SURIA RESORTS MANAGEMENT SDN BHD v Kerajaan Malaysia (T-01(NCvC)(W)-646-08/2022)

Ini adalah suatu rayuan selepas bicara penuh mengenai penamatan kontrak berdasarkan kepentingan negara.

Perayu merupakan sebuah syarikat persendirian berhad Bumiputera yang menjalankan perniagaan pengurusan resort dan lain-lain kemudahan.

Responden adalah Kerajaan Persekutuan Malaysia.

Kami telah mendengar rayuan ini pada 2hb Julai 2024. Selepas itu, kami menangguhkan keputusan kami bagi mempertimbangkan hujahan-hujahan yang telah dikemukakan oleh pihak-pihak.

Maka selepas berbuat demikian, kami memberikan keputusan kami bersama alasan-alasan penghakiman di bawah ini.

Pada 28hb Mei 2003, Responden telah meluluskan cadangan perlaksanaan Program Latihan Khidmat Negara (“PLKN”), maka Akta Latihan Khidmat Negara digubal dan Rang Undang-Undang diluluskan pada 7hb Julai 2023.

Pada penghujung tahun 2003, selepas proses tawaran sebut-harga, Kementerian Pertahanan Malaysia telah melantik Perayu untuk memulakan kerja-kerja penyediaan prasarana kem mengikut spesifikasi berdasarkan keperluan minimum Kerajaan di kem Perayu di Merang Suria Holiday Camp, Setiu, Terengganu Darul Iman (“Kem”).

Selain itu, Responden juga telah melantik Perayu membekalkan kemudahan-kemudahan latihan termasuk khemah dan perkhidmatan sajian makanan bagi peserta PLKN di dalam Kem.

Perkhidmatan Perayu ini termaktub dalam kontrak no. KP/Pemb/Kon(CT)KN29/2003 antara Perayu dan Responden pada tahun 2005 (“Kontrak Pertama”).

Kontrak Pertama tersebut telah dilanjutkan melalui kontrak tambahan pada 13hb Mac 2006 dan sekali lagi pada 23hb Disember 2008.

Pada tahun 2011 dan penghujung tahun 2013, perkhidmatan Perayu dilanjutkan sepertimana termaktub dalam kontrak no. KP/JLKN(PRA)/KEM46/2008 antara Perayu dan Responden (“Kontrak Kedua”).

Kemudiannya pada tahun 2014, perkhidmatan Perayu dalam Kontrak Kedua tersebut telah dilanjutkan lagi sepertimana termaktub dalam kontrak no. KP/JLKN(PRA)/KEM55/2014 antara Perayu dan Responden (“Kontrak Ketiga”).

Kontrak Ketiga tersebut telah dilanjutkan sebanyak dua kali iaitu pada 13hb Mac 2017 dan 28hb Februari 2018. Kontrak Ketiga ini mengandungi terma-terma yang sama seperti dalam Kontrak Pertama dan Kontrak Kedua tersebut, antara lainnya, mengandungi klausa 36 seperti berikut: “(36.1) Tidak tertakluk kepada mana-mana peruntukan dalam Kontrak ini, KERAJAAN berhak menamatkan Kontrak ini pada bila-bila masa dengan memberikan notis bertulis tidak kurang daripada tiga puluh (30) hari kepada KONTRAKTOR (tanpa memberi apa-apa sebab) sekiranya kerajaan berpendapat penamatan itu perlu dilaksanakan atas kepentingan negara keselamatan negara atau bagi tujuan polisi kerajaan atau polisi awam. (36.2) Bagi maksud klausa ini, perkara yang berjumlah kepada “kepentingan negara”, “kepentingan keselamatan negara”, “polisi kerajaan” dan “polisi awam” hendaklah diputuskan oleh KERAJAAN sahaja dan keputusan itu adalah muktamad dan tidak boleh dicabar. (36.3) Pihak-pihak bersetuju bahawa KONTRAKTOR tidak berhak untuk menuntut sebarang kerugian termasuk kehilangan perolehan pendapatan, pampasan, tuntutan, gantirugi atau sebagainya atas penamatan Kontrak itu.”

Walau bagaimanapun, selepas Pilihan Raya Umum Ke-14 Malaysia pada tahun 2018, YB Tuan Lim Guan Eng, Menteri Kewangan, diikuti oleh Tuan Syed Saddiq Syed Abdul Rahman, Menteri Belia dan Sukan, telah mengumumkan penamatan kesemua PLKN, kecuali lima (5) kem PLKN di Sarawak yang didiami oleh Angkatan Tentera Malaysia.

Berikutan itu, Responden, melalui surat kepada Perayu, telah membatalkan Kontrak Ketiga tersebut berdasarkan Klausa 36, dengan penamatan dalam tempoh 30 hari bermula pada 3 September 2018. Surat tersebut adalah seperti berikut:

Perayu mempertikaikan pembatalan Kontrak Ketiga tersebut.

Oleh itu, Perayu pada 7hb Februari 2020 telah memfailkan Guaman no. TA-21NCVC-1-02/2020 di Mahkamah Tinggi Terengganu terhadap Responden untuk menuntut pampasan (“Tindakan”).

Perayu menuntut pampasan seperti berikut dalam tindakan tersebut: a) Satu deklarasi bahawa Klausa 36 Perjanjian tersebut adalah tidak sah dan bercanggah dengan peruntukan Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan Akta Kontrak 1950 dan tidak mengikat Plaintif; b) RM3,376,015.67 sebagai gantirugi ke atas kos naiktaraf kem PLKN Plaintif tersebut; c) RM8,985,566.00 sebagai kerugian kehilangan keuntungan penyewaan insfrastruktur bagi baki kontrak dari Oktober 2018 sehingga Disember 2020; dan juga kekurangan bayaran penyewaan infrastruktur dari Mac 2015 sehingga September 2018 dan kekurangan bayaran sajian makanan akibat kekurangan bilangan peserta dan tempoh program setiap tahun yang telah dijanjikan di dalam Perjanjian tersebut sejak Mac 2015 sehingga Disember 2020; 7 d) Faedah berterusan pada kadar 5% setahun ke atas jumlah Penghakiman dari 03.10.2018 sehingga tarikh tindakan ini difailkan; e) Faedah berterusan pada kadar 5% setahun ke atas jumlah Penghakiman dari tarikh tindakan ini difailkan sehingga penyelesaian penuh; f) Kos tindakan ini; dan g) Apa-apa relif lain atau selanjutnya sepertimana yang difikirkan sesuai oleh Mahkamah yang Mulia ini.

Responden pula menjawab bahawa Responden tidak bertanggungan khususnya berdasarkan peruntukan kontrak.

Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi yang bijaksana (“HMT”) berpendapat seperti berikut dalam alasan-alasan penghakiman Tindakan (“Penghakiman”): “[53] Mahkamah berpendapat tidak ada kekaburan perkataan yang digunakan dalam klausa 36 Perjanjian itu. Oleh kerana perkataannya jelas maka tafsiran terhadap klausa tersebut hendaklah dibuat berdasarkan kepada maksud biasa perkataan-perkataan tersebut “natural ordinary meaning”. Di bawah maksud biasa. Klausa 36 ini bermakna Kerajaan berhak menamatkan kontrak dan/atau Perjanjian tersebut pada bila-bila masa atas kepentingan negara. [54] Tafsiran berdasarkan maksud biasa munasabah dan sesuai berdasarkan kepada perkataan di dalam Perjanjian itu dan ianya selaras dengan prinsip undang-undang dalam kes Yap Nyo Nyok v Bath Pharmacy Sdn Bhd [1993] 3 CLJ 188 di mana Mahkamah mengatakan seperti yang berikut:-

Clause 4 of the agreement must be construed according to the intent of the parties. The express words used in the clause must be given their natural ordinary meaning unless it appears from the context that by so doing they are being used in a sense different from that in which the parties intended to use them or unless by so using them a manifest inconsistency results which could not have been the intention of the parties. In its natural and ordinary meaning the wording in clause 4 does not create or confer an option exercisable by the plaintiff to terminate the sublease before expiration of the fixed term. … [72] Plaintif mengatakan klausa 36 bertentangan dengan s. 29 Akta Kontrak dan merujuk kepada kes-kes yang berikut CIMB Bank Berhad [supra], Maybank Trustee [supra], Thene Arulmani Chelvi Arumugam [supra]… … [75] Oleh itu, pada dasarnya Mahkamah bersetuju dengan penghujahan peguam Plaintif klausa 36 dalam Perjanjian itu mempunyai kesan yang sama dengan klausa 12 dalam kes CIMB Bank Berhad kerana Plaintif dihalang daripada menuntut sebarang kerugian termasuk kehilangan peroleh pendapatan, pampasan, tuntutan gantirugi atau sebagainya atas penamatan Perjanjian itu dan oleh yang demikian klausa itu bercanggah dengan s. Akta Kontrak yang menyebabkan ianya tidak sah dan terbatal. [76] Mahkamah berpendapat walaupun kontrak itu tidak sah dan terbatal, ianya tidak bermakna Plaintif berhak menuntut kerugian di atas penamatan Perjanjian itu. [77] Mahkamah berpendapat berdasarkan kepada fakta kes ini, s. 29 AK perlu dibaca bersama dengan s. 66AK… … [79] Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes John Ambrose v. Peter Anthony [2017] MLJU 270 memutuskan seperti yang beikut:-

Sinnadurai on Law of Contract, 4th edn at p. 694 states the following: It is clear that section 66 is a restitutionary provision and any remedy granted under the section is not based strictly on contract. The general principles under English law are that the courts will not enforce nor grant any remedy under an illegal contract. However, one of the main exceptions to this rule is that an innocent party may obtain certain remedies, whereas no remedy is available to a guilty party. Section 66 is a wide provision which has no direct parallel under English law. English cases, are therefore, not relevant in determining the scope of section 66. If the agreement 'is discovered to be void' section 66 shall apply. At p. 701, learned author continues: Where parties are in pari delicto. No relief under section 66 may be granted to either party to an illegal agreement if both the parties had full knowledge of the illegality at the time when the agreement was entered into. Indeed it would be against public policy to allow any party to obtain relief who knowingly entered into an illegal contract. [80] Jika Plaintif mengatakan s. 29 adalah tidak sah dan terbatal kerana klausa 36(3) memperuntukkan bahawa Plaintif tidak berhak menuntut sebarang kerugian dan dihalang untuk mengambil tindakan undang-undang terhadap Defendan maka berdasarkan kepada keterangan yang ada plaintif telah tahu dari awal peruntukan klausa ini semasa menandatangani perjanjian itu, justeru itu kontrak di antara Plaintif dan Defendan tidak sah dan terbatal dari awal semasa Plaintif menandatangani kontrak tersebut kerana terma klausa 36 memang telah sedia ada dalam Perjanjian tersebut dan ianya tidak pernah dipinda atau dikeluarkan daripada Perjanjian itu. Tidak ada keterangan yang menunjukkan Plaintif hanya mengetahui terma itu setelah Defendan menamatkan Perjanjian itu. Oleh yang demikian, berdasarkan s. Akta Kontrak dan kes John Ambrose [supra], Plaintif telah tahu berkenaan ketidakesahaan Perjanjian itu dari awal dan in pari delicto dengan Defendan untuk memasuki suatu kontrak yang tidak sah, justeru itu beliau tidak berhak untuk menuntut relif-relif kerugian dan satu deklarasi bahawa perjanjian itu tidak sah dan terbatal kerana Perjanjian itu telah tidak sah ab initio. … [82] Oleh itu, Mahkamah berpendapat adalah tidak tepat untuk pihak Plaintif bergantung kepada kes-kes CIMB Bank Berhad, Maybank Trustee Berhad dan Thene Arulmani Chelvi Arumugam untuk menguatkan tuntutannya. Jika Plaintif ingin menggunakan hujahan ini, maka ianya bermakna tidak wujud kontrak yang sah di antara plaintif dan Defendan dari awal kerana salah satu pra-syarat dalam elemen kontrak iaitu keesahan (illegality) tidak dipatuhi, Mohd Shukri Mat [supra]. Oleh kerana Plaintif adalah pari delicto dengan Defendan untuk memasuki satu perjanjian dan/atau suatu kontrak yang tidak sah maka kontrak itu terbatal, justeru itu, Plaintif tidak berhak untuk menuntut sebarang keraguan akibat penamatan kontrak. Plaintif hanya berhak terhadap tuntutan gantiruginya selepas penamatan kontrak dia baru sedar kontrak itu terbatal disebabkan oleh Plaintif dihalang untuk mengambil tindakan undang-undang atas kerugiannya. ... [85] Berdasarkan di atas, Mahkamah memutuskan pihak Plaintif telah gagal membuktikan kesnya di atas imbangan kebarangkalian. Walaupun Perjanjian itu tidak sah dan terbatal seperti yang dihujahkan oleh peguam Plaintif kerana terma-terma itu menghalang Plaintif daripada mengambil tindakan undang-undang, ketidaktentuan terma bertentangan dengan s. 29 Akta Kontrak maka adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah bahawa tuntutan Plaintif dihalang oleh s.66 Akta Kontrak kerana Plaintif pari delicto dengan Defendan untuk memasuki satu transaksi kontrak yang tidak sah. Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah telah menolak tuntutan Plaintif dengan kos sebanyak RM60,000.00 tertakluk kepada alokatur.” [21] Perayu, yang tidak berpuas hati dengan Penghakiman tersebut, telah merayu kepada Mahkamah Rayuan pada 29hb Ogos 2022. DAPATAN MAHKAMAH INI [22] Perayu telah di hadapan kami membangkitkan tiga isu utama untuk dikaji semula berikutan kesilapan HMT, iaitu:

Sama ada klausa 36 Perjanjian tersebut bercanggah dengan peruntukan Akta Kontrak 1950 dan Perlembagaan Persekutuan serta sama ada penamatan kontrak atas kepentingan negara menurut klausa 36 adalah tidak sah dan salah;

(ii) Sama ada wujudnya kepentingan negara yang menjadi asas penamatan di bawah klausa 36 Perjanjian tersebut; dan

(iii) Sama ada Perayu berhak menuntut gantirugi sebanyak RM3,376,015.67 dan RM8,985,566.00 daripada Responden. [23] Mengenai isu pertama, Perayu secara amnya mengulangi hujahan yang dikemukakan di Mahkamah Tinggi khususnya pergantungan pada kes CIMB Bank Berhad v. Anthony Lawrence Bourke & Anor [2019] 1 MLRA 599 (“CIMB Bank”). [24] Berpandukan kepada isu kedua, Perayu berhujah bahawa tiada bukti yang kukuh dikemukakan oleh Responden bahawa Kontrak Ketiga Perayu telah dibatalkan berdasarkan kepentingan negara. [25] Akhirnya mengenai isu ketiga, Perayu berhujah bahawa, ini tidak dipertikaikan oleh Responden kecuali bahawa Perayu tidak layak kerana gagal memenangi isu-isu pertama dan kedua. Maka, Perayu mesti diberikan pampasan sekiranya isu-isu pertama dan kedua didapati bercenderung kepada Perayu. [26] Responden juga mengulangi hujahan-hujahan yang dikemukakan di Mahkamah Tinggi bahawa Responden langsung tidak berliabiliti terhadap Perayu dari segi fakta dan undang-undang khususnya berdasarkan pentafsiran Perjanjian tersebut. [27] Fungsi Mahkamah ini adalah semakan sahaja berdasarkan rekod rayuan sepertimana diputuskan dalam kes Perembun (M) Sdn Bhd v. Conlay Construction Sdn Bhd [2012] CLJU 1416 (CA), di mana Abdul Wahab Patail HMR telah menyatakan berikut dengan penekanan diberikan oleh kami: "[4] Both parties began their submissions with the clear understanding that an appellate court will be slow to interfere with the findings of facts and judicial appreciation of the facts in the trial judge. They cited this court in Sivalingam Periasamy v. Periasamy & Anor [1996] 4 CLJ 545 CA; [1995] 3 MLJ 395 CA. This general principle was adopted by this court in Lee Ing Chin & Ors v. Gan Yook Chin & Anor [2003] 2 CLJ 19 and other cases. It is clear it is a general principle and that there are exceptions when appellate intervention is necessary to ensure justice is done. In the cases regularly cited, the terms "intervene" and "interfere" are used interchangeably. A more precise use of terminology would remove much unnecessary confusion and argument. It is more precise to say that an appellate court will intervene to correct an injustice when it is shown to have occurred in the trial court, but it would be an interference otherwise. ... [7] There is almost no limit to the range within which cases in court may vary. At one end there are cases that involve solely questions of law, and no facts are disputed. On the other there are cases that involve no law but all the facts are disputed. Within these cases there may be cases with disputed facts that involve solely interpretation and inferences leading to a conclusion on a finding on the disputed fact, and there may be other cases with disputed facts that involve solely oral evidence and the finding depends entirely upon an assessment of the credibility of witnesses who testified and were tested before the trial judge. [8] Hence, the proper approach is that if (a) it is shown that the judgment cannot be explained or justified by the special advantage enjoyed by the trial judge by reason of having seen and heard the witnesses testify and being tested before him, and (b) an injustice is demonstrated to have been occasioned by any error by the trial judge, for example:

the judgment is based upon a wrong premise of fact or of law;

there was insufficient judicial appreciation by the trial judge of the evidence of circumstances placed before him;

the trial judge has completely overlooked the inherent probabilities of the case;

that the course or events affirmed by the trial judge could not have occurred;

the trial judge had made an unwarranted deduction based on faulty judicial reasoning from admitted or established facts; or

the trial judge had so fundamentally misdirected himself that one may safely say that no reasonable court which had properly directed itself and asked the correct questions would have arrived at the same conclusion; an appellate court will intervene to rectify that error so that injustice is not occasioned." Rujuk juga Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v. Wendy Tan Lee Pheng, Administrator of the Estates of Tan Ewe Kwang, Deceased & Ors [2020] 10 CLJ 1 (FC). [28] Kami akan menyentuh isu-isu yang dibangkitkan oleh Perayu satu demi satu.

Isu penamatan Kontrak tidak sah dan salah [29] Pihak-pihak tidak mempertikaikan bahawa penamatan kontrak tersebut telah ditamatkan oleh Responden berdasarkan klausa 36.1 perjanjian di antara mereka. Perayu telah berhujah bahawa klausa 36 adalah bercanggahan dengan perkara 8 Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan juga seksyen 24 dan 29 Akta Kontrak 1950. Oleh itu, tindakan Responden yang bergantung kepada klausa 36 tersebut adalah salah di sisi undang-undang. [30] Perkara 8 Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan seksyen 24 dan 29 Akta Kontrak 1950 adalah seperti yang berikut: “Article 8. Equality

All persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law.

Except as expressly authorized by this Constitution, there shall be no discrimination against citizens on the ground only of religion, race, descent, place of birth or gender in any law or in the appointment to any office or employment under a public authority or in the administration of any law relating to the acquisition, holding or disposition of property or the establishing or carrying on of any trade, business, profession, vocation or employment.

There shall be no discrimination in favour of any person on the ground that he is a subject of the Ruler of any State.

No public authority shall discriminate against any person on the ground that he is resident or carrying on business in any part of the Federation outside the jurisdiction of the authority.

This Article does not invalidate or prohibit—

any provision regulating personal law;

any provision or practice restricting office or employment connected with the affairs of any religion, or of an institution managed by a group professing any religion, to persons professing that religion;

any provision for the protection, well-being or advancement of the aboriginal peoples of the Malay Peninsula (including the reservation of land) or the reservation to aborigines of a reasonable proportion of suitable positions in the public service;

any provision prescribing residence in a State or part of a State as a qualification for election or appointment to any authority having jurisdiction only in that State or part, or for voting in such an election;

any provision of a Constitution of a State, being or corresponding to a provision in force immediately before Merdeka Day;

any provision restricting enlistment in the Malay Regiment to Malays. Section 24. What considerations and objects are lawful, and what not The consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless-

it is forbidden by a law;

it is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat any law;

it is fraudulent;

it involves or implies injury to the person or property of another; or

the court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy. In each of the above cases, the consideration or object of an agreement is said to be unlawful. Every agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void. Section 29. Agreement in restraint of legal proceedings void Every agreement, by which any party thereto is restricted absolutely from enforcing his rights under or in respect of any contract, by the usual legal proceedings in the ordinary tribunals, or which limits the time within which he may thus enforce his rights, is void to that extent. Saving of contract to refer to arbitration dispute that may arise Exception 1 - This section shall not render illegal a contract by which two or more persons agree that any dispute which may arise between them in respect of any subject or class of subjects shall be referred to arbitration, and that only the amount awarded in the arbitration shall be recoverable in respect of the dispute so referred. Saving of contract to refer questions that have already arisen Exception 2 - Nor shall this section render illegal any contract in writing, by which two or more persons agree to refer to arbitration any question between them which has already arisen, or affect any law as to references to arbitration. Exception 3 - Nor shall this section render illegal any contract in writing between the Government and any person with respect to an award of a scholarship by the Government wherein it is provided that the discretion exercised by the Government under that contract shall be final and conclusive and shall not be questioned by any court. In this exception, the expression "scholarship" includes any bursary to be awarded or tuition or examination fees to be defrayed by the Government and the expression "Government" includes the Government of a State.” [31] Bagi isu ini, kami ingin merujuk kepada kes Kerajaan Malaysia v. PDS Training Camp Sdn Bhd Rayuan Sivil no. N-01(NCVC)(W)-324- 06/2023 yang mana Mahkamah Rayuan baru-baru ini membuat keputusan berdasarkan fakta-fakta yang serupa juga untuk projek membekalkan kemudahan-kemudahan latihan dan perkhidmatan sajian makanan yang lain. Di dalam kes itu, Lim Chong Fong HMR menyatakan sepertimana berikut dengan penekanan diberikan oleh kami: “[24] First and foremost, we have carefully read clause 36 of the Contract vis- à-vis article 8 of the Federal Constitution. This is a non-starter in our view in that we do not see any discrimination made specifically against the Plaintiff by the Defendant that violated the safeguard or protection accorded by article 8. [25] Next in respect of the standing of clause 36 of the Contract vis-à-vis s. 29 of the Contracts Act 1950, the Plaintiff implored us to follow the reasoning in the CIMB Case which was wholly relied by the learned JC as seen in paragraphs (39) and (40) as well as (50) of the GOJ. [26] We observed that the CIMB Case has caused unease, as it seems to have altered the commonly understood norm and application of exclusion or limitation of liability provision in commercial contracts: see, amongst others, the following academic treatises:- An exclusion clause wrongly ousted: a well drafted exclusion clause misinterpreted on many levels, University of Malaya Law Review (2019) and The legal saga of exclusion clauses in Malaysia, Review of Politics and Public Policy in Emerging Politics Journal UTAR (Vol.1 no. 1 June 2019). This unease arises primarily because it was held in Pacific Bank Bhd v. Kerajaan Negeri Sarawak [2015] 3 CLJ 717 FC that s. 29 of the Contracts Act 1950 would only be attracted if there is contractual restriction on the enforcement of a right, particularly regarding the timing of the commencement of an action in court. [27] Notwithstanding this, as with all judicial endeavours, the applicability or otherwise of a judicial precedent, including that of the apex court, is highly dependent on the facts and circumstances of each case. [28] In this respect, we noticed two obvious dissimilarity between the facts here and those in the CIMB Case. [29] Firstly, the contract here involves the Federal Government and a private entity, whereas the CIMB Case involved two private entitles. [30] Secondly, it must foremost be appreciated that clause 36 of the Contract is a termination for convenience provision in the national interest and not a termination for default provision. The exclusion clause 36.3 here is triggered upon termination of the contract by the Federal Government without default, whereas the exclusion clause in the CIMB case was triggered due to the claim by the customer for default or breach on the part of the bank. [31] Consequently, we are not strictly bound by the CIMB case due to the principle of stare decisis. [32] Be that as it may, we observed that the Federal Court therein whilst dealing with clause 12 of the loan agreement construed that the clause absolutely restricted the plaintiff from enforcing his rights and remedies under the banking loan contract, which tantamounted to a clause that sought to oust the jurisdiction of the court; thereby violated s. 29 of the Contracts Act 1950. [33] Upon our construction of clause 36.3 of the Contract here, we do not find that all the Plaintiff’s rights and remedies have been absolutely restricted by the Defendant’s invocation of clause 36.1 of the Contract. In this regard, the Plaintiff is only disallowed from claiming loss and damage consequential to the termination of the Contract, but not the contract consideration which has already accrued to the Plaintiff up to the termination of the Contract. As the result, we do not find that clause 36.3 of the Contract infringes s. 29 of the Contracts Act 1950. [34] Furthermore, we observed that the learned JC by following the CIMB case again, found it justified to strike down clause 36 of the Contract because of unequal bargaining power between the parties here. [35] The contract in the CIMB case is a banking loan contract. It must be appreciated that, in such instances, it is the customer who bargains with the bank during the procurement of the loan, but the bank prevailed on its terms of the contract because of its stronger bargaining position. The position is quite different here. This is a services contract procured by the Plaintiff on an open tender basis at the invitation of the Defendant. The terms of the contract required by the Defendant were made known to all tenderers prior to submission of tender. The Plaintiff was at liberty not to bid if the requisite terms are unacceptable to the Plaintiff. There is also no evidence that the Plaintiff has sought to delete clause 36 of the Contract at all material times. Factually, there was hence no bargaining here that attracted the notion of unequal bargaining power. [36] We are therefore of the view that the learned JC’s reasoning in paragraphs (61) to (63) of the GOJ is conjecture and accordingly unsustainable. [37] Consequently, we find that the learned JC made a serious misdirection and is plainly wrong by applying s. 29 of the Contracts Act 1950 to invalidate clause 36 of the Contract. Appellate intervention is thus justified.” [32] Berdasarkan fakta-fakta di sini, kami berpendapat bahawa HMT tidak terkhilaf dalam memutuskan bahawa penamatan Kontrak Ketiga tersebut adalah sah walaupun alasan-alasan beliau berpendapat demikian berbeza daripada kami. Dalam erti kata lain, isu yang dibangkitkan oleh Perayu kini tidak bermerit. Oleh hal yang demikian, isu berkaitan pari-delicto Perayu yang telah diambil kira oleh HMT tidak lagi relevan.

