem supaya tidak terputus sistem keselamatan pengurusan bersepadu. Bermakna tindakan-tindakan ini lar yang menyebabkan kita yakin akan masuk fasa baru. Ok, saya tanya. Kita rujuk pada dokumen yang sama yang masih ada di depan saya. Kita rujuk dokumen ini tarikh dia tahun 2003 kan? 2003 tuan. Ini adalah di luar skop kontrak sekarang, betul? Dalam kontrak... Dalam di luar tempoh pelaksanaan kontrak sekarang. Sekarang 2013-2018 Betul Jadi maksudnya, 2003 surat ini dikeluarkan adalah satu arah untuk meneruskan. Ia ada satu arahan bertulis yang mana telah dimuktamadkan dengan satu perjanjian 2013 tadi, setuju atau tidak? Setuju tuan. [Emphasis added] [23] Also [at NOP at page 40] PW1 said, Kita pergi kepada terma 2.11.2 di bawah itu ya.

2.11.2 tertakluk kepada peraturan dan prosedur kewangan kerajaan hendaklah sentiasa mempunyai kuasa budibicara mutlak sama ada membenar atau tidak membenar permohonan perlanjutan tempoh kontrak oleh kontraktor yang dibuat menurut perenggan 22.11.1 diatas. Ok. Ya. [Emphasis added] [24] What it appears to me is that the “extension” of these contracts was only what the Plaintiff hoped it would have happened. There was nothing from the Defendant to that effect. Also, while the earlier contract (in 2003) had such a clause asking the Plaintiff to continue their work while waiting for the extension, such clause never appeared in any of the Contracts. The Contracts could not be clearer: any extension is always at the absolute discretion of the treasury in responding to such application to extend made by the contractor. [25] Furthermore, it is obvious that the duration of the 1st Contract is only for 78 months i.e., from 24.04.2012 until 23.10.2018. If it was indeed the intention of the parties to extend the 1st Contract, the Plaintiff ought to apply to the Defendants for the extension. Clause 2.11.1 of the 1st Contract specified this. During cross-examination, PW1 admitted that no such application was made the Plaintiff. [NOP at pages 39-40] Encik Suhaimi saya minta Encik Suhaimi rujuk perjanjian di muka surat 2.11 kita tengok terma-terma perjanjian, jilid yang sama. Muka surat 265.

