(vi) In our view failing to seek a prayer for leave in the originating application in the nature of Form 109 will be fatal unless the applicant has filed an application to amend the originating process for inadvertence within the three months (or extended) period specified in O. 53 r. 3(6) of the Rules of Court 2012 or for some special or exceptional reason the court is prepared to invoke O. 53 r. 3(7) which reads as follows: The Court may, upon an application, extend the time specified in rule 3(6) and if it considers that there is a good reason for doing so. 30 January 2022 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ________________________________________________________________________ 5 [12] In the instant case Form 109 is the originating process as reflected by O. 53 r. 2(1) of the Rules of Court 2012 which, read together with O. r. 3(1) and (2) of the Rules of Court 2012, is to be made ex parte to a judge in chambers. Once leave is obtained then the hearing of the substantive prayer can proceed upon filing of Form 110 with the Form 109 as well as all affidavits and the mandatory 'statement' served on the relevant parties, as set out in the rules. The appellant here had not satisfied O. 53 r. 3(2) and had not filed the relevant forms according to rule of procedure and/or practice and has also failed to make any application promptly to condone inadvertence and/or non-compliance. [Emphasis added.] [5] As such, the Applicant’s failure to obtain leave itself had rendered the Application defective and a non-starter. Non-compliance with Order 53 rule 3(6) – Requirement to file the Application within three months [6] Since the Police Supervision Order was dated 27 April 2021, the Application should have been filed before 27 July 2021, that is, at the expiry of three months, as provided in Order 53 rule 3(6) of the Rules of Court. The Application was, however, filed on 30 July 2021, without an application to extend time. [7] First and foremost, it is trite law that an application for judicial review shall be made promptly, within three months, as prescribed by Order 53 rule 3(6) of the Rules of Court, which makes the three-month deadline a mandatory requirement. Although it was argued that the Applicant was merely four days late, the fact of the matter is that the three-month deadline had expired. The failure to apply within the time limit was, therefore, fatal, as explained in Yahya Kassim v Kerajaan Malaysia & Anor [1998] 1 CLJ 43. 30 January 2022 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ________________________________________________________________________ 6 Non-compliance with Order 53 rule 3(7) and (8) – Application for extension of time [8] Since the three-month deadline had expired, the Applicant should have filed an application to extend time, which should have been heard inter partes, as prescribed by Order 53 rule 3(8) of the Rules of Court. Such inter partes application to extend time should have been filed separately from the ex parte application for leave, as explained in DKLS Sunshine Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Pulau Pinang & Anor [2019] MLJU 25. However, the Applicant had failed to file the necessary applications. Whether procedural defects curable [9] The gist of the Applicant’s contention to all the procedural non-compliance mentioned above was that such omissions were mere technicalities that could be cured by Order 1A of the Rules of Court, which reads: Order 1A - Regard shall be to justice In administering these Rules, the Court or a Judge shall have regard to the overriding interest of justice and not only to the technical non-compliance with these Rules. [10] In support thereof, the Applicant relied on the Court of Appeal case of Redang Paradise Vacation Sdn Bhd v Yap Chuan Bin & Other Appeals [2017] 10 CLJ 296. The Applicant further submitted that allowing the Preliminary Objection would cause injustice to the Applicant as it would deprive him of a chance of having an adverse decision reviewed by this Court. 30 January 2022 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ________________________________________________________________________ 7 [11] In my view, this argument was untenable as Order 1A of the Rules of Court is not a carte blanche to ignore mandatory procedural requirements, as and when it suits a litigant. I am mindful that the 'relation of the rules of practice to the work of justice is intended to be that of handmaid rather than mistress; and the Court ought not to be so far bound and tied by rules' (per Lord Collins MR in Re Coles and Ravenshear [1907] 1 KB 1). However, in certain situations, procedural rules are not merely subservient to substantive justice, as in this case, where the requirement for leave was mandatory. [12] I also found instructive the case of Yick Hoe Ferrous Steel Sdn Bhd v Tribunal Rayuan Kastam [2011] 7 CLJ 544, where it was stated by Aziah Ali J (as she then was): Based on the express provisions of O.53 r. 2(1) I am unable to agree with counsel for the applicant that resort may be had to O.1A or O. 2 r.1 to cure the irregularity in this application. To my mind the failure to comply with the clear provisions of O.53 r. 2(1) is a fundamental procedural defect not curable under O.1A of the RHC. The procedure adopted in this matter is misconceived. Further by commencing this action by way of originating motion the applicant is evading the mandatory requirements of O.53 in particular the requirement to first obtain leave. [Emphasis added.] [13] As such, the Applicant’s submission that all the procedural defects in the Application could be cured by Order 1A of the Rules of Court, was bereft of merit and untenable. [14] The Application was rendered more defective as there was no satisfactory explanation for the delay. The Applicant’s explanation of having overlooked or forgotten the deadline was unconvincing, and 30 January 2022 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ________________________________________________________________________ 8 could not be entertained by this Court, as that will be setting a dangerous precedent to allow such feeble excuses to prevail over the limitation period prescribed by the law. Conclusion [15] In the final analysis, it was fundamental to note that Order 53 of the Rules of Court imposes stringent conditions which must be followed, as impressed upon in a plethora of cases including Subramaniam Vythilingam v The Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM) & Ors [2003] 6 CLJ 175, Ahmad Jefri Mohd Jahri v Pengarah Kebudayaan & Kesenian Johor & Ors [2010] 5 CLJ 865, and Yick Hoe Ferrous Steel Sdn Bhd v Tribunal Rayuan Kastam [2011] 7 CLJ 544. [16] In Subramaniam Vythilingam v The Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM) & Ors [2003] 6 CLJ 175, it was stated by Abdul Malik Ishak J, in the following passages: It was rightly submitted on behalf of the defendants that by choosing to file enclosure (1), the plaintiff was deliberately attempting to get around the following stringent mandatory requirements and safeguards as enumerated in Order 53 of the RHC: