Preamble
Menurut beliau lagi bantuan untuk Covid-19, bantuan hari raya, Ramadhan hanya boleh dibaut bersama oleh kepimpinan G5 dan jumlah pengeluaran adalah berdasarkan kepada keperluan sebenar setelah PW14 berbincang dengan Exco Armada yang bertanggungjawab.” [126] There was no consideration or evaluation done as to whether DW3 is capable of belief and if he was not, the reasons must be given because DW3 was an important defence witness who had corroborated the Appellant’s defence. Pertinently, there ought to be consideration and findings made as to the contradictions between DW3’s, PW13’s and PW11’s evidence. [127] It is trite that when defence raised by an accused is not bare denial, it is incumbent on the trial judge to consider and scrutinise the defence’s version and even if the defence’s version cannot be believed, the trial judge must give reasons as to why the version did not cast reasonable doubt on the prosecution’s case (see Hairie Mahthinem v PP [2011] 8 CLJ 625). This is why s.182A (1) of the CPC imposes the duty on the trial judge to consider all the evidence adduced and to decide whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt. [128] In the case of Prasit Puyang v PP [2014] 7 CLJ 392 the Court of Appeal had stated: “[8] ……In accordance with the provisions of s.182A (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, it is the bounden duty of the learned JC, at the conclusion of the trial, to consider all the evidence adduced before him and shall decide whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond S/N xu6klu98UWhlTrdx3MjnA reasonable doubt. The legislature has advisedly used the term all the evidence. The emphasis must be on the word all…… The aim of this provision is obviously to make certain that an accused person gets a fair trial.” [129] Clearly, the LTJ, was bound to, but did not view the whole of the evidence objectively and from all angles, with the result that the Appellant had lost the chance which was fairly open to him of being acquitted. On this point, we consider that the non-direction of the LTJ amounts to a misdirection. [130] It is true that an appeal is a re-hearing of the case and that the appellate Court can consider the evidence and evaluate the merits of the case. Learned Deputy Public Prosecutor referred to the case of Public Prosecutor v Ramesh a/l Rajaratnam [2024] MLJU 2054 where the Court held that the High Court in exercising its appellate jurisdiction cannot decide an appeal solely on inter alia non-speaking judgment without considering the merits of the case and whether the error committed by the LTJ is material. [131] We have reviewed the evidence and the LTJ’s judgment. We find the LTJ’s failure to consider all the evidence adduced by the Appelant and his witness was indeed material to the verdict of the case and had occasioned a serious lapse in the decision-making process, in breach of s.182A (1) CPC which warrants appellate intervention. The LTJ must explain how His Lordship consider all the evidence in relation to the defence and the failure of which breach the common law rule that the defence of an accused must be judicially appreciated. The adjudication process in our adversarial system of administration of justice demands that S/N xu6klu98UWhlTrdx3MjnA every defence available to the accused person on the evidence and facts before the Court must be considered by the Court. Only when the accused person fails to profer evidence or rebut the prosecution’s case leaves the Court with no choice but to convict him. [132] It is further found that the LTJ had failed to consider the substantial part of the Appellant’s statement (P98) which was tendered during the prosecution stage and was used by the prosecution to cross-examine DW3. DW3 had stated that there was no mention of the amount to be withdrawn for the purpose of the Covid-19 and Hari Raya and that PW13 was tasked to manage it during the meeting at the Appellant’s house. DW3 stated: “…Saya sahkan pada sekitar penghujung Februari 2020, Pegawai Tertinggi ARMADA ‘G5’ ada membut perbincangan bersama, saya sudah tidak ingat di mana perbincangan tersebut dibuat, semasa perbicangan itu, kamu ‘G5’ iaitu YB Syed Saddiq, Aizad, Redzuan, Rafiq Hakim dan saya ada berbincang mengenai keperluan mengeluarkan sejumlah wang untuk persiapan menghadapi wabak COVID 19 dan persiapan Hari Raya Aidilfitri 2020. Saya sahkan, semasa perbincangan tersebut, jumlah sebenar wang yang ingin dikeluarkan tidak dimaklumkan secara khusus dan anggaran juga tidak dinyatakan. Saya sahkan, G5 telah bersetuju dan menyerahkan tanggungjawab sepenuhnya kepada Rafiq Hakim untuk membuat anggaran perbelanjaan mengikut keperluan dan memberi sepenuh kepercayaan kepada Rafiq Hakim selaku Bendahari ARMADA untuk menguruskannya.” [133] We find that this part of the evidence spoke in favour of the Appellant in that there was a discussion within the G5 to withdraw money for Covid 19 pandemic and for Hari Raya Aidilfitri where no amount was discussed and that PW13 was tasked to manage and determine the amount of S/N xu6klu98UWhlTrdx3MjnA expenses. Given that P98 was tendered by the prosecution and that this piece of evidence support the Appellant’s defence, the LTJ therefore erred in failing to consider the evidence. [134] One other important aspect of the Appellant’s defence relate to the probability of PW13’s motivation to give evidence against the Appellant. It was the defence’s contention that from PW13’s evidence it can be strongly inferred that PW13 has tailored his evidence to appease the MACC. The relevant parts of PW13’s evidence were highlighted as follows: [a] While being examined by the prosecution, PW13 had admitted that he had been remanded by the MACC for a period of 6 days and during the remand period, he was sad and under a lot of stress; [b] He suffered a break down after being informed that his initial remand period may be extended for one more day; and [c] While he was in remand, he had even called his wife (PW12) to inform her that “bagi tahu pada sahabat-sahabat di luar, tak payah buat-buat PC ni apa, sebab kat dalam, saya yang kena teruk, bukan mereka kat luar.” [135] PW13 then admitted during cross-examination that after being made aware that Art. 24.8 of the Bersatu Constitution used the word ‘perbelanjaan’ instead of ‘pengeluaran’, he had changed his evidence to focus on no working papers being prepared for the withdrawal of the said RM1 million. The Court’s attention was taken to that part of PW13’s evidence: “PB (GDW) :Now you know… that PWRm got it wrong. Right? Because 24.8 does not say “pengeluaran” it says S/N xu6klu98UWhlTrdx3MjnA “perbelanjaan”. Untuk a one-off payment of RM500,000.00 which wasn’t the case here, correct? :Yes PB (GDW) :Yeah. That’s why your whole evidence has changed now and you are focusing just on kertas kerja,right? :Yes.” [136] The defence further highlighted that another defence witness, DW4 had testified that she had been threatened and roughed up by MACC officers who had interrogated her in respect of the Appellant’s case. She had then lodged a police report (D95) and called a press conference pertaining to the incident. In D95, DW4 revealed that: i. On 4.6.2020, the MACC officers had taken her mobile phone, squealed at her and threw her mobile phone towards her; ii. While in the investigation room, 6 MACC officers had hissed her and abused her with the words “babi” and “bodoh”. These officers were said to have asserted that she deserved to live alone and to be cast aside by her family when they were dissatisfied with her answers; and iii. One of the MACC officers had even threatened to slap her face and that subsequently she was also asked to stand for about 30 minutes with one of her legs and both of her hands up. [137] The Appellant had written to MACC Chief Commissioner complaining inter alia of the incident that happened to DW4 (P96). S/N xu6klu98UWhlTrdx3MjnA [138] DW4 is the wife of PW10, Abdul Hannan bin Khairy who also admitted that he was pressured while being investigated. The relevant part of PW10’s evidence is reproduced: “PB (GDW) :Adakah kamu juga rasa tertekan? PW10 :Ya PB (GDW) :Ya. Dan ini semua adalah kerana PWRM hendak jawapan-jawapan tertentu dari kamu dan isteri kamu? PW10 :Ya.” [138] We have examined the evidence of PW13 and as alluded to earlier, his evidence is inconsistent in many aspects during EIC, cross examination and re-examination. We find there is merit in the defence’s contention that the evidence of these witnesses being pressured give rise to a strong reasonable inference that the MACC might have also exerted improper pressure upon PW13 to tailor his evidence to suit the prosecution case. We agree with the defence’s contention that it cannot be dismissed PW13 had succumbed to the pressure of being investigated and interrogated to the extent that he admitted he had committed criminal breach of trust when questioned by the prosecution and gave evidence against the Appellant. [140] We are of the considered view that when there is evidence that witnesses were pressured and submissions made to infer evidence being tailored to suit the prosecution case, coupled with inconsistencies in the witness’s testimony such as PW13 herein, not only there is merit in the submission, the