Saya rasa di jilid 1(2). Sekarang kita pergi ke perenggan 2.11.1,

11.2. Saya baca 2.11.1. Berkenaan Kontraktor boleh membuat permohonan kepada kerajaan untuk melanjutkan tempoh kontrak ini dalam tempoh yang tidak kurang daripada 6 bulan sebelum tarikh tamat tempoh kontrak sebagaimana yang tersebut di subklausa 2.10 di atas. Ok? Ya Kita tengok subklausa 2.10 di atas. Ia akan tamat pada 23 Oktober 2018 ya? Betul Maksudnya soalan saya ada atau tidak Encik Suhaimi menulis kepada kementerian permohonan lanjutkan tempoh kontrak iaitu 6 bulan sebelum tamat tempoh kontrak, ada atau tidak? Tidak Kita pergi kepada terma 2.11.2 di bawah itu ya. 2.11.2 tertakluk kepada peraturan dan prosedur kewangan kerajaan hendaklah sentiasa mempunyai kuasa budibicara mutlak sama ada membenar atau tidak membenar permohonan perlanjutan tempoh kontrak oleh kontraktor yang dibuat menurut perenggan 2.11.1 diatas ok. PW: Ya. [Emphasis added] [26] If there was never such an application by the Plaintiff, how could there be any extension? How then could there be any Alleged Post Contract between the parties? [27] I also agree with the Counsel for the Defendants’ submission that it was never agreed between the parties that the SKPB could only be performed through the Plaintiff. This was also agreed by PW1 during cross-examination: [NOP at page 65] Tetapi saya tambah sikit soalan kontrak tidak dijanjikan yang kontrak ini akan diteruskan dengan STT sahaja, tidak ada? Tidak ada. [28] Resultantly, the Defendants initiated a tender process to allow any vendors to bid and procure the new contract after the 1st and 2nd Contracts had ended. Despite that, the Plaintiff had failed to join or participate in the procurement process. [NOP at pages 67 – 68] Saya cadangkan bahawa tender telah dibuka mempelawa kepada kontraktor-kontraktor untuk bersaing mendapatkan projek SPKB ini, Encik Suhaimi tahu atau tidak? Saya hanya dimaklumkan bahawa pada December 2019 yang saya katakan tadi kementerian floatkan tender pada 2019. Maksudnya tender telah dibuka lar? Dibuka dan lain di luar pengetahuan saya. Tender telah dibukkan, ada Encik Suhaimi masuk tender bagi pihak STT Technologies? Tidak. Tidak ada? Tidak. Encik Suhaimi tau tak sekiranya tidak masuk tender kebarangakalian untuk tidak dapat lebih tinggi lar, kalau tidak masuk tender, setuju atau tidak? Setuju. Kalau Encik Suhaimi masuk tender ada kebarangkalian untuk STT dapat balik disebabkan dia punya track rekod dan isu keselamatan yang Encik Suhaimi sebut tadi, setuju atau tidak? Ya, dia menyebabkan isu keselamatan setuju” [Emphasis added] [29] Again, if the Plaintiff had never even attempted to bid for this, how could there be any intention by the parties for the new contract or the Alleged Post Contract? [30] The Plaintiff’s counsel also heavily relied on the case of Teras Kimia Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Malaysia [2014] 4 MLRH 429 where the Court held that there was an agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant after the expiry of the original contract. Her Ladyship Nalini Pathmanathan J (as she then was) observed and held the following at para [64]: “[64] For the foregoing reasons, it appears to this court that there was, during the interim period a valid contract subsisting between the plaintiff and the defendant on terms substantively similar to that of the Original Contract. As stated above, I so conclude because of negotiations between the parties after the expiry of the Original Contract, the offer of, and acceptance of services identical to that contained in the Original Contract for a term of seven months. There was no demur or objection or protest from the defendant as the execution of the contract. In fact, the defendant participated and co-operated in the execution of the same. Even after the plaintiff issued its first invoice at the end of July 2011, there was no protest or objection from the defendant to the effect that as far as it was concerned the services were being performed gratis. At no time did the defendant communicate to the plaintiff or any third party until the trial of this matter that the services of the plaintiff were being performed for non-payment. In any event the defendant’s subjective understanding of the same, as testified by DW2, is not relevant for the purpose of ascertaining whether a contract subsisted between the parties. The fact that there no pricing was agreed between the parties does not to my mind render the contract void because the cost of providing the services may be implied into the contract that subsisted between them. Such a term may be implied because of the terms set out in the Original Contract. As the services provided by the plaintiff were identical in nature to that in the Original Contract it follows that the remuneration should be the same, and that such a term may be implied. Alternatively, the pricing may be considered as a term, the determination of which the parties considered inessential, and which does not preclude a contract from coming into existence. The issue of the pricing may then be computed on quantum meruit basis.” [Emphasis added] [31] However, I see no application of Teras Kimia (supra) to our present case due to the material difference of the facts of Teras Kimia (supra) and our present case. In Teras Kimia (supra), the parties were involved in the negotiations for a new contract for the provision of similar services. There was also an offer made by the plaintiff vide letter dated 31 March 2011 and the defendant accepted the services. Moreover, such co-operation also existed between the parties in which the plaintiff received and accepted directives from the defendant’s servants and agents as it had done during the course of the original contract. And, most importantly, in the offer dated 31 March 2011, the plaintiff offered to continue to provide services, ‘without commitment’ for a further period of two months. [32] In contrast, in our present case, aside from the 2013 Audit Report and the October 2018 Meeting, no other correspondence or documentary evidence could support the Plaintiff’s claim. The Plaintiff did argue that several e-mails and phone calls were made by the Defendants’ officers in requesting such services from the Plaintiff, but no witnesses were ever called to attest to this. Nor had there any such documentary evidence been tendered to establish this. [33] Not to mention and the most essentially, from the Minutes, in the October 2018 Meeting, the Plaintiff had agreed to give their services for free. [34] Again, PW1 admitted this during cross-examination: [NOP at pages 14-16] Encik Suhaimi saya minta rujuk kepada minit mesyuarat bertarikh 23.10.2018, ikatan jilid 1(13), enclosure 69 di muka surat 126-147. Itu minit mesyuarat. Soalan saya Encik Suhaimi pernah tengok minit mesyuarat ini? Ada Tuan. Ada tengokkan? Ada.. ada. Saya cadangkan Encik Suhaimi dapat cabutan minit mesyuarat ini sekitar hujung tahun 2018, setuju atau tidak? Sekitar Oktober Hujung tahun Oktober 