Furthermore, from the sale of the houses from the said Project, which is 866 units, there is an amount of RM14,755,131.91 which is being deposited into the HDA, therefore, there is no question of the 2nd Defendant owing Plaintiff (Exhibit "CKS-4", Enclosure 25). [19] D2 disputed the termination of the Collaboration Agreement and contemplated challenging it in Court. D2 had filed an action against Plaintiff and Hong Xin Construction in Johor Bahru High Court (JA- 22NCVC-5-01/2020) but was struck out when the Court ordered security for cost of RM100,000.00 to be paid to Plaintiff, and the matter is now pending in the Court of Appeal. [20] In view of the above, D2 now contends that the current position or disputes between D2 and Plaintiff involved issues and conflicts that are unsuitable to be determined summarily via affidavit evidence and should be adjudicated through proper writ action. Analysis and Findings [21] The issue before this Court is solely the effect of the terms in the 3rd PA on both the Plaintiff and D2 to justify a grant of the declaratory relief sought by the Plaintiff in the OS. As for D1, their status as registered owners holding the land in trust for the Plaintiff after full payment of the purchase price is undisputed. Their concerns relate only to their legal obligations to pending or incoming actions by third-party purchasers. [22] The crux of the matter was, therefore, the interpretation of the terms and conditions set out in the agreement between the Plaintiff and D2. [23] Inarguably, it is trite that the parties are bound by the four corners of the contract/agreement. S/N e1Kzo1ve5kGsXn8VV4v4Jw [24] The Federal Court in Catajaya Sdn Bhd v Shoppoint Sdn Bhd & Ors [2021] 3 CLJ 159 on a question of whether termination clauses ought to be construed strictly, which was answered in the positive, it was discussed at length as follows: "[39] … We are of the view that when interpreting a written agreement, the Court must identify the intention of the parties to the agreement. Thus, the terms of the SSA represents the true intention of the parties, defining the obligations and commitments of the parties under the agreement. … [55] In so far as construction of the terms of an agreement, the role of the Court is merely to interpret the terms by examining the words and language used as well taking into consideration the factual matrix of the case. The Court must not even attempt to improve the words used in the clauses which the parties have made themselves, however desirable the improvement may be. His Lordship Dato Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) in Charles Grenier Sdn. Bhd. v Lau Wing Hong [1997] 1 CLJ 625 elucidated: ... a party to a contract who, after having concluded his bargain, entertains doubts as to the wisdom of the transaction may be in the unfairly advantageous position to invent all sorts of imaginary terms upon which disagreement may be expressed when the more formal document is being prepared in order to escape from his solemn promise. Businessmen would find the law to be a huge loop-hole and commerce would come to a virtual standstill. … [57] The terms and conditions of an agreement that have been agreed to by the parties of the agreement cannot be simply brushed aside and ignored. This Court through the judgment of Azahar Mohammad FCJ in the case Lucy Wong Nyuk King & Anor v. Hwang Mee Hiong [2016] 4 CLJ 813; [2016] 3 MLJ 689 explained the principle of construing a contract as follows: S/N e1Kzo1ve5kGsXn8VV4v4Jw ... it is an established principle of construing a contract that, among others, a contract must be construed as a whole, in order to ascertain the true meaning of its several clauses, and also, so far as practicable, to give effect to every part of it. Each clause in an ordinary commercial contract should be so interpreted as to bring them into harmony with the other clauses of the contract (see National Coal Board v. Wm Neill & Son (St Helens) Ltd [1984] 1 All ER 555 which was cited in Royal Selangor Golf Club v. Anglo-Oriental (M) Sdn Bhd [1990] 1 CLJ 995; [1990] 3 CLJ (Rep) 37 and Mulpha Pacific Sdn Bhd v. Paramount Corporation Bhd [2003] 4 MLJ 357; [2003] 4 CLJ 294). In Australian Broadcasting Commission v. Australasian Performing Right Association Limited [1973] 129 CLR 99, it was held that the whole of the contract has to be considered, since the meaning of any one part of it may be revealed by other parts, and the words of every clause must if possible be construed so as to render them all harmonious one with another. … [65] In interpreting a clause in an agreement, it is pertinent to take into consideration the context of the agreement as a whole, to examine the relevant clauses in detail and to consider the relevant factual matrix to give guidance as to the true intent of the parties.." [25] On this premise, I reproduce the following pages in the 3rd PA (enclosure 2, pages 122-123) for ease of reference: S/N e1Kzo1ve5kGsXn8VV4v4Jw S/N e1Kzo1ve5kGsXn8VV4v4Jw S/N e1Kzo1ve5kGsXn8VV4v4Jw [26] The cooperation between the parties is made clear in the agreements they enter into, and they are clear about their intentions as to how the collaboration or alliance works to develop and benefit from said lands. [27] In the circumstances, the understanding as in the 3rd PA must be construed as a whole within its four corners that reasonably reflect the parties' intention. [28] Therefore, the declaration sought by the Plaintiff that they are the beneficial owner of the said lands and that D1 is merely a trustee is technically undisputed. [29] D2's argument regarding the alleged dispute over whether they still owe the Plaintiff any amount is irrelevant to this application. Their complaints were properly brought for adjudication through a series of litigations between them, and D2 may continue to pursue all remedies available to it. In the meantime, however, the legal status in relation to the amount owed and the subsequent impact of D2's non-payment, which has affected the existing PA on the duties and obligations of the parties, must be respected and observed. [30] Consequently, I also find that in view of the default judgment dated 6.4.2022, which has not yet been set aside, the 3rd PA is conditional on the full repayment of the sum of RM75,559,182.00 (clause E of the PA). [31] After D2 had failed to complete the Project, the Plaintiff had hired a third party to complete it. As a result, it was necessary to revoke the 3rd PA and create a new PA so that the Plaintiff could complete the Project. Again, it is undisputed that all parties knew that creating a new PA was S/N e1Kzo1ve5kGsXn8VV4v4Jw necessary to move forward and complete the Project for the collaboration to work. I agree with Plaintiff that without the PA, Plaintiff cannot fulfil its obligations and is exposed to the risk of litigation with third-party purchasers. [32] As the 3rd PA is revoked and declared null and void, to empower Plaintiff to do all acts that may be necessary to effectuate the completion of the Project, D1 is hereby ordered to execute a fresh PA in favour of Plaintiff with additional indemnity clause to be included to safeguard D1's interest in case of future possible litigation. [33] With regard to D1's submissions, I agree with Plaintiff that their unsubstantial reasoning for opposing this application cannot be accepted as they are blowing hot and cold on their clear position in the agreed scheme. Conclusion [34] Having heard all parties, perused all affidavits and read the submissions filed, enclosure 13 is hereby allowed with additional orders as indicated earlier in paragraph 2, and the cost of this application, RM2000, will be borne by D2, subject to the allocator fee. Dated this: 21st October 2024 ~ signed ~ (NOOR HAYATI BINTI HAJI MAT) Judicial Commissioner Shah Alam High Court NVCV 9 S/N e1Kzo1ve5kGsXn8VV4v4Jw Counsels: For the Plaintiff: Aawaisha Steven Asokan Pillai Messrs Sidek Teoh Wong & Dennis For the First Defendant: Simon Tay Lai Eng Messrs Tay L.E. & Co. For the Second Defendant: Manian K. Marappan together with May Soh May En Messrs Manian K. Marappan & Co. S/N e1Kzo1ve5kGsXn8VV4v4Jw