Surinder Kaur A/P Pertab Singh (P) v Manjeet Singh A/L Sadhu Singh (WA-33-410-07/2022)

This is an application (Encl. 146) by the Respondent for discovery of financial documents from the relevant financial institutions pertaining to bank accounts belonging to the Petitioner and Tetuan Khalil Surinder & Associates, a law firm where the Petitioner is the sole practitioner. The Petitioner and Respondent are currently involved in contested divorce proceedings.

The application was against CIMB Bank Berhad, Maybank Berhad. OCBC Bank (Malaysia) Berhad and RHB Bank Berhad. It was made pursuant to Section 7 of the Bankers' Books (Evidence) Act 1949 (Act 33), Order 24 rules 7, 7A, 12 and 16 of the Rules of Court 2012 (RoC), Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 (Act 56), and Rule 24 of the Law Reform (Marriage and. Divorce) Act 1976 (Act 164).

The reliefs sought in Encl. 146 are as follows:

bahawa CIMB BANK BERHAD [No. Syarikat: 197201001799 (13491- P)] (seterusnya dirujuk sebagai "CIMB Bank tersebut") sebuah syarikat yang diperbadankan di Malaysia menurut Akta Syarikat 1965 dan dilesenkan di bawah Akta Perbankan dan Institusi Kewangan 1989 mengenal pasti dan mengemukakan kepada Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini dan kepada peguamcara Responden dalam tempoh masa tujuh (7) hari daripada tarikh penghantar serahan perintah Mahkamah ini sesalinan semua penyata-penyata ("statements of account(s)") berhubung kesemua akaun-akaun semasa ("current account(s)") dan/atau akaun-akaun deposit tetap ("fixed account(s)") dan/atau akaun-akaun simpanan ("savings account(s)") yang dipegang oleh Pempetisyen dan/atau bersama mana-mana pihak lain dalam mana-mana cawangan CIMB Bank tersebut dari tarikh pembukaan akaun-akaun tersebut sehingga penyata terakhir yang terkini khususnya bagi akaun-akaun peribadi Pempetisyen;

(ii) bahawa CIMB BANK BERHAD [No. Syarikat: 197201001799 (13491- P)] (seterusnya dirujuk sebagai "CIMB Bank tersebut") sebuah syarikat yang diperbadankan di Malaysia menurut Akta Syarikat 1965 dan dilesenkan di bawah Akta Perbankan dan Institusi Kewangan 1989 mengenal pasti dan mengemukakan kepada Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini dan kepada peguamcara Responden dalam tempoh masa tujuh (7) hari daripada tarikh penghantar serahan perintah Mahkamah ini sesalinan semua penyata-penyata ("statements of account(s)") berhubung kesemua akaun-akaun semasa perniagaan ("office account(s)") dan/atau akaun-akaun perbelanjaan ("disbursement account(s)") dan/atau akaun-akaun pemegang amanah ("stakeholder account(s)") yang dipegang oleh Pempetisyen di atas nama Tetuan Khalil Surinder & Associates (seterusnya dirujuk sebagai "Firma tersebut") di cawangan Menara UAB, No. 6, Jalan Tun Perak, 50050 Kuala Lumpur sejak tarikh pembukaan akaun-akaun tersebut sehingga penyata terakhir yang terkini khususnya bagi akaun bernombor 80-00132478;

(iii) bahawa MALAYAN BANK BERHAD [No. Syarikat: 196001000142 (3813-K)] (seterusnya dirujuk sebagai "MayBank tersebut") sebuah syarikat yang diperbadankan di Malaysia menurut Akta Syarikat 1965 dan dilesenkan di bawah Akta Perbankan dan Institusi Kewangan 1989 mengenal pasti dan mengemukakan kepada Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini dan kepada peguamcara Responden dalam tempoh masa tujuh (7) hari daripada tarikh penghantar serahan perintah Mahkamah ini sesalinan semua penyata-penyata ("statements of account(s)") berhubung kesemua akaun-akaun semasa perniagaan ("office account(s)") dan/atau akaun-akaun perbelanjaan ("disbursement account(s)") dan/atau akaun-akaun pemegang amanah ("stakeholder account(s)") yang dipegang oleh Pempetisyen di atas nama Firma tersebut dalam mana-mana cawangan MayBank tersebut sejak tarikh pembukaan akaun-akaun tersebut sehingga penyata terakhir yang terkini khususnya bagi akaun-akaun bernombor 014066423949;

(iv) bahawa OCBC BANK (Malaysia) BERHAD [No. Syarikat: 199401009721 (295400-W)] (seterusnya dirujuk sebagai "OCBC Bank tersebut") sebuah syarikat yang diperbadankan di Malaysia menurut Akta Syarikat 1965 dan dilesenkan di bawah Akta Perbankan dan Institusi Kewangan 1989 mengenal pasti dan mengemukakan kepada Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini dan kepada peguamcara Responden dalam tempoh masa tujuh (7) hari daripada tarikh penghantar serahan perintah Mahkamah ini sesalinan semua penyata-penyata ("statements of account(s)") berhubung kesemua akaun-akaun semasa perniagaan ("office account(s)") dan/atau akaun-akaun perbelanjaan ("disbursement account(s)") dan/atau akaun-akaun pemegang amanah ("stakeholder account(s)") yang dipegang oleh Pempetisyen di atas nama Firma tersebut dalam mana-mana cawangan OCBC Bank tersebut sejak tarikh pembukaan akaun-akaun tersebut sehingga penyata terakhir yang terkini bagi akaun-akaun tersebut;

bahawa RHB BANK BERHAD [No. Syarikat: 196501000373 (6171- M)] (seterusnya dirujuk sebagai "RHB Bank tersebut") sebuah syarikat yang diperbadankan di Malaysia menurut Akta Syarikat 1965 dan dilesenkan di bawah Akta Perbankan dan Institusi Kewangan 1989 mengenal pasti dan mengemukakan kepada Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini dan kepada peguamcara Responden dalam tempoh masa tujuh (7) hari daripada tarikh penghantar serahan perintah Mahkamah ini sesalinan semua penyata-penyata ("statements of account(s)") berhubung kesemua akaun-akaun semasa perniagaan ("office account(s)") dan/atau akaun-akaun perbelanjaan ("disbursement account(s)") dan/atau akaun-akaun pemegang amanah ("stakeholder account(s)") yang dipegang oleh Pempetisyen di atas nama Firma tersebut dalam mana-mana cawangan RHB Bank tersebut sejak tarikh pembukaan akaun-akaun tersebut sehingga penyata terakhir yang terkini bagi akaun-akaun tersebut;

(vi) bahawa Bank Negara Malaysia membekalkan butir-butiran kesemua akaun akaun dalam mana-mana bank-bank dan/atau institusi-institusi kewangan atas nama Pempetisyen ataupun bersama mana-mana pihak lain dan/atau di atas nama Firma tersebut dalam masa tujuh (7) hari daripada tarikh penghantar serahan perintah Mahkamah ini kepada Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini dan peguamcara Responden;

(vii) bahawa Pempetisyen adalah dikehendaki mengenal pasti dan mengemukakan kepada Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini dan kepada peguamcara Responden dalam tempoh masa tujuh (7) hari daripada tarikh penghantar serahan perintah Mahkamah ini dokumen-dokumen seperti berikut:- a) dokumen-dokumen berhubung pembelian pengsapuri di No. 185-1, Block H, Tingkat Satu, Rampai Court berserta sesalinan suratan Hak Milik Stratanya yang dirujuk dalam perenggan 23 (1) di muka surat 12 Petisyen Perceraian (Kandungan 1); b) dokumen-dokumen berhubung pembelian banglo dua tingkat di No. 75, Block H, Jalan Ayer Molek 2, Taman Tasik Titiwangsa, 53200, Kuala Lumpur berserta sesalinan suratan Hak Milik Stratanya yang dirujuk dalam perenggan 23 (ii) di muka surat 12 Petisyen Perceraian (Kandungan 1); c) dokumen-dokumen berhubung pembelian kondominium di Block c-33-06, Kondominium Tinggian Titiwangsa, No.1, Jalan Tiara Titiwangsa, 53200 Kuala Lumpur berserta sesalinan suratan Hak Milik Stratanya yang dirujuk dalam perenggan 23 (i) di muka surat 13 Petisyen Perceraian (Kandungan 1); d) dokumen-dokumen berhubung belian dan jualan kedai di UG 24, Kompleks Wilayah, Kuala Lumpur yang dipegang di bawah Geran 7858/M1/1/65, Lot 241, Seksyen 40, Bandar Kuala Lumpur yang dirujuk dalam perenggan 23 (i) di muka surat 13 Petisyen Perceraian (Kandungan 1); e) dokumen-dokumen berhubung belian dan jualan hartanah di Muar yang dipegang dibawah Geran 496974, Lot 2877, Mukim Bukit Serampang, Daerah Ledang, Negeri Johor yang dirujuk dalam perenggan 23 (ii) di muka surat 13 Petisyen Perceraian (Kandungan 1); f) dokumen-dokumen berhubung belian dan jualan banglo dua tingkat di Bangsar yang dirujuk dalam perenggan 23 (iii) di muka surat 13 Petisyen Perceraian (Kandungan 1); dan g) dokumen-dokumen berhubung penubuhan dan pendaftaran Firma guaman bernama Tetuan Khalil Surinder & Associates;

(viii) bahawa Responden dibenarkan untuk memohon sebarang perintah sampingan/lanjutan untuk memberi kesan dan efek kepada perintah-perintah yang dipohon dalam perenggan-perenggan (i) hingga (vii) di atas;

(ix) bahawa mana-mana pihak yang tidak mematuhi Perintah yang dipohon di sini hendaklah dikenakan tindakan undang-undang menghina Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini; dan

bahawa kos permohonan ini adalah kos dalam kausa.