2018, selepas dari tarikh mesyuarat ini lar Ya. Saya cadangkan Encik Suhaimi, selepas terima minit mesyuarat ini Encik Suhaimi tidak pernah maklumkan apa-apa kepada Defendan bahawa kandungan minit mesyuarat adalah tidak tepat. Tiada hantar surat kata kandungan ini tidak tepat, tidak ada? Tiada. Encik Suhaimi sekarang kita rujuk ke muka surat 146, di perenggan 7.4.4. Nyata kat sini pihak STT Technologies Sdn Bhd memaklumkan bahawa pihaknya masih membantu tapak-tapak SPKB Fasa 9 yang telah tamat tempoh penyelenggaraan dari segi tindakan pembetulan (corrective action) tanpa mengenakan sebarang kos kepada pihak kementerian. Ini betul ye maklumat ini? Betul. Encik Suhaimi saya cadangkan tiada mana-mana catatan dalam minit mesyuarat yang mengatakan sekiranya kontrak tidak dilanjutkan dan diawadkan semula kepada STT, STT akan mengenakan caj bayaran pada kerja-kerja yang dikatakan tanpa kos tadi, setuju atau tidak? Selepas sekiranya STT, ulang soalan tuan. Dalam minit mesyuarat in kan, tiada apa-apa perenggan yang menyatakan bahawa STT akan menuntut kerja-kerja yang dikatakan sebagai tanpa apa sebarang kos kepada kementerian ini sekiranya kontrak tidak dilanjutkan dan diawadkan semula kepada Plaintiff, tiada dalam ini, betul? Tiada dalam ini tetapi ada dalam perenggan lain dalam Tidak mengapa nanti. Jadi maksudnya perenggan 7.4.4 ini adalah satu akur janji yang dibuat tanpa bersyarat oleh STT, betul ya? Ya, betul. [Emphasis added] [35] Nonetheless, the Plaintiff then tried to argue that the Defendants had misunderstood with respect to the corrective action reflected in the Minutes. The Plaintiff contended that since SPKB is a computerised system, one must understand the distinctiveness between maintenance and correction works. The Plaintiff further submitted that they had agreed for the corrective actions to be provided without costs since they only form a minor part of the SPKB. The same, according to them cannot be said about the maintenance works. [36] Once again, I have to disagree with the Plaintiff. It is my finding that if the Plaintiff only meant for the corrective actions to be gratuitous and that the maintenance work would be charged, the Plaintiff had ample time to correct the Defendants’ alleged misunderstanding before signing off and agreeing to the Minutes. As per the Note of Proceeding stated earlier, PW1 agreed to the Defendants’ counsel suggestion that no amendment nor objection was ever submitted by the Plaintiff pertaining to the Minutes, in particular, this part of the Minutes (concerning free service). Indeed, there was no mentioning even as to the definition or demarcation of corrective and maintenance works either during the October 2018 Meeting or in the Minute or in any correspondences or documents!! [37] It was on that basis that the Defendants allowed the Plaintiff to enter numerous sites during the Post Contract Period. The Plaintiff had never notified the Defendants any non-corrective actions or works or any maintenance works being conducted. Neither had they highlighted at any time after receiving the Minutes that they would not be providing any non-corrective works free. Thus, the fact that the Plaintiff undertook to provide the services for free means that the services provided during the Post Contract Period were gratuitous. If it was not, the Plaintiff ought to have communicated with the Defendants and made it clear to the Defendants the job scope concerned. The Plaintiff did not do so. Thus, the Defendants believed and had good reason to believe that the services rendered post-contract were gratuitous since that was what the Plaintiff had offered. This belief is more than justifiable. Henceforth, there is nothing to confirm that there was any post contract entered into or agreed upon by the Plaintiff and the Defendants. The argument of the Plaintiff at this point does not hold any water and ought to be dismissed. ii. Whether the Plaintiff successfully established the Quantum for the Alleged Post Contract [38] Now, even if the Plaintiff had successfully proven that there was such a (post) contract between the parties, the Plaintiff still has the burden to prove and to establish the quantum of this Claim. [39] As discussed previously, the Plaintiff argued that the gratuitous service only applied to those corrective actions. However, the Defendants never agreed to be charged for all other types of works (there was nothing to even suggest that the Plaintiff had ever proposed this or mentioned this during the October 2018 Meeting). The fact remains that the Plaintiff had also failed to raise this matter to the Defendants. The burden of proof therefore is on the Plaintiff to explain and establish to this Court which of the services rendered were corrective and which of them were maintenance actions. It is not enough for the Plaintiff to only tender the invoices, Service Order Invoice (SOI), Work Order (WO) and Time Management System (TMS) as definite proof of the actual services without any elaboration and verification. On top of that, there was no verification made by the Defendants’ agents for these chargeable services on all those documents. No witnesses have ever been called to attest the alleged performance and the completion of all these works by the Plaintiff. [40] The Defendants’ counsel had appropriately highlighted several e-mails in Common Bundle of Documents [Volume 1(3) at 73 – 180] which the Plaintiff claimed was the “request” for the Plaintiff’s services: Bil Mukasurat daripada Ikatan Dokumen Jilid 1(3) Agensi Tarikh emel Jenis kerja pembaikan/ penyelenggaraan Luar/ Dalam kontrak 23 1 73 – 76 Arkib Negara 02.10.2017 Kerja pembaikan disebabkan aduan Kerosakan Dalam kontrak 2 77 – 79 Arkib Negara 05.10.2017 Kerja penyelenggaraan Dalam kontrak 3 80 – 83 Arkib Negara 09.10.2017 Kerja pembaikan disebabkan aduan kerosakan Dalam kontrak 4 84 – 85 Arkib Negara 10.10.2017 Kerja pembaikan disebabkan aduan kerosakan Dalam kontrak 5 86 Arkib Negara 13.10.2017 Pas keselamatan. Penyelenggaraan. Dalam kontrak Bil Mukasurat daripada Ikatan Dokumen Jilid 1(3) Agensi Tarikh emel Jenis kerja pembaikan/ penyelenggaraan Luar/ Dalam kontrak 13 102 – 104 Arkib Negara 12.01.2018 Kerosakan di Pintu Arkib Negara Malaysia. Pembaikan. Dalam tempoh kontrak. 14 106 – 107 Arkib Negara 15.01.2018 Pas keselamatan. Penyelenggaraan. Dalam tempoh kontrak. 15 108 Arkib Negara 08.02.2018 Pas keselamatan. Penyelenggaraan. Dalam tempoh kontrak. 16 109 – 110 Arkib Negara 20.02.2018 Kerosakan di Menara Ilmu Arkib Negara Malaysia. Pembaikan. Dalam tempoh kontrak. 17 111 – 112 Arkib Negara 22.02.2018 Pas keselamatan. Penyelenggaraan. Dalam tempoh kontrak. Bil Mukasurat daripada Ikatan Dokumen Jilid 1(3) Agensi Tarikh emel Jenis kerja pembaikan/ penyelenggaraan Luar/ Dalam kontrak 18 113 Arkib Negara 19.03.2018 Kebenaran Masuk Untuk Buat Pemeriksaan sistem. Penyelenggaraan. Dalam tempoh kontrak. 24 19 114 – 116 Arkib Negara 09.04.2018 Pas keselamatan. Penyelenggaraan. Dalam tempoh kontrak. 20 117 – 119

