Tacon Development Sdn Bhd v Ang Chin Siong (JB-22NCC-6-04/2022)

ANG CHIN SIONG

ANG KIAN SIA

OOI PENG LENG

TEE CHOON MENG

ANG SOON KIAT

TE BAN YEK

BERSATU WIRE MESH TRADING SDN BHD February 5, 2024 2 [NO. SYARIKAT: 200301008600 (611020-H)]

BERSATU WIRE MESH INDUTRIES SDN BHD [NO. SYARIKAT: 200201020160 (587823-X)]

9.

TAN MENG LOON (NO. K/P: 851210-04-5123) … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN CORAM: SURIA KUMAR A/L DURAIRAJ JOHNSON PAUL JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER  GROUNDS OF DECISION  INTRODUCTION [1] Plaintiff alleges Defendants conspired to cause losses to them in respect of nine (9) units of condominium in a project developed by Plaintiff in Batu Pahat, Johor. [2]

8 APARTMENTS RELEASED (#102, #203, #203A, #3A01, #3A02, #501, #503, #703) You have nothing outstanding that you need to pay for the 8 units of apartments and you also have no claims against the company or the directors of the company. ………………………………………………………..

APPLICATION FOR RELEASE OF BUMI LOTS AT COMPANY We shall apply for the Bumi release for the two units, # 02-03A and # 07-03 that have been assigned to you. The application fee shall be paid for by the company.” [23] Thereafter Plaintiff together with Tee Boon Tiong entered into a Settlement Agreement on 29.09.2016 with the 1st Defendant, 7th February 5, 2024 7 Defendant and 8th Defendant in respect of the 8 units of condominium. [24] In summary, the Settlement Agreement declares the full purchase price for the eight (8) units of the condominium as fully settled via contra payment with the full amount invested by the 1st Defendant, 7th Defendant and 8th Defendant into the development project. [25] The Settlement Agreement also provided that in consideration of the 1st Defendant, 7th Defendant and 8th Defendant agreeing to settle the debts owed by Plaintiff to two of its creditors, Plaintiff agrees to obtain the release and consent to transfer the 2 units of Bumiputra lots from State Authority. [26] The Plaintiff and Tee Boon Tiong had to obtain the release and consent to transfer the 2 units of Bumiputra lots from the State Authority within six months with an extension of three months failing which agreed liquidated damages had to be paid to the 1st Defendant, 7th Defendant and 8th Defendant. [27] Whereas the 9th Defendant is a firm of solicitors and the 10th Defendant is a partner with the 9th Defendant firm. They were involved in the preparation of this Settlement Agreement. [28] On or around December 2016, the strata titles for the individual condominium units in the project were issued and it was kept by the Plaintiff in its custody. February 5, 2024 8 [29] Although the 9th Defendant made numerous requests to Plaintiff to surrender the strata titles for six (6) of the units (excluding 2 units of the Bumiputra lots), Plaintiff failed to adhere to their request. [30] The Plaintiff also failed to obtain the release and consent for the 2 Bumiputra units and failed to pay the agreed liquidated damages as stipulated in the Settlement Agreement to the 1st, 7th and 8th Defendants upon demand. [31] As for the 4th Defendant, he executed a Sale and Purchase Agreement on 28.3.2013 to purchase one unit known as #09-03A and made full payment. A receipt was issued by the Plaintiff for this full payment. [32] This particular unit was not part of the 8 units under the Settlement Agreement. [33] Despite full settlement of the purchase price, Plaintiff failed to surrender the strata title and to execute the transfer for this unit in favour of the 4th Defendant. [34] This led to the 1st, 5th, 6th and 7th Defendants filing a civil action against the Plaintiff to compel the Plaintiff to execute the transfer of the 6 units of the condominium and to surrender the strata titles. [35] Next, the 7th and 8th Defendants filed a civil action against the Plaintiff to recover the agreed liquidated damages in the sum of RM2,806,624.34 for its failure to obtain the release and consent from the State Authority for the 2 Bumiputra lots. February 5, 2024 9 [36] Lastly, a civil action was filed by the 4th Defendant against Plaintiff to compel Plaintiff to execute the transfer for unit No. #09-03A and to surrender the strata title. [37] I shall discuss all the three civil actions below. [38] In a nutshell, Plaintiff now claims against the 1st to 8th Defendants that they had conspired to cause Plaintiff to suffer loss in respect to the nine (9) units of the condominium as per the facts alluded to above. [39] Whereas in respect of the 9th and 10th Defendants, Plaintiff contends they conspired with the other Defendants in preparing the Settlement Agreement between the 1st, 7th, and 8th Defendants and Plaintiff and Tee Boon Tiong. [40] Further, Plaintiff also contends that the Settlement Agreement prepared by the 9th and 10th Defendants has no basis, is wrong and is used as a tactic to transfer the eight (8) units of condominiums. [41] In addition, Plaintiff also alleges that without the 9th and 10th Defendants rendering their professional services to assist the other Defendants, especially to the 1st Defendant, the eight (8) units of condominiums could not have been transferred to the respective Defendants. ANALYSIS AND FINDING [42] The law on striking out pleadings is trite. Please see Bandar Builder Sdn. Bhd. & Ors v. United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] February 5, 2024 10 3 MLJ 36, Tan Wei Hong (a minor suing through guardian ad litem and next friend Chuang Yin E & Ors v MALAYSIAN AIRLINES BHD And Other Appeals [2019] 1 MLJ 59 and Protasco Bhd v PT Anglo Slavic Utama & Ors [2020] MLJU 1413 about principles governing striking out pleadings. Bearing in mind that this is a drastic power and guided by the principles established in these cases, I now proceed with the analysis and findings.

Civil Suit No: JB-22NCVC-25-03/2017 (first civil action) [43] This civil suit was commenced by the 1st, 5th, 6th and 7th Defendants against the Plaintiff to obtain the transfer and the original title deeds in respect of the six (6) units of the condominium known as Unit #01- 02, #02-03, #05-01, #03A-01, #03A-02, #05-03. [44] This claim was based on the Settlement Agreement entered into on 29.9.2016 between the 1st, 7th and 8th Defendants and the Plaintiff and Tee Boon Tiong, its director. [45] In the statement of defence filed by Plaintiff in this suit, Plaintiff admitted to their agreement to transfer the six (6) units but pleaded that it has to be done simultaneously with the two (2) other Bumiputra lots for which their application for release and approval to the State Authority was pending. [46] This first civil action was resolved by parties recording a Consent Judgment wherein Plaintiff agreed to execute the transfers and surrender the original title deeds for the six (6) units of the condominium to the 1st, 5th, 6th and 7th Defendants. February 5, 2024 11

(ii) Civil Suit No: JB-22NCVC-58-08/2017 (second civil action) [47] This civil suit was commenced by the 1st, 7th and 8th Defendants against the Plaintiff and its director, Tee Boon Tiong in respect of the two (2) units of condominium which were Bumiputra lots i.e unit #02-3A and #07-03 that required the release and consent from the State Authority to be obtained by Plaintiff. [48] The basis of this claim was that Plaintiff failed to obtain the release and consent for the Bumiputra lots and thus was in breach of the Settlement Agreement and therefore liable to pay agreed liquidated damages stipulated in the Settlement Agreement. [49] Summary judgement was entered for the sum of RM 2,806,624.34 against Plaintiff and there was no appeal by Plaintiff against the said decision.

(iii) Civil Suit No: JB-22NCVC-61-09/2017 (third civil action) [50] This civil action was filed by the 4th Defendant against the Plaintiff in respect of a unit known as #09-03A. This unit did not fall under the Settlement Agreement. [51] The basis of this action was that the 4th Defendant had paid full purchase price for this unit but the Plaintiff failed to transfer this unit to the Defendant and surrender the strata title. [52] The 4th Defendant sought a mandatory injunction to compel Plaintiff to execute the transfer form and to surrender the original title deed. February 5, 2024 12 [53] The Plaintiff in their statement of defence denied receiving the purchase price for this unit from the 4th Defendant. [54] After a full trial, judgement was entered against the Plaintiff. [55] Plaintiff thereafter filed an appeal to the Court of Appeal. However, their appeal was struck off due to their failure to deposit security for costs in compliance with the order made by the Court of Appeal. The Order for security for costs was obtained by the 4th Defendant on the ground that Plaintiff was wound up by the time the decision was delivered by the High Court in this third civil action. [56] In the above three (3) civil actions, Plaintiff was represented by different solicitors. [57] It’s my finding from the facts alluded to above pertaining to the three

civil actions, that the Settlement Agreement was never declared to be null and void. [58] In fact, the Plaintiff affirmed the Settlement Agreement in their statement of defence and also by entering into the Consent Judgement in the first civil action. [59] To date, the Consent Judgement in the first civil action has not been set aside by way of a separate action and is valid and binding. [60] As for the Summary Judgement for the sum of RM2,806,624.38 obtained in the second civil action, Plaintiff did not challenge the Settlement Agreement and raised the issue of conspiracy by the Defendants to cause loss to Plaintiff. February 5, 2024 13 [61] There were no counter-claims by Plaintiff to declare the Settlement Agreement null and void and claim for losses caused to Plaintiff as a result of a conspiracy by the Defendants in the first and second civil action. [62] As for the Judgement after a full trial in the third civil action, the Plaintiff did not proceed with its Appeal against the decision of the High Court which found the full purchase price for unit #09-03A was paid to the Plaintiff. Neither did Plaintiff claim for losses caused as a result of a conspiracy by the Defendants in the third civil action. [63] The Plaintiff submits that they have a reasonable cause of action against the Defendants and there exist various issues to be tried. [64] To cut it short, there is only one issue which is whether the 1st and 2nd Defendants upon having absolute control of Plaintiff conspired with other Defendants to cause losses to Plaintiff in respect of the transfers of the nine units of the condominium without any purchase consideration. [65] Leading from this main issue, Plaintiff submits the 1st and 2nd Defendants although resigned as directors, were the shadow directors and committed a breach of statutory duties. [66] According to learned counsel for the Plaintiff, this warrants a trial by calling witnesses. [67] Whereas the 1st to 8th Defendants contend that Plaintiff ought to have raised the allegations of conspiracy in the above three (3) civil February 5, 2024 14 actions and not after those matters were properly adjudicated and determined. [68] As such, according to the Defendants, Plaintiff is precluded from relitigating those matters. [69] According to the 9th and 10th Defendants, they only represented the other Defendants in their professional capacity in the three (3) civil actions and had no personal relationship with them. In this circumstance, they owe no contractual duty or any duty in tort towards the Plaintiff. [70] The 9th and 10th Defendants also plead that the Plaintiff is estopped from bringing this action against them due to the Judgements in the previous three (3) civil actions based on the principle of res judicata. [71] In my judgement the Plaintiff’s claim fails in law based on the various doctrines of estoppels and res judicata that are discussed below.

Judicial Admission of the Settlement Agreement in the Plaintiff’s statement of defence in the 1st civil action. [72] The Plaintiff’s admission of the Settlement Agreement in their statement of defence in the first civil action is tantamount to a judicial admission of the Settlement Agreement. [73] In Zulpadli Mohammad & Ors v. Bank Pertanian Malaysia Bhd [2011] 1 LNS 1853, it was held by the Court of Appeal as follows:- February 5, 2024 15 “[18] In the earlier suit filed by the original owners of USESB (the vendor of the said land), the respondent itself had taken the position that the Registrar of Titles was solely at fault and responsible for the loss suffered and that the respondent, through the appellants had adhered to all prudent banking practices in granting the loan facility and that all documentation was valid. [19] In this regard the respondent, in its defence in the said earlier suit, had pleaded as follows:

at all material times the respondent through its firm of solicitors (the appellants) had adhered to all prudent banking practices;

having followed the usual banking practices, the respondent was entitled to enter into the various agreements pertaining to the transfer of the land; and

at all material times the various documents for the transfer of the said land were valid and enforceable in law for it having followed all the rules and procedures set by law. [20] The foregoing in law amounts to judicial admissions which had been made by the respondent. In this regard, we are in agreement with the decision in the case of Hu Chang Pee v. Tan Sri Datuk Paduka (Dr) Ting Pek Khiing [1999] 7 CLJ 328; [1999] 3 MLJ 402 February 5, 2024 16 (subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Tan Sri Datuk Paduka (Dr) Ting Pek Khiing v. Hu Chang Pee [2011] 9 CLJ 859 as follows:

The Plaintiff in entitled to rely on the Defendant’s affidavit filed in Suit No 22-18-96 as the basis in the present suit. What was stated by the Defendant in his affidavit dated 3 December 1996 was actually an admission by him. Admission in pleadings is judicial admission and can be made the foundation of rights. Admission are admissible against the party making them. [21] Further in YK Fung Securities Sdn Bhd v. James Capel (Far East) Ltd [1997] 4 CLJ 300, Mahadev Shanker JCA held as follows: For the record, however, we must state here that it is the opinion of this court that once a party to litigation has admitted a fact in his pleadings he shall not be heard to contend the contrary in the trial or in any appeal therefrom. [22] The respondent’s own admission in the earlier suit as well as the amended statement of claim in the present suit show that the appellants were innocent victims as much as the respondent was. The respondent is estopped from taking a position different from that pleaded in its defence in the earlier suit.” February 5, 2024 17 [74] Hence Plaintiff is bound by the terms of the Settlement Agreement that declares the full purchase price for the 8 units of the condominium as settled and the Plaintiff’s agreement to pay liquidated damages in respect of the two units of Bumiputra lots if they fail to get the release and consent from the State Authority.

(ii) Issue Estoppel based on the Consent Judgement in the first civil action. [75] The Plaintiff is estopped from bringing this action due to the Consent Judgement recorded in the 1st civil action between the parties in respect of the six (6) units. [76] In Wong Sin Fan & Ors v. Ng Peak Yam & Anor [2011] 9 CLJ 873, it was held by the Court of Appeal as follows:- “[26] A consent order could form the basis of an issue estoppel as long as the order is final (see: The Doctrine of Res Judicata (supra) at para 38; Kinch v. Walcott [1929] AC 482; and Goh Nellie v. Goh Lian Teck & Ors (supra).Thus the consent order dated 4 June 2010 entered into between the parties herein (appellants and respondents) which clearly states that there shall be no liberty to file afresh is capable of forming the basis of issue estoppel. The said consent order was a final and conclusive judgment on the merits between the parties. Thus the first ingredient for issue estoppel to apply has been satisfied.” February 5, 2024 18 [77] It’s my finding that the three other ingredients i.e. the judgement of a Court of competent jurisdiction, parties and identity of the subject matter are also satisfied and therefore issue estoppel applies against the Plaintiff.

(iii) Estoppel Per Rem Judicatum applies due to failure to bring the issue relating to conspiracy in the previous civil actions. [78] Plaintiff never alleged or pleaded that the Defendants conspired to cause losses to Plaintiff in the previous three (3) civil actions. [79] There was no counterclaim by the Plaintiff in the previous three civil actions for losses caused as a result of a conspiracy by the Defendants. [80] The Plaintiff had the opportunity to raise this issue but failed to do so. [81] In S & M Shopping Arcade Sdn Bhd v. Ch Williams, Talhar And Wong Sdn Bhd [2007] 10 CLJ 738, it was held by Tengku Maimun JC (as she then was):- “[11] Quite apart from the finding made by the learned judge above, there is another aspect of issue estoppel which ought to be considered here ie whether such issues as submitted by learned counsel for the plaintiff are issues which might have been and which were not brought forward in the earlier proceedings before Abdul Malik J. To my mind those issues should have been brought in the earlier proceedings and hence even if the February 5, 2024 19 submission of learned counsel for the plaintiff is to be accepted that the issues were not actually considered by the learned judge, the plaintiff is still caught by the doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatum as stated in the case of Asia Commercial Finance, supra. In the earlier proceedings where the plaintiff challenged the valuation report prepared by the defendant as being inaccurate, the defendant should and could have been brought as a party wherein the alleged breach of duty of care in preparing the valuation could appropriately be determined.” [82] The application of estoppel per rem judicatum was explained by His Lordship Peh Swee Chin FCJ in Asia Commercial Finance (M) Berhad v. Kawal Teliti Sdn. Bhd. [1995] 3 CLJ 783 as follows:- “What is res judicata? It simply means a matter adjudged, and its significance lies in its effect of creating an estoppel per rem judicature. When a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a Court of competent jurisdiction, the parties and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata, because the judgment becomes the truth between such parties, or in other words, the parties should accept it as the truth; res judicata pro veritate accipitur. The public policy of the law is that it is in the public interest that there should be finality in litigation - interest rei publicae ut sit finis lithium. It is only just that no one ought to be vexed twice for the same cause of action - Nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa. Both maxims are the rationales for the doctrine of res judicata, February 5, 2024 20 but the earlier maxim has the further elevated status of a question of public policy. Since a res judicata creates an estoppel per rem judicatum, the doctrine of res judicata is really the doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatum,… The starting point ought to be the celebrated passage by Wigram, V.C., in the case of Henderson v. Henderson [1843] 3 Hare 100 115 which is: “The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the Court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence might have brought forward at the time.” It is important to bear in mind the manner in which the issue estoppel operates in preventing such contradiction of the previous judgment… It is particularly important to bear in mind the question of the public policy that there should be finality in litigation in conjunction with the exploding population; the increasing sophistication of the populace with the law and with the expanding resources of the Courts being found always one step behind the resulting increase in litigation. February 5, 2024 21 It is further necessary at this stage to understand the import of the words in the said famous statement ie “... every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation...” which Somervell LJ explained in Greenhalgh v. Mallard [1947] 2 All ER 255, 257 as follows: ... res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the Court is actually asked to decide, but it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the Court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them.” [83] Whereas in Serac Asia Sdn Bhd v Sepakat Insurance Brokers Sdn Bhd [2013] 6 CLJ 673 the Federal Court held as follows:- “We conclude by saying that once a regularly obtained order or judgment has been perfected, the court is functus officio. The matter as decided vide encl. 6 is thus res judicata and cannot be re-litigated. It needs to be emphasised that the order made under encl. 6 was appealed and affirmed right up to the Federal Court. It cannot now be revisited or reasserted under any guise in a subsequent proceeding. The issue raised by the respondent in encl. 29 could have been brought up during the appeal process. The law does not allow the respondent to have a second bite of the cherry and the manner as it did. This passage from Tenaga Berhad explains the rationale: February 5, 2024 22 There was no merit in the appellant’s argument that the second application to set aside the default judgment was justified because it was based upon a different ground from that relied upon in the first application. The doctrine of res judicata in its wider sense was applicable in the present case. It was certainly open to the appellant to ground its first application on the basis that the default judgment was irregular. It was therefore an issue which properly belonged to the first application. But it chose not to rely upon that ground. Once the first application was dismissed, it was not open to the appellant to make a second application to set aside the judgment on a different ground. It would amount to presenting one’s case in installment which the law does not permit. In our judgment too, the re-litigation of a regularly and properly concluded matter as determined by the court is prohibited by the wide doctrine of res judicata. The judicial process rests on the twin pillars of certainty and finality. A final order or judgment must therefore be vigorously protected by this doctrine, a position taken by the common law courts ever since Henderson [1843].” [84] Hence the Plaintiff is precluded from raising the allegation of conspiracy against the Defendants by bringing this claim now

(iv) Equitable Estoppel applies to prevent the Plaintiff from litigating claims which are plainly inconsistent with that litigation in the first proceeding. February 5, 2024 23 [85] Plaintiff now attempts to litigate their claim for conspiracy by the Defendants to injure and cause losses to Plaintiff which is plainly inconsistent with what was litigated in the earlier three civil actions. [86] This doctrine was recognized by the Court of Appeal in Leisure Farm Corporation Sdn Bhd v. Kabushiki Kaisha Ngu & Ors [2017] 1 LNS 499 by referring to a decision OJSC Oil Company Yugraneft v. Roman Arkadievich Abramovich, Millhouse Capital UK Limited, Boris Berezovsky [2008] EWHC 2613 (Comm) 2 where the Court of Appeal explained:- “Courts apply equitable estoppel to prevent a party from contradicting a position taken in a prior judicial proceeding... Equitable estoppel enables a party to avoid litigating, in the second proceeding, claims which are plainly inconsistent with those litigated in the first proceeding. Because the doctrine is intended to ensure fair dealing between the parties, the courts will apply the doctrine only if the party asserting the estoppel was a party in the prior proceeding and if that party has detrimentally relied upon his opponent’s prior position.” [87] Therefore, Plaintiff is estopped now from litigating claims which are plainly inconsistent with the litigation in the previous three (3) civil actions.

Collateral Estoppel prevents the Plaintiff from relitigating factual matters that were fully considered and decided in a prior proceeding. February 5, 2024 24 [88] In essence, Plaintiff’s claim herein is to relitigate the factual matters that were fully considered and decided in the previous three (3) civil actions by way of a collateral attack. [89] In the case of OJSC Oil Company this doctrine was also explained as follows:- “Collateral estoppel prevents relitigation of factual matters that were fully considered and decided in a prior proceeding. Thus, collateral estoppel operates to prevent repetitive litigation....” [90] Hence Plaintiff is estopped from relitigating in this claim in respect of the factual matters that were fully considered and decided in the previous three (3) civil actions

(vi) Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel prevents Plaintiff from asserting an inconsistent position in a subsequent proceeding [91] Finally, in my judgement, the Plaintiff’s action herein is caught by the doctrine of judicial estoppel. [92] The Plaintiff is estoppel from asserting an inconsistent position in the present action after unequivocally asserting a different position in the previous three (3) civil actions. [93] The object of this doctrine is to protect the integrity of the judicial process, the judiciary as an institution and from the perversion of judicial machinery. February 5, 2024 25 [94] This doctrine was also explained in the case of OJSC Oil Company (supra) as follows:- “The doctrine of judicial estoppel applies to a party who has successfully and unequivocally asserted a position in a prior proceeding; he is estopped from asserting an inconsistent position in a subsequent proceeding... Unlike equitable estoppel, judicial estoppel may be applied even if detrimental reliance or privity does not exist.... This distinction reflects the difference in the policies served by the two rules. Equitable estoppel protects litigants from less than scrupulous opponents. Judicial estoppel, however, is intended to protect the integrity of the judicial process.... Scarano v. Central R. Co., 203 F.2d 510, 512-13 (3rd Cir. 1953) (“such use of inconsistent positions would most flagrantly exemplify that playing ‘fast and loose with the courts’ which has been emphasized as an evil the court should not tolerate.”) The essential function of judicial estoppel is to prevent intentional inconsistency; the object of the rule is to protect the judiciary, as an institution, from the perversion of judicial machinery.... Collateral estoppel is essentially a finality rule, which serves to conserve judicial resources by precluding the litigation of issues previously decided. Judicial estoppel addresses the incongruity of allowing a party to assert a position in one tribunal and the opposite in another tribunal. If the second tribunal adopted the party’s inconsistent position, then at least one court has probably been misled...” [95] In the foregoing, based on the operation of the various estoppels in law that is triggered by the facts and determination of the previous February 5, 2024 26 three (3) civil actions discussed above, Plaintiff is now barred in law from bringing this claim against the 1st to 8th Defendants. [96] Hence this Court does not see the necessity to go into the factual allegations of conspiracy made by Plaintiff in connection with the breach of the fiduciary duties by the 1st and 2nd Defendants and the Settlement Agreement to see if it warrants a trial. [97] Since I have found that the various estoppels in law operate in preventing the Plaintiff from bringing this claim against the 1st to 8th Defendants, therefore the Plaintiff's claim against the 9th and 10th Defendants premised on them being co-conspirators together with the 1st to 8th Defendants also fails. DECISION [98] In the foregoing, the 1st and 8th Defendants application is allowed with costs. [99] The 9th and 10th Defendants application is also allowed with costs. [100] The Plaintiff's claim against all the Defendants is struck off. Dated this 5th February 2024 at Muar in the State of Johore. t.t. SURIA KUMAR DJ PAUL Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya February 5, 2024 27 Muar Johore Darul Ta’zim Counsels: For the Plaintiff : Teh Ee Chern For the 1st to 8th Defendants : Tan Chee Giap For the 9th and 10th Defendants : Neo Hee Kwang George Neo with Christie Liau Hui Min Solicitors: For the Plaintiff Messrs Gan SL & Associates Advocates & Solicitors No. 47, Jalan Tiong 3 Bandar Puchong Jaya 47100 Puchong Selangor Darul Ehsan [Ref. No. : GSLA(P)/6:TD-ACS/L20/TEC] For the 1st to 8th Defendants Messrs Soh Yok Lam & Co. Advocates & Solicitors No. 23, Ground Floor Jalan Majidi February 5, 2024 28 84000 Muar Johor [Ref. No. : TCG/OR/4586/22/maza] For the 9th and 10th Defendants Messrs Yeo Chambers Advocates & Solicitors Suite 30.06, 30th Floor, Johor Bahru City Square Office Tower 106, Jalan Wong Ah Fook 80000 Johor Bahru Johor [Ref. No. : GN/OHT/ckm.9724/2206.8] Hearing Date : 13th July 2023, 25th July 2023, 4th September 2023 Decision Date : 5th February 2024