in case BA-25-50-07/2023 (“No. 50”), the applicant sought a prayer of declaration and certiorari to quash the award given vide Claim No.: TPS/B-5083-11/2022 through which the first respondent prayed for “The Management Corporation to repaint all the staircases and external walls of all the buildings of Subang Perdana Court 4 within three (3) months from date of order/award for compliance with Sections 59(1)(a), 61(2) and 51(2)(a) of the Strata Management Act 757, Regulation 3(5) of the Strata Management Regulations 2015 and Article 8(1) of the Federal Constitution as the buildings have not been repainted for more than fourteen (14) years, whereas the same common property at Court 3 & 5 under the same Management Corporation have been repainted during this period. The works shall include cleaning the walls, removing old peeling paint and applying primer coat (“Claim No. 5083”). [4] The awards in respect of all five Claim Nos. 5078, 5080, 5081, 5082 and 5083 as mentioned above were delivered by the second respondent on 8.6.2023. They bore similar effect, which is that the applicant is to convene an Extraordinary General Meeting (“EGM”) for Subang Perdana Management Corporation Court 3 to 5 within 60 days from the date of awards to consider, discuss and decide on the motions of the first respondent which have been served to the applicant through the first respondent’s letter dated 13.2.2023, and S/N gxkqciiOF0Wu9jQwZW0b1A the cost and expenses incurred therefrom be borne by the applicant (collectively referred to as “the Impugned Decisions”). [5] The first respondent stated that he will not be defending the judicial review application by the applicant. The applicant filed a supplemental affidavit to this effect. The first respondent nonetheless filed in an affidavit verifying the respondent’s document (Enclosure 42 of case No. 46), through which he exhibited his email to the applicant’s solicitors, the notes of proceedings and grounds of award by the second respondent and his second email to the applicant’s solicitors. This was objected to by the applicant. [6] It is also pertinent to note that the first respondent has filed in his written submissions, through which he raised certain factual issues which was not backed by any affidavit. [7] While the first respondent had informed this court he will not be defending in this judicial review application, he had nonetheless filed an affidavit and written submissions. Hence this court proceeded to consider this application for judicial review based on the notice of application for leave, the Order 53 Statement, the applicant’s affidavit in support and Form 110. The Law Pertaining to Judicial Review [8] The grounds for an application for judicial review are illegality, irrationality, procedural impropriety and proportionality. These grounds were laid down by Lord Diplock in the case of Council of S/N gxkqciiOF0Wu9jQwZW0b1A Civil Service Unions & Ors v. Minister of Civil Service [1985] AC 374 which was adopted by the Federal Court in the case of R Rama Chandran v. The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145 as follows: “In this context, it is useful to note how Lord Diplock (at pp 410– 411) defined the three grounds of review, to wit, (i) illegality, (ii) irrationality, and (iii) procedural impropriety. This is how he put it: By 'illegality' as a ground for Judicial Review I mean that the decision maker must understand directly the law that regulates his decision making power and must give effect to it. Whether he has or not is par excellence a justiciable question to be decided, in the event of a dispute, by those persons, the judges, by whom the judicial power of the state is exerciseable. By 'irrationality' I mean what can by now be succinctly referred to as 'Wednesbury unreasonableness' (see Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223). It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. Whether a decision falls within this category is a question that judges by their training and experience should be well equipped to answer, or else there would be something badly wrong with our judicial system. To justify the courts' exercise of this role, resort I think is today no longer needed to Viscount Radcliffe's ingenious explanation in Edwards v Bairstow [1956] AC 14, of irrationality as a ground for a court's reversal of a decision by ascribing it to an inferred S/N gxkqciiOF0Wu9jQwZW0b1A though undefinable mistake of law by the decision maker. 'Irrationality' by now can stand on its own feet as an accepted ground on which a decision may be attacked by Judicial Review. I have described the third head as 'procedural impropriety' rather than failure to observe basic rules of natural justice or failing to act with procedural fairness towards the person who will be affected by the decision. This is because susceptibility to Judicial Review under this head covers also failure by an administrative tribunal to observe procedural rules that are expressly laid down in the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is conferred, even where such failure does not involve any denial of natural justice. Lord Diplock also mentioned 'proportionality' as a possible fourth ground of review which called for development.” [9] The Federal Court’s decision in R Rama Chandran v. The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor (supra) suggests that the courts are permitted to scrutinize the challenged decision not only for process but also for substance. In other words, the courts are allowed to go into the merit of the matter. Nonetheless, the Federal Court in subsequent decisions held that not every case is amenable to such approach and merits can only be scrutinized in the most appropriate of cases. [10] In the Federal Court case of Ranjit Kaur a/p S Gopal Singh v. Hotel Excelsior (M) Sdn Bhd [2010] 6 MLJ 1 the court stated the following: S/N gxkqciiOF0Wu9jQwZW0b1A “[16] The Rama Chandran decision has been regarded or interpreted as giving the reviewing court a license to review without restrain decisions for substance even when the said decision is based on finding of facts. However, post Rama Chandran cases have applied some brakes to the courts’ liberal approach in Rama Chandran. The Federal Court in the case of Kumpulan Perangsang Selangor Bhd v Zaid Noh [1997] 1 MLJ 789; [1997] 2 CLJ 11 after affirming the Rama Chandran decision held that there may be cases in which