Brief facts as elicited from the pleadings filed by respective parties are as follows:

the Petitioner and Respondent's marriage was registered on 16.9.1989 at National Registration Department Petaling Jaya, Selangor;

(ii) There are 3 children from the marriage, all of whom are above 30 years old.

(iii) a Divorce Petition (Encl 1) was filed by the Petitioner on 27.7.2022 seeking an order for, inter alia, that the marriage between her and the Respondent be dissolved; maintenance for her and the children, and that all the assets be equally distributed between her and the Respondent;

(iv) all the assets were listed in paragraphs 23 and 24 of the Divorce Petition including a premise where the Firm is located, i.e. at No. 8, Persiaran Titiwangsa 3, Taman Tasik Titiwangsa, Kuala Lumpur, which was purchased by the Respondent;

all the Firm's expenses including the employees' salary were paid by the Respondent and/or the Respondent's law firm, Tetuan Manjeet & Associates, for at least five (5) to six (6) years since the Firm's establishment;

(vi) In addition to the allegations of unreasonable behaviour, both the petitioner and respondent had cross alleged adultery on the part of the other. Consequently, third parties involved have been joined to these proceedings either as co respondent or third party cited. Summary of The Proceeding

On 13.4.2026, in the presence of counsels for the Petitioner, Respondent and the banks as in paragraph 2, a Consent Order was recorded between the Respondent, CIMB Bank Berhad and RHB Bank Berhad (Consent Order).

The terms of the Consent Order inter alia both CIMB and RHB to provide the documents to the Applicant within 30 days of the Consent Order and costs of RM3000.00 to be payable to the solicitors for each bank.

On 11.5.2026, the Petitioner filed an unexpected appeal against the Consent Order.

On 18.5.2026, the Petitioner filed a stay of execution of the Consent Order which is pending disposal for reasons set out below.

By this time, both CIMB and RHB had complied with the terms of the Consent Order.

On 25.3.2025, the Respondent filed an application for discovery Encl. 146.

For the purposes of the hearing of Encl 146, the following cause papers had been filed namely: Encl. No.DocumentsDate of Filing146Notice of Application25.3.2025147Affidavit in Support25.3.2025153Petitioner's Affidavit in Reply14.4.2025155RHB Bank Berhad's Affidavit in Reply25.4.2025156Respondent's Affidavit in Reply to Encl.1539.5.2025157Petitioner's Affidavit in Reply to Encl.15622.5.2025166Respondent's Written Submission26.5.2025171Petitioner's Written Submission29.5.2025174&175Petitioner's Submission in Reply2.6.2025177Respondent's 2ndAffidavit in Reply(to Encl.157)5.6.2025178Respondent's Submission in Reply6.6.2025187Petitioner's 2ndAffidavit in Reply(to Encl.156)19.6.2025

Despite the Plaintiff's objection to Encl.146 as evidenced by the affidavits (Encl 153,157 & 187) and submission (Encl.171,174 & 175) filed, the Plaintiff's solicitor who was present during the hearing of the application on 13.4.2026 elected to remain silent, even as the terms of the Consent Order was recorded between the Respondent, CIMB Bank Berhad and RHB Bank Berhad.

Furthermore, as the terms of the Consent Order directly concerned the Petitioner, the decision to remain silent led both Respondent, CIMB, RHB and court to believe the Petitioner agreed to the terms of the Consent Order. Consequently, the Consent Order was duly recorded and the merits or otherwise of Encl 146 were not addressed.

The Petitioner having had the requisite knowledge and opportunity to address the court prior to the recording of the Consent Order, should now be precluded from changing her stance. In fact, the Petitioner waited 3 weeks to file an appeal further demonstrates that this late stage objection is an afterthought that should not be entertained.

The Petitioner's decision to remain a bystander in her own case choosing to complain only later is comparable to the "sniper" analogy in the case of Tradium Sdn Bhd v Zain Azhari bin Zainal Abidin

1 MLJ 668 (CA). This case concerned a judicial review application filed by the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Respondent to quash the $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Respondent's approval. Tradium Sdn Bhd (TSB), a property developer, was not initially included as a party to the proceedings. However, TSB requested for the cause papers once they became aware about the proceedings.

Despite knowing that a grant of certiorari would affect them financially, TSB chose not to apply to be added as a party. Their primary reasons for not intervening was to avoid potential liability for legal costs should $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Respondent succeed in its application. An order for certiorari was granted by the High Court and the $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Respondent appealed against the decision. Only at this stage TSB applied to add itself as a party but the application failed. There was no appeal lodged against that decision.

Instead, TSB by way of a Notice of Motion sought leave from the Court of Appeal for, inter alia, an order that TSB be permitted to intervene and take part as an intervener in the appeal.

The Court of Appeal in dismissing the application stated that: "The applicant admittedly did not wish to face an order for costs. Nevertheless, while enjoying that protection, it attacked the first respondent's arguments before the judge. In my view, the applicant was no better than a sniper who, whilst concealed and protected by the foliage in which he hides, proceeds to take pot-shots at his unsuspecting opponent. He was not prepared to take on all the risks of a full battle and, when the event went against him, decided to change his role. In Nana Ofori Atta II v Nana Abu Bonsra II [1958] AC 95; [1957] 3 All ER 559; [1957] 3 WLR 830 the appellant claimed certain lands belonging to the respondent. Both were chieftains in what was then known as the Gold Coast, now Ghana. Some 16 years earlier, a chieftain subordinate to the appellant had laid claim to the same lands. That action had been decided in the respondent's favour. The appellant, who was the person really interested in those lands, had knowingly stood by while the earlier action was fought out. The Privy Council when affirming the decisions of the court below dismissing the appellant's claim, applied the principle formulated by Lord Penzance in Wytcherley v Andrews (1871) LR 2 P & D 327 at p 328 and stated in the following terms: There is a practice in this court, by which any person having an interest may make himself a party to the suit by intervening; and it was because of the existence of that practice that the judges of the Prerogative Court held, that if a person, knowing what was passing, was content to stand by and see his battle fought by somebody else in the same interest, he should be bound by the result, and not be allowed to reopen the case. That principle is founded on justice and common sense, and is acted upon in courts of equity, where, if the persons interested are too numerous to be all made parties to the suit, one or two of the class are allowed to represent them; and if it appears to the court that everything has been done bona fide in the interests of the parties seeking to disturb the arrangement, it will not allow the matter to be reopened. Although those words were spoken in the context of a probate action concerning a will, the Privy Council considered it to be of universal application."

During the hearing of Encl 146, the Petitioner chose to remain silent and did not oppose the application, despite having previously filed affidavits and submissions to the contrary. Had the Petitioner objected at the hearing, the Respondent, CIMB and RHB would have the opportunity to address her objection before the terms of the Consent Order were recorded. By remaining silent, she deprived them of that opportunity and allowed them to proceed to finalise and act on the Consent Order in the belief that it was unopposed. Consequently, the Petitioner's appeal demonstrated that she is now taking a different position. She should be estopped as the court proceeded on the understanding that the Petitioner raised no objections.

On the doctrine of estoppel, the Federal Court in Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd (1995) 3 MLJ 331 stated the following: "Thus far we have dealt with the operation of the doctrine in the context of there having been offered some active encouragement by the party sought to be estopped. But we do not apprehend the law to be different when the encouragement comes in the form of silence. The true principle in such cases is to be found in the following passage in the judgment of Thesiger LJ in De Bussche v Alt (1878) 8 Ch D 286 at p 314: "If a person having a right, and seeing another person about to commit, or in the course of committing an act infringing upon that right, stands by in such a manner as really to induce the person committing the act, and who might otherwise have abstained from it, to believe that he assents to its being committed, he cannot afterwards be heard to complain of the act".

By choosing to appeal instead of initiating a separate action to set aside the Consent Order, the Petitioner bypassed the requirement to inform the court of the grounds of how the Consent Order had prejudiced her or the grounds on which she sought to set aside the Consent Order.

After all, it is trite that a separate suit should be filed to set aside the Consent Order. See the case of Serac Asia Sdn Bhd v Sepakat Insurance Brokers Sdn Bhd [2013] 5 MLJ 1 (FC).

Furthermore, the Petitioner had waited until 18.5.2026, some 5 weeks after the Consent Order to file an application for stay of execution of the Consent Order. Notably it was only filed after the appeal against the Consent Order had been filed.

Consequently, the delay in seeking a stay and the absence of any application to expedite it suggests that the Petitioner did not believe she had been prejudiced by the Consent Order. Notably, she was represented by a senior member of the Bar at all material times.

During this delay, both CIMB and RHB had already complied with the terms of the Consent Order which required submission of documents within 30 days from the Consent Order.

At the end of the day, the proverb "the bird has flown the coop" best sums up the Petitioner's position. Dated: 3rd of July 2026 JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA, Counsel for Petitioner: Mr. Ravi Nekoo Messrs. Nekoo Counsel for Respondents: 1 $ ^{1 \mathrm{st}} $ Respondent: Mr. Vinobha Dass Messrs. George Varughese $ 2^{\mathrm{n d}} $ Respondent: Mr. Samreet Singh Messrs. Gurdip, Sarjit & Co.