(iii) the back-dated 13 June 2023, which was when Enclosure 68 was filed. This range of dates indicated some confusion on the part of the Petitioner as to the correct point in time from which the Order should take effect. [23] In my view, when an effective date is not expressly stated in a court order, the default position is that the effective date is the date the court order was granted. Therefore, in this instance, the effective date would be 10 January 2024, the date when the decision was given on Enclosure 68. [24] A court order is generally intended to take effect immediately upon issuance, unless the order explicitly provides for a different timeline. The Petitioner’s reliance on alternative dates, such as the date of service on the Bank or the date of filing of Enclosure 68, seemed misplaced and without legal basis. While these other dates may pertain to procedural actions taken following the issuance of the Court Order, they did not influence or modify the effective date of the Court Order itself unless it was specifically stated. The Court Order’s effective date was central to its enforcement, and without any express provision to the contrary, it was presumed to take effect immediately. Thus, the Petitioner’s reliance on these alternative dates appeared to misconstrue the proper operation of the Court’s directive. [25] Furthermore, I found no valid justification for the Petitioner’s confusion or for her reliance on alternative dates. The absence of any ambiguity in the Court Order itself rendered the Petitioner’s stance perplexing and difficult to comprehend. 22 October 2024 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- _______________________________________________________________________ 11 Whether the words "Supermax Corporation Berhad, if any" should be removed from paragraph (a)(8) [26] Regarding the third clarification in this application, the Court Order explicitly stated that it applied solely to 50% of the assets held in the First Respondent’s name. [27] The First Respondent maintained that, even to this day, he does not own any shares in Supermax Corporation Berhad. On the other hand, the Petitioner failed to demonstrate to the Court that the First Respondent held shares in Supermax Corporation Berhad at the time the Court Order was issued. [28] It is trite law that the burden of proof lies with the Petitioner to show that the First Respondent holds shares in Supermax Corporation Berhad. In this instance, there was no evidence from the Petitioner to support the claim that the First Respondent holds shares in the company, and the official documents from both the Companies Commission of Malaysia (SSM) and Supermax Corporation Berhad, which are publicly available, do not indicate such ownership. [29] Consequently, I found myself in agreement with the First Respondent’s position that the inclusion of shares in Supermax Corporation Berhad within the scope of the Court Order was not sustainable from a legal standpoint. The reference to 'Supermax Corporation Berhad, if any,' implied uncertainty and lacked a concrete basis. This speculative inclusion introduced ambiguity into the Court Order, as it suggested the possibility of an asset that may or may not exist, which undermined the clarity and enforceability of the Court Order. 22 October 2024 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- _______________________________________________________________________ 12 [30] In judicial proceedings, clarity and precision are crucial to avoid misinterpretation or improper execution of court directives. Given that the existence of such shares was uncertain or unverified, their inclusion did not meet the threshold of certainty required for a valid court order. Therefore, in the interest of legal accuracy and fairness, this speculative reference to ‘Supermax Corporation Berhad, if any’ should be omitted from the Court Order. Whether the First Respondent could continue using bank account ending with numbers “2911” [31] In the fourth clarification, the First Respondent sought guidance from this Court if 50% of the funds purportedly frozen under the Court Order in one of the bank accounts ending with the numbers “2911”, could be transferred into a new fixed deposit account. The First Respondent proposed that this amount would remain untouched and unwithdrawn, ensuring it would not be used by him pending the final resolution of the Judicial Separation proceedings. [32] The First Respondent argued that he had experienced significant hardship due to the Bank's initial decision to impose a full freeze on the funds in his bank account, ending with the numbers “2911”, which served as his primary salary account. This complete freeze had directly impacted his financial stability, restricting access to his regular income and creating undue strain on his ability to meet personal and financial obligations. [33] The First Respondent emphasised that the freezing of his salary account, had caused severe difficulties, exacerbating the already 22 October 2024 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- _______________________________________________________________________ 13 challenging circumstances stemming from the ongoing legal proceedings. [34] The First Respondent further asserted that the purpose of seeking this clarification was not intended to alter the original intent of the Court Order. The First Respondent fully acknowledged that he remains prohibited from dealing with 50% of the funds in the said account in any manner. The clarification was sought solely to facilitate the practical operation of the bank accounts, ensuring that the management of funds could be streamlined without undermining the Court's directives. The request, he claimed, was aimed to prevent any unnecessary financial hardship, while still maintaining strict adherence to the terms set forth in the Court Order. [35] In my view, the First Respondent’s submission regarding the fourth clarification was untenable. The Court Order clearly and unequivocally prohibited the First Respondent from transferring, withdrawing, charging, encumbering, or otherwise disposing of 50% of his assets, including the funds in his bank accounts. This restriction was absolute and left no room for exceptions or modifications. The intent of the Court Order was to preserve the integrity of the assets during the legal proceedings, and any attempt to transfer funds, even under the guise of clarification, would violate the clear terms and spirit of the Court’s directive. [36] The First Respondent's submission, in essence, amounted to a re-litigation of issues that have already been addressed by the Court. Such an attempt to revisit and reargue matters that have been conclusively decided cannot be permitted. The Court's earlier rulings 22 October 2024 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- _______________________________________________________________________ 14 are binding, and reopening these settled issues undermines the finality of judicial decisions and the orderly administration of justice. [37] Consequently, the First Respondent’s submission must be rejected on the grounds that it improperly sought to re-litigate matters already resolved. Whether this Court was empowered to clarify and/ or to grant consequential orders [38] There were issues raised regarding the Court’s power to entertain this Application, on the basis of res judicata and functus officio. [39] In my view, it was crucial to highlight that this Court is empowered to grant a clarification and consequential order sought in this Application, pursuant to Order 20 rule 11 and Order 92 rule 4 of the Rules of Court, both of which read: Order 20 – Amendments Rule 11 – Amendment of judgment and orders Clerical mistakes in judgment or orders, or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission, may at any time be corrected by the Court by a notice of application without an appeal. ***** Order 92 – Miscellaneous Rule 4 – lnherent powers of the Court For the removal of doubt it is hereby declared that nothing in these Rules shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the Court to make any order as may be necessary to prevent injustice or to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court. 22 October 2024 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- _______________________________________________________________________ 15 [40] My attention was also brought to the Federal Court case of Stone World Sdn Bhd v. Engareh (M) Sdn Bhd [2020] 9 CLJ 358, where the court had outlined several principles. The judgment detailed various circumstances in which a court may issue an additional order after its initial sealed order. The following paragraphs are relevant: [17] There are limited and discrete situations where the court may make a further order subsequent to its previous sealed order. These situations include: