such statement must be properly proved. The record must show that these provisions have been complied with and terms such as “treating the witness as hostile” should be avoided. Once this has been done and it is proved that the previous statement when compared with the evidence given in Court contains material inconsistencies the witness's credit is impeached and his evidence becomes worthless because the witness himself has been shown to be unworthy of credit. The previous statement cannot be used to prove the offence against the accused as was apparently done in this case because of the clear prohibition against the admission of such statement in evidence contained in section 113(i). [31] Mengambil iktibar daripada kes di atas dan juga kes Koay Chooi v Regina [1955] 1 MLJ 209 dalam memutuskan bahawa keterangan saksi yang berjaya dicabar adalah menjadi tidak bernilai, maka Mahkamah ini memutuskan bahawa testimoni yang diberikan oleh SP1 tidak boleh diterima masuk sebagai keterangan dan atas demikian, Mahkamah ini tidak mengambil kira keterangan SP1 dalam penilaian di akhir kes pendakwaan. ELEMEN PERTAMA: SAMA ADA 3 BEG PLASTIK DAN 7 BAKUL PLASTIK BERISI DAUN-DAUN DISYAKI DAUN KETUM SERTA 9 BUNGKUSAN BERISI CECAIR DISYAKI AIR KETUM MENGANDUNGI RACUN JENIS MITRAGYNINE SEBAGAIMANA DISENARAIKAN DI DALAM JADUAL PERTAMA DAN KETIGA AKTA RACUN 1952. [32] Dalam pembuktian elemen pertama ini, pihak pendakwaan bergantung kepada keterangan daripada Ahli Kimia (SP4) dan Laporan Kimia (P41). [33] Dalam konteks ini, Mahkamah ini mengambil panduan daripada kes Mahkamah Agung Munusamy v PP [1987] 1 MLJ 492 di mana Mahkamah telah memutuskan bahawa: "We are therefore of the view, that in this type of cases where the opinion of the chemist is confined only to the elementary nature and identity of the substance, the Court is entitled to accept the opinion of the expert of its face value, unless it is inherently incredible or the defence calls evidence in rebuttal by another expert to contradict the opinion. So long as some credible evidence is given by the chemist to support his opinion, there is no necessity for him to go into the details of what he did in the laboratory, step by step." [34] Selanjutnya dalam kes In PP v. Lam San [1991] 3 MLJ 426, Mahkamah Agung juga merujuk kepada perenggan dalam kes Munusamy v PP [supra] di atas dan menjelaskan perkara tersebut seperti berikut: “Two things are implicit in that passage. First, unless the evidence is so inherently incredible that no reasonable person can believe it to be true it should be accepted as prima facie evidence. Second, so long as the evidence is credible there is no necessity for the chemist to show in detail what he did in his laboratory. In our view the evidence of the chemist in this case was more than sufficient as basis to call for the defence granted that all the other ingredients of the offence had been successfully proved.” [35] Selain itu, dalam kes Tarmizi bin Yacoob & 1 lagi v PP [2006] 6 MLJ 197, Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan seperti berikut: “Pendakwa hanya perlu membuktikan bahawa beg yang dirampas itu mengandungi dadah berbahaya tak kira berapa beratnya. Jenis dan berat dadah hanya relevan bagi mengenalpasti identiti serta berat sebenar dadah berbahaya yang dinyatakan dalam pertuduhan. Bagi maksud itu, mahkamah perbicaraan seperti juga mahkamah ini seharusnya mengambil pendekatan yang disarankan oleh Mahkamah Agong dalam kes Munusamy v Public Prosecutor [1987] 1 MLJ 492 yang diikuti dalam kes Public Prosecutor v Lam San [1991] 3 MLJ 426 dalam menangani keterangan daripada ahli kimia. [25] Panduan pertama yang ditetapkan dalam kes-kes itu ialah supaya mahkamah perbicaraan menerima prima facie keterangan ahli kimia melainkan ia ternyata sukar dipercayai hingga tiada orang yang berfikiran waras boleh percaya kebenarannya. Keduanya, selagi keterangan itu boleh dipercayai ahli kimia tidak perlu menunjukkan secara terperinci apa yang dibuat di dalam makmalnya.” [36] Prinsip ini juga diikuti oleh kes-kes Mahkamah Atasan seperti Balachandran v. PP [2005] 2 MLJ 301, dan Khoo Hi Chiang v PP [1994] 1 MLJ 265. [37] Berkenaan dengan perkara ini, SP4 telah mengesahkan penemuan beliau bahawa setelah membuat analisa pada barang kes yang diberikan kepada beliau, beliau mendapati bahawa barang-barang kes yang telah diserahkan kepada beliau bagi tujuan analisa mengandungi racun jenis Mitragynine sebagaimana disenaraikan di dalam Jadual Pertama dan Ketiga Akta Racun 1952 seperti yang dinyatakan dalam keterangan beliau dan juga laporan kimia (P41) yang disediakan oleh beliau. [38] Keterangan ini pada hemat Mahkamah, adalah keterangan yang memberangsangkan dan walaupun cuba dicabar oleh pihak Pembelaan, perkara tersebut tidak menimbulkan sebarang keraguan yang material dalam pembuktian elemen pertama oleh pihak pendakwaan. Oleh itu, Mahkamah ini menerima keterangan SP4 secara prima facie seperti yang diputuskan dalam kes-kes yang dirujuk di atas. [39] Setelah meneliti keterangan yang diberikan oleh SP4, Mahkamah menerima keterangan beliau sebagai seorang ahli kimia yang berkelayakan untuk menjalankan analisa dan seterusnya mendapati tiada keraguan berkaitan dengan identiti dan kuantiti racun tersebut seperti yang telah disahkan oleh SP4, dan juga seperti yang dilaporkan dalam Laporan Kimia (P41). [40] Di samping itu, Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa pergerakan barang kes dan rantaian keterangan dalam kes ini adalah baik dan tidak terputus bermula daripada rampasan barang kes, proses analisa sehinggalah dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah ini. [41] Oleh hal yang demikian, Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan elemen pertama terhadap Tertuduh dalam kes ini. ELEMEN KEDUA: SAMA ADA RACUN TERSEBUT ADALAH DALAM MILIKAN TERTUDUH [42] Bagi membuktikan pertuduhan di bawah S. 30(3) Akta Racun 1952, khususnya berkenaan elemen milikan, pihak Pendakwaan boleh menggunakan anggapan di bawah S. 30(4) Akta yang sama. [43] Peruntukan ini adalah hampir sama dengan peruntukan S. 37(d) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 (ADB) iaitu: “(d) any person who is found to have had in custody or under his control whatsoever containing any dangerous drug shall, until the contrary is proved, be deemed to have been in possession of such drug and shall, until the contrary is proved, be deemed to have known the nature of such drugs ”. [44] Perkataan milikan (possession) telah diperjelaskan dalam kes Leow Nghee Lim v Reg [1956] MLJ 28 di mana Taylor J dalam nada yang seiring dengan peruntukan S. 37(d) ADB menyatakan seperti berikut: “The word “possession” is a vague and general word which cannot be closely defined. Without at least general knowledge there cannot be possession but there can be possession without full and exact knowledge. This is recognized in the present Drugs Ordinance which provides, by the presumption already cited, that if a man has custody or control of a drug the onus of proving, first that he did not have possession, and secondly that he did not know the nature of the drug, shall be shifted to him.” [45] Justeru itu, adalah menjadi keperluan untuk pihak pendakwaan membuktikan milikan (possession) oleh Tertuduh terhadap Racun tersebut bagi membuktikan pertuduhan yang dikenakan terhadap seseorang Tertuduh. Selanjutnya, sekiranya pihak pendakwaan berjaya berbuat demikian, maka beban akan beralih kepada pihak pembelaan untuk membuktikan sebaliknya. [46] Mahkamah-Mahkamah Atasan telah acapkali dalam beberapa kes, menjelaskan prinsip berkenaan pentakrifan elemen milikan, kawalan, jagaan dan pengetahuan. Dalam erti kata yang lebih ringkas, prinsip milikan (“possession”) adalah berkaitan dengan konsep kawalan, jagaan dan pengetahuan sepertimana yang telah ditakrifkan dalam kes Chan Pean Leon v PP [1956] 22 MLJ 237 di mana Thomson J mengupas mengenai elemen milikan (possession) bagi kes-kes jenayah secara amnya: “In my experience there is no question which Magistrates find more difficult to deal with than this question of what amounts to “possession” for the purposes of the criminal law. Much of this difficulty arises from a failure to appreciate that in reality there are two separate questions involved. The first is whether the accused party was in possession of the article in question and the second by reason of the application of the maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea is whether he had knowledge of the nature of the thing possessed. “Possession” itself as regards the criminal law is described as follows in Stephen's Digest (9th Edition, page 304):— “A moveable thing is said to be in the possession of a person when he is so situated with respect to it that he has the power to deal with it as owner to the exclusion of all other persons, and when the circumstances are such that he may be presumed to intend to do so in case of need.” To put it otherwise, there is a physical element and a mental element which must both be present before possession is made out. The accused must not only be so situated that he can deal with the thing as if it belonged to him, for example have it in his pocket or have it lying in front of him on a table. It must also be shewn that he had the intention of dealing with it as if it belonged to him should he see any occasion to do so, in other words, that he had some animus possidendi. Intention is a matter of fact which in the nature of things cannot be proved by direct evidence. It can only be proved by inference from the surrounding circumstances. Whether these surrounding circumstances make out such intention is a question of fact in each individual case. If a watch is in my pocket then in the absence of anything else the inference will be clear that I intend to deal with it as if it were my own and accordingly I am in possession of it. On the other hand, if it is lying on a table in a room in which I am but which is also frequently used by other people then the mere fact that I am in physical proximity to it does not give rise to the inference that I intend to deal with it as if it belonged to me. There must be some evidence that I am doing or having done something with it that shews such an intention. Or it must be clear that the circumstances in which it is found shew such an intention. It may be found in a locked room to which I hold the key or it may be found in a drawer mixed up with my own belongings or it may be found, as occurred in a recent case, in a box under my bed. The possible circumstances cannot be set out exhaustively and it is impossible to lay down any general rule on the point. But there must be something in the evidence to satisfy the Court that the person who is physically in a position to deal with the thing as his own had the intention of doing so.” [47] Kes ini telah dirujuk dan dipetik oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes-kes tersohor seperti Chan Wei Loon v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2021] 4 MLJ 660 dan Public Prosecutor v Denish a/l Madhavan [2009] 2 MLJ 194 antara lain. [48] Berdasarkan otoriti-otoriti di atas, pihak pendakwaan perlu membuktikan elemen-elemen berikut bagi membuktikan milikan barang-barang kes yang mengandungi Racun tersebut ke atas Tertuduh: i. Samada Tertuduh mempunyai jagaan dan kawalan ke atas barang-barang kes yang mengandungi Racun tersebut; ii. Samada Tertuduh mempunyai pengetahuan tentang barang-barang kes yang mengandungi Racun tersebut. [49] Pada peringkat ini, Mahkamah percaya adalah penting untuk dihuraikan pentakrifan “exclusive possession” juga memandangkan pihak pendakwaan menghujahkan bahawa tiada keperluan ke atas pihak pendakwaan untuk membuktikan pemilikan eksklusif dalam kes melibatkan dadah atau racun dengan merujuk kepada kes PP v. Denish Madhavan [2009] 2 MLJ 194. [50] Dalam kes tersebut, penting untuk diberikan perhatian terhadap pemakaian konsep pemilikan ekslusif dan oleh itu, perlu dipertimbangkan panduan yang diperjelaskan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Persekutuan, Abdul Aziz Mohamad FCJ dalam menyampaikan penghakiman beliau seperti berikut: “The idea of exclusivity features in the meaning of ‘possession’ in criminal law as one of the elements necessary to constitute possession. As Taylor J said in Leow Nghee Lim v. Reg [1956] MLJ 28: …It is often said that ‘possession must be exclusive’. This is ambiguous. Possession need not be exclusive to the accused. Two or more persons may be in joint possession of chattels, whether innocent or contraband. The exclusive element of possession means that the possessor or possessors have the power to exclude other persons from enjoyment of the property. Custody likewise may be sole or joint and it has the same element of excluding others. The main distinction between custody and possession is that a custodian has not the power of disposal. The statement that ‘possession must be exclusive’ is often due to confusion of the fact to be proved with the evidence by which it is to be proved. It is essential to keep this distinction clearly in mind, especially when applying presumptions. Thomson J in Chan Pean Leon v. Public Prosecutor [1956] MLJ 237, said that ‘possession’ for the purposes of criminal law involves possession itself – which some authorities term ‘custody’ or ‘control’ – and knowledge of the nature of the thing possessed. As to possession itself he cited the following definition in Stephen’s Digest (9th Ed), at p 304), in which the exclusive element mentioned by Taylor J appears: A moveable thing is said to be in the possession of a person when he is so situated with respect to it that he has the power to deal with it as owner to the exclusion of all other persons, and when the circumstances are such that he may be presumed to intend to do so in case of need. Once the elements needed to constitute possession are established, including the element of exclusive power to deal, then what is established is possession, not exclusive possession. So much for exclusive possession.” [penekanan ditambah] [51] Petikan di atas, jika dihalusi secara keseluruhannya, membawa makna bahawa pada asasnya, penghakiman di dalam kes Denish Madhavan [supra] tidak menghapuskan unsur 'eksklusiviti'. Sebaliknya, unsur pemilikan eksklusif boleh dibuktikan apabila pemilik mempunyai kuasa untuk mengecualikan orang lain daripada premis atau sesuatu barang di mana sesuatu barang salah dijumpai, tidak kira sama ada milikan tersebut adalah bersama ataupun tidak. [52] Prinsip ini ditekankan selanjutnya oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam Siew Yoke Keong v. Public Prosecutor [2013] 3 MLJ 630, seperti berikut: “So, in our judgment in the circumstances of this case, the presence of the ladies clothing (two female upper garments and two pairs of female jeans) along with male clothing in the third room of the first house does not mean that no possession was established against Siew. The crucial question is whether Siew was so situated with respect to the proscribed drugs found in the second and third rooms of the first house that he had the power to deal with the drugs as owner to the exclusion of all other persons, and when the circumstances are such that he may be presumed to intend to do so in case of need. In other words, Siew must be so situated that he can deal with the proscribed drugs as if it belonged to him, and it must be shown that he had the intention of dealing with it as if it belonged to him should he see any occasion to do so (he had animus possidendi). [penekanan ditambah] [53] Berdasarkan petikan di atas, dapat kita perhatikan bahawa Mahkamah Persekutuan telah menekankan keperluan untuk dadah itu dikendalikan oleh pemilik sesuatu premis/barang dengan pengecualian semua yang lain. Bagi mengesahkan bahawa penglibatan orang lain dikecualikan, adalah wajar untuk membuktikan bahawa hanya Tertuduh mempunyai akses eksklusif ke tapak di mana dadah atau sesuatu barang salah ditemui. Rujukan juga dibuat kepada kes Chan Wei Loon v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2021] 4 MLJ 660 di mana prinsip yang sama juga diketengahkan. [54] Maka berdasarkan autoriti-autoriti tersebut, dapatlah disimpulkan bahawa ia menjadi keperluan untuk mengecualikan individu lain daripada akses ke tempat di mana dadah atau barang salah itu ditemui bagi pihak pendakwaan membuktikan elemen jagaan, kawalan atau pemilikan. [55] Dalam erti kata yang lebih komprehensif, bagi membuktikan elemen ‘milikan’ ini, adalah penting dalam kes semasa di hadapan Mahkamah ini, untuk pihak pendakwaan membuktikan bahawa hanya Tertuduh mempunyai jagaan, kawalan dan pengetahuan terhadap Racun tersebut yang dikatakan dijumpai dalam milikan beliau di rumah tersebut. [56] Maka berpandukan kepada nas undang-undang yang dikupaskan di atas, Mahkamah ini kemudiannya membuat penganalisisan terhadap keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh kesemua saksi-saksi pendakwaan. Isu Akses ke Rumah No. 2-53 [57] Dalam kes semasa, satu fakta yang tidak dinafikan ialah bahawa barang-barang kes telah dijumpai di sebuah rumah bernombor 2-53 yang disewa oleh Tertuduh dan keluarganya dan sedang dalam proses pemindahan ke rumah baharu. Walaupun pihak pembelaan pada awalnya cuba mewujudkan keraguan terhadap alamat rumah tersebut, Mahkamah ini percaya keraguan yang cuba dibangkitkan ini adalah tidak material dan sememangnya barang-barang kes telah dijumpai di rumah bernombor 2-53 seperti dalam pertuduhan. Pada masa yang sama, pembelaan Tertuduh juga difokuskan kepada rumah tersebut. Maka Mahkamah mendapati tiada sebarang prejudis kepada Tertuduh dalam perkara ini. [58] Satu lagi fakta yang tidak dinafikan adalah bahawa Tertuduh telah ditahan berseorangan semasa serbuan dilakukan oleh pihak polis ke dalam rumah tersebut. Pihak pendakwaan dengan merujuk kepada kes Pendakwa Raya v. Panizan Sunan Achyari [2010] 1 LNS 311 telah menghujahkan bahawa Tertuduh dalam kes semasa di hadapan Mahkamah ini mempunyai physical proximity ke atas barang-barang kes yang membolehkan Tertuduh berurusan dengan racun tersebut. Namun begitu, perlu diambil perhatian bahawa dalam kes yang dirujuk oleh pihak pendakwaan tersebut, fakta kes adalah berbeza dengan kes semasa di mana dadah dalam kes tersebut telah dijumpai di dalam beg plastik yang dijumpai di dalam raga hadapan motosikal yang ditunggang oleh Tertuduh dalam kes tersebut. [59] Prinsip undang-undang berkenaan dengan “physical proximity” ini telah digariskan dalam kes PP v Abdul Rahman Akif [2007] 4 CLJ 337 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan dengan merujuk kepada kes Chan Pean Leon v PP [supra] yang membuat pemerhatian: "the mere fact that I am in physical proximity to it does not give rise to the inference that I intend to deal with it as if it belonged to me. There must be some evidence that I am doing or having done something with it that shews such an intention. Or it must be clear that the circumstances in which it is found shew such an intention But there must be something in the evidence to satisfy the court that the person who is physically in a position to deal with the thing as his own had the intention of doing so... On the other hand, if it is lying on a table in room in which I am but which is also frequently used by other people than the mere fact that I am in physical proximity to it does not give rise to the inference that I intend to deal with it as if it belongs to me..." [60] Dalam kes PP v Mok Kar Poh [2001] 5 CLJ 206, YA Zainun Ali memutuskan bahawa: "Whether or not there was possession due to proximity, depends very much on the facts and circumstances of each case. … Thus the mere fact that the said offending article (ie, the drug) was in physical proximity to the accused does not ipso facto, give rise to the inference that the accused intends to deal with it as if it belonged to him.” [61] Dalam kes Oh Eng Thye V Public Prosecutor [1954] 1 MLJ 1, Hakim Bellamy J telah menyatakan bahawa: “It has frequently been held in this Court that mere juxtaposition is not enough to constitute possession. There must be something more.” [62] Maka, bagi menjawab persoalan sama ada “physical proximity” adalah memadai untuk pihak pendakwaan membuktikan elemen milikan, kawalan dan jagaan terhadap Tertuduh, Mahkamah ini selanjutnya merujuk kepada kes Toh Ah Loh And Mak Thim v Rex [1949] 1 MLJ 54 seperti berikut: Possession, in order to incriminate a person, must have the following characteristics. The possessor must know the nature of the thing possessed, must have in him a power of disposal over the thing, and lastly must be conscious of his possession of the thing. If these factors are absent, his possession can raise no presumption of mens rea, without which (except by statute) possession cannot be criminal. It was necessary therefore to put these factors before the the jury. It was essential to direct the jury that before they could convict the accused of being in “unlawful possession”, they must be satisfied that he knew the boxes contained ammunition. Such knowledge was of the essence of the offence and to quote Halsbury Vol. IX p. para. 4. “Where a particular intent or state of mind is of the essence of an offence, the person committing the act is not criminally responsible if he had no mens rea and the act was ordered or procured by another person — but the person who ordered or procured the act is criminally responsible.” [63] Prinsip kes di atas telah dijadikan panduan dalam kes-kes Mahkamah Atasan di mana kini adalah menjadi undang-undang mantap bahawa pemilikan fizikal semata-mata adalah tidak cukup untuk mewujudkan pemilikan. Dalam erti kata lain, “Proximity does not necessarily constitute possession. - PP v Kang Choo Heng & Anor [1991] 3 CLJ 2574”. [64] Mengambil kira nas undang-undang yang telah dihuraikan di atas, maka Mahkamah ini mengabsahkan fakta bahawa hanya kerana tiada orang lain yang berada bersama Tertuduh dalam rumah tersebut semasa serbuan dilakukan oleh pasukan polis sahaja tidak mencukupi untuk Mahkamah membuat dapatan bahawa Tertuduh mempunyai milikan, kawalan, jagaan dan pengetahuan terhadap barang kes yang dijumpai. [65] Atas demikian, Mahkamah selanjutnya membuat penilaian secara menyeluruh terhadap kesemua keterangan yang diberikan oleh saksi-saksi pendakwaan, dari segi keterangan lisan di Mahkamah dan juga keterangan-keterangan dokumentari yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pendakwaan. Hal ini adalah demikian kerana seperti yang dihuraikan sebelum ini, beban pembuktian adalah di bahu pihak pendakwaan untuk membuktikan niat Tertuduh dalam mengendalikan barang-barang kes tersebut selain mengecualikan kebarangkalian kehadiran individu lain daripada akses ke tempat di mana racun itu ditemui iaitu di rumah tersebut. [66] Sekiranya diperhalusi keterangan saksi-saksi polis dalam kes ini, iaitu SP3, SP7 (pegawai-pegawai serbuan) serta SP6 (pegawai penyiasat), dapat diperhatikan bahawa terdapat banyak barang-barang seperti kasut-kasut, payung, dan sebagainya yang diletakkan di luar rumah tersebut. Gambar-gambar P4 dan P5 juga mengesahkan fakta sedemikian. KETERANGAN SP3 PADA 22 JANUARI 2025 Pemeriksaan Balas SP3 79. PB: Ini payung kecil perempuan? Siapa punya tuan tak tahu? SP3: Tak tahu