Suruhanjaya Komunikasi Dan Multimedia Malaysia (MCMC), Cyberjaya v INDIVIDU YANG TIDAK DIKENALI (Pentadbir Saluran Telegram 'Edisi Siasat') (WA-21CY-1-05/2025)

PERSONS UNKNOWN (ADMINISTRATORS OF THE “EDISI SIASAT” TELEGRAM

CHANNEL) PERSONS UNKNOWN (ADMINISTRATORS OF THE “EDISI KHAS” TELEGRAM

CHANNEL) TELEGRAM MESSENGER INC …DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 58 – Plaintiff’s Notice of Application for Erinford Injunction)

This is the Plaintiff’s application for an Erinford injunction pending appeal against this Court’s decision dated 11 September 2025, whereby this Court had, after hearing the parties inter partes, granted a prohibitory injunction restraining the three Defendants from further publishing or disseminating the Telegram channels "Edisi Siasat" (@edisisiasatmy) and "Edisi Khas" (@echodelta204), collectively known as "the Impugned Channels". These channels had served as the medium for the dissemination of information to the public and to the world at large on the Telegram platform and have amassed a substantial audience over a period of time. However, this Court declined to grant the mandatory injunctions compelling closure of the Impugned Channels and any future similar channels.

Following the dismissal of the mandatory reliefs, the Plaintiff has filed an appeal to the Court of Appeal and now seeks, by way of this application under Enclosure 58, dated 22 September 2025, an Erinford injunction to preserve the status quo pending determination of that appeal.

Upon hearing the application, this Court granted the Erinford injunction. Dissatisfied with the decision, the 3rd Defendant has filed an appeal to the Court of Appeal on 26 November 2025.

Herein, I set out the full grounds of judgment for the decision that has been delivered on 30 October 2025.

On 13 June 2025, the Plaintiff was granted the interlocutory injunctions by way of ex parte, among others, to compel the 3rd Defendant to shut down the Impugned Channels and the similar or new channels, and to prohibit all the Defendants from further publishing the Impugned Contents or similar contents.

Subsequently, on 11 September 2025, upon the inter partes hearing, this Court granted prohibitory injunctions restraining the Defendants from continuing to publish, disseminate, or republish the specific Impugned Contents identified in the Statement of Claim. However, this Court did not allow the prayers for mandatory injunctions compelling the closure of the Impugned Channels and the closure of any future channels.

As a result, the Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal dated 19 September 2025, and the application for Erinford Injunction dated 22 September 2025.

In the case of Jawi Ak Landu v Sunny Inspiration Sdn Bhd and Anor [2007] 8 MLJ 38 (HC), the High Court briefly and concisely explained Erinford Injunction in the following manner: “[12] It is correct to say, where an applicant has failed in his interlocutory application for an interim injunction, he may appeal against the said decision and at the same time apply for an interim injunction to restrain the other party from dealing with the subject matter of the action pending the appeal. Such an interim injunction pending appeal is known as an Erinford injunction. The principle governing this form of injunction is to preserve the status quo pending the determination of an appeal so that the appeal will not be rendered nugatory. …”. [Emphasis added]

In the case of Subashini a/p Rajasingam v Saravanan a/l Thangathoray and other appeals [2008] 2 MLJ 147 (FC), Abdul Aziz Mohamed FCJ opined that: “[175] The authority for the granting of an Erinford or an Erinford-type injunction is Erinford Properties Ltd v Cheshire County Council [1974] 2 All ER 448, where Megarry J, after refusing an interlocutory injunction, granted an injunction in the same terms pending appeal. He did so on the principle that when a party is appealing, exercising his undoubted right of appeal, the court ought to see that the appeal, if successful, is not nugatory’ (p 454f).”. [Emphasis added]

Similarly, in the case of Marina bte Mohd Yusoff v Pekeliling Triangle Sdn Bhd (receiver and manager appointed) [2008] 1 MLJ 317 (CA), the Court of Appeal held that: “… It is well settled that the court has jurisdiction on dismissal of an application for an interlocutory injunction to grant the unsuccessful applicant an injunction pending an appeal against the dismissal. The principle governing the grant of the said injunction, known as an Erinford injunction, was set out by Meggary J, in Erinford Properties Ltd v Cheshire County Counsel [1974] 2 All ER 448, at p 454, as follows: There will, of course, be many cases where it would be wrong to grant an injunction pending appeal, as where any appeal would be frivolous, or to grant the injunction would inflict greater hardship than it would avoid, and so on. But subject to that, the principle is to be found in the leading judgment of Cotton LJ in Wilson v Church (No 2)(1879-1980) 12 Ch D 454, where speaking of an appeal from the Court of Appeal to the House of Lords, he said at p 458, … when a party is appealing, exercising his undoubted right of appeal, this court ought to see the that the appeal, if successful, is not nugatory.’ That was the principle which Pennycuick J applied in the Onion case [1962] 1 WLR 1085 and although the case had not been cited to me, it was on that principle, and not because I felt any doubts about my judgment on the motion, that I granted Mr Newsom the limited injunction pending appeal that he sought. This is not a case which damages seem to me to be a suitable alternative. Apart from the test whether there is a likelihood of a successful appeal being rendered nugatory, in our view the principle governing the grant of an interlocutory injunction are equally applicable to the grant of an Erinford injunction. Any application for an Erinford injunction must involve considerations of the overall justice of the case and as to whether damages being an adequate remedy.”. [Emphasis added]

In the case of Kilang Kosfarm Sdn Bhd v Kosma Nusantara Bhd [2002] 5 MLJ 662 (HC) (“Kilang Kosfarm”), the High Court concisely summarised the principles in Erinford Properties Ltd v Cheshire County Council [1974] 2 All ER 448 as follows: “From the above passage, the relevant principles expounded by Megarry J (as far as the present application is concerned) could be summarized as follows:

that a decision that no injunction should be granted pending the trial is not inconsistent with holding that an injunction should be granted pending an appeal against the decision not to grant the injunction;

that by refusing an injunction pending the trial, the judge does not become functus officio quoad granting any injunction at all;

that the balance of convenience (ie the comparative effects of granting or refusing an injunction pending an appeal) are such that it would be right to preserve the status quo pending the appeal;

that it would be wrong to grant an injunction pending appeal in cases where the appeal would be frivolous, or to grant the injunction would inflict greater hardship than it would avoid;

that when a party is appealing, exercising his undoubted right of appeal, the court ought to see that the appeal, if successful, is not nugatory; and

that an injunction pending appeal is not applicable in cases where damages seem to be a suitable and adequate remedy;

that to grant or not to grant the injunction is a matter of the court's discretion which must be exercised based on the facts of each particular case. It is not a matter of right.”. [Emphasis added]

Recently, in the case of Edisijuta Parking Sdn Bhd v TH Universal Builders Sdn Bhd & Anor [2025] 5 MLJ 524 (CA), the Court of Appeal held that: “[36] I am of the following view regarding a single judge panel’s discretionary power to grant an Erinford injunction pending the disposal of an appeal by the Court of Appeal (‘interim Erinford injunction (pending appeal)’):

when a High Court dismisses an application for an injunction, final and interlocutory (‘High Court’s dismissal (injunction application)’), an interim Erinford injunction (pending appeal):

only restrains the successful party in the High Court’s dismissal (injunction application) from taking any step or action pending the disposal of an appeal to the Court of Appeal;

cannot stay the execution of the High Court’s dismissal (injunction application); and

does not stay the proceedings in the High Court. …”. [Emphasis added]

Based on the authorities and discussion above, Erinford Injunction is sought to restrain the successful party from dealing with the subject matter of the action, taking any step or action pending the appeal against a decision of dismissing an interlocutory application for an interim injunction. It is to preserve the status quo pending the determination of the appeal.

The relevant principles in relation to Erinford Injunction are summarised as follows:

When a party is appealing, exercising his undoubted right of appeal, the court ought to see the that the appeal, if successful, is not nugatory;

The balance of convenience is such that it would be right to preserve the status quo pending the appeal;

It would be wrong to grant an injunction pending appeal in cases where the appeal would be frivolous or to grant the injunction would inflict greater hardship;

An injunction pending appeal is not applicable in cases where damages seem to be a suitable and adequate remedy;

The principle governing the grant of an interlocutory injunction are equally applicable to the grant of an Erinford Injunction. D. ANALYSIS AND FIINDINGS OF THE COURT

In the present case, the Plaintiff was granted the interlocutory injunctions by way of ex parte, among others, to compel the 3rd Defendant to shut down the Impugned Channels and the similar or new channels, and to prohibit all the Defendant from further publishing the Impugned Contents or similar contents.

Upon the inter partes hearing, this Court has granted the prohibitory injunctions restraining the Defendants from continuing to publish, disseminate, or republish the specific Impugned Contents identified in the Statement of Claim. However, the High Court did not allow the prayers for mandatory injunctions compelling closure of the Impugned Channels and closure of any future channels.

Accordingly, the effect of the Erinford Injunction if granted will seek to preserve the status quo prior to the interlocutory injunction upon inter partes hearing to ensure that the Impugned Channels and the similar or new channels remain closed and that the Impugned Contents or similar contents are prohibited from publication.

I shall state the grounds in support of the above proposition as follows:

Status Quo

In the case of Kilang Kosfarm, the High Court in determining the period of status quo held that it referred to the state of affairs existing immediately before the plaintiff filed his writ and ex parte application for injunction as follows: “Maintaining status quo The concern of the plaintiff in the present case is to preserve the status quo so that the appeal, if successful, would not be nugatory. It is however not clear as to what the period of status quo that the plaintiff is asserting in the present cases. What the plaintiff is more interested in is that the plaintiff should be allowed to remain in the said land and to harvest the oil palm fruits pending disposal of his appeal; and not to be evicted by the defendant who is the owner of the said land. What is ‘status quo’ for the purpose of granting an interlocutory injunction? The ‘status quo’ is the existing state of affairs, but since state of affairs do not remain static, this raise a query: existing when? In Garden Cottage Foods Ltd v Milk Marketing Board [1984] AC 130, Lord Diplock stated at p 131: The relevant status quo which it was said in American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396, it is a counsel of prudence to preserve when other factors are evenly balanced, is state of affairs existing during the period immediately the preceding the issue of the writ claiming the permanent injunction or, if there be unreasonable delay between the issue of the writ and the motion for an interlocutory injunction, the period immediately preceding the motion. The duration of that period since the state of affairs last changed must be more than minimal, having regard to the total length of the relationship between the parties in respect of which the injunction is granted; otherwise, the state of affairs before the last change would be the relevant status quo. Applying the above principle, I am of the view that the relevant period of status quo in the present case must be the period immediately before the plaintiff filed his writ of summons (encl 3) and his ex parte application for injunction (encl 5) against the defendant. During that period, the state of affairs between the parties was that the relevant agreement between them has been terminated by the defendant; the plaintiff's service and job (to collect the oil palm fruits under the agreement) has also been terminated; and the plaintiff was ordered to leave the said land and to stop collecting the fruits. If that ‘status quo’ is to be preserved, then the plaintiff's application must fail. In any event, the issue of ‘status quo’ is only relevant to be considered in cases where the balance of convenience is evenly balanced. This principle has been decided in American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396; and Garden Cottage Foods, In the present case, the balance of convenience clearly lies in favour of the defendant. Therefore, the question of maintaining status quo, as requested by the plaintiff, does not arise.” [Emphasis added]

Following the authority above, the status quo for the present case would thus be the state of affairs existing immediately before the issuance of writ and the ex parte application for injunction, which would mean that the Erinford Injunction could not be granted to preserve the state of affairs before the interlocutory injunction upon inter partes hearing to ensure that the Impugned Channels and the similar or new channels remain closed and that the Impugned Contents or similar contents are prohibited from publication.

However, this Court is of the opinion that the above authority should not be applicable to the application for Erinford Injunction, upon the very reason that the case of Kilang Kosfarm in determining the period of status quo had placed reliance on the “status quo” for the purpose of granting interlocutory injunction.

In the case of Cheng Hang Guan & Ors v Perumahan Farlim (Penang) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1988] 3 MLJ 90 (HC), the High Court discussed “status quo” in a wider context as follows: “When considering the problem of the status quo and, in particular, the difficulty of pinponting when precisely ‘ante’ the ‘status’ was ‘quo’ Megaw LJ dealt with the matter in Dunhill (Alfred) Limited v Sunoptic SA & Anor [1979] FSR 337 as follows (at p 376): I do not think that any assistance is to be derived in this case from consideration of the ‘status quo’ which is referred to in American Cyanamid. Like all Latin terms used in a legal context, it is necessary to try to see what, in English, the Latin term is intended to convey. ‘Status quo’ or, more fully, ‘status quo ante’ means simply ‘the existing state of things’ … existing before a particular point of time. For that to be of any help, it is necessary to answer the question: Existing when? Before what point of time? For the answer may be different, according as you look at the existing state of things at the date when the defendant did the act, or the first act, which is alleged to have been wrongful; or the date when the plaintiff first learned of that act; or the date at which the plaintiff ought first to have been aware of that act; or the date when the plaintiff first complained to the defendant; or the date when he issued his writ. I think the relevant point of time for purposes of the ‘status quo’ may well vary in different cases. And when considering the definition of the term ‘status quo’, Sir John Pennycuick said in Fellowes v Fisher [1976] QB 122 at pp 199H-200A: By the expression ‘status quo’ I understand to be meant the position prevailing when the defendant embarked upon the activity sought to be restrained. Similarly, in Garden Cottage Foods Ltd v Milk Marketing Board [1984] AC 130 Lord Diplock said this (at p 140D): The duration of that period since the state of affairs last changed must be more than minimal, having regard to the total length of the relationship between the parties in respect of which the injunction is granted; otherwise the state of affairs before the last change would be the relevant status quo. In the context of the present case, I have no doubt that the status quo means the position prevailing immediately before the making of the plaintiffs' application for ex parte interim relief when the third and fourth defendants embarked upon the activities sought to be restrained.”. [Emphasis added]

Upon considering the authority, this Court must bear in mind that the relevant point of time for purposes of the status quo may well vary in different cases, it means the position prevailing when the defendant embarked upon the activity sought to be restrained.

Accordingly, this Court believes that for the purpose of granting Erinford Injunction in the present case, having regard to the purpose of Erinford Injunction to restrain the successful party from taking any step or action pending the appeal against a decision of dismissing an interlocutory application for an interim injunction, the status quo sought to be preserved in the present case refers to the state of affairs before the interlocutory injunction upon inter partes hearing to ensure that the Impugned Channels and the similar or new channels remain closed and that the Impugned Contents or similar contents are prohibited from publication.

Balance of Convenience

In determining the balance of convenience, the Supreme Court in Alor Janggus Soon Seng Trading Sdn Bhd & Ors v Sey Hoe Sdn Bhd & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 241 (SC) had held that: “Be that as it may, the grant or refusal of an interlocutory injunction must be decided on the fundamental principle that the court should take whichever course that appears to carry the lower risk of injustice. We are engaged in weighing the respective risks that injustice may result from deciding one way rather than the other at the stage when the evidence is incomplete. On the one hand, there is the risk that if the interlocutory injunction is refused but the plaintiffs succeed in establishing at the trial their legal rights to the protection for which the injunction has been sought they may in the meantime have suffered harm and inconvenience or monetary loss for which an award of money can provide no adequate recompense. On the other hand, there is the risk that if the interlocutory injunction is granted but the plaintiffs fail at the trial, the defendants may in the meantime have suffered harm and inconvenience which is similarly irrecompensable.”. [Emphasis added]

Accordingly, in determining whether the balance of convenience lies in favour of the Plaintiff in granting the Erinford Injunction pending the appeal, this Court should take whichever course which appears to carry the lower risk of injustice, whereby this Court may consider whether:

the appeal would be frivolous or to grant the injunction would inflict greater hardship;

damages would be a suitable and adequate remedy.

With regard to the inter partes hearing, this Court dismissed the mandatory injunctions upon the following grounds:

The Court should be cautious in granting at the interlocutory stage relief which is in substance indistinguishable from the final relief sought.

The Court is not persuaded that the stringent threshold for the grant of an interim mandatory injunction has been met.

In the case of Gibb & Co v Malaysia Building Society Bhd [1982] 1 MLJ 271 (FC), the Federal Court explained the stringent requirement for the grant of interlocutory mandatory injunction as follows: “Before we deal with the issues raised we should perhaps touch on a point made by Mr. Sri Ram for the appellant in referring to the judgment of this court in Sivaperuman v Heah Seok Yeong Realty Sdn Bhd [1979] 1 MLJ 150which, referring to a pronouncement to that effect in Wah Loong (Jelapang) Tin Mine Sdn Bhd v Chia Ngen Yiok [1975] 2 MLJ 109, 114 restates inter alia that an interim or interlocutory mandatory injunction is never granted before trial save in exceptional and extremely rare cases. That statement of the law is correct as an interlocutory application for a mandatory injunction is a very exceptional form of relief (Canadian Pacific Railway v Gaud [1949] 2 KB 239 249(at page 249)), but there is no reason why interlocutory or indeed interim mandatory injunctions should not issue in proper and appropriate cases and the court has jurisdiction to so order. Fry L.J., said in Bonner v Great Western Railway Company (1883) 24 Ch D 1 10(at page 10): “I have no doubt of the jurisdiction of the court to grant a mandatory injunction on interlocutory applications as well as the hearing.” The case however must be ‘unusually sharp and clear’ (Shepherd v Sandham [1971] Ch 340), and the court must feel a high degree of assurance that at the trial a similar injunction would probably be granted but we should observe that questions of degree are involved which depend inter alia upon considerations of hardship to the parties. In deciding the manner of interlocutory injunction that should be granted courts of equity will consider how the interests of the parties may best be protected, bearing in mind both the position of the parties subsequently at the final hearing and also questions of hardship and inconvenience in the meantime, and will take into account any other relevant discretionary considerations which may arise. One of the most important circumstances which will be taken into account by the court is the degree of probability with which it appears to be established that the applicant will ultimately succeed at the final hearing. The stronger the case of the applicant that the matters complained of are unlawful, the more likely it is that it will be found to be just and equitable that his interests be protected by the immediate issue of an injunction (Bonner (1883) 24 Ch D 1 10). Other matters of particular importance are, on the one hand, the ease or difficulty with which there can be compliance with a mandatory order and the extent of hardship which compliance will cause the respondent and, on the other hand, the nature of the injury and inconvenience which will be caused to the applicant if he does not obtain protection at once (Strelley v Pearson (1880) 15 Ch D 113 117(at page 117)).”. [Emphasis added]

Upon careful reading of the passages above, interlocutory mandatory injunction is granted in exceptional and extremely rare cases which must be ‘unusually sharp and clear’, and the Court must feel a high degree of assurance that at the trial a similar injunction would probably be granted.

However, it must be borne in mind that questions of degree are involved which depend inter alia upon considerations of hardship to the parties, whereby the degree of probability with which it appears to be established that the plaintiff will ultimately succeed at the final hearing, is merely one of the most important circumstances.

This Court strongly believes that it is also required to take into consideration other matter of importance, such as the nature of the injury and inconvenience which will be caused to the plaintiff if he does not obtain protection at once.

To support the above position, reference is made to the English case of Zockoll Group Ltd v Mercury Communications Ltd [1998] FSR 354 (CA), where the English Court of Appeal held that: “These observations in Leisure Data were consistent with the conclusions of Hoffman J. in Films Rover Ltd v. Cannon Film Sales Ltd [1987] 1 W.L.R. 670 at 680. These were not cited to the court, but were subsequently to be approved by Lord Jauncey in R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd (No.2) [1991] 1 A.C. 603 at 683 and were relied upon by Miss Heilbron as representing the current state of the law: The principal dilemma about the grant of interlocutory injunctions, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is that there is by definition a risk that the court may make the "wrong” decision, in the sense of granting an injunction to a party who fails to establish his right at the trial (or would fail if there was a trial) or alternatively, in failing to grant an injunction to a party who succeeds (or would succeed) at trial. A fundamental principle is therefore that the court should take whichever course appears to carry the lower risk of injustice if it should turn out to have been to have been "wrong” in the sense I have described. The guidelines for the grant of both kinds of interlocutory injunctions are derived from this principle. The passage quoted is from Megarry J. in Shepherd Homes Ltd v. Sandham [1971] Ch. 340 , 351, qualified as it was by the words "in a normal case”, was plainly intended as a guideline rather than an independent principle. It is another way of saying that the features which justify describing an injunction as "mandatory” will usually also have the consequence of creating a greater risk of injustice if it is granted rather than withheld at the interlocutory stage unless the court feels a "high degree of assurance” that the plaintiff would be able to establish his right at a trial. I have taken the liberty of reformulating the proposition in this way in order to bring out two points. The first is to show that semantic arguments over whether the injunction as formulated can properly be classified as mandatory or prohibitory are barren. The question of substance is whether the granting of the injunction would carry that higher risk of injustice which is normally associated with the grant of a mandatory injunction. The second point is that in cases in which there can be no dispute about the use of the term "mandatory” to describe the injunction, the same question of substance will determine whether the case is "normal” and therefore within the guideline of "exceptional” and therefore requiring special treatment. If it appears to the court that, exceptionally, the case is one in which withholding a mandatory interlocutory injunction would in fact carry a greater risk of injustice than granting it even though the court does not feel a "high degree of assurance” about the plaintiff's chances of establishing his right, there cannot be any rational basis for withholding the injunction. In Shepherd Homes Ltd. v. Sandham , Megarry J. spelled out some of the reasons why mandatory injunctions generally carry a higher risk of injustice if granted at the interlocutory stage: they usually go further than the preservation of the status quo by requiring a party to take some new positive step or undo what he has done in the past; an order requiring a party to take positive steps usually causes more waste of time and money if it turns out to have been wrongly granted than an order which merely causes delay by restraining him from doing something which it appears at the trial he was entitled to do; a mandatory order usually gives a party the whole of the relief which he claims in the writ and make it unlikely that there will be a trial. One could add other reasons, such as that mandatory injunctions (whether interlocutory or final) are often difficult to formulate with sufficient precision to be enforceable. In addition to all these practical considerations, there is also what might be loosely called a 'due process' question. An order requiring someone to do something is usually perceived as a more intrusive exercise of the coercive power of the state than an order requiring him temporarily to refrain from action. The court is therefore more reluctant to make such an order against a party who has not had the protection of a full hearing at trial. I would concur with this passage as providing detailed guidance to the approach of the court when considering an application to grant a mandatory interlocutory injunction. A more concise summary, which I would commend as being all the citation that should in future be necessary, is the following passage in the judgment of Chadwick J. in Nottingham Building Society v. Eurodynamics Systems [1993] F.S.R. 468 at 474: In my view the principles to be applied are these. First, this being an interlocutory matter, the overriding consideration is which course is likely to involve the least risk of injustice if it turns out to be 'wrong' in the sense described by Hoffmann J. Secondly, in considering whether to grant a mandatory injunction, the court must keep in mind that an order which requires a party to take some positive step at an interlocutory stage, may well carry a greater risk of injustice if it turns out to have been wrongly made than an order which merely prohibits action. thereby preserving the status quo. Thirdly, it is legitimate, where a mandatory injunction is sought, to consider whether the court does feel a high degree of assurance that the plaintiff will be able to establish this right at a trial. That is because the greater the degree of assurance the plaintiff will ultimately establish his right, the less will be the risk of injustice if the injunction is granted. But, finally, even where the court is unable to feel any high degree of assurance that the plaintiff will establish his right, there may still be circumstances in which it is appropriate to grant a mandatory injunction at an interlocutory stage. Those circumstances will exist where the risk of injustice if this injunction is refused sufficiently outweigh the risk of injustice if it is granted.”. [Emphasis added]

Accordingly, following the above English case, an interlocutory mandatory injunction may still be granted even though the Court is unable to feel any high degree of assurance that the plaintiff will establish his right, if it appears to the Court that, exceptionally, the case is one in which withholding an interlocutory mandatory injunction would in fact carry a greater risk of injustice than granting it.

In the present case, this Court believes that, it is one in which withholding an interlocutory mandatory injunction would in fact carry a greater risk of injustice than granting it, based on the following grounds:

The risk of injustice if this injunction is refused sufficiently outweigh the risk of injustice if it is granted, because the interlocutory mandatory injunction to close the Impugned Channels and other similar or new channels is necessary for the effective compliance of the interlocutory prohibitory injunctions which restrains all the Defendants from continuing to publish, disseminate, or republish the specific Impugned Contents or similar contents when the identities of the 1st and 2nd Defendants are unknown who are the administrators of the Impugned Channels.

This Court upon the inter partes hearing was satisfied that the detailed particulars in the Statement of Claim show that the Impugned Channels are engaged in a deliberate campaign of disseminating false, menacing and offensive content, directed at the highest levels of government, the Royal Institution, and enforcement agencies.

This Court upon the inter partes hearing held that damages would not be a suitable and adequate remedy as the alleged harm goes beyond personal reputations and undermines the public confidence in the governance, institutions and national security.

There is no apparent hardship on the 3rd Defendant if the interlocutory mandatory injunction is granted as the 3rd Defendant reopened the Impugned Channels and other similar channels immediately after the decision of the High Court in dismissing the mandatory injunction upon inter partes hearing. (See Encl. 73, Plaintiff’s Written Submission, at para. 9)

Furthermore, it is also pertinent to bear in mind the public interest element where the Impugned Channels are engaged in a deliberate campaign of disseminating false, menacing and offensive content, directed at the highest levels of government, the Royal Institution, and enforcement agencies.

In the case of Keet Gerald Francis Noel John v Mohd Noor Bin Abdullah & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 193 (CA), Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as His Lordship then was) held that a judge hearing an application for an interlocutory injunction would be entitled to take into account all discretionary considerations including any question going to the public interest, as follows: “To summarize, a judge hearing an application for an interlocutory injunction should undertake an inquiry along the following lines: …

the judge must have in the forefront of his mind that the remedy that he is asked to administer is discretionary, intended to produce a just result for the period between the date of the application and the trial proper and intended to maintain the status quo, an expression explained by Lord Diplock in Garden Cottage Foods Ltd v Milk Marketing Board [1984] AC 130; [1983] 2 All ER 770; [1983] 3 WLR 143 and applied in Cheng Hang Guan. It is a judicial discretion capable of correction on appeal. Accordingly, the judge would be entitled to take into account all discretionary considerations, such as delay in the making of the application or any adequate alternative remedy that would satisfy the plaintiff's equity, such as an award of monetary compensation in the event that he succeeds in establishing his claim at the trial. Any question going to the public interest may, and in appropriate cases should, be taken into account. A judge should briefly set out in his judgement the several factors that weighed in his mind when arriving at his conclusion.”. [Emphasis added]

As found above that the principles governing the grant of an interlocutory injunction are equally applicable to the grant of an Erinford Injunction, this Court is of the opinion that in deciding whether or not to grant the Erinford Injunction, is equally entitled to take into account all discretionary considerations including any question going to the public interest.

In the case of Bar Malaysia v Index Continent Sdn Bhd [2012] 4 MLJ 90 (HC), it was held that the public interest element plays a role in tilting the balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiff as a greater harm will result if the defendant’s activities were allowed to proceed as this will involve an untold number of unsuspecting and gullible public.

