TALLY DEVELOPMENT (M) SDN BHD v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Gombak (BA-25-74-12/2023)

KERAJAAN NEGERI SELANGOR RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] This is an application for judicial review by the applicant, Tally Development Sdn Bhd seeking this court for the following reliefs as stated in Enclosure 1: “2. Bahawa kebenaran diberikan kepada Pemohon yang dinamakan di atas menurut Aturan 53 Kaedah 3(1) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 untuk memohon suatu perintah Deklarasi dan / atau CerIorari dilaksanakan terhadap Pihak Responden-Responden untuk membatalkan keputusan yang telah diberikan oleh Responden Pertama, Responden Kedua dan / atau Responden Ketiga melalui surat bertarikh 21 September 2023 atau apaapa keputusan yang membatalkan permohonan untuk mengubah jenis kegunaan dan meminda syarat nyata keatas Hak Milik tanah GM 993 Lot 2752 Mukim Setapak dan GM 994 Lot 2753 Mukim Setapak daripada Tiada / Pertanian kepada

Suatu Perintah Deklarasi dan / atau CerIorari dikeluarkan agar keputusan RespondenResponden untuk membatalkan atau menarikbalik permohonan untuk mengubah jenis kegunaan dan meminda syarat nyata ke atas Hak Milik tanah GM 993 Lot 2752 Mukim Setapak dan GM 994 Lot 2753 Mukim Setapak daripada Tiada / Pertanian kepada Bangunan (Kediaman) [No. Rujukan: PTG No. 7/3/59/98 (27)] diisytiharkan batal dan tidak sah;

Suatu Perintah Deklarasi dan / atau Mandamus dikeluarkan agar Responden-Responden memberi kesan dan mematuhi syarat-syarat yang dikemukakan dalam surat pentadbiran [Bil (23) dlm PTG. No. 7/3/59/98 bertarikh 4 Oktober 2002] dan Borang 7G Kanun Tanah Negara bertarikh 4 Oktober 2002 berkenaan Permohonan untuk mengubah jenis kegunaan dan meminda syarat nyata keatas Hak Milik tanah GM 993 Lot 2752 Mukim Setapak dan GM 994 Lot 2753 Mukim Setapak daripada Tiada / Pertanian kepada Bangunan (Kediaman).

Pemohon menyerahkan Suratan Hak Milik dibawah GM 993 Lot 2752 Mukim Setapak dan GM 994 Lot 2753 Mukim Setapak kepada Responden Ketiga untuk memberi kesan kepada pengurusan Permohonan untuk mengubah jenis kegunaan dan meminda syarat nyata bagi GM 993 Lot 2752 Mukim Setapak dan GM 994 Lot 2753

Bahawa Pendaftar Hakmilik Tanah Negeri Selangor hendaklah menurut Seksyen 417 Kanun Tanah Negara (Akta 828) dengan serta-merta mengubah jenis kegunaan dan meminda syarat nyata bagi GM 993 Lot 2752 Mukim Setapak dan GM 994 Lot 2753 Mukim Setapak ke dalam dokumen pendaftaran hakmilik untuk GM 993 Lot 2752 Mukim Setapak dan GM 994 Lot 2753 Mukim Setapak dan lain-lain rekod/dokumen yang berkenaan dengan hakmilik tanah tersebut semasa diserahkan Perintah Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini memerintahkan Pendaftaran bagi mengubah jenis kegunaan dan meminda syarat nyata bagi mengubah jenis kegunaan dan meminda syarat nyata bagi GM 993 Lot 2752 Mukim Setapak dan GM 994 Lot 2753 Mukim Setapak memberi kesan kepada perintah Mahkamah ini;

Sekiranya permohonan untuk mengubah jenis kegunaan dan meminda syarat nyata keatas Hak Milik tanah GM 993 Lot 2752 Mukim Setapak dan GM 994 Lot 2753 Mukim Setapak (selepase ini dirujuk sebagai kedua-dua tanah tersebut) daripada Tiada / Pertanian kepada Bangunan (Kediaman) [No. Rujukan: PTG No. 7/3/59/98 (27)] adalah terbatal dan /atau ditarikbalik, Responden-Responden adalah dipertanggungjawabkan atas segala kerugian bagi perbezaan harga pengambilan kedua-dua tanah tersebut berkenaan jenis kegunaan tanah iaitu antara Pertanian / Tiada dan Bangunan (Kediaman)

Kos Permohonan ini dibayar oleh Responden-Responden kepada Pemohon; dan

Relief-relief lain atau selanjutnya yang dianggap patut dan sesuai oleh Mahkamah yang Mulia ini.” Factual Background [2] The facts of this judicial review application have been obtained from documents filed by parties. [3] Wassim Sdn. Bhd. (Wassim) was the Original Proprietor of the Lands more particularly identified as GM 993 Lot 2752 Mukim Setapak and GM 994 Lot 2753 Mukim Setapak (“the Lands”). [4] Vide a letter dated 8 May 2001, the first respondent and/or second respondent had informed Wassim (the then Proprietor of the Lands) that its application for change of category of land use had been approved by the State Authority with conditions set out at paragraphs 2.1 to 4.1 in the letter (“Approval”). [5] The first respondent then issued the required Form 7G (made in pursuance of the National Land Code) to Wassim to require payment of premium and tax that had been determined as RM108,599.00. [6] The first respondent and/or second respondent subsequently in a letter dated 28 February 2002 approved Wassim’s appeal to reduce the premium from RM 103,996.00 to RM 83,196.80. [7] The first respondent then issued a revised Form 7G to Wassim requiring payment for premium and tax of RM 87,799.80 to be paid in 3 months from the date of receipt of the Form. [8] Subsequently, first respondent and/or second respondent in a letter dated 4 October 2002 rejected another appeal by Wassim for a further reduction on the premium and issued a revised Form 7G to Wassim requiring payment for premium and tax of RM 87,799.80 to be paid in 3 months from the date of receipt of the Form. [9] On 3 January 2003, Wassim paid the requested premium and tax of RM 87,799.80 to the second respondent. [10] Through a Sale & Purchase Agreement dated 8 February 2012, the applicant purchased the Lands from Wassim. [11] The applicant received notification by way of Forms E and F made pursuant to the Land Acquisition Act 1960 that the Jabatan Ketua Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Persekutuan Negeri Selangor was intending to acquire the Lands for the purposes of the East Coast Rail Link (ECRL) Project. [12] The applicant responded to the said Jabatan with a letter dated 16 August 2023 notifying that although the premium and tax for the conversion of the Lands from Agriculture to Building (Residential) had been paid since 3 January 2003, the status reflected on the said title deeds to the Lands remained as Agriculture. [13] The second respondent through its letter dated 21 September 2023 then informed the applicant inter alia:

that although the premium of RM 87,799.80 was paid, Wassim had failed to submit the title deeds to the Respondents when making the payment;

(ii) that the Majlis Kerajaan Negeri Selangor (MMKNS) had during their Mesyuarat ke 33/2013 & 34/2013, decided to reject all applications for change of name of an applicant once an approval for conversion had been given;

(iii) that Wassim’s application was therefore cancelled and withdrawn; and

(iv) that the Applicant would have to file a fresh application seeking for approval for conversion of the Lands. [14] The applicant replied through a letter dated 1 November 2023 that:

It requested the second respondent to rectify the records to show the applicant as the current Proprietor of the Lands;

(ii) It wanted further information and clarification relating to the cancellation / withdrawal of Wassim’s Application; and

