(c) The words are published. [26] In Ayob bin Saud v TS Sambanthamurthi (1989) 1 MLJ 315 Mohamed Dzaiddin J (as he then was) has laid down the necessary procedure in establishing claim for libel (with which we agree) when his lordship said at page 316 as follows: 'In our law on libel, which is governed by the Defamation Act 1957, the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff to show (1) the words are defamatory; (2) the words refer to the plaintiff; and (3) the words were published. Where a defence of qualified privilege is set up, as in the present case, the burden lies on the defendant to prove that he made the statement honestly; and without any indirect or improper motive. Then if he succeeds in establishing qualified privilege, the burden is shifted to the plaintiff in this case to show actual or express malice which upon proof thereof, communication made under qualified privilege could no longer be regarded as privileged: Rajagopal v Rajan (1972) 1MLJ 45.' [27] In Chok Foo Choo v The China Press Bhd (1999) 1 CLJ 461, Gopal Sri Ram JCA (later FCJ) speaking for the Court of Appeal postulated the following two-staged approach in evaluating the words complained of: The appellant took umbrage over the article. He issued writ. In his statement of claim, he alleged that the natural and ordinary meaning of the words in the offending article meant and were understood to mean, inter alia, that the appellant was a cheat and that he was guilty of issuing false statements to the press with the intention of gaining popularity. Or, as his counsel put it during the argument before us, the article conveyed the meaning that the appellant was untrustworthy... It cannot, I think, be doubted that the first task of a court, in an action for defamation, is to determine whether the words complained of are capable of bearing a defamatory meaning. And it is beyond argument that this is in essence a question of law that turns upon the construction of the words published. As Lord Morris put it in Jones v Skelton (1963) 3 All ER 952 at page 958: The ordinary and natural meaning of words may be either the literal meaning or it may be an implied or inferred or an indirect meaning: any meaning that does not require the support of extrinsic facts passing beyond general knowledge but is a meaning which is capable of being detected in the language used can be a part of the ordinary and natural meaning of words (see Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd (1963) 2 All ER 151). The ordinary and natural meaning may therefore include any implication or inference which a reasonable reader, guided not by any special but only by general knowledge and not fettered by any strict legal rules of construction, would draw from the words. The test of reasonableness guides and directs the court in its function of deciding whether it is open to a jury in any particular case to hold that reasonable persons would understand the words complained of in a defamatory sense. In my judgment, the test which is to be applied lies in the question: do the words published in their natural and ordinary meaning impute to the plaintiff any dishonourable or discreditable conduct or motives or a lack of integrity on his part? If the question invites an affirmative response, then the words complained of are defamatory. The article in the present instance when read as a whole clearly suggests that the appellant is a person who, under the guise of doing service, was in fact making false statements in order to deceive the people of Lukut. The implication is that the appellant is a man given to deception and is untrustworthy. I think that there can be no doubt that to say of a man that he is a cheat and a liar is a serious defamation of him. It has the effect of lowering the appellant in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally. It follows that the learned judge in the present case clearly fell into error when he held that the words complained of were not defamatory of the appellant. Having decided whether the words complained of are capable of bearing a defamatory meaning, the next step in the inquiry is for the court to ascertain whether the words complained of are in fact defamatory. This is a question of fact dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case. [28] It is instructive to refer to the general principles involved in determining the actual meaning of the impugned statement which has been neatly summarised in the judgment of Ramly Ali J (later JCA and FCJ) in Soh Chun Seng v CTOS-EMR Sdn Bhd (2004) 5 CLJ 46 at p 53, (2003) 4 MLJ 180 ("Soh Chun Seng") at p 10 as follows: In construing the meanings of the words complained of as pleaded by the plaintiff, the court must do so in the context of the entirety of the content of exh. P2. In Gatley on Libel and Slander ( $ 9^{th} $ Ed) at p. 96 the learned author states: It is necessary to take into consideration, not only the actual words used, but the context of the words. At p. 97, the learned author continues: It follows from the fact that the context and circumstances of the publication must be taken into account and that the plaintiff cannot pick and choose parts of the publication which, standing alone, would be defamatory. This or that sentence may be considered defamatory, but there may be other passages which take away the sting.' [29] We are of the considered view that a plain reading of the excerpts of the Impugned Statements made by the Defendant at the Press Conference as reproduced by the Plaintiff in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Statement of Claim were taken in isolation and out of context to justify the Plaintiff's allegation that the Impugned Statements are defamatory in nature. The Court is of the further view that if the Impugned Statements are taken in its entirety and construed objectively in their natural and ordinary meaning, they are incapable of bearing any defamatory meaning. [30] In our view the Press Conference held by Tan Sri Shahrir Samad, the Chairman of FELDA, was to address the issues relating to the transfer of Lands for the Development Project as highlighted by several portals and/or newspapers on or about 21.12.2017. It was contended by the Defendant that the public were concerned with the issue that FELDA may have lost its Lands and the Press Conference was held on the same day to address the issue. This can be seen from the statements by the TV Presenter as follows: Presenter: Ok dan antara berita yang akan kami bawakan di Astro Awani .com. dan juga di Buletin Awani adalah sidang media khas yang diadakan sebentar saja lagi oleh Felda di Menara Felda sendiri oleh pengerusinya Tan Sri Shahrir Samad yang dipercayai berkaitan dengan isu penjualan atau transaksi penjualan tanah milik Felda yang didakwa berlaku transaksi yang mencurigakan dan ini dilaporkan oleh beberapa portal pada hari ini dan pengerusinya Tan Sri Shahrir sendiri memberi kenyataan dan juga kami menghantar wartawan kami iaitu Asyraf Hasnan untuk mendapatkan perkembangan lanjut. Kita akan melihat apakah yang diperkatakan oleh Tan Sri Shahrir. Ok, beliau sudah bersedia. Kita terus saja ke Menara Felda bersama dengan Pengerusi Felda. [31] The Defendant attended the Press Conference in his capacity as the Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister's Department and it was also to assist the former Prime Minister in monitoring matters relating to Felda. [32] The Defendant also confirmed that there were discussions held between FELDA, the Attorney General's Chambers and the Prime Minister's Department to address the issue relating to the internal abuse of power in FELDA and subsequently, the various options open to FELDA to recover the Lands back. [33] We are of the view that reading the Press Statements in its entirety, a reasonable man would be of the considered view that the Defendant's statements amounted to a call for accountability directed at the internal management of FELDA, FIC and/or other Statutory Bodies and were not defamatory of the Plaintiff. In fact the Defendant had expressed his view that he did not want anyone to speculate and that further investigation will be conducted and necessary steps taken by FELDA either by way of civil or criminal proceedings or exploring an amicable settlement to resolve the matter. [34] More importantly, we agreed with the learned HCJ that the Impugned Statements in its entirety and construed objectively in their natural and ordinary meaning do not even refer to the Plaintiff. Learned counsel for the Plaintiff however submitted that the Defendant's Press Statements referred to the Plaintiff in the context of the statement namely, 'Bila kita gagal melakukan tadbir urus yang baik ini yang berlaku. Sebab FELDA, FIC dan juga pihak syarikat'(Emphasis added) It was the contention of the Plaintiff that the reference to 'pihak syarikat' could only mean Synergy, and no other entity. It was also contended that there was no other company that was mentioned by the Defendant at the Press Conference. It is interesting to note that according to the Plaintiff, at the said Press Conference, Tan Sri Shahrir had spoken first where Tan Sri Shahrir explicitly mentioned 'Synergy' by name, namely, 'Syarikat Synergy Promenade yang di berikan PA'. The Plaintiff had filed a suit in defamation against Tan Sri Shahrir based on the Press Statements issued by him. [35] In our view, the Plaintiff's case is premised on the Impugned Statements allegedly made by the Defendant during the Press Statement. In this regard the Court would only construe in its entirety whether there was any reference made to the Plaintiff by the Defendant notwithstanding that both the Defendant and Tan Sri Shahrir were present at the Press Statement. The Defendant was never asked to clarify or explain whom he meant by the reference to the word 'syarikat'. It could not be assumed that the word 'syarikat' referred to the Plaintiff. In fact the Plaintiff named themselves in the pleading as 'Synergy Promenade Sdn Bhd' and not as 'Syarikat Synergy Promenade Sdn Bhd'. It was also too late in the circumstances of this case for the Plaintiff to orally seek to amend the Statement of Claim. [36] In Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Ltd (supra), it was stated that it is an essential element of the cause of action in defamation that the words complained of be published 'of the plaintiff'. Where he is not named, the test is whether the words would reasonably lead people acquainted with him to the conclusion that he was the person referred to. The question whether they did so, in fact does not arise if they cannot in law be regarded as being capable of referring to him. [37] It is pertinent to note that regardless of whether in an application to strike out a claim or a full trial, the alleged defamatory words complained of must refer to the plaintiff. [38] The test is an objective one. It is not a subjective test. In Newstead v London Express Newspaper Ltd (1940) 1 KB 377, it was observed that the reasonable meaning of impugned words and whether they referred to the plaintiff must be tested objectively and not subjectively. The question is to be determined by the words actually used and the context and not what the defendant intended to mean. [39] In Tan Sri Musa bin Dato' Hj Hassan & Ors v Uthayakumar a/I Ponnusamy (2012) 1 MLJ 68 this Court held inter alia that: This is an appeal on an O.18. r.19 of the Rules of Court 1980 application by the appellants (the defendants) to strike out the pleadings of the respondent (the plaintiff) for an action in libel which was dismissed by the learned judicial commissioner. By a majority, we allowed this appeal as the statement of claim discloses no reasonable cause of action and obviously unsustainable by the plaintiff in his private, personal and individual capacity, because it is patently clear from the alleged defamatory statement pleaded in paras 11, 15 and 17, that does not refer to, or directed against him personally, but to an illegal organisation known as HINDRAF'. Conclusion [40] Having perused the records of appeal and having considered the submissions of both parties written and oral, and based on the reasons as adumbrated above and in all the circumstances, it is our unanimous decision that there is no appealable error in the finding and decision of the learned HCJ. In addition, we find that the Plaintiff's Statement of Claim had also failed to properly plead how the Impugned Statements referred to the Plaintiff. In this regard, we are of the view that it was too late for the Plaintiff to orally seek to amend the Statement of Claim. In the premises, we are of the view that the Plaintiff's claim against the Defendant 'discloses no reasonable cause of action and is plain and obviously unsustainable'. We dismissed the appeal with costs and affirmed the decision of the High Court dated 4.10.2018. We award costs of RM10,000.00 to be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant subject to allocator. Dated: 01.08.2021 Sgd. (MOHD SOFIAN BIN TAN SRI ABD RAZAK) Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia Putrajaya For Appellant:Ken St. James (together with Jonathan Gerard) [Messrs. Ken St. James]For Respondent:Brian Ernest Cumming (together with Teo Qing Qing) [Messrs. Gideon Tan Razali Zaini]