Similarly, in the case of SV Beverages Holdings Sdn Bhd & Ors v Kickapoo (M) Sdn Bhd [2008] 4 MLJ 187 (CA), the Court of Appeal held that: “There is another important fact which, to our mind, must also be taken into account in considering where the balance of justice lies in this case. It is the public interest. Public interest is always a relevant consideration in granting specific relief. …” [Emphasis added]

Thus, premised on the principles of Erinford Injunction stated above, it must be satisfied that the balance of convenience, which is the comparative effects of granting or refusing an injunction pending an appeal, is such that it would be right to preserve the status quo pending the appeal.

In the Singaporean case of DJY v DJZ & Anor [2025] SGHC 59, the High Court granted the Erinford Injunction upon the balancing exercise to balance the comparative effects of granting or not granting the Erinford injunction, on the basis that the current financial status quo had been present for 15 years and a change of the same would likely to have an adverse impact on the applicant, as compared to the impact on the respondent that the time until the appeal was heard was fairly short and any prejudice can be remedied by damages if the injunction was granted. The relevant passages of the judgment are reproduced as follows: “57 Moving on to the balancing of the comparative effects of granting or not granting the injunction, I nonetheless found that the balance lay in favour of granting the injunction. … 60 These arguments tempted me to allow these disparate conclusions to cancel each other out. However, in undertaking the test on the balance of prejudices, I found that the balance ultimately tilted in favour of DJY simply because the current financial status quo had been present for over 15 years. A shift of this reality would more likely than not have an adverse impact on DJY. All other things being equal, the more logical conclusion would be to allow the status quo to remain. … 62 Moving next to the impact on DJZ if the injunction is granted, I agreed with DJY that the time until the appeal is heard is fairly short, being only a few months, as compared to the 15-year status quo. While DJZ has argued that it will suffer prejudice from being denied the SBLC Sum, any such prejudice is tempered by the fact that it will only be for a short period of time until the appeal is heard. Furthermore, such prejudice can be remedied by damages, and DJY has undertaken to repay any such damages.”. [Emphasis added]

Accordingly, to balance the comparative effects of granting or refusing an injunction pending an appeal, this Court shall take into account the public interest element as abovementioned, where the balance of convenience is tilted in favour of the Plaintiff for the grant of the Erinford Injunction to preserve the status quo pending the appeal.

Otherwise, a greater harm will result if the Impugned Channels and the similar or new channels do not remain closed and the Impugned Contents and similar contents are not prohibited from publication as it undermines the public confidence through the deliberate campaign of disseminating false, menacing and offensive content, directed at the highest levels of government, the Royal Institution, and enforcement agencies.

Moving on to the impact on the Defendants if the Erinford Injunction is granted, it is submitted that the public interest shall outweigh the private interest of the Defendants even though it might be prejudiced from the closure of the Impugned Channels and the restraint of the publication of the Impugned Contents.

In the Indian case of The Public Prosecutor, Andhra Pradesh Versus Pocku Syed Ismail and others (1973) 1 MLJ (Crl) 52, it was held that: “Where a conflict between public and private interests arises, the former must prevail. To put it differently, private interests must yield to or give way to public interests, whenever a conflict arises between the two.”. [Emphasis added]

Based upon the analysis and the reasons given, this Court finds that the balance of convenience lies in favour of the Plaintiff in granting the Erinford Injunction to preserve the status quo pending the appeal, which is the course that appears to carry the lower risk of injustice, upon the following grounds:

The appeal would unlikely be frivolous;

To grant the injunction would not inflict greater hardship;

Damages would not be a suitable and adequate remedy;

Taking into consideration the public interest element, the balance of convenience is tilted in favour of granting the injunction as a greater harm will result if the Impugned Channels and the similar or new channels do not remain closed and the Impugned Contents and similar contents are not prohibited from publication. The public interest shall outweigh the private interest.

The Appeal, If Successful, Is Not Nugatory

As stated earlier, in granting the Erinford Injunction, the Court must ensure that the appeal, if successful, is not nugatory.

Therefore, in order to ascertain whether the appeal if successful would be rendered nugatory, appropriate guidance may be found in the case of Kilang Kosfarm as follows: “In order to assist me in exercising my discretion on this matter, it is pertinent to see that there would be no impediment to the plaintiff enforcing any judgment in its favour should the plaintiff succeed in its intended appeal as well as the main writ. Whether a successful appeal by the plaintiff against my earlier decision being rendered nugatory or not, we have to go back to the plaintiff's claim against the defendant in its writ and statement of claim. I have scrutinized all the prayers in the plaintiff's statement of claim (as listed above) and am satisfied that whether or not the plaintiff succeeds in the appeal and in the main action will not be effected by its failure to obtain the present Erinford injunction. There would be no impediment to the plaintiff enforcing any judgment in its favour should it succeed in its appeal, and ultimately in its writ. There is no evidence to show that the defendant would be in no position financially to honour the judgment obtained by the plaintiff. Therefore, I must say quite confidently that there is no likelihood of a successful appeal against my decision being rendered nugatory.” [Emphasis added]

In determining whether the appeal, if successful, would be rendered nugatory, it is pertinent to see that there would be no impediment to the Plaintiff enforcing any judgment in his favour should the Plaintiff succeed in the intended appeal as well as the main writ.

Upon perusal of the Plaintiff’s claim in the Writ and Statement of Claim, this Court believes that the appeal, if successful, would be rendered nugatory in the event that the Erinford Injunction is not granted, upon the following grounds that:

As submitted by the Plaintiff in the Submission in Reply (Encl. 76), the Impugned Channels remain accessible, and the content and channels in dispute may multiply, migrate, or become irretrievable.

The interlocutory mandatory injunction to close the Impugned Channels and other similar or new channels is necessary for the effective compliance of the interlocutory prohibitory injunctions which restrains all the Defendants from continuing to publish, disseminate, or republish the specific Impugned Contents or similar contents when the identities of the 1st and 2nd Defendants are unknown who are the administrators of the Impugned Channels.

In conclusion, premised upon the analysis above, this Court finds that the Erinford Injunction should be granted to preserve the status quo prior to the interlocutory injunction upon inter partes hearing to ensure that the Impugned Channels and the similar or new channels remain closed and that the Impugned Contents and similar contents are prohibited from publication, upon the following grounds:

To ensure that the appeal, if successful, is not nugatory;

The balance of convenience lies in favour of the Plaintiff in granting the Erinford Injunction to preserve the status quo pending the appeal, which is the course that appears to carry the lower risk of injustice, upon the following grounds:

The appeal would unlikely be frivolous;

(ii) To grant the injunction would not inflict greater hardship;

(iii) Damages would not be a suitable and adequate remedy;

(iv) Taking into consideration the public interest element, the balance of convenience is tilted in favour of granting the injunction. Otherwise, a greater harm will result if the Impugned Channels and the similar or new channels do not remain closed and the Impugned Contents and similar contents are not prohibited from publication, as it undermines the public confidence through the deliberate campaign of disseminating false, menacing, and offensive content, directed at the highest levels of government, the Royal Institution, and enforcement agencies. The public interest shall outweigh the private interest.

Accordingly, the Court grants the Erinford injunction in terms of Prayer (a) and Prayer (b) of the Notice of Application dated 22 September 2025, to remain in force pending the disposal of the Plaintiff’s appeal to the Court of Appeal. Costs in the cause.

Before parting with the reasons of this decision, I must observe that the 3rd Defendant’s conduct in reopening or maintaining access to the Impugned Channels and continuing similar publications, immediately after this Court’s inter partes decision, demonstrates a troubling attitude of technical compliance without substantive regard to the spirit and purpose of the Court’s earlier Order.

This Court notes that the earlier injunction under Prayer (a) which restrained the Defendants from uttering, writing, broadcasting, or republishing harmful contents of the same or similar nature, was granted precisely to curb the dissemination of the identified and analogous offensive materials.

The 3rd Defendant’s narrow construction of that Order, treating it as limited only to the specifically identified contents in Prayer (b), reflects an attempt to exploit procedural precision to circumvent substantive justice.

This Court cannot countenance a situation where an intermediary platform, having been made aware of injunctive restraints, continues to permit the proliferation of the same kind of harmful material merely because it is newly uploaded or slightly altered in form or link.

This conduct underscores the necessity of granting the Erinford injunction, not as an extension of punitive control, but to preserve the integrity and efficacy of the Court’s earlier injunction and to prevent the appeal from being rendered nugatory. It also serves as a reminder that compliance with Court Orders must be both procedural and substantive, reflecting the real effect intended by the Order rather than its literal minimum.

Before I end, this Court feels bound to remark that the counsel representing the platform operator, though not locally established and perhaps unfamiliar with the unique social fabric of this nation, ought to exercise a measure of sensitivity and respect towards the constitutional and societal context in which this Court operates.

Malaysia is a nation governed under a constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy. It is a country of a multi-racial and multi-religious constitutional monarchy where harmony, mutual respect, and public order are paramount. It is therefore incumbent upon all who participate in our legal process, whether domestic or foreign, to approach it with due regard to these foundational values.

The law here is not applied in a vacuum. It operates within a delicate balance of rights, responsibilities, and the preservation of public harmony, a balance that must be conscientiously upheld by all officers of the Court. Date : 4th December 2025 ……………………………………………… (YA PUAN MAHAZAN BINTI MAT TAIB) JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR For The Plaintiff : Datuk Sankara Nair & Wong Guo Jin Messrs. S N Nair & Partners Advocates & Solicitors For The Defendant 3 :