07.

05.2018 Kerosakan Power Supply JKKN Sabah. Pembaikan. Dalam tempoh kontrak. 21 120 – 121 Arkib Negara. 04.07.2018 Pas keselamatan. Penyelenggaraan. Dalam tempoh kontrak. 22 122 – 123 Perpustakaan Negara 05.09.2018 Mesyuarat sahaja. Bukan kerja penyelenggaraan atau pembaikan. Dalam Tempoh kontrak. Bil Mukasurat daripada Ikatan Dokumen Jilid 1(3) Agensi Tarikh emel Jenis kerja pembaikan/ penyelenggaraan Luar/ Dalam kontrak 23 124 Arkib Negara. 20.09.2018 Pas keselamatan. Penyelenggaraan. Dalam tempoh kontrak. 24 148 - 158 Arkib Negara 07.12.2018 Kebenaran Menjalankan Naziran di Semua Premis Arkib Negara. Bukan pembaikan atau penyelenggaraan. Di luar tempoh kontrak 25 159 - 163 Arkib Negara 14.01.2019 Laporan Audit Kerosakan SPKB di Arkib Negara. Bukan pembaikan Atau penyelenggaraan. Di luar tempoh kontrak Bil Mukasurat daripada Ikatan Dokumen Jilid 1(3) Agensi Tarikh emel Jenis kerja pembaikan/ penyelenggaraan Luar/ Dalam kontrak [41] The Defence then established that by looking at the e-mails listed above, most of the alleged services were done during the tenure of the 1st and 2nd Contracts (only 9 of them were emails sent after the October 2018 Meeting). The Plaintiff also had failed to relate all the e-mails to the invoices that they are now claiming payment. For instance, Invoice No. 23493 which states: 26 164 Arkib Negara 17.01.2019 Pas keselamatan. Penyelenggaraan. Di luar tempoh kontrak 27 165 - 166 Arkib Negara 18.02.2019 Pas keselamatan. Penyelenggaraan. Di luar tempoh kontrak 28 167 Jabatan Kebudayaan dan Kesenian Ibu Pejabat 08.03.2019 Kebenaran Masuk Untuk melakukan kerja-kerja penggantian. Pembaikan. Di luar tempoh kontrak 29 168 Arkib Negara 14.03.2019 Sebutharga penggantian disebabkan kerosakan. Pembaikan. Di luar tempoh kontrak Bil Mukasurat daripada Ikatan Dokumen Jilid 1(3) Agensi Tarikh emel Jenis kerja pembaikan/ penyelenggaraan Luar/ Dalam kontrak 30 169 - 179 Arkib Negara 15.05.2019 Perpindahan Server SPKB ANM Negeri Perak ke Bangunan Baru. Penyelenggaraan. Di luar tempoh kontrak 31 180 Arkib Negara 28.03.2019 Data Transaksi Arkib 1 Mac hingga 17Mac 2019.Bukan penyelenggaraan atau pembaikan. Di luar tempoh kontrak BIL TAPAK NILAI TAPAK (RM) ASAS PENGIRAAN NILAI PERKHIDMATAN SEBULAN (RM) JUMLAH PERKHIDMATAN (BULAN) JUMLAH TUNTUTAN (RM) 1 Penyiaran Labuan 639,252 18% 9,588.77 6 57,532.64 2 Penyiaran Sri Aman 582,107 18% 8,731.60 6 52,389.60 3 Penyiaran Limbang 650,591 18% 9,758.86 6 58,553.15 4 Penyiaran Sibu 509,033 18% 7,635.50 6 45,812.98 5 Penyiaran Sarawak 262,694 18% 3,940.40 6 23,642.42 6 MCR 12,971,794 18% 194,576.91 6 1,167,461.43 7 Wisma TV 1,192,817 18% 17,892.26 6 107,353.55 8 Wisma Radio 1,411,751 18% 21,176.26 6 127,057.57 9 IBC 939,873 18% 14,098.09 6 84,588.55 10 IPTAR Lama 194,189 18% 2,912.84 6 17,477.05 11 IPTAR Baru 161,298 18% 2,419.47 6 14,516.82 12 Penyiaran Kelantan 461,708 18% 6,925.62 6 41,553.72 13 Penyiaran Terengganu 427,896 18% 6,418.44 6 38,510.63 14 Penyiaran Pahang 402,744 18% 6,041.16 6 36,246.95 15 Penyiaran Kedah 437,425 18% 6,561.38 6 39,368.27 16 Penyiaran Langkawi 324,793 18% 4,871.90 6 29,231.38 17 Penyiaran Perlis 143,302 18% 2,149.53 6 12,897.17 18 Penyiaran Pulau Pinang 636,935 18% 9,554.02 6 57,324.12 19 Kompleks Bersepadu Perak 2,300,911 18% 34,513.67 6 207,082.01 20 Penyiaran Johor 235,419 18% 3,531.28 6 21,187.68 21 Penyiaran Negeri Sembilan 148,452 18% 2,226.78 6 13,360.66 22 Penyiaran Miri 596,744 18% 8,951.16 6 53,706.93 23 JASA Kedah (Kuala Kedah) 361,592 18% 5,423.88 6 32,543.30 24 Penerangan Kedah 598,888 18% 8,983.32 6 53,899.90 25 Stesen Pemancar Kota Bharu 483,158 18% 7,247.37 6 43,484.22 26 Kompleks Bersepadu Kota Kinabalu 3,869,179 18% 58,037.69 6 348,226.13 27 Finas Ulu Klang 1,896,281 18% 28,444.21 6 170,665.26 28 4G9 2,701,821 18% 40,527.32 6 243,163.92 35,542,645 3,198,837.90 KKMM FASA 9 (NOVEMBER 2018 - APRIL 2019) Perincian Tuntutan Perkhidmatan Penyelenggaraan SPKB [42] Notably, Invoice No. 23493 above does not state any type of works or services that were done by the Plaintiff (the scopes, the details and whether it was corrective or maintenance) and if they were all maintenance works, the reason to this bearing in mind there has never been any clear definition of these 2 types of works. [43] Another example highlighted by the Defendants’ counsel is Invoice No. 23494. The Defendants’ counsel submitted that in the supporting document for this invoice (page 14 of CBOD Vol. 3(1)), the Work Order was unclear and vague. I refer to PW1 testimony during cross-examination, in which he also cannot confirm or even explain the work that has been done to warrant such price. [NOP at pages 68-69] Sekarang kita lihat kepada invois pada 23494 di muka surat 4-12. Ini adalah jabatan arkib negara. Kalau 4-12 sebenarnya adalah berkenaan jabatan audit negara, jabatan arkib negara. Itu saya nak nyatakan. So apa-apa catatan di sini adalah melibatkan peralatan-peralatan yang telah dipasang di jabatan arkib negara, setuju atau tidak? Setuju Untuk kos pemasangan tersebut bayaran telah dibuat kerana ia berdasarkan kontrak yang lama, betulkan? Ya, 2018. Sekarang kita pergi ke muka surat 14, dokumen yang sama. Ini adalah work order. Work order ini permohonan kerja, betulkan? Ya, betul Daripada ada permohonan daripada macam contoh daripada kementerian untuk buat kerja, betul? Betul. Tengok di muka surat 14 ini. Muka surat 14 ini kosong. Tidak ada apa-apa catatan melainkan tarikah sahaja

22.1.2015, setuju atau tidak? Tidak, ini macam kabur. Ini kabur ini. Saya tidak tahu, dekat saya memang tidak ada. Itu yang saya cadangkan kepada peguam kamu, tanya satu per satu. Dia tak nak. Tidak mengapa yang ini mungkin masalah terperincil ini. Ok tidak mengapa, daripada sini tiada catatan setuju atau tidak? Berpandu kepada borang sekarang ini tiada catatan. Soalan saya seterusnya kosong dokumen ini kita tidak tahu apa sebenarnya kerja yang dibuat, betul atau tidak? Daripada kosong ini, kalau daripada kosong ini memang saya setuju, kita dah bagi tuan. [Emphasis added] [44] Likewise, at page 24 CBOD Vol. 3(1), PW1 also cannot ascertain the person who allegedly signed the Work Order is indeed the representative of Sarawak Archive (Arkib Sarawak). PW1, indeed, admitted the following: [NOP at page 72] DC: Sekarang kita pergi kepada, ini saya punya cadangan. Setuju tak bahawa berdasarkan dokumen ini kita tida dapat nak pastikan bahawa orang yang menandatangani bahagian bawah kenana tersebut adalah merupakan wakil tapak untuk arkib tersebut? PW1: Untuk hari itu. [45] Also, during cross-examination, PW2 made a contradictory statement concerning Invoice No. 23405. The Defendants’ counsel suggested to PW2 (which he agreed) that Invoice No. 23405 had already been paid since the work done was before September 2018. But, when the Defendants’ counsel referred to the e-mail at page 73 of CBOD Vol. 1(3), and suggested the same, PW2 disagreed. Thus, it is apparent to this Court that the Plaintiff themselves cannot identify nor confirm which work had been done during the alleged post contract period and whether the same had been paid. [NOP at pages 237-241] En. Hizami, m/s 4 dan 5 ini adalah dokumen sokongan untuk tuntutan melalui invois di m/s 3, invois 23406, setuju? Tidak setuju. En. Hizami, kita tengok di m/s 5, jumlah di bawah dia RM75,718.18 betul? Betul. Kita tengok di m/s 3 invois jumlah di bayar itu RM75,718.18 betul? Betul. Jadi, setuju tak saya tanya sekali lagi dokumen m/s 4 dan 5 ini adalah dokumen sokongan untuk tuntutan invois 23406? Setuju Tuan. En. Hizami, saya cadangkan sekiranya invois 23406 ini telah dibayar ini bermaksud tiada lagi tunggakan kerja untuk, sini Muzium, untuk MOTAC bagi kerja-kerja yang telah tamat seawal September 2017, betul atau tidak? Betul. En. Hizami kita pergi kepada m/s 23 dan 24 juga. Soalan saya tengok di bahagian bawah 24 itu jumlah sebanyak RM12,286.34 tengok ingat jumlah ini dan kita pergi kepada m/s 23. Jumlah dekat sini adalah RM12,286.34. Encik Hizami setuju atau tidak yang dokumen 23 ini adalah sokongan kepada invois 23405 di m/s 23 tadi? Setuju. En. Hizami, soalan saya lagi, setuju atau tidak sekiranya invois 23405 ini telah dijelaskan, telah dibayar ya ia bermaksud tiada lagi tunggakan kerja-kerja bagi tapak yang tamat seawal September 2017 pada September 2018, betul atau tidak? Betul. En. Hizami, tadi En. Hizami ada rujuk kepada IDD ya. Saya nak tanya En. Hizami, dalam IDD ini ianya adalah melibatkan invois yang telah dibayar kepada Plaintif, setuju atau tidak? Setuju. Maksudnya dalam ini semua dah dibayar, tak ada hutang-hutang lagi, betul? Betul. Maksudnya berdasarkan emel ini, yang you katakan permintaan ini dibuat pada 2/10/2017 kan Ya, betul. Maksudnya 2/10/2017 kalau ikut kiraan itu dia adalah benda yang berlaku sebelum September 2018 betul? Betul. [Emphasis added] [46] Despite this, the Plaintiff argued that the rate for the maintenance services for the Alleged Post Contact could be ascertained from the previous contracts. This according to them was due to the fact that services were provided in continuation of the 1st and 2nd Contracts. It was on this point that the Plaintiff’s claim embarked on its journey to seek remedy under “quantum meruit”. To support, the Plaintiff referred to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Syarikat Binaan Utara Jaya (a firm) v Koperasi Serbaguna Sungai Glugor Bhd [2009] 2 MLJ 546. In this case, the Court of Appeal summarised the principle of quantum meruit as follows: “[40] However, there may be a quantum meruit claim in the following situations:

When there is an express agreement to pay a reasonable sum;

When no price is fixed (thus, if the contractor does work under a contract express or implied and no price is fixed by the contract, the contractor is entitled to be paid a reasonable sum for his labour and the materials supplied…;

(c)In a quasi-contract situation (a classic example would be when work is carried out while negotiations as to the terms of the contract are proceeding but agreement is not reached upon essential terms, the contractor is entitled to be paid a reasonable sum for the work carried out…;

When work is performed outside a contract (thus, in a situation where there is contract for specified work but the contractor does work outside the contract at the employer’s request the contractor is entitled to be paid a reasonable sum for the work outside the contract on the basis of an implied contract…;

(e)When work is done under a void contract (this envisages the situation where a contractor carries out work or renders services under a contract subsequently found to be void, the contractor is entitled to a quantum meriut for the work or services…” [47] Based on the above principles, the Plaintiff submitted that this Claim falls under (b) and (c). Consequently, the Plaintiff alleged that it is entitled to be compensated for its services post contract. I disagree. Our present case could not even fulfil items (b) or (c) stated in Syarikat Binaan Utara Jaya (supra). To claim quantum meruit under (b), there must be an express or implied contract to begin with. There has never been any such contract here. To claim under (c), likewise, there must be a negotiation. It is undeniable that there has never any of such negotiation. In fact, the Plaintiff admitted it had not requested or even submitted or retendered after those 2 contracts!! Hence, the Plaintiff’s claim under quantum meruit has also failed miserably. [48] The Plaintiff further argued that it is entitled to be compensated by the Defendant by virtue of Section 71 of Contracts Act 1950. Here, the Plaintiff cited the case of Siow Wong Fatt v Susur Rotan Mining Ltd & Anor [1967] 1 MLRA 53. [49] In contrast, the Defendants’ counsel argued that this issue was not included in the agreed issues to be tried. Nonetheless, the Defendants’ counsel premised that if the Plaintiff were to rely on Section 71, they must fulfil all four conditions to establish the claim. According to Siow Wong Fatt (supra) the four conditions that need to be satisfied by the claimants are: “The doing of the act or the delivery of the thing referred to in the section:

Must be lawful

Must be done for another person

Must not be intended to be done gratuitously

Must be such that the other person enjoys the benefit of the act or the delivery” [50] Hence, referring to Siow Wong Fatt (supra) above, the burden of proof is on the Plaintiff to show that they had established all the requirements. In this Court’s view, as premised by the Defendants’ Counsel, the Plaintiff has failed to do so. As previously discussed, if the Plaintiff only meant for the corrective actions to be gratuitous, the Plaintiff should have said so or specified these in correspondences immediately after receiving the Minutes. This they have failed to do (as established earlier). Thus, it is inevitable for this Court to dismiss the Plaintiff’s claim under Section 71 of the Contracts Act 1950. [51] Referring again to Syarikat Binaan Utara Jaya (supra), the Plaintiff failed to highlight that in this case, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge’s decision in dismissing the appellant contractor’s claim. His Lordship Abdul Malik Ishak JCA elaborated that: “[41] Here, everything depends on the certification by the engineer. Without the engineer’s certification, the appellant contractor’s claim purportedly in quantum meruit is without basis. A claim in quantum meruit would be made on the basis that the respondent employer had derived a benefit from the work done by the appellant contractor and; if this is so, a reasonable remuneration has to be paid to the contractor. But the learned judge of the High Court found that there was no evidence to support the appellant contractor’s claim for quantum meruit. We agree with the findings of the learned judge of the High Court in regard to the second issue. In its original text, this was the learned judge of the High Court said (see p 5-6 of the additional appeal record): Plaintif tahu adalah “condition precedent” sebelum bayaran dibuat SP2 hendaklah meluluskannya. Tanpa verification dan kelulusan dari SP2, mahkamah ini tidak berpuashati plaintif telah melaksanakan kerja-kerja itu. Saya mengambilkita bahawa defendan telah membayar plantif sebanyak RM1.27 juta berdasarkan kepada kerja yang diluluskan oleh SP2. Saya juga meragui tuntutan plaintif kerana selepas penamatan perjanjian oleh defendan, plaintif tidak langsung menulis surat kepada SP2 selama 4 tahun mengenai apa-apa tuntutan plaintif kepada defendan yang perlu diluluskan oleh SP2. Saya menolak pemakaian tuntutan quantum meruit kerana saya tidak berpuashati plaintif telahpun membuat kerja-kerja itu. Tanpa pengesahan dan kelulusan oleh SP2 saya enggan menerima keterangan SP1 tanpa bukti. …” [Emphasis added] [52] Similarly in our present case, the Plaintiff submitted that the invoices could be corroborated by the WO, SOI and TMS as proof of the work done. In summary, the Plaintiff said during submission that from all its documents, the following breakdown could be established: DOCUMENT TOTAL PERCENTAGE (%) A Total Service Order Invoice (SOI) 4464 Unsigned SOI 3030 67.88 Signed SOI 1434 32.12

