Notwithstanding section 51, when an order is issued by a court of the sums of money standing to the credit of a member of the Fund is 8 April 2025 11 matrimonial asset, the Board may, after being served with the sealed order, transfer the sum of money as ordered by the court from the account of a member of the Fund into the account of the receiver named in the order subject to any terms and conditions as prescribed by the Board. … [Emphasis added.] [27] It has also been established by case law, including Ching Seng Woah v Lim Shook Lin [1997] 1 CLJ 375 and Leow Kooi Wah v Philip Ng Kok Seng & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 133, that EPF is a matrimonial asset. [28] To firmly establish that the Employees Provident Fund (EPF) was unequivocally included as a divisible asset under paragraph (b) of the Court Order, a holistic reading of the Order leaves no doubt as to its status. Crucially, paragraph (a) of the same Order expressly listed the EPF under “aset-aset yang dinyatakan seperti berikut,” thereby explicitly classifying it as part of the matrimonial assets. This unambiguous enumeration serves a dual purpose: first, it eliminates any potential ambiguity regarding the nature of the EPF, and second, it confirms the Court’s intent to treat it as a distributable asset in the division. [29] Thus, the First Respondent’s EPF, by virtue of its express designation in paragraph (a), was incontrovertibly deemed part of the divisible assets. Any contention to the contrary would be untenable, as it disregards both the explicit language of the Court Order and the settled canons of interpretive certainty in legal instruments. 8 April 2025 12 [30] Given the clarity of the law and the consistent judicial approach toward EPF, there was no reasonable justification for the First Respondent to exclude them from disclosure. [31] This was further underscored by the fact that the First Respondent was represented by a firm of highly experienced and reputable family practitioners in Malaysia, who would have been well aware of the legal obligation to disclose all assets, including the First Respondent’s EPF. [32] Another instance of non-compliance by the First Respondent was his failure to provide a full and accurate disclosure of his assets. While he disclosed his shareholding and property holdings from the date of marriage up until the filing of the Judicial Separation in April 2022, he failed to account for his assets as they stood at the time of filing his Affidavit of Means or at the date of the Court Order. This omission was significant, as the relevant period for financial disclosure should have reflected his financial position at the time the Court required it, ensuring transparency and fairness in the proceedings. [33] The First Respondent countered by asserting that the Court Order contained material ambiguity concerning the operative date for asset disclosure. Specifically, he argued that the Order failed to provide explicit direction as to whether the disclosure should have reflected his financial position as of the filing of the Judicial Separation in April 2022, or whether the date should have been the filing his Affidavit of Means, as ordered by the Court. 8 April 2025 13 [34] The First Respondent maintained that his interpretation—while potentially differing from the Petitioner's position—was both objectively reasonable and made in good faith compliance with his disclosure obligations. He further emphasised that absent clear judicial direction on this critical temporal aspect, he should not be subject to penalties for adopting a plausible construction of the Order's requirements. [35] I found this contention untenable as it was my view that if the First Respondent had been genuinely uncertain about the required period for asset disclosure, the logical and appropriate course of action would have been to seek clarification from the Court. Notably, this was not an unreasonable expectation, as his Counsel had previously sought clarification from the Court in April 2024 regarding the interpretation of several other terms in the Court Order — one of which pertained to the effective date for freezing 50% of the funds in his account as ordered by paragraph (a) of the Court Order. [36] In Tan Bee Geok v. Thai Kim Sim (Lin Woon Fui – Party Cited) [2024] 8 AMR 854, which clarified the same Court Order, the effective date of the terms in the Court Order was explained in the following passage: [23] In my view, when an effective date is not expressly stated in a court order, the default position is that the effective date is the date the court order was granted. Therefore, in this instance, the effective date would be 10 January 2024, the date when the decision was given on encl 68. [24] A court order is generally intended to take effect immediately upon issuance, unless the order explicitly provides for a different timeline. The petitioner's reliance on alternative dates, such as the date of service on the bank or the date of filing of encl 68, seemed misplaced and without legal basis. While these other dates may pertain to procedural actions 8 April 2025 14 taken following the issuance of the court order, they did not influence or modify the effective date of the court order itself unless it was specifically stated. The court order's effective date was central to its enforcement, and without any express provision to the contrary, it was presumed to take effect immediately. Thus, the petitioner's reliance on these alternative dates appeared to misconstrue the proper operation of the court's directive. [Emphasis added.] [37] The Court Order unequivocally took effect on the date it was granted, namely, 10 January 2024. Since this effective date applied to all other terms of the Order, there was no logical basis for excluding paragraph (b). This inconsistency raised a fundamental question: if the First Respondent accepted that the Order’s date governed the other terms, why should paragraph (b) be interpreted differently? [38] Notably, when seeking clarification in April 2024, the First Respondent contended that the Petitioner’s reliance on alternative date, such as the date of service on the bank or the date of filing of Enclosure 68, was misplaced and lacked a valid legal foundation. After careful consideration, I had found the Fist Respondent’s argument during the hearing of the application for clarification to be well-founded and acceptable. [39] The principle of fairness necessitates consistency in the application of the Court Order across all its provisions. Since the First Respondent had insisted on a strict interpretation regarding the Petitioner’s reliance on dates, then by the same standard, the First Respondent must also adhere to a uniform application of the Court Order’s effective date. After all, what is sauce for the goose is sauce 8 April 2025 15 for the gander — fairness dictates that same rules must apply equally to both parties. Whether there was wilful refusal to comply with paragraph (b) of the Court Order [40] It was undeniable that the First Respondent had breached paragraph (b) of the Court Order as he had not denied it, but merely attempted to justify it by stating said that the term of the Court Order was vague and ambiguous. [41] This Court was mindful that contempt of court must be based on wilful refusal to comply with an order of the Court. This is based particularly on the words of Lee Hun Hoe (Borneo) CJ, where in citing the case of Fairclough & Sons v. Manchester Ship Cane Co. (No 2) [1897] WN 7 in T O Thomas v Asia Fishing Industry Pte Ltd [1977] 1 LNS 126 Ltd [1977] 1 MLJ 151 (“T O Thomas”), his Lordship had stated that ‘an order of court must have been contumaciously disregarded. It is no good if it is casual, accidental and unintentional.’ [42] Lee Hun Hoe (Borneo) CJ referred to "intention" in T O Thomas in the context of ensuring clarity and unambiguity in a court order. In the present case, paragraph (b) of the Court Order was unequivocal, and the First Respondent was fully aware of its meaning. [43] In T O Thomas, it was further stated by Lee Hun Hoe (Borneo) CJ, in the following passage: Intention is of no consequence in the matter of contempt by disobedience to a court order: A-G v. Walthamstow Urban District Council; [1895] 11 TLR 533. Stancomb v. Trowbridge Urban District Council [1910] 2 Ch. 190. In particular, Donovan LJ expressed his view 8 April 2025 16 clearly in Re A-G's Application, A-G v. Butterworth [1963] 1 QB 696 in these words: - I conceive the position, however, to be this. Regina v. Odham's Press Ltd [1957] 1 QB 73 ex parte A-G [1956] 3 All ER 494 makes it clear that an intention to interfere with the proper administration of justice is not an essential ingredient of the offence of contempt of court. It is enough if the action complained of is inherently likely so to interfere. [Emphasis added.] [44] My attention was also brought to the case of Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd v. Monatech (M) Sdn Bhd [2001] 4 MLJ 577 where it was held that ‘mens rea is not an ingredient to be proved in contempt proceedings’ and that ‘the corollary of there being no necessity to prove mens rea is that lack of intention does not prevent an alleged contemnor from being found guilty of contempt’. Thus, the First Respondent’s intention or lack of it as he claimed, would not negate his conduct which amounted to contempt of court. [45] The contention that the First Respondent’s conduct was a deliberate attempt at concealment was supported by his silence and inaction when confronted about his undisclosed accounts. Rather than addressing the concerns raised about his non-compliance with paragraph (b) of the Court Order, the First Respondent remained passive, offering no reasonable explanation for his failure to disclose these financial assets. In a matter as crucial as court-mandated financial disclosure, such an absence of response pointed not to an inadvertent omission, but to an intentional and deliberate act of withholding vital information. 