(iii) The issue of this failure to bring along and submit the original title deeds at the time of making the payment and the ensuing consequences was never brought to the attention of Wassim. [15] The second respondent in its response through its letter dated 27 November 2023 took the position that the applicant’s questions had been duly answered in their earlier letter dated 21 September 2023. [16] The applicant then filed this application for Judicial Review to challenge the decision relating to the Approval of the respondents (the Impugned Decision). Principles relating to Judicial Review [17] Prior to considering and analyzing this application, it would be prudent for this court to be reflect on the legal principles relating to judicial review. Order 53 Rules of Court 2012 provides for the procedures for an application for judicial review. [18] It is trite that the decision of a public authority may be reviewed by this court on the grounds of illegality, irrationality, procedural impropriety or disproportionality. This review is not confined to the decision-making process but also to the merits of the decision. [19] In the Federal Court case, Akira Sales & Services (M) Sdn Bhd v. Nadiah Zee Abdullah & Another Appeal [2018] 2 CLJ 513; [2018] 2 MLJ 537, the liberal approach on judicial review in R Rama Chandran v. The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 CLJ 147; [1997] 1 MLJ 145 has been re-emphasised at pp. 547 to 548 (CLJ); pp. 571 to 572 (MLJ) as follows: “[45] In the same appeal, Edgar Joseph Jr FCJ (Eusoff Chin in agreement) said that an award could be reviewed for substance as well as for process: It is often said that judicial review is concerned not with the decision but the decision making process. (See eg Chief Constable of North Wales Police v. Evans [1982] 1 WLR 1155). This proposition, at full face value, may well convey the impression that the jurisdiction of the courts in Judicial Review proceedings is confined to cases where the aggrieved party has not received fair treatment by the authority to which he has been subjected. Put differently, in the words of Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions & Ors v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, where the impugned decision is flawed on the ground of procedural impropriety. But Lord Diplock’s other grounds for impugning a decision susceptible to Judicial Review make it abundantly clear that such a decision is also open a challenge on grounds of ‘illegality’ and ‘irrationality’ and, in practice, this permits the courts to scrutinise such decisions not only for process, but also for substance. In this context, it is useful to note how Lord Diplock (at pp. 410- 411) defined the three grounds of review, to wit, (i) illegality, (ii) irrationality, and (iii) procedural impropriety. This is how he put it: By ‘illegality’ as a ground for Judicial Review, I mean that the decision maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision making power and must give effect to it. Whether he has or not is par excellence a justiciable question to be decided, in the event of dispute, by those persons, the judges, by whom the judicial power of the state is exercisable. By ‘irrationality’, I mean what can by now be succinctly referredto as ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’ (see 11 BA-25-4-01/2023 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury Corp. [1948] 1 KB 223). It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. Whether a decision falls within this category is a question that judges by their training and experience should be well equipped to answer, or else there would be something badly wrong with our judicial system. To justify the courts’ exercise of this role, resort I think is today no longer needed to Viscount Radcliffe’s ingenious explanation in Edwards v. Bairstow [1956] AC 14, or irrationality as a ground for a court’s reversal of a decision by ascribing it to an inferred though undefinable mistake of law by the decision maker. ‘Irrationality’ by now can stand on its own feet as an accepted ground on which a decision may be attacked by Judicial Review. I have described the third head as ‘procedural impropriety’ rather than failure to observe basic rules of natural justice or failure to act with procedural fairness towards the person who will be affected by the decision. This is because susceptibility to judicial review under this head covers also failure by an administrative tribunal to observe procedural rules that are expressly laid down in the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is conferred, even where such failure does not involve any denial of natural justice. Lord Diplock also mentioned ‘proportionality’ as a possible fourth ground of review which called for development.” [20] Further, the meaning of error of law has also been explained in the case of Syarikat Kenderaan Melayu Kelantan Bhd v. Transport Workers Union [1995] 2 CLJ 748; [1995] 2 MLJ 317 in the following words: “Is neither feasible nor desirable to attempt an exhaustive definition of what amounts to an error of law, for the categories of such an error are not closed. But it may be said that an error of law would be disclosed if the decision-maker asks himself the wrong question or takes into account irrelevant considerations or omits to take into account relevant considerations (what may be conveniently termed Anisminic error) or if he misconstrues the terms of any relevant statute, or misapplies or misstates a principle of the general law.” [21] Founded on these principles, this court will consider this application for judicial review. Preliminary Objection [22] At the onset, the respondents had raised a preliminary objection to this application for judicial review. The objection raised is that the present application by the applicant is misplaced as there is a more appropriate alternative remedy available under the National Land Code and that the applicant ought to have filed an appeal under section 418 of the National Land Code. The respondents cited Government of Malaysia & Anor v Jagdis Singh [1987] 2 MLJ 185 and Robin Tan Pang Heng @ Muhammad Rizal bin Abdullah (suing as public officer at Penang Turf Club) v Ketua Pengarah Kesatuan Sekerja Malaysia & Anor [2011] 2 MLJ 457 in support. [23] In this regard, section 418 of the National Land Code provides: “418 Appeals to the Court

Any person or body aggrieved by any decision under this Act of the State Director, the Registrar or any Land Administrator may, at any time within the period of three months beginning with the date on which it was communicated to him, appeal therefrom to the Court.

Any such appeal shall be made in accordance with the provisions of any written law for the time being in force relating to civil procedure; and the Court shall make such order thereon as it considers just.

In this section "decision" includes any act, omission, refusal, direction or order.” [24] The facts show that such refusal is the decision of the Land Administrator in exercising its administrative function to endorse and/or execute a decision which had earlier been made under the National Land Code (the Approval under section 124 of the National Land Code obtained by Wassim). [25] The fact is that the Impugned Decision is in the furtherance of the decision made under section 124 of the National Land Code. Nothing in section 124 of the National Land Code states appeal to the court. This is contrary to other provisions of the National Land Code, specifically sections 37, 102, 134, 175F and 321 which specifically provide for an appeal to the court, under section 418 of the National Land Code. [26] Premised on the foregoing, this court opines that the Impugned Decision does not fall under the purview of section 418 of the National Land Code. This preliminary objection is hereby dismissed. Analysis [27] The applicant took the position that since the premium had been fully paid and accepted by the Gombak District and Land Office (and was not returned for the span of over two decades), the latter must accept the presentation by the former, the original Issue Document of Title for both Lot 2752 and Lot 2753, and to put into effect the Approval. [28] It was further argued that the Approval did not stipulate the submission of the original Issued Document of Title as a condition precedent. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that if the requirement for the original Issue Document of Title to be submitted was essential, it would have been stated as the first and main condition precedent in the Approval. The applicant described it, as merely a “by the way” request. [29] Citing subsection 124(8) of the National Land Code, the applicant argued that with Form 7G being issued, the only condition is the payment of premium and once it has been fully settled, the Approval becomes unconditional and there is no right available to the respondents to withdraw or cancel such approval. [30] The applicant too contended that the respondents are not authorised to arbitrarily and unilaterally revoke the Approval, more so when the premium paid was held for over 20 years. [31] The respondents contended that the requirement that Wassim to produce the original Issue Document of Title for both Lot 2752 and Lot 2753 is part of the condition in the Approval and the failure thereof would indicate that Wassim is no longer interested in proceeding with the variation of category of land use as well as the express condition. [32] Furthermore, the mere fact that the applicant had proceeded to purchase and effect the transfer of proprietorship for both the lands back in 2012 which were still in the category of “agricultural”, and subsequently its failure to name Wassim the present suit, indicate waiver and acquiescence on the part of the applicant. [33] As alluded to earlier, the requirement that the successful applicant Wassim is required to bring the original Issue Document of Title, upon the payment of the premium and rent imposed, is stipulated in Paragraph 6 of the Approval dated 8 May 2001, which is reproduced below: “6. Pihak tuan juga dikehendaki untuk membawa bersama hakmilik asal semasa membuat bayaran.” [34] The above Paragraph 6 was mentioned after Paragraph 5 which stipulated that “Sila ambil perhatian bahawa tindakan-tindakan susulan akan diambil oleh Pentadbiran ini hanya setelah tuan mengambil tindakan ke atas perkara 2.4 dan 4 (i) dan (ii) yang tersebut diatas.” [35] It is a pertinent to note that in Paragraph 6, the phrase “dikehendaki” (required) was used. The same wording was also being used at the beginning of Paragraph 4 (which was referred to in Paragraph 5), as follows: “4. Sekiranya tuan bersetuju dengan bayaran dan syarat-syarat yang tersebut diatas, tuan/puan adalah dikehendaki menjelaskan bayaran-bayaran yang berikut:” [36] Having considered the Approval, this court respectfully, finds it difficult to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that Paragraph 6 is mentioned in passing or by the way. This court finds that a similar wording is used in Paragraph 4 as with Paragraph 6 of the Approval namely the word “dikehendaki” (required). [37] The category of land use and express condition for both Lot 2752 and Lot 2753 remain the same. The authority was unable to effect the Approval as Wassim had failed to present together with the payment, the original Issue Document of Title. The Approval is applicable only to Wassim and the rights thereunder did not devolve or transmit to the applicant being the new owner. [38] The reason given on behalf of the Land Administrator for the Gombak district is consistent with subsection 124(7) of the National Land Code, which provides: 124 Power of State Authority to vary conditions, etc., on application of proprietor …

Upon approval by the State Authority under this section, the Land Administrator shall sign a memorandum in Form 7C in accordance with the direction of the State Authority and shall present the same, and on the memorial thereof being made, the Registrar shall make an entry on the register and issue documents of title to the land and shall note the date thereof and the authority therefor, and authenticate the same under his hand and seal of which the entry shall be made upon payment in accordance with subsection (8). [Emphasis added] [39] Subsection 124(7) of the National Land Code did not only mention the register document of title but also the issue document of title (which is currently in the possession of the applicant). For the purpose of the instant Application, both Lot 2752 and Lot 2753 were held under a Mukim grant (Geran Mukim), indicating that it is a Land Office Title. [40] In this regard, subsection 85(1) of the National Land Code reads: “85. Register and issue documents of title

For the purpose of the alienation of land under this Act under final title, there shall be prepared in accordance with section 86 or 87—

a register document of title, on the registration of which in accordance with section 88 the alienation shall take effect; and

an issue document of title, which shall be issued to the proprietor of the land in accordance with section 90.” [41] Section 87 stipulates the form of documents for the Land Office Title: “87 Form of documents for Land Office title In the case of land to be alienated under Land Office title—

the register document of title shall consist of a Mukim grant in Form 5D or a Mukim lease in Form 5E, according as the land is to be alienated in perpetuity or for a term of years, and shall be prepared in the appropriate book of the Mukim Register;

the issue document of title shall consist of a copy of the register document of title; and

both the register document of title and the issue document of title shall include a plan of the land, certified as correct by or on behalf of the Director of Survey and Mapping.” [42] Based on the abovementioned provision, there shall be only one register of title and an issue document of title for each and every piece of land, with the latter being a copy of the former. [43] Without the original of the Issue Document of Title being presented together with the payment of the premium, the Registrar of Titles be able would be unable to make an entry over the approval under section 124 of the National Land Code. [44] Moreover, Paragraph 6 of the Approval clearly stated that the original title deed (to wit, the Issue Document of Title) must be presented together with the payment of premium and rent. [45] In the considered view of this court, the authority cannot be expected to effect the approval of the variation of express condition and category of land use without the Issue Document of Title. To do so would have the effect of creating two conflicting versions of documents of title over one piece of land. This would be in contravention of the requirement that an Issue Document of Title (which is the copy issued to the registered proprietor under paragraph 85(1)(b) of the National Land Code) must be the copy to the Register Document of Title. [46] The applicant contended that the respondents having accepted the payment of the premium and rent cannot now take the position that the Approval cannot be put into effect simply for the reason that the title deeds were not presented with the payment. Learned counsel further relied on subsection 124(8) of the National Land Code to argue that it is the only condition precedent. [47] With respect to the learned counsel, subsection 124(8) of the National Land Code must be read together with subsection 124(7). The final part of subsection 124(7) of the National Land Code provides that “shall be made upon payment in accordance with subsection (8)”, indicating that the payment of the premium must be made simultaneously with the presentation of the original Issue Document of Title in order for the Registrar to be able to make such entry as may be necessary under subsection 124(7) of the National Land Code. [48] The applicant further argued that since the premium and rent had been fully paid and accepted by the relevant authority, the endorsement on the Issue Document of Title is merely administrative and of no significance. [49] In this respect, reference could be made to the case of Tan Sri Dato’ Lim Cheng Pow v Bellajade Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2021] 10 CLJ 183 where Rhodzariah Bujang FCJ stated the following: “[13] It is clear from that said provision that upon approval of the application for the said change, the State Authority would direct that the subject matter of the approval be endorsed on the land title. It is to be equally emphasised that s. 113(a) which we had reproduced earlier, in turn provides that the condition and restriction in interest on the land be subject to the changes which result from the granting of any application under s. 124(1). [14] From our reading and understanding of the above provisions, the NLC does not stipulate when is the effective date for the approval of the change in condition unlike that for alienation of land as provided in s. 78(3) and change in category of land use in s. 124(1)(a). In the absence of such specific provision, that effective date, in our view, would be when the same is similarly endorsed on the title. We say this because, firstly it is settled law that under the Torrens system, which our land law is subject to, that the register is, to repeat the word of Ali Ag CJ (Malaya) in Teh Bee v. K Maruthamuthu [1977] CLJU 134; [1977] 1 LNS 134; [1977] 2 MLJ 7 at p. 12 thereof, "everything" and therefore, the change of use of the land will only take effect upon its endorsement on the land title. This cited case concerns the appellant's claim as the registered land owner for vacant possession of her land which was occupied by the respondent. The respondent resisted the claim on the principal ground that the title was null and void. That was because the appellant had failed to pay the requisite fees imposed by the State Authority for alienation of the land to her and the time specified under the approval for her to do so had also lapsed. Nevertheless, the Federal Court gave her the relief she prayed for on account of the registration on the land title in her name as the registered landowner as aforesaid. Secondly, as held by this court in Toh Huat Khay v. Lim A Chang [2010] 7 CLJ 261; [2010] 4 MLJ 312, even if there was an approval by the State Authority to transfer the land but without the consequential mandatory requirements of s. 124(7) being carried out, to wit, the entry of a memorandum in Form 7C by the Registrar on the register and issue document of title of the approval to strike off or delete the restriction approved, that is insufficient to legalise the transfer since the restriction is still endorsed on the land title. This cited case concerns a restriction in interest endorsed on a temporary occupation licence issued to the deceased regarding the transfer of the land, but in spite of that restriction, the transfer was effected to the defendant after approval by the Land Administrator although there was no such entry being recorded on the land title. Thus, the Federal Court affirmed the High Court decision to set aside the transfer. This very same s. 124(7) is equally applicable to an approval for change in condition in these appeals because of the clear requirement in the said provision and when it is read with sub-s. (1)(c) and (4) which we had reproduced earlier. This we must do given the opening sentence of s. 124(7) which we have emphasised in a reproduction of that provision below. …” [Emphasis added] [50] Based on the foregoing excerpts, it could be concluded that the payment of premium and the acceptance thereof is not all that is required in order for the variation under section 124 of the National Land Code to be completed. There must be an endorsement for it to be effective, and the endorsement is based not only on the payment of the premium and rent, but also the presentation of the original Issue Document of Title for the purpose of it to be endorsed. [51] The facts is that there had since a change of ownership in both Lot 2752 and Lot 2753, and for the purpose of the instant application for judicial review, this court will consider the validity of the Impugned Decision as against the facts of the case. This is not a case where the presentation of Wassim was rejected by the Land Administrator. This is a case where it was presented by its successor in title namely the applicant. [52] Counsel for the applicant argued that the Approval did not stipulate that, to quote in verbatim “a change to the proprietorship of the land would have had the serious consequence of the Approval being revoked”. [53] In order to deal with this issue, it is pertinent to examine the contents of the First Reply Letter issued by the Gombak District and Land Office. It stated that based on the outcome of the Mesyuarat Kerajaan Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan ke-33/2013 which confirmed the outcome of the Mesyuarat Kerajaan Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan ke-34/2013, applications to vary the successful applicant’s name in the Approval will not be accepted. As a consequence, the Approval issued under the name of Wassim is revoked and withdrawn (terbatal dan ditarikbalik). [54] The facts too reveal that there is no attempt by the applicant to make any application to replace itself to the ones stated in the Approval. [55] This court opines that as the variation had not been endorsed on the Document of Title, then the variation has not been completed. The Approval cannot devolve into the name of the successor in title of the land in question. It is trite that Malaysia adopts the Torrens System where “registration is everything”. Any change of the condition or variation must be endorsed or effected in the land title. Conclusion [56] For the aforementioned reasons, this court is satisfied there is no illegality, irrationality, unreasonableness or procedural impropriety which would enable this court to allow this application for judicial review. This application is therefore dismissed with no order as to costs. Date: 27 March 2025 (SHAHNAZ BINTI SULAIMAN) Judge High Court of Malaya Shah Alam Counsels: For the Appellant: Kenny Chan Kean Li, Terence Naidu a/l V. Raja @Raja Naidu, Siti Syahaneem Sajali & Koh Shean Wai Tetuan Gibb & Co. Advocates & Solicitors No. 28A, (First Floor) Taman Ros, Jalan Sultan Abdullah, 36000 Teluk Intan, Perak Admin-ti@gibblawyers.com 05-623 2713 For the Respondents: Muhammad Shah Faris bin Kamarulzaman Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Selangor Kamar Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan, Tingkat 4, Podium Utara, Bangunan Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah 40512 Shah Alam, Selangor. +6 03 5544 7183