evidence are both material and relevant to be considered. Yet again, nowhere in the LTJ’s grounds of judgment disclosing that His S/N xu6klu98UWhlTrdx3MjnA Lordship had evaluated and considered these critical evidence. The omission to consider all the evidence has resulted a failure of justice to the Appellant and we find there is a serious misdirection on the part of the LTJ. [141] In regards to the s.403 charge, it was the Appellant’s defence that since the RM120,000 was for his political campaign, the money belonged to him and was not the property of Armada, Bersatu, ABBE and/or PW13. As such there was no dishonest misappropriation or conversion on his part. [142] PW13 testified and confirmed that it was him who had suggested to DW2 that the Appellant could use the ABBE account. As such, that does not make PW13 the owner of the RM120,000. According to the Appellant he had initiated programs to promote himself for the 14th General Election. The Appellant had used his own funds for this purpose and had also formed a team known as “Team Saddiq” comprising of himself, DW4, DW2, and a few others who were not members of Bersatu. It was the Appellant’s evidence that for both the fundraising events, he had used his own funds for organizing and preparing the locations of the dinners etc. He did not receive any financial assistance from Armada and/or Bersatu. [143] It was the Appellant’s evidence further that for the two fundraising dinners, he wanted to use his personal account but his team suggested that it would be better if a business account was used which eventually resulted to the Appellant agreeing to use the ABBE’s account. [144] It was also established that PW13 was not involved in the organizing of the two fundraising dinners. S/N xu6klu98UWhlTrdx3MjnA [145] It was the Appellant’s defence that he treated the proceeds from the two fundraising dinners of RM120,000 as a reimbursement of the monies he spent on his own personal political campaign as the money did not belong to Bersatu, Armada, PW13 and or ABBE. In other words the RM120,000 was temporary parked in the ABBE account and when he requested for the impugned money to be transferred to his Maybank account, he did not commit the offence. [146] To corroborate and strengthened his defence, the Appellant called DW2 and DW4 who confirmed that the fundraising events were meant for the Appellant and the same did not involve any members of Bersatu or Armada. DW2 and DW4 stated that the ABBE’s account was used for the fundraising events at the suggestion of PW13 and DW2’s allowance for his assistance in the Appellant’s Ampang’s fundraising dinner and political campaign were initially paid by the Appellant. [147] The LTJ found as follows: “[45] Bagi pertuduhan kedua, ketiga dan keempat, OKT menegaskan bahawa wang kutipan hasil majlis makan malam yang diadakan adalah untuk menggantikan perbelanjaan yang telah dikeluarkan dari wang beliau sendiri yang telah digunakan olehnya bagi menampung kos kempen pilihanraya beliau sendiri. [46] Untuk menyokong dakwaan ini, OKT telah mengemukakan D85, D86, D87, D88 dan D89 iaitu poster majlis makan malam, hantaran di Facebook dan ciapan di Twitter. [47] DW2 dan DW4 juga dalam keterangan mereka menyatakan bahawa segala program meraih dana tersebut adalah bagi tujuan kempen OKT sebagai calon dalam PRU14. S/N xu6klu98UWhlTrdx3MjnA [48] Setelah memberikan pertimbangan terhadap pembelaan yang dikemukakan ini dan keseluruhan keterangan Pihak Pendakwaan, Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa tiada satu pun keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh OKT menunjukkan bahawa kutipan majlis makan malam yang akan diadakan adalah untuk menggantikan perbelanjaan yang telah dibuat oleh OKT sebelum ini, sebaliknya adalah untuk menampung kempen pilihanraya OKT. [49] Selain dari itu, jika dilihat dari kronologi dan tarikh-tarikh yang berkaitan menunjukkan bahawa pemindahan wang dari akaun ABBE kepada akaun peribadi Maybank OKT berlaku sebelum pilihanraya berlangsung. Manakala, pemindahan wang ke akaun ASB OKT pula berlaku sebulan selepas pilihanraya berlangsung. [50] Penyata-penyata bank yang dikemukakan iaitu P77, P73, P72 (a-d), P71 (a-d), P48, P37, P36 tidak menunjukkan sebarang pengeluaran yang boleh dikatakan sebagai perbelanjaan bagi kempen pilihanraya. [51] Justeru itu, dakwaan bahawa OKT telah membelanjakan wang beliau sendiri juga tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan. Tanpa sebarang bukti untuk menyokong fakta ini, dakwaan yang wang terlibat adalah untuk menggantikan wang OKT sendiri juga adalah tidak berasas. (Seksyen 101,102 dan 103 Akta Keterangan).” [148] Firstly, it must be noted that the LTJ did not consider the evidence of DW2 and DW4 but merely narrated their evidence. At the risk of repetition, DW2 stated that for the 14th General Election, the Appellant and Team Saddiq had proposed the two fundraising dinners to be held in Muar and Ampang. The fundraising dinners were meant for the Appellant personally and members of Bersatu or Armada was not involved. Team Saddiq discussed on the bank account to be used for the two fundraising dinners and DW2 reached out to PW13 and the latter proposed for the ABBE account to be used. DW2 confirmed that the RM120,000 belonged S/N xu6klu98UWhlTrdx3MjnA to the Appellant and that DW2’s allowance for his assistance in the fundraising dinner in Ampang was initially paid by the Appellant. [149] DW4 stated that for the previous 10 programs initiated to promote the Appellant as a candidate for Muar’s Parliamentary seat, the Appellant had used his own personal money. According to DW4, Team Saddiq proposed to organize the fundraising dinners and that the process of registering Saddiq Resources with the Companies Commission of Malaysia was postponed after PW13 allowed the Appellant to use his ABBE account for the purpose of the fundraising. DW4 further stated that she had informed the contributors who had contacted her in relation to their donation banked into the ABBE account that the Muar’s fundraising dinner was meant for the Appellant’s personal political campaign. Neither Armada nor Bersatu rendered any assistance for the Muar’s fundraising dinner and the proceeds were solely for the benefit of the Appellant. According to DW4, the Appellant had given her cash amounting to RM30,000 to organize the fundraising dinner in Muar. During the campaign period for the 14th General Election, the Appellant had also given her cash to pay for all the expenses incurred for his personal political campaign. DW4 had prepared D91, the official submission to the Election Commission confirming that the Appellant had spent RM171,675 in his campaign. [150] Premised on the evidence above it is therefore perplexing when the LTJ found: “[51] Justeru itu, dakwaan bahawa OKT telah membelanjakan wang beliau sendiri juga tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan. Tanpa sebarang bukti untuk menyokong fakta ini, dakwaan yang wang terlibat S/N xu6klu98UWhlTrdx3MjnA adalah untuk menggantikan wang OKT sendiri juga adalah tidak berasas. (Seksyen 101,102 dan 103 Akta Keterangan).” [151] It is pertinent to note that the LTJ did not say that DW2 or DW4 are not credible witnesses. Their evidence supported the Appellant’s defence but their evidence were not considered but merely narrated. [152] Secondly, we are of the considered view that at paragraph [48] of the judgment, when the LTJ stated that there no evidence was adduced by the Appellant showing that the funds collected from the fundraising dinners was to substitute the expenses spent by him but instead was for his political campaign, we agree with the defence’s contention that the LTJ failed to appreciate that the funds collected from the fundraising dinners (“kutipan majlis makan malam adalah untuk menggantikan perbelanjaan”) and to accommodate the Appellant’s political campaign (“menampung pilihanraya OKT”) are closely connected and disclosed absence of dishonesty on the part of the Appellant of misappropriation or conversion. [153] Further, the LTJ failed to consider that PW13 in actual fact corroborated the Appellant’s defence. The LTJ failed to consider that PW13’s evidence in cross-examinaiton where the latter agreed for the ABBE account to be used and that the money was meant for the Appellant’s political campaign. In cross-examination PW13 agreed that during investigation he told the MACC officers that the fundraising dinners was for the Appellant’s personal campaign. [154] We find the LTJ not only had omitted to consider and appreciate the crucial evidence stated in the above, His Lordship had also erred in his findings reflected in paragraphs [48] to [51] of the judgment. The real S/N xu6klu98UWhlTrdx3MjnA question was whether the money belonged to the Appellant and the LTJ failed to ask himself this question. We find that from the evidence adduced, the RM120,000 belonged to no other persons but the Appellant and as such no offence under s.403 of the PC was committed by the Appellant. [155] In regards to the AMLA charges, no findings were made by the LTJ relating to the Appellant’s defence that the proceeds in both these charges were not proceeds of unlawful activity. There was no consideration as to the Appellant’s defence that he had no