for reason of public policy, national interest, public safety or national security the principle in Rama Chandran may be wholly inappropriate. [17] The Federal Court, in Petroliam National Bhd v. Nik Ramli Nik Hassan [2004] 2 MLJ 288; [2003] 4 CLJ 625, again held that the reviewing court may scrutinise a decision on its merits but only in the most appropriate of cases and not every case is amenable to the Rama Chandran approach. Further, it was held that a reviewing judge ought not to disturb findings of the Industrial Court unless they were grounded on illegality or plain irrationality, even where the reviewing judge might not have come to the same conclusion.” [11] Founded on the principles relating to judicial review, this court will consider this application for judicial review. S/N gxkqciiOF0Wu9jQwZW0b1A Analysis and Findings [12] The applicant placed reliance on the case of Ng Hee Thoong & Anor v. Public Bank Bhd [1995] 1 CLJ 609 in its written submission so as to implicate the first respondent in opting not to “defend” in this action. [13] The duty of the court in dealing with judicial review applications is as per the Federal Court case of R Rama Chandra v. Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 CLJ 147. The court hearing application for judicial review are allowed to scrutinize not only the decision-making process but also for substance, as to whether they are tainted by illegality, irrationality or Wednesbury unreasonableness, procedural impropriety and also proportionality. It is observed here that the party which is subject to examination is the decision making body, and not the parties to which the Impugned Decisions is made. [14] In the case of Petroliam Nasional Bhd v. Nik Ramli Nik Hassan [2003] 4 CLJ 625 the Federal Court found that the R Rama Chandra (supra) approach is also applicable “to decisions of other statutory tribunals or bodies”. However, the Federal Court also observed that the R Rama Chandra (supra) approach should be exercised carefully and it depends on the factual matrix of the case. [15] Nonetheless, in cases involving issue of public policy, national interest, public safety or national security are not amenable to the approach taken in R Rama Chandra (supra). Similar observation S/N gxkqciiOF0Wu9jQwZW0b1A could also be made in the case of Akira Sales & Services (M) Sdn Bhd v. Nadiah Zee Abdullah & Another Appeal [2018] 2 CLJ 513. [16] Founded on the foregoing, it may be concluded that the court in dealing with an application for judicial review as the instant case here, concerns on the decision making process (and if the circumstances called for, the substance) of the second respondent. [17] In order to determine if the second respondent has acted correctly or otherwise, the court has to scrutinize the material available before it. It is therefore incumbent upon the applicant to satisfy the court that it is entitled to the reliefs sought for, by adducing sufficient material for this court to consider. [18] A perusal of the applicant’s Affidavit in Support indicate that the facts averred are essentially what has transpired, from the first respondent’s filing of his claim in the second respondent, up until an interim direction by the second respondent to have the first respondent’s claim to be tabled as motion in the then upcoming Annual General Meeting, until the delivery of the Impugned Decisions. In the view of this court, even if the first respondent did not reply to the averments, the facts averred are not against the first respondent. [19] Paragraph 11 of the Affidavit in Support states that the second respondent had been acting irrationally and unreasonably when the second respondent ordered the applicant to convene an EGM, and paragraph 13 which laid down the grounds of its complains. S/N gxkqciiOF0Wu9jQwZW0b1A [20] Both paragraphs are, as the applicant averred, based on the advice of its solicitors. Even if there isn’t such averment that the source of the said allegations are from its solicitors, this court is of the view that it is statement of law which “remains to the domain of the court to reflect and expound”. Reference is made to the High Court case of Chan Min Swee v. Melawangi Sdn Bhd [2000] 7 CLJ 1 where Abdul Malik Ishak J (as he then was) observed that: “Only the facts must be deposed to in affidavits. The law, …, remains the domain of the court to reflect and expound … … It would be apparent that the defendant did not file any affidavit to deny the letter because the defendant agrees that such a letter was given. The plaintiff wanted this court to believe that the defendant had admitted to the validity of the letter. In my judgment, the defendant admitted to the existence of that letter but questioned the legal meaning and effect of that letter. For this purpose, there was no necessity for the defendant to file an affidavit in reply. This was my judgment and I so hold accordingly.” [Emphasis added] [21] The issue for this court’s consideration are whether the Impugned Decisions are tainted with illegality, irrationality or Wednesbury unreasonableness, or procedural impropriety. S/N gxkqciiOF0Wu9jQwZW0b1A [22] This court finds the applicant’s Order 53 Statement failed to identify which ground the second respondent had erred, other than the statement that the second respondent should not have ordered an EGM to be convened because the first respondent motions have been tabled and voted by the attendee in the 16th Annual General Meeting on 26.3.2023. [23] The applicant did not state how and why the Impugned Decisions ought not to be granted by the learned President. The applicant only stated that such Impugned Decisions are “irrational” and “unreasonable”. [24] In this regard, this court alluded to the Court of Appeal case of Sunway University College v. Mahkamah Perusahaan Malaysia & Anor [2019] 7 CLJ 55 where Tengku Maimun Tuan Mat JCA (now CJ) stated: “[33] In the instant case, the claimant has not shown how the findings of the Industrial Court were based on grounds of illegality. Neither has it been shown that the award was plainly irrational. In fact, the statement filed by the claimant pursuant to O. 53 r. 3(2) of the Rules of Court 2012 did not specifically plead the two limited grounds of illegality and plain irrationality to allow the High Court to review the decision of the Industrial Court on the merits. The claimant had only made the following general averments: