Surendran A/L Thuraisingam v Selvamanickaraja A/L Manohar (WA-22NCvC-432-08/2023)

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1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) WRIT SUMMON NO: WA-22NCvC-432-08/2023 BETWEEN SURENDRAN A/L THURAISINGAM [ Identity Card No.: 781113145201] (sebagai Wasi kepada Hartapusaka KUMAR A/L THURAISUNGAM …PLAINTIFF AND SELVAMANICKARAJA A/L MANOHAR [ Identity Card No.: 780107145649] (pembelaan untuk diri sendiri dan sebagai wakil litigasi kepada MANOGARAN A/L SELVAMANICKARAJA dan ATHYIYAMAN A/L SELVAMANICKARAJA, seorang kanak-kanak) …DEFENDAN 09/12/2025 11:23:03 WA-22NCvC-432-08/2023 Kand. 82

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Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013, meaning the proceeds should be part of the estate and used to pay the debts. 7. The Defendant in his Pleadings: a. Asserts that the claim is frivolous, vexatious, and discloses no cause of action, and should be struck out. [An application to strike out was dismissed prior to trial.] b. Admits the existence of the Deed of Trust, insurance policies, and beneficiaries, but denies that “blood relationship” is relevant to distribution under the Trust. c. Argues that the Deed of Trust and Will are separate instruments, and the Will did not revoke the Trust. d. Challenges the validity of the Will (alleged doubtful signature, no explicit revocation of Trust) and states that all insurance policies have named beneficiaries. e. Points to clauses in the Deed of Trust that set aside one policy specifically to settle the Deceased’s debts, and notes that the Defendant was appointed as a Protector with powers over the Trustee. f. States that the FSA 2013 applies only when there is no Will or Deed of Trust and no family member seeks Administration. g. Prays for dismissal of the Plaintiff’s claim with Costs. 8. The agreed issues between the Parties, as extracted from Enclosure (`Encl’) 41, are as follows: a. Whether, pursuant to paragraph 6 of Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013, any payment made to a nominee who is not a family member shall form part of the Deceased policyowner's estate [i.e., Kumar a/l Thuraisingam (NRIC No: 710819-10- 6089)] and be subject to his debts. b. Whether the Defendant is entitled to receive the Trust assets from Rockwills. c. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to claim the Trust assets from Rockwills to manage the debts and estate of the Deceased. d. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the following reliefs: (i) A declaration that, under paragraph 6 of Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013: (a) The Defendant is not entitled to the Trust assets. (b) Any payment / Trust assets to the Defendant shall form part of the Deceased policyholder's estate and be subject to debts owed by the Deceased; and (c) The Defendant shall return any payment / Trust assets received to the Plaintiff. (ii) Interest at the rate of 5% per annum on the sum in (a) from the date of filing until full settlement. 9. The key legal conflict is whether the Defendant is entitled to Trust assets when not related to the deceased, given Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013 and the terms of the Deed of Trust and the Will. If the question is answered in the affirmative, then the Plaintiff’s action would fail and vice versa. 10. The relevant terms of the Trust in this Suit: a. Recital D expressly declares that the Trust is fixed and revocable. Clause 3.1 also declares that the Trust is revocable and provides for the manner in which the balance of the ‘Trust Asset’ is to be distributed upon revocation. b. Clause 5.3.1(a) of the Trust Deed (Policy Number W804389257 held under AIA Berhad): the Defendant was to receive a sum of RM45,000.00; or if he is unable to obtain an interest, then the sum is to be utilised by the Trustee for the maintenance of the Defendant’s children; or if he has no children on his death, the sum becomes part of the Defendant’s estate. c. Clause 5.3.2 of the Deed (Policy Number 2878413A-02-12 with AIA Berhad): to be paid to the Defendant in one lump sum, and if the Defendant predeceases the Deceased, the said sum is to be utilised by the Trustee for the maintenance of the Defendant’s children; or if he has no children on his death, the sum becomes part of the Defendant’s estate. d. Clause 5.3.4 (Policy Number 1006394129 with Great Eastern Life Assurance (Malaysia) Berhad) from which proceeds are allocated in the following manner: (i) RM100,000.00 to Manogaran a/l Selvamanickaraja for his maintenance, education and medical expenses until he attains 28 years, whereupon the remaining balance is to be paid to him by the Trustee. (ii) RM70,000.00 to Athiyaman a/l Selvamanickaraja for his maintenance, education and medical expenses until he attains 28 years, whereupon the remaining balance is to be paid to him by the Trustee. e. Clause 5.3.3 of the Deed of Trust (Policy Number M0303024 with Sun Life Malaysia Assurance Berhad) directs that proceeds are to be used to settle the Deceased’s debts (e.g., credit card and hire purchase loans). 11. The Defendant participated fully at the trial through Solicitors and gave evidence at the trial, however the Defendant did not file any Submissions until the 11th hour. 12. This Court issued directions on 17 September 2025 for Submissions to be filed on dates agreed upon by both parties. These directions were given at the end of the proceedings on that day after the Defendant had closed its case. 13. Notwithstanding the Defendant’s 11th-hour Submissions, this Court has considered the Defendant’s Submissions, and taken into consideration the evidence of the Defendant in Examination in Chief and Cross-Examination and also considered the Plaintiff’s Submission and Cross-Examination of the Plaintiff’s witnesses in coming to this decision. The Analysis of the Issues: 14. Whether the Defendant is entitled to receive Trust assets despite the Will. (a) It is noted from the Will executed by the Deceased in 2021 that he listed all his assets, including those assets in the Trust. By this Will, the Deceased appointed the Plaintiff as his Executor and directed that the Plaintiff and the Deceased’s partner in the legal Firm, Hii Ding Shann, settle all debts owed by the Deceased and/or the Firm. (b) In Clause 5 of the Will, the Deceased expressed an intention that all nominees of his insurance policies are to take the proceeds beneficially. In the same clause he directed his partner of his legal Firm, Mr Hii Ding Shann to utilise the proceeds of the insurance policies nominated to him personally and in the Rockwills Trust Deed to settle any outstanding debts or claims on the legal firm. (c) After the Deceased expired, Rockwills intended to perform its functions and distribute the Trust assets in accordance with the terms of the Trust. (d) However, some Beneficiaries under the Trust, namely Beneficiaries, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 12 renounced their rights under the Trust in favour of the terms of the Will, apparently to honour the wishes of the Deceased. This was to enable the estate to settle the substantial debts of the Deceased. (e) In this regard, the Plaintiff pleaded at paragraph 16 of the Statement of Claim that the Defendant and his children, namely Beneficiaries 1, 9 and 10, refused to renounce their rights and wished to have the relevant policy proceeds paid to them. (f) This led the Plaintiff to institute this action, premised on the terms in Schedule 10 of the FSA 2013. (g) It is an agreed fact between the Parties that the Defendant and his children are not family members of the Deceased. (h) The purported entitlement of the Defendant and his children only arises under the Trust expressly and impliedly in Clause 5 of the Will. (i) To ascertain whether the Defendants can claim their entitlement as beneficiaries under the Trust, notwithstanding the provisions of Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013, the relevant statutory provisions that the Plaintiff has pleaded must be addressed, and the effect of the terms vis-à-vis the Defendant and his children must be considered. These provisions merit reproduction in full.

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SCHEDULE 10 [Section 130] PAYMENT OF POLICY MONEYS UNDER LIFE POLICY AND PERSONAL ACCIDENT POLICY 1. Application of Schedule In this Schedule, a reference to a policy is a reference to a life policy, including a life policy under section 23 of the Civil Law Act 1956, and a personal accident policy, effected by a policy owner upon his own life, providing for payment of policy moneys on his death. 2. Power to make nomination (1) A policy owner who has attained the age of sixteen years may nominate an individual to receive policy moneys payable upon his death under the policy by notifying the licensed insurer in writing the name, date of birth, national registration identity card number or birth certificate number and address of the nominee. (2) A nomination under subparagraph (1) may be made— (a) at the time the policy is issued; or (b) if the policy has already been issued, by notifying the licensed insurer in writing or by submitting the policy for an endorsement of the nomination by the insurer. (3) A nomination made under subparagraph (1) shall be witnessed by a person of sound mind who has attained the age of eighteen years and who is not a nominee named under that subparagraph. (4) The licensed insurer— (a) shall prominently display in the nomination form that the policy owner has to assign the policy benefits to his nominee if his intention is for his nominee, other than his spouse, child or parent, to receive the policy benefits beneficially and not as an executor; (b) shall record the nomination and the particulars of the nominee in its register of policies; and (c) shall return the policy to the policy owner after endorsing the nomination on the policy or by issuing an endorsement to the original policy by registered mail to the policy owner and the nomination shall take effect from the date the nomination is registered by the insurer. (5) A failure to comply with subparagraph (4) shall not affect the validity of the nomination if it is otherwise proved that the nomination was made by the policy owner and given to the licensed insurer. (6) A nomination made under subparagraph (1) may be in favour of one person or several persons and where there is more than one nominee, the policy owner may direct that specified shares be paid to the nominees and in the absence of such direction by the policy owner, the licensed insurer shall pay the nominees in equal shares. 3. Revocation of nomination. (1) A nomination, including a nomination to which paragraph 5 applies, shall be revoked— (a) upon the death of the nominee, or where there is more than one nominee, upon the death of all the nominees, during the lifetime of the policy owner; (b) by a notice in writing given by the policy owner to the licensed insurer; or (c) by any subsequent nomination. (2) Subject to subparagraph (1), a nomination shall not be revoked by a will or by any other act, event or means. (3) Where there is more than one nominee and one of the nominees predeceases the policy owner, in the absence of any subsequent nomination by the policy owner disposing of the share of the deceased nominee, the licensed insurer shall pay the share to the remaining nominees in proportion to their respective shares. 16 4. Payment of policy moneys where there is nomination (1) Subject to subparagraph (2), where a policy owner dies having made a nomination, the licensed insurer shall pay the policy moneys according to the direction of the nomination upon receipt of a claim by the nominee together with proof of death of the policy. (2) Where a nominee fails to claim the policy moneys within sixty days of the licensed insurer becoming aware of the death of the policy owner, the insurer shall immediately notify the nominee in writing at his last known address of his entitlement to claim the policy moneys. (3) Where a nominee fails to claim the policy moneys within twelve months of the licensed insurer becoming aware of the death of the policy owner despite notification under subparagraph (2), paragraph 8 shall apply as though no nomination was made. (4) Where a nominee, other than a nominee under paragraph 5, dies after the death of the policy owner but before any policy moneys has been paid to him as nominee, paragraph 3 or 8 shall apply to the policy, as the case may be. 5. Trust of policy moneys (1) A nomination by a policy owner, other than a Muslim policy owner, shall create a trust in favour of the nominee of the policy moneys payable upon the death of the policy owner, if— (a) the nominee is his spouse or child; or (b) where there is no spouse or child living at the time of nomination, the nominee is his parent. (2) Notwithstanding any written law to the contrary, a payment under subparagraph (1) shall not form part of the estate of the deceased policy owner or be subject to his debts. (3) The policy owner may, by the policy, or by a notice in writing to the licensed insurer, appoint any person other than himself to be trustee of the policy moneys and where there is no trustee appointed— (a) the nominee who is competent to contract; or (b) where the nominee is incompetent to contract, the parent of the incompetent nominee other than the policy owner and where there is no surviving parent, the Public Trustee or a trust company nominated by the policy owner, shall be the trustee of the policy moneys and the receipt of a trustee shall be a discharge to the insurer for all liability in respect of the policy moneys paid to the trustee. (4) If there is more than one nominee who is competent to contract, the nominees shall be joint trustees and the consent for the purposes of this paragraph shall be given by all such trustees. (5) A policy owner shall not deal with a policy to which subparagraph (1) applies by revoking a nomination or adding a nominee other than his spouse, child or parent under the policy, by varying or surrendering the policy, or by assigning or pledging the policy as security, without the written consent of the trustee. (6) If it is proved that the policy was effected and the premiums paid with intent to defraud a creditor of the policy owner, the creditor shall be entitled to receive from the policy moneys payable under the policy a sum equal to the premiums paid under that policy. 6. Nominee other than nominee under subparagraph 5(1) (1) A nominee, other than a nominee under subparagraph 5(1), shall receive the policy moneys payable on the death of the policy owner as an executor and not solely as a beneficiary and any payment to the nominee shall form part of the estate of the deceased policy owner and be subject to his debts and the licensed insurer shall be discharged from liability in respect of the policy moneys paid. (2) The nominee referred to in subparagraph (1) shall distribute the policy moneys in due course of administration of the estate of the deceased policy owner in accordance with the will of that policy owner or the law relating to the distribution of the estate of deceased persons as applicable to that policy owner. (3) Notwithstanding subparagraph (1), a nominee to whom policy moneys have been assigned under sub subparagraph 2(4)(a) shall receive the policy moneys solely as a beneficiary and not as an executor. 19 7. Assigned or pledged policy moneys (1) Notwithstanding a nomination under paragraph 2 or the creation of a trust under subparagraph 5(1), where the policy moneys, wholly or partly, have been pledged as security or assigned to a person, the claim of the person entitled under the security or the assignee shall have priority over the claim of the nominee and subject to the rights under the security or the assignment being preserved, the licensed insurer shall pay the balance of the policy moneys to the nominee. (2) Where more than one person is entitled under the security or the assignment, the respective rights of the persons entitled under the security or the assignment shall be in the order of priority according to the priority of the date on which written notification of the security or the assignment was given to the licensed insurer, both security and assignment being treated as one class for this purpose. 8. Payment of policy moneys where there is no nomination (1) Where a policy owner dies without having made a nomination, subject to paragraph 7, the licensed insurer shall pay the policy moneys of the deceased policy owner to the lawful executor or administrator of his estate. (2) Where the licensed insurer is satisfied that there is no lawful executor or administrator of the estate of the deceased policy owner at the time of payment of policy moneys, the insurer may pay the policy moneys to the deceased policy owner’s spouse, child or parent in accordance with section 6 of the Distribution Act 1958 [Act 300] and where there is no spouse, child or parent and— (a) where the policy moneys do not exceed one hundred thousand ringgit or such greater amount as may be prescribed by the Bank, the insurer may pay all such policy moneys without requiring a grant of probate or letters of administration or distribution order to a person who satisfies the insurer that he is entitled to the property of the deceased policy owner under his will or under the law relating to the disposition of property or that he is named as an executor in the will or has the consent of all the lawful beneficiaries to be the administrator of the estate of the deceased policy owner; or (b) where the policy moneys exceed one hundred thousand ringgit, or such greater amount as may be prescribed by the Bank, the insurer may pay to the person referred to in sub subparagraph (a) the amount referred to in that sub subparagraph and pay the balance of the policy moneys to the lawful executor or administrator of the estate of the deceased policy owner. (3) In this paragraph, a reference to policy moneys is a reference to the aggregate amount of policy moneys in respect of all policies of the policy owner with that licensed insurer where the policy owner has not made any nomination. (4) The grant of probate or letters of administration or distribution order in respect of a personal estate comprising policy moneys, by a court in Malaysia or a competent authority outside Malaysia, or its court certified copy shall be sufficient proof to the licensed insurer to pay the policy moneys to the person named therein as the lawful executor or administrator provided that the same has been duly registered with the court in Malaysia and sealed in accordance with the Probate and Administration Act 1959 [Act 97]. (5) Policy moneys paid under this paragraph shall be deemed to have been duly paid and the licensed insurer shall be discharged from liability in respect of the policy moneys so paid notwithstanding the absence or invalidity of, or any defect in the grant of probate or letters of administration or distribution order or any other document having the same effect. (6) A person to whom a payment is made under this paragraph shall give a receipt which shall be deemed to be a valid receipt. 9. Payment to person incompetent to contract. Where a person has not attained the age of eighteen years, or who is certified by a medical practitioner fully registered under the Medical Act 1971 [Act 50] to be of unsound mind and no committee of his estate has been appointed, or to be incapable, by reason of infirmity of mind or body, of managing himself and his property and affairs, the licensed insurer— (a) in the case of a nominee under subparagraph 5(1), shall pay the policy moneys to the trustee appointed under subparagraph 5(3), or where no such trustee has been appointed, to the parent of the incompetent nominee, and where there is no surviving parent of the incompetent nominee— (i) if the policy moneys do not exceed fifty thousand ringgit, may pay the policy moneys to a person who satisfies the insurer that he will apply the policy moneys for the maintenance and benefit of the nominee under subparagraph 5(1), as the case may be, or a person to whom policy moneys are payable under subparagraph 8(2), subject to the execution of an undertaking by that person that the policy moneys will be applied solely for the maintenance and benefit of the nominee; and (ii) if the policy moneys exceed fifty thousand ringgit, shall pay the policy moneys to the Public Trustee or a trust company nominated by the policy owner; or (b) in the case of a person to whom policy moneys are payable under subparagraph 8(2), pay to the Public Trustee or a trust company nominated by the policy owner. 10. Distribution of policy moneys in due course of administration A person to whom policy moneys may be paid under sub subparagraphs 8(2)(a) and (b) shall receive the policy moneys as an executor and not solely as a beneficiary and shall distribute the policy moneys in due course of administration of the estate of the deceased person in accordance with the terms of a will of the deceased person, and if there is no such will, in accordance with the law applicable to the administration, distribution and disposition of his estate upon his intestacy. 11. Licensed insurer not A licensed insurer shall not in any circumstances be bound or bound to see application of policy moneys concerned to ensure the application of any policy moneys which it has paid in respect of any person under this Schedule. 12. Interest on claim amount (1) Where a claim or a part of a claim made under a life policy, or under a personal accident policy upon the death of the policy owner is not paid by the licensed insurer within sixty days of notification of the claim, the insurer shall pay a minimum compound interest at the average fixed deposit rate applicable for the period of twelve months for licensed banks as published by the Bank plus one per cent or such other rate as may be specified by the Bank, on the amount of policy moneys upon expiry of the sixty days until the date of payment. (2) Where the balance of policy moneys are to be paid by a licensed insurer to the lawful executor or administrator of the estate of the deceased policy owner under sub subparagraph 8(2)(b), interest payable under subparagraph (1) shall only apply to the balance of policy moneys upon expiry of sixty days from the time that the lawful executor or administrator produces the grant of probate or letters of administration or distribution order until the date of payment. 13. Schedule to prevail over policy and any other written law (1) This Schedule shall have effect in relation to a policy which is in force on or after the appointed date, and in relation to a nomination made before, on or after the appointed date, notwithstanding anything contained in the policy, and nothing contained in a policy shall derogate from, or be construed as derogating in any manner or to any extent from, this Schedule. (2) This Schedule shall have full force and effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent with or contrary to any other written law relating to probate, administration, distribution, or disposition, of the estates of deceased persons, or in any practice or custom in relation to these matters. 15. The Plaintiff takes the position that based on paragraph 5 of

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Schedule 10 [above], unless the nominee of a policy under the Trust is the spouse, child, or parent [if there is no spouse or child] of the policyowner, that nominee shall not be entitled to receive the policy proceeds as beneficiary but only as an Executor, subject to the settlement of the policyowner’s debts before any distribution. The payment for this intended nominee shall form part of the Deceased’s estate. 16. The Plaintiff cited the case of Kiranjit Kaur a/p Dr Jagjit Singh [menyaman dalam keupayaan sebagai pentadbir bersama harta pusaka Suresh a/l Thanabalasingam, si mati) v Thamabalasingam @ Thanabalasingam (disaman dalam keupayaan sebagai pentadbir bersama harta pusaka Suresh a/l Thanabalasingam, si mati) [2022] MLJU 829, where Leong Wai Heong J, had considered the issue of the application of Paragraph 5 of Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013. a. In this case, the wife of deceased brought an action against the father of deceased, and argued that as the deceased had a spouse and children living at the time of death, a prior nomination of insurances policies to the father did not entitle the father to take as beneficiary, and allowed the father to receive the proceeds as Executor of the estate to pay the debts of the Estate. b. The Learned Judge said at paragraph 77, reproduced here states: [77] Ordinarily, if a son nominates his dad or mother as a nominee of an insurance policy, on the demise of the son, the dad or mother will receive the insurances monies as a sole beneficiary and not as a trustee for the estate of the son irrespective of whether the son was married or not at the time he made the said nomination. However, legislation had intervened in the form of Paragraph 6[1] of

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Schedule 10 of the FSA 2013 which is Pari Materia [a Latin phrase meaning “On the same matter or same subject”] with the repealed S 167[1] Insurance Act 1996. This legislation puts some restrictions on the right of the dad or mother to receive the insurances monies as a sole beneficiary and not as a trustee for the estate of the son. Now the dad or mother can only receive the insurances monies as a sole beneficiary and not as a trustee for the estate of the son only if there is no spouse or child living at the time of the nomination by virtue of paragraph 5(1) b of the FSA 2013 which is Pari Materia with the repealed S 166[1] Insurance Act 1996. c. Based on the above, the Learned Judge found that the Defendant [Father] was not a nominee within paragraph 5(1) of Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013 as he was nominated after the marriage of the deceased to the Plaintiff, and went on to hold that Paragraph 6 of Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013 applied against the Father and that he was therefore only entitled to receive as Executor and not as Beneficiary. This is because of the operative words in Paragraph 5(b) of

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Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013 are “living at the time of nomination”. d. Based on this, His Lordship came to the conclusion, at paragraph 81 of the judgment, that the Defendant was not a nominee within paragraph 5(1)(b) of Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013 as his nomination was made after the deceased’s marriage to the Plaintiff. e. His Lordship was fortified in his decision by the analysis given to the now-repealed sections 166(1) and 167(1) of the Insurance Act 1966, which provisions are in Pari Materia with paragraph 5(1) and 6(1) of Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013. This analysis in seen in the following authorities: (i) Re Tan Hui Guan Deceased, (Phang Siew Ha v Aw Kim Siok) [2006] 3 MLJ 663: here, the Defendant, who was the deceased’s mother, had been nominated as nominee of insurance policies before the deceased and the Plaintiff were married. Hence, at the point of nomination there was ‘no spouse or child living at the time of the nomination” as stated in section 166(1) of the Insurance Act 1966.Hence, the proceeds of the policy did not form part of the estate of the deceased and therefore went to the parent to whom the policy was nominated. This decision would not have changed if the operative provision was paragraph 5(1)(b) of Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013. (ii) Lee Heng Moy v John Hancock Life Insurance (M) Bhd [2010] 1 MLJ 624: here, the second Respondent was held not to be the lawful spouse of the deceased. Therefore, she could not take the proceeds of the policy as beneficiary but only as Executor, and payment to her would become a part of the estate of the deceased and be subject to the deceased’s debts as stated in section 167(1) of the Insurance Act 1966. This decision would also not have changed if the operative provision were paragraph 6(1) of Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013. (iii) Upon a perusal of the above-mentioned decisions and the authorities therein quoted by the Learned Judge, this Court agrees with the same as a correct pronouncement of the application of Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013, which leave no room for doubt as to the intent and meaning of the words therein used. The words used are clear and this court is duty bound to apply the words used by the Legislature to give effect to it: Tebin Mostafa v Hulba-Danyal Balia [2020] 7 CLJ 561. 17. What then is the position of the Defendant and his two children in this case? a. It is clear that the Defendant and his children are neither spouse, child or parent of the Deceased. b. Therefore, Paragraph 5 of Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013 is inapplicable to the Defendant. c. One must therefore look to Paragraph 6 of Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013 and ascertain whether the Defendant can receive the proceeds as Beneficiary or only as an Executor. d. A reading of Paragraph 6 of Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013 tells us that a nominee (except one covered under subparagraph 5(1) of Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013) receives the insurance payout after the policyholder’s death as an Executor, not solely as a Beneficiary. The money becomes part of the Deceased’s estate; is subject to any debts; and once the insurer pays the nominee, the insurer has no further liability for that amount. e. Therefore, from the precise wording of Paragraph 6 of

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Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013, it is clear that the Defendant has no leg to stand on vis-à-vis the provisions of Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013. 18. The evidence against the Defendant’s entitlement was clear and unequivocal, and can be seen from the cross-examination of DW- 1, the Defendant himself. The Defendant, in cross-examination, said that his relationship with the Deceased was that they were close childhood friends and that the Deceased was godfather to his two sons. Other than this statement in cross-examination, no evidence was adduced that the Deceased was in fact the ‘godfather’. a. A ‘godfather’ is, at best, a guardian or sponsor in religious or cultural contexts and does not have legal status. The role is that of a mentor or guide, mostly in spiritual matters and normally chosen by the parents of a child. b. This point was, in any event, not pleaded: See: Samuel Naik Siang Ting v Public Bank Bhd [2015] 6 MLJ 1. c. This Court finds therefore, that this assertion is irrelevant vis-a-vis the provisions of Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013. 19. The Defendant also admitted that he was not a spouse, child or parent of the Deceased. 20. The Defendant, in his defence, as alluded to above, took the following positions: 20.1 He denies that blood relationship is relevant to distribution under the Trust. a. In this regard, when one examines Paragraph 5(1)(a) and (b) read together with Paragraph 6(1) of Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013, the following points are crystal clear: (i) Paragraph 5 states that the proceeds of the policies are nominated to a spouse or child, or if no spouse or child is living at the time of the nomination, to a parent, entitling these nominees, as the case may be, to receive the proceeds as beneficiaries. (ii) Paragraph 6 provides that if a nominee falls outside the category of persons listed in Paragraph 5, the nominee may only receive the policy proceeds in the capacity of an executor, not as a beneficiary, and those proceeds must be applied toward settling the deceased’s estate debts. (iii) In this case, the evidence shows that neither the Defendant, nor his two children come within the categories of recognised persons to receive the proceeds beneficially under paragraph 5 of

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Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013. (iv) Therefore, the fate of the policies which were nominated to the Defendant and his two children falls to be decided under Paragraph 6(1) of

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Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013. (v) On the strength of the case law examined in Paragraph 16 above, the Defendants can only be Executors. They therefore cannot receive the proceeds from the policy nominated to them as Beneficiaries. (vi) What is evident from Paragraph 5(1) of Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013 is that the only category of persons entitled to receive proceeds as beneficiaries is a spouse, child or, as the case may be, a parent. (vii) I pause here to observe that the Plaintiff and Defendant have used the term ‘blood relationship’. I do not think this is correct, as a legally adopted child is a child recognised by law and hence will also come under the category of ‘child’ in Paragraph 5(1) of Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013. – See: Section 9(2) of the Adoption Act 1952 20.2 The Defendant argues that the Deed of Trust and Will are separate instruments, and the Will did not revoke the Trust. a. To my mind, this pleading is a non-starter. b. It matters not whether the Deed of Trust or the Will are separate. c. It is also irrelevant that the Will did not revoke the Trust. d. The only things that matter are the following: (i) Was there a life policy; (ii) Was a nomination made; (iii) Are the nominees within the category of persons recognised in Paragraph 5(1) of Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013. (iv) If (iii) is not satisfied, then the matter ends there, and Paragraph 6(1) of Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013 comes into play. e. Therefore, as stated above, the Defendant can only be Executor. He therefore cannot receive the proceeds from the policy nominated to him and his children as Beneficiaries. 20.3 The Defendant challenges the validity of the Will (he alleges doubtful signature of the Deceased and that there was no explicit revocation of trust) and pleaded that all insurance policies have named beneficiaries and this means that these beneficiaries are entitled to receive the proceeds from the policies nominated to them. a. This plea is without merit based on an examination of Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013. b. The cross-examination of the witnesses [PW1, 2 and 3] by Counsel for the Defence only proves to this Court that the Will was validly executed. The Court finds that these witnesses were steadfast and credible. c. Paragraph 6(2) of Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013 places a duty on the nominee as Executor under Paragraph 6(1) of Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013 to distribute the insurance policy proceeds as part of administering the Deceased policyowner's estate, following either the Deceased's Will or the applicable laws on estate distribution. d. Even if the Will is invalid, such invalidity would simply render distribution of the estate to be carried out under the Distribution Act, 1958 [Revised 1983] [Act 300]. e. Hence, nothing turns on this plea by the Defendant. 20.4 The Defendant also points to clauses in the Deed of Trust that set aside one policy specifically to settle the Deceased’s debts, and pleads that he was appointed as a Protector with powers over the Trustee; therefore, the Plaintiff’s claim cannot be sustained. a. Whether the Deceased expressly set aside one or more policies in the Trust to settle his debts or not, is not a consideration when reading Paragraphs 6(1) and (2) of

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Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013. b. The only consideration is what is stated in Paragraphs 6(1) and (2) of Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013. c. A protector is a person who holds powers under a Trust but who is not a Trustee. A protector is a person who is independent of the Trustees. The protector’s role is usually to monitor, oversee or exercise a degree of control over the Trust by the Trustees. It is common for a Settlor to choose to provide for a protector where a third party / institutional trust company is appointed as trustee: See: https://www.lexisnexis.co.uk/legal/guidance/protectors d. A Protector, therefore, cannot override a statutory provision. e. Whatever the position or appointment of the Defendant, it does not overcome the provisions of Paragraph 5 and 6 of Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013. f. Further, Paragraph 13 of Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013 expressly states that Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013 takes precedence over policy terms, other laws, and customs relating to estate matters. g. Therefore, this pleading does not at all obviate the application of Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013. 20.5 The Defendant pleads that the FSA 2013 applies only when there is no Will or Deed of Trust and no family member seeks administration, therefore he suggests that in this case the terms of the Trust must take precedence. a. This is answered simply by reference to Paragraph 6

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Schedule 10 to the FSA 2013 as explained above. b. The issue of the application of the stated provisions do not depend on whether there is a Trust or a Will or whether there is any application for administration. c. The issue is whether a person not within the categories in Paragraph 5 of Schedule 10 to the FSA was designated as nominee of a life policy. d. In this case, a life policy was nominated to a a person not within the categories in Paragraph 5 of Schedule 10 to the FSA. 21. There is also no evidence that the Deceased had assigned the relevant policies to the Defendant and his two children. 22. Therefore, his Court allows the Plaintiff’s claim in paragraphs 23(a)(i) to (iii) and 23(c) of the Statement of Claim. 23. Costs are awarded to the Deceased’s estate in the sum of RM5,000.00 subject to allocatur. Dated the 07th day of November 2025 ……………………………….. AVINDER SINGH GILL JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER OF THE HIGH COURT HIGH COURT (CIVIL DIVISION NCvC2) HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY, MALAYSIA Counsel for the Plaintiff: Mr Reno Nga together with Miss Jess Wong [Pelatih Dalam Kamar] Messrs Nga Chambers (Kuala Lumpur) Counsel for the Defendant: Mr Saravanan together with Mr G Sivajothi Messrs Saravanan Veerappan & Co (Puchong)