reason to believe or suspect that the RM100,000 transferred into his ASB account were proceeds of an unlawful activity or the instrumentalities of a scheduled offence as the monies belong to him. [156] To borrow the words of Gopal Sri Ram JCA in Mohd Johi Said v PP [2005] 5 MLJ 409, this is the case where the Appellant had proffered a strong defence supported by credible evidence presented to the Court. Therefore, it was the bounden duty of the LTJ to consider that defence. There was simply no judicial appreciation of the defence case. This is accordingly a case of non direction by the LTJ unto himself. It is not sufficient for the LTJ to say that he had considered or he had evaluated the evidence when the said consideration or evaluation could not be found in the judgment. [157] In Maria Elvira Pinto Exposto v PP [2020] 3 MLJ 21 the Federal Court through the judgment of learned Chief Justice stated: “[64] In the instant case the learned judge merely re-evaluated the fact deemed by operation of law, namely the element of knowledge. What His Lordship did was consonant with Balachandran and s.182A of the CPC which provides that at the conclusion of the trial, the Court shall S/N xu6klu98UWhlTrdx3MjnA consider all the evidence adduced before it. Under the law, the learned trial judge was thus obligated to consider the defence and to determine whether it has succeeded in rebutting the statutory presumption invoked and/or has succeeded in raising a reasonable doubt on the prosecution’s case.” [158] We further observed that the LTJ had not made a single reference or consideration to the submissions made by the Appellant’s counsel although His Lordship had afforded the Appellant to make submission. When an accused is directed to submit orally or to file written submissions, the court must not disregard or not consider that submission. It is unfortunate that nowhere in the judgment the LTJ directed his attention to the submission made on behalf of the Appellant on the core features of the defence and issues. It is our considered view that failure to consider the submissions made by the counsel representing the Appellant is an appelable error, a misdirection by way of non-direction which had occasioned grave miscarriage of justice. [159] In Lim Poh Soon v PP [2013] 6 MLJ 252, the Court of Appeal had held: “[13]……Ultimately, for the purpose of s 180(1) and (4) of the CPC, the learned judge was under a legal obligation to arrive at, and make the necessary finding on this factual issue on the basis of the evidence tendered and the submissions made by the parties before him. It follows from this that once the evidence had been place and submissions made, there was a statutory duty cast on the learned judge to make a specific finding of facts on the material discrepancy issue raised by the appellant. These are deep-seated expectations not only from the appellant but also from the prosecution before the learned judge. This is acutely important in a case that attracts the mandatory death penalty prescribed by the DDA as in the present S/N xu6klu98UWhlTrdx3MjnA case. For that reason, the duty of the learned judge as a trial judge is to ensure that this legal obligation is complied with so as to avoid ‘failure of justice’ situations. However, as we indicated earlier, the learned judge never addressed or commented on this issue in his judgment. This was never considered by the learned judge and he failed to direct his mind on this point. In our judgment, the failure on the part of the learned judge to take the evidence regarding the material discrepancy into consideration amounted in effect to a failure to consider a defence which had been put forward (see Er Ah Kiat v Public Prosecutor [1965] 2 MLJ 238). It was the duty of the learned trial judge to consider that defence, no matter how weak it may be (see Davendar Singh a/l Sher Singh v Pendakwa Raya [2012] MLJU 321; [2012] 3 AMR 489). In our view, this is a serious non-direction which amounts to a miDWirection by the learned trial judge warranting appellate intervention (see Gooi Loo Seng v Public Prosecutor [1993] 2 MLJ 137; [1993] 2 AMR 1135).” [Emphasis added]. Conclusion [160] Premised on the above, we unanimously find that the convictions entered by the High Court on all the charges preferred against the Appellant are unsafe. [161] The Appellant’s appeals are therefore allowed. The convictions and sentences are set aside. The Appellant is hereby acquitted and discharged of the charges. Dated: 25th June 2025 Sgd NOORIN BINTI BADARUDDIN Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia S/N xu6klu98UWhlTrdx3MjnA Counsels for Appellant