Isu tiada kepentingan negara bagi pembatalan Kontrak [33] Isu ini merupakan persoalan fakta dan kami telah meneliti semula keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan. [34] Kami sekali lagi merujuk kepada kes Kerajaan Malaysia v. PDS Training Camp Sdn Bhd Rayuan Sivil no. N-01(NCVC)(W)-324- 06/2023 di mana Lim Chong Fong HMR menyatakan berikut dengan penekanan diberikan oleh kami: “[38] That notwithstanding and for completeness, we find that the Contract does not offend s. 24 of the Contracts Act 1950 contrary to what was alluded by the Plaintiff because we do not find the objects therein to be unlawful in any way. Moreover, we find and hold that the termination for convenience in the national interest without default provision in clause 36 of the Contract is also not contrary to public policy. This is by reason that the Plaintiff still has legal recourse if that termination provision has been used capriciously in bad faith; see Pembinaan Perwira Harta Sdn Bhd v. Letrikon Jaya Bina Sdn Bhd [2013] 2 CLJ 437 FC. Before us, we are satisfied from the evidence adduced that clause 36 of the Contract has been invoked in the national interest, particularly due to the financial constraint faced by the Defendant. The Plaintiff however has not made out a case that the usage of clause 36 of the Contract by the Defendant was improper and mala fide.” [35] Berikutan tafsiran kami, kami berpendapat bahawa penamatan Kontrak Ketiga berdasarkan klausa 36 Perjanjian tersebut telahpun dibuat oleh Responden dengan suci hati mengikut kemampuan kewangan Responden demi kepentingan negara pada masa yang material. Perayu tidak mengemukakan apa-apa keterangan yang menunjukkan bahawa penamatan itu telah dibuat dengan niat jahat seperti memberikan semula kontrak itu kepada pihak yang lain. [36] Oleh yang demikian, kami berpendapat bahawa isu yang dibangkitkan oleh Perayu juga tidak bermerit. [37] Selain itu, kami ingin menyatakan bahawa pendapat kami konsisten dan disokong oleh Mahkamah ini dalam kes berkaitan Kerajaan Malaysia v. Bagai Budi Sdn Bhd Rayuan Sivil W-01(NCVC)(W)-413-06/2022 bagi satu projek yang lain yang meliputi fakta-fakta yang serupa.

Isu tuntutan gantirugi [38] Isu ini tidak lagi relevan berdasarkan pendapat kami berkenaan isu pertama dan kedua di atas. [39] Walau bagaimanapun, dan secara ringkas, kami berpendapat bahawa tuntutan Perayu adalah jenis pampasan kehilangan yang tidak dibenarkan oleh klausa 36.3 Perjanjian tersebut. KESIMPULAN [40] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, kami dengan sebulat-suara berpendapat bahawa kes Perayu tiada merit; maka rayuan ini ditolak dan perintah Mahkamah Tinggi bertarikh 9hb Ogos 2022 dikekalkan dengan kos RM 20,000.00 dibayar oleh Perayu kepada Responden. Bertarikh 28hb November 2024 t.t LIM CHONG FONG HAKIM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN SENARAI PEGUAM: Peguambela bagi pihak

Perayu

Datuk Adnan bin Seman @ Abdullah Harris bin Md Nor Peguamcara bagi pihak Perayu TETUAN ADNAN SHARIDA & ASSOCIATES Advocates & Solicitors, No.3-1-1A, 3-2-2A & 2B, Jalan Medan PB 2A, Seksyen 9, 43650 Bandar Baru Bangi, Selangor Darul Ehsan litigation@adnansharida.com Peguambela bagi pihak

Responden

Anisah Normah binti Muhammad Nor Fariza Amira binti Azman Peguamcara bagi pihak Responden JABATAN PEGUAM NEGARA Bahagian Guaman No. 45, Persiaran Perdana, Presint 4, 62100 Putrajaya. anisah.normah@agc.gov.my farizaamira@agc.gov.my SENARAI STATUT YANG DIRUJUK: Artikel 8 Perlembagaan Persekutuan; Seksyen 24 dan 29 Akta Kontrak 1950; SENARAI KES YANG DIRUJUK: CIMB Bank Berhad v. Anthony Lawrence Bourke & Anor [2019] 1 MLRA 599; Perembun (M) Sdn Bhd v. Conlay Construction Sdn Bhd [2012] CLJU 1416 (CA); Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v. Wendy Tan Lee Pheng, Administrator of the Estates of Tan Ewe Kwang, Deceased & Ors [2020] 10 CLJ 1; Kerajaan Malaysia v. PDS Training Camp Sdn Bhd Rayuan Sivil no. N- 01(NCVC)(W)-324-06/2023; and Kerajaan Malaysia v. Bagai Budi Sdn Bhd Rayuan Sivil W-01(NCVC)(W)- 413-06/2022.