100.00 B Total Work Order (WO) Unsigned WO 341 72.86 Signed WO 127 27.14

100.00 C Total Time Management System (TMS) 1568 [53] Following the above, I agree with the Defence that the Plaintiff had failed to prove its claim sufficiently. Firstly, there is too much uncertainty on whether the work or services were completed by the Plaintiff just by relying on the above documents. Secondly, there were too many unsigned SOI and WO. To establish its claim for RM31,076,555.05, the Plaintiff must prove and convince this court that whatever it is claiming must have been rendered, performed, and rightfully invoiced. This had never been done by any witnesses. This clearly does not correspond with the alleged work done (if any) by the Plaintiff. [54] Thirdly, I totally disagree with the Plaintiff’s contention that the TMS could illustrate that the Plaintiff’s agent or employees had performed and completed the services. As submitted by the Defence, the TMS was self- generated by the Plaintiff. Also, the TMS can only show that the Plaintiff’s agent or employees had attended to the site but could not verify the performance or completeness of the service. This also may explain why most of the SOI and WO were unsigned by the Defendants’ officers. And as far as this Court is concern, these documents are all self-serving document with no verification at all by the Defendants’ agents. Even among those (few) signed SOIs or WOs, as the Defence had put to Plaintiff’s witnesses that, many of them were signed using pencil without proper record of the name(s) and designation(s) of the person(s) verifying them. How could those documents be valid legal documents to establish such claim? [55] Fourthly, the Plaintiff has also failed to show which of the services were maintenance actions and which of them were corrective actions. Since the Plaintiff claimed that only certain corrective actions were considered as gratuitous, such distinction must be proven as the Defendants at all material times believed that all the services were rendered without any charge. This is also in line with the 2nd Defendant’s action in requesting further supporting documents when the Plaintiff for the first time issued the invoices on 12.06.2019. Thus, the burden of proof lies on the Plaintiff to establish and adduce evidence to claim its remedy. [56] In addition, the Plaintiff also invoiced and claimed for ‘standby’ service, which was never included in the scope of work in the previous contracts. No evidence was tendered as to how and why such “standby service” happened and on whose instruction or request. [57] Considering that this Claim was for alleged works rendered during a 6-month period, the amount prayed by the Plaintiff is too substantial for this Court to allow without any concrete evidence. Bearing in mind that the contract value for the 1st Contract was only RM29,709,655.00 for a 5-year period, yet, in this claim, the Plaintiff is now claiming RM31,076,555.05 for work done in 6 months. [58] Moreover, as mentioned earlier, other than the above-mentioned e-mails, the Plaintiff also claimed that several phone calls were made by the Defendants’ representative and/or officers requesting for the Plaintiff’s services. However, no witnesses were ever called to corroborate this. Without any evidence to establish such request, how could the Plaintiff even justify its claim here? This together with the vague invoices and the like put forward by the Plaintiff without any verification or explanation by any witnesses had binned the entire Plaintiff case. [59] Looking at the overall evidence tendered and submission made by the Plaintiff, I see no solid evidence that could convince me the Plaintiff’s entitlement to such quantum. It is not sufficient for the Plaintiff to merely state the amount of damages that he is claiming for or wish to claim. Proper evidence must be adduced. For this I find great guidance in the Federal Court case of Datuk Mohd Ali bin Hj Abdul Majdi & Anor (both practising as Messrs Mohd Ali & Co) v Public Bank Bhd [2014] 4 MLJ 465, where Ariffin Zakaria CJ lucidly rationed that: “[31] The object of an award of damages is to give the claimant compensation for the damage, loss or injury he has suffered the damage, loss or injury he has suffered. The general principle governing the measure of damages has its origin in the words of Lord Blackburn in Livingstone v Raywards Coal Co (1880) 5 App Cas 25 where he said: That the sum of money which will put the party who has been injured, or who has suffered, in the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong for which he is now getting his compensation of reparation. [32] it is trite law that a claimant claiming damages must prove that he has suffered the damage. The claimant has the burden of proving both liability and quantum of damages, before he can recover the sum claimed. This follows from the general rule that the burden of proving a fact is upon him who alleges it and not upon him who denies it, so that where a particular allegation forms and essential part of a person’s case, the proof of such allegation falls on him (see s 103 of the Evidence Act 1950). If he fails to prove both the liability and the quantum of damages, he loses the action. [33] Therefore, in a claim for damages, it is not sufficient for the plaintiff to merely state the amount of damages that he is claiming, he must prove the damage that he had in fact suffered to the satisfaction of the court. This principle is borne out in the case of Bonham-Carter v Hyde Park Hotel (1948) 64 TLR 177 where Lord Goddard CJ observed: Plaintiffs must understand that if they bring actions for damages it is for them to prove their damage; it is not enough to write. Down the particulars, and, so to speak, throw them at the head of the court, saying; ‘This is what I have lost, I ask you to give me these damages.’ They have to prove it. This statement was cited with approval by Edgar Joseph JR FCJ in Tan Sri Khoo Puat v Plenitude Holdings Sdn Bhd [1994] 3 MLJ 777.” [Emphasis added] [60] All things considered, the Defendants’ counsel had asserted that this Court has the discretion to award nominal damages under such circumstances. The Defendants’ counsel quoted the Court of Appeal case of Koperasi Kastam Diraja Malaysia Bhd v Yi Go Group Sdn Bhd [2021] 5 MLJ 590 where His Lordship Lee Swee Seng JCA at p. 608 held: “[71] The plaintiff had not led any evidence on its costs in this contract and this is not a case where the plaintiff had stated that there is no costs involved. [72] Where there is loss or damage suffered but the party claiming has failed to prove the damages, the only nominal damages would be awarded. [73] The Federal Court in Guan Soon Tin Mining Co v Wong Fook Kum [1969] 1 MLJ 99 at p 100 enunciated this principle as follows: The respondent, as plaintiff, of course had to discharge the burden of proving the fact and the amount of damages before he could recover. Where he succeeded in proving neither fact nor amount of damage he must lose the action or, if a right was infringed, he would recover only nominal damages. Where he succeeded in proving the fact of damage, but not its amount, he would again be entitled to an award of nominal damages only. This statement of the law is concisely stated in Mayne & McGregor on Damages (12th Ed) para 174…” [Emphasis added] [61] Since it is my finding that the Plaintiff had failed to prove the quantum nor justify their claim on this matter, unfortunately, I have to dismiss the Plaintiff’s claim in its entirety. I could not even award any nominal damages because the Plaintiff has not even established any fact of damage or to even suggest that the alleged work were indeed requested by the Defendants’ agent(s) or staff(s). Nor could they adequately show to this court in certainty what had they actually rendered (and accepted by the Defendants’ staffs or agents). Conclusion [62] To sum up, this Court find that the Plaintiff had failed to prove to this Court that there is a post-agreement contract between the parties. Neither has it established its entitlement to any damage under quantum meruit. Premised on the above evidence and reasons, I dismiss the Plaintiff’s claim with costs. Dated: 21st October, 2023 John Lee Kien How @ Mohd Johan Lee Judge High Court Malaya Kuala Lumpur For the Plaintiff Muhammad Nazrin Harith bin Mohd Mahyudin & Norhabibi Binti Talib Messrs. Mahyudin Zainal & Puteri Advocates & Solicitors For the Defendant Nik Mohd bin Nik Kar & Muhammad Asraf bin Shahbuddin Senior Federal Counsels Attorney General Chambers Table of Authorities Cases Dae Hanguru Infra Sdn Bhd v Baldah Toyyibah (Prasarana) Kelantan Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2022] 4 MLRA 689 Datuk Mohd Ali bin Hj Abdul Majdi & Anor (both practising as Messrs Mohd Ali & Co) v Public Bank Bhd [2014] 4 MLJ 465 Johara bt Abdul Kadir Marican v Lawrence Lam Kwok Fon & anor [1981] 1 MLJ 139 Koperasi Kastam Diraja Malaysia Bhd v Yi Go Group Sdn Bhd [2021] 5 MLJ 590 MWE Properties Sdn Bhd v Saw Lip Kean [2011] 1 MLRA 553 RHB Bank Berhad v Yung Chen Wood Industry Sdn Bhd & Ors [2019] MLJU 1845 Siow Wong Fatt v Susur Rotan Mining Ltd & Anor [1967] 1 MLRA 53 Syarikat Binaan Utara Jaya (a firm) v Koperasi Serbaguna Sungai Glugor Bhd [2009] 2 MLJ 546 Teras Kimia Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Malaysia [2014] 4 MLRH 429