8 April 2025 17 [46] Instead of rectifying his non-compliance, the First Respondent took a defensive stance, filing the Application to Set Aside in June 2024. Rather than demonstrating an intention to cooperate, he attempted to challenge the legitimacy of the committal proceedings against him. [47] After reviewing the Application to Set Aside, in September 2024, the Court dismissed it outright, deeming it frivolous and devoid of merit. This dismissal reinforced the view that the Application to Set Aside lacked a substantive legal basis and served no legitimate purpose other than to obstruct the committal proceedings. [48] Accordingly, I found myself in agreement with the Petitioner’s contention that the First Respondent’s move was a calculated delaying tactic designed to waste judicial time and evade accountability. By filing the Application to Set Aside, which was baseless and unsubstantiated, the First Respondent had deliberately prolonged the committal proceedings, creating unnecessary hurdles instead of addressing the core issue, which was his failure to comply with the paragraph (b) of the Court Order. [49] Moreover, even after being fully apprised of his breaches, the First Respondent took no steps to correct his non-compliance. Despite ample opportunity to provide full and accurate financial disclosure, he refused to take remedial action, demonstrating a blatant disregard for the Court’s authority. [50] To make matters worse, the First Respondent failed to issue even an apology for his failure to comply. Acknowledging wrongdoing—if not through substantive action, then at least through an expression 8 April 2025 18 of regret—could have signalled some willingness to rectify his conduct. Yet, his continued silence only reinforced his lack of accountability. [51] This persistent defiance ultimately substantiated the Petitioner’s argument that the First Respondent had wilfully refused to comply with the Court Order. [52] At this juncture, it was crucial to remember that the rule pertaining to committal should be applied in all its strictness. Any disregard of a court order is a grave matter. [53] ‘It is the plain and unqualified obligation of every person against, or in respect of whom, an order is made by a court of competent jurisdiction, to obey it unless and until that order is discharged. The uncompromising nature of this obligation is shown by the fact that it extends even to cases where the person affected by a court order believes it to be irregular or even void’ – per Romer LJ in Hadkinson v. Hadkinson [1952] 2 All ER 567. [54] It was undeniable that contempt of court is not about punishing someone for failing to comply with an order that benefits or harms the other party. Rather, it concerns actions that disrupt or undermine the integrity and authority of the judicial system itself. The principles of contempt apply equally to all, regardless of one's identity or position. [55] I found instructive the explanation by Arifin Zakaria CJ in the Federal Court in Tan Sri Dato’ Dr Rozali Ismail v Lim Pang Cheong [2012] 3 MLJ 1 in adopting the definition of contempt as stated in Oswald’s Contempt of Court: 8 April 2025 19 [20] In dealing with the applications to set aside the leave for committal proceedings, it is necessary for us to consider the law of contempt. A good starting point would be the definition of contempt of court itself. Oswald's Contempt of Court (3rd Ed), at p 6 gives a general definition of contempt of court as follows: To speak generally, contempt of court may be said to be constituted by any conduct that tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard, or to interfere with or prejudice parties, litigants, or their witnesses during the litigation. [21] The jurisprudence for arming the court with the power to punish a contempt is best expounded by Brown J in Re HE Kingdon v SC Goho [1948] MLJ 17 as follows: But the root principle on which this inherent power to punish for contempt is founded, and the purpose for which it must be exercised, is not to vindicate the dignity of the individual judge or other judicial officer of a court or even of the court itself, but to prevent an undue interference with the administration of justice in the public interest. [22] Hence, the power to punish a contempt is not derived merely from statute nor truly from common law but instead flows from the very concept of a court of law (see Borrie & Lowe's The Law of Contempt (3rd Ed), at p 465; and Master Jacob (1970) 23 Current Legal Problems 23). [Emphasis added.] [56] Following from the paragraphs above in Tan Sri Dato’ Dr Rozali Ismail v Lim Pang Cheong, it was, therefore, essential to underscore to all Parties that the First Respondent’s failure to comply with paragraph (b) of the Court Order was not a matter of preserving the dignity of this Court; rather, it is directly linked to the Court's authority to guarantee that the administration of justice is neither obstructed nor thwarted. 8 April 2025 20 [57] Reference was made also to the case of Lee Chang Yong v Teng Wai Yee [2017] MLJU 1841, where the rationale of the law of contempt was highlighted in the following passage: The object of the law of contempt is not to protect Judges and their dignity but to protect the rights of the public by ensuring that the administration of justice is not obstructed or prevented. To constitute contempt of court, there must be some “act done, or writing published calculated to bring a Court or Judge of the Court into contempt or to lower his authority” or “calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process of the Courts”. [Emphasis added.] [58] I also drew guidance from the case of Chandra Sri Ram v Murray Hiebert [1997] 3 CLJ Supp 518, where it was stated that the ‘Courts must fulfil its responsibilities by passing an appropriate sentence to reflect the extreme seriousness of the instant case, in particular, the respondent’s unrelenting interference with due administration of justice and the unmitigated culpability of the respondent as demonstrated in his article. Our courts would not be doing their duties and indeed would be acting against public interest, especially having regard to the facts and circumstances of the instant case, by imposing a mere fine’ – per Low Hop Bing J (as he then was). [59] Contempt of court is, therefore, less about an individual's personal failure to follow orders and more about the broader principle that the judicial system must be respected and able to operate without interference. No one, should be allowed to thumb their nose at any court order, regardless of his position. [60] In the final analysis I found the First Respondent’s conduct to be deliberate, intentional and a wilful refusal to comply with the term of 8 April 2025 21 the Court Order. It was also indicative of his impertinence and total disrespect to the administration of justice, which this Court took an extremely dim view of. Sentencing [61] The power of this Court to punish the First Respondent for contempt of court is found in article 126 of the Federal Constitution, and section 13 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, both of which read: Federal Constitution Article 126 – Power to punish for contempt The Federal Court, the Court of Appeal or a High Court shall have power to punish any contempt of itself. ****** Courts of Judicature Act 1964 Section 13 - Contempt The Federal Court, the Court of Appeal and the High Court shall have power to punish any contempt of itself. [62] The Petitioner argued that the circumstances of the case justified the imposition of a custodial sentence for the First Respondent due to his deliberate, intentional, and wilful refusal to comply with paragraph (b) of the Court Order. While it was undeniable that the First Respondent had indeed disobeyed the Court Order, it was emphasised that these proceedings should not be used as a platform for Parties to engage in personal vendettas. [63] The primary function of the Court is to administer justice impartially, not to be used as a vehicle for one party to exact revenge against 8 April 2025 22 the other. Consequently, any punishment imposed must serve the interests of justice rather than act as retribution for the Petitioner. The purpose of the contempt proceedings was not to vindicate the Petitioner but to uphold the Court’s authority and ensure compliance with its orders. [64] The Petitioner further argued that imposing a fine might prove ineffective as a form of punishment, given that the First Respondent’s financial standing would allow him to pay the amount without significant impact, effectively treating it as mere "loose change." [65] Although I acknowledged the Petitioner’s contention, it was my view that the focus of this Application should not be on the First Respondent’s financial capacity but rather on the seriousness of his non-compliance of the term of the Court Order. The punishment should reflect the gravity of the breach of the Court Order, rather than being determined by the First Respondent’s ability to pay. Conclusion [66] Accordingly, the Court imposed a fine of MYR20,000 for each of the three categories of non-compliance, amounting to a total fine of MYR60,000. The categories were as follows: (a) the First Respondent’s failure to fully disclose details of his bank accounts;