Tan Boon Thien v Tan Poh Lee (W-02(IM)(NCVC)-2540-12/2018)

LOW CHOW YENG (F) (NRIC NO.: 711029-10-5318) ... APPELLANTS

TAN POH YEE (NRIC NO.:731104-14-5140) ... RESPONDENTS [In The High Court of Malaya At Kuala Lumpur In The Federal Territory, Malaysia (Civil Division) Suit No. : WA-22NCVC-703-10/2018 > Between Tan Poh Lee (f) ... Plaintiff

Tan Boon Thien ... 1 $ ^{st} $ Defendant

Chew Phye Keat ... 2 $ ^{n d} $ Defendant

Tan Poh Hui (f)

Tan Poh Yee (f) ... 3rd Defendant

Low Chow Yeng (f) ... 4th Defendant ... 5th Defendant] CORUM: MARY LIM THIAM SUAN, JCA HAS ZANAH BINTI MEHAT, JCA VAZEER ALAM BIN MYDIN MEERA, JCA JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (ENCLOSURE 81) INTRODUCTION [1] This is the 1 $ ^{st} $ appellant's application to set aside the ex-parte order dated 25.07.2019 (Enclosure 71) granting leave to the $ ^{1st} $ respondent to commence committal proceedings against the $ ^{1st} $ appellant (Leave Order) and consequently, that the Notice of Motion dated 27.07.2019 (Enclosure 70) filed by the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ respondent for an Order for committal against the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ appellant be struck out. [2] The relevant cause papers are as follows:

Enclosure 71- Ex-Parte Order for leave for Committal Order dated 25.07.2019 (Leave Order);

(ii) Enclosure 70 - Notice of Motion dated 29.07.2019 for an order for committal;

(iii) Enclosure 81- Notice of Motion dated 06.08.2019 to set aside the Ex-Parte Order (Leave Order);

(iv) Enclosure 61 - Notice of Motion and Statement pursuant to Order 52 rule 3 of the Rules of Court 2012 dated 16.07.2019 (the Statement);

Enclosure 62- $ 1^{st} $ Respondent's Affidavit Verifying/In Support affirmed on 16.07.2019 (the $ 1^{st} $ Respondent's Affidavit (1));

(vi) Enclosure 66 -1 $ ^{1 \mathrm{st}} $ Respondent's Further Affidavit affirmed on 23.07.2019 (the $ 1^{ \mathrm{st}} $ Respondent's Affidavit (2));

(vii) Enclosure 82- $ 1^{st} $ Appellant's Affidavit affirmed on 06.08.2019 in opposing Enclosure 70 and supporting Enclosure 81 (the $ 1^{st} $ Appellant's Affidavit (1)); and

(viii) Enclosure 88 -1 $ ^{1 \mathrm{st}} $ Respondent's Affidavit in Reply affirmed on 09.08.2019 (the $ 1^{ \mathrm{st}} $ Respondent's Affidavit (3)). [3] We heard submissions on enclosure 81 on 20.8.2019 and we adjourned for our deliberation and decision. BACKGROUND FACTS [4] The $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ appellant, $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ and $ 3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ respondents are siblings and the lawful children of Tan Kim Choon (the deceased). The $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ appellant is the wife of the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ appellant. [5] Numerous disputes arose between the appellants and the respondents revolving around the deceased's estate. Various actions were filed at the High Court. One of them is Suit No. WA-22NCVC-703 10/2018 which was filed at the Kuala Lumpur High Court (KL probate action). [6] Pending the determination of the KL probate action, the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ respondent filed Enclosure 6, primarily pursuant to section 19 of the Probate and Administration Act 1959 for an order to appoint an Administrator Pendente Lite to administer the deceased's estate pending the determination of the KL probate action. The High Court allowed the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ respondent's application on 7.12.2018 (the High Court order). [7] Dissatisfied with the High Court order, the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ and $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ appellant filed an appeal to the Court of Appeal. [8] The $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ and $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ appellants filed applications for stay of the High Court order but the applications were dismissed by the High Court. [9] Both appellants on 4.1.2019 and 7.1.2019, filed applications in enclosure 10 and 18 respectively for stay of the High Court order or alternatively for an order that the status quo of the KL probate action to be maintained pending the disposal of the appellants' appeal. On 12.1.2019, the $ 2^{nd} $ and $ 3^{rd} $ respondents (the $ 3^{rd} $ and $ 4^{th} $ defendant in the High Court) filed application in enclosure 25 to intervene in the proceedings. [10] All three applications were fixed and heard together before this Court on 21.2.2019. There were no objections to enclosure 25 and we allowed the application with costs to follow the event. As for enclosures 10 and 18, an order for the interim preservation of assets as listed in Schedules A and B of enclosure 11 (the affidavit filed in support of enclosure 10) was allowed pending the disposal of the appeal (Stay Order). The order for an interim preservation of assets in the Stay Order reads as follows: "kesemua hartanah dan aset yang disenaraikan dalam Jadual A dan B (seperti dilampirkan) dipelihara sementara, di mana tiada pelupusan, pemindahan ataupun penyerahan hak aset-aset tersebut dibenarkan sementara menunggu pelupusan akhir rayuan ini" [All properties and assets listed in Schedules A and B (as annexed) be interim preserved, whereby no disposition, transfer or assignment whatsoever of the assets are allowed pending the outcome of this Appeal]. [11] On 10.5.2019, the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ appellant filed a suit in Singapore against HSBC Trustees International Limited (HSBC) who was holding trust monies in the accounts specified in item (k) of Schedule B (the Trust Account). The relief sought by the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ appellant in that suit is a declaration that the Trust has terminated (the Singapore HSBC suit). On 13.5.2019, the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ appellant filed an ex parte injunction in the same Singapore HSBC suit. One of the prayers sought by the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ appellant in that application is: "... that the following sum of RM6 million is disbursed from Account No 8212- 3153-5800-01 and/or such other account of the trust Accounts (as defined in the Affidavit of Tan Boon Tien affirmed on 7 May 2019 and filed in support therein)..." [12] The filing of the Singapore HSBC suit came to the knowledge of the $ ^{1st} $ respondent. To the respondents, the filing of the Singapore HSBC suit and especially the prayer sought in the injunction application by the $ ^{1st} $ appellant was a clear breach of the Stay Order and also an interference with the due administration of justice. The $ ^{1st} $ respondent then filed an ex parte application in enclosure 61 for leave to issue contempt proceedings against the $ ^{1st} $ appellant under O.52 r.2 of the Rules of Court 2012 (ROC 2012). [13] On 25.7.2019, this Court heard the application for leave (enclosure 61). On being satisfied that the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ respondent had made out a prima facie case against the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ appellant, this Court granted leave to the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ respondent (the Leave Order). [14] By enclosure 81, the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ appellant applied to set aside the Leave Order. THE 1ST APPELLANT'S CASE [15] The $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ appellant filed only one affidavit in support of both his applications to set aside the Leave Order and to oppose the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ respondent's application to commit him to prison. He relied on various grounds. However, learned counsel for the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ appellant in his submission, raised three (3) procedural grounds. Learned counsel submitted that the Leave Order obtained by the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ respondent was irregular and invalid as there were:

no notice to show cause given to the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ appellant under Order 52 Rule 2B of ROC 2012 prior to the filing of the leave application;

no cause papers were served on the Attorney General (AG); and

no consent was sought from the AG to commence committal proceedings against the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ appellant. [16] Learned counsel argued that by not giving the notice to show cause to the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ appellant before the filing of the application for leave, the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ appellant has been deprived of his right to defend himself right from the beginning. Hence, based on these grounds alone, the Leave Order granted on 26.07.2019 should be set aside and consequently enclosure 81 should be allowed and enclosure 70 should be dismissed. THE 1ST RESPONDENT'S CASE [17] Learned counsel for the 1 $ ^{st} $ respondent on the other hand replied that there is full compliance with all the procedural requirements in procuring leave from this Court pursuant to O.52 r.3 of the ROC 2012. In this regard, learned counsel contended that there was no requirement that the leave application must be preceded by a show cause notice that has to be personally served on the 1 $ ^{st} $ appellant. PROCEDURAL ISSUES [18] Based on the submissions, the procedural issues for our consideration are:

whether the service of notice to show cause under O.52 r.2B on the proposed contemnor is mandatory before any ex parte application for leave under O.52 r.3 can be properly made;

(ii) whether the AG's consent is required in contempt proceeding initiated by a party in a civil proceedings; and

(iii) whether the cause papers shall be served on the AG in the proceedings undertaken under para (ii) above. OUR DECISION

Whether a formal notice to show cause under O.52 r.2B is mandatory [19] In view of there being no case precedents shown to us that were either decided by this Court or the Federal Court on the effect of rule 2B as raised by learned counsel for the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ appellant, we are of the considered view that this issue merits our full consideration before we proceed to consider other grounds raised by the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ appellant in his affidavit in support. If we agree with the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ appellant's counsel submission, it may not be necessary at this stage for this Court to consider enclosure 70 on merit. [20] The enabling provisions in our law on the power to initiate any contempt proceedings is enshrined in Article 126 of the Federal Constitution and is similarly provided under section 13 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964. Both Article 126 and section 13 read as follows: Article 126. Power to punish for contempt The Federal Court, the Court of Appeal or a High Court shall have power to punish any contempt of itself.

Contempt The Federal Court, the Court of Appeal and the High Court shall have power to punish any contempt of itself. [21] On the procedural requirements to commence a contempt proceedings, it is apt for us to reproduce O.52 of the ROC 2012 which provides as follows:

Committal

..

Committal for contempt of Court (O.52 r.2) The Court may, on the application of any party to any cause or matter or on its own motion, make an order of committal in Form 107.

Contempt committed in the face of the Court (O.52 r.2A)

If a contempt is committed in the face of the Court, it shall not be necessary to serve a formal notice to show cause, but the Court shall ensure that the person alleged to be in contempt understands the nature of the offence alleged against him and has the opportunity to be heard in his own defence, and the Court shall make a proper record of the proceedings.

Where a Judge is satisfied that a contempt has been committed in the face of the Court, the Judge may order the contemnor to appear before him on the same day at the time fixed by the Court for the purpose of purging his contempt.

Where such person has purged his contempt by tendering his unreserved apology to the Court and the Judge considers the contempt to be not of a serious nature, the Judge may excuse such person and no further action shall be taken against him.

Where such person declines or refuses to purge his contempt, then the Judge shall sentence him.

Other cases of contempt (O.52 r.2B) In all other cases of contempt of Court, a formal notice to show cause why he should not be committed to the prison or fined shall be served personally.

Application to Court (O.52 r.3)

No application to a Court for an order of committal against any person may be made unless leave to make such an application has been granted in accordance with this rule.

An application for such leave must be made ex parte to the Court by a notice of application supported by a statement setting out the name and description of the applicant, the name, description and address of the person sought to be committed and the grounds on which his committal is sought, and by an affidavit, to be filed before the application is made, verifying the facts relied on.

Application for order after leave to apply granted (O.52 r.4)

When leave has been granted under rule 3 to apply for an order of committal, the application for the order must be made by notice of application to the Court, and, unless the Court granting leave has otherwise directed, there must be at least eight clear days between the service of the notice of application and the day named therein for the hearing.

Unless within fourteen days after such leave was granted the notice of application is filed, the leave shall lapse.

Subject to paragraph (4), the notice, accompanied by a copy of the statement and affidavit in support of the application for leave under rule 3 and the order granting such leave, must be served personally on the person sought to be committed.

Without prejudice to the powers of the Court or Judge under Order 62, rule 5, the Court or Judge may dispense with service of the notice under this rule if it or he thinks it just to do so. [emphasis added] [22] It is clear that based on O.52, there are two different sets of procedure to commence contempt proceedings depending on the nature or category of contempt in issue: r 2A is where the act of contempt is in the face of the court; and r 2B which deals with other forms of contempt. The case before us falls under the second category. [23] As a matter of history, r. 2A and r.2B were inserted to Order 52 of RHC 1980 on 21.9.2000 vide PU(A) 342/2000 as a result of amendments introduced by the Rules Committee established under section 16 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964. The same amended rules were adopted in our present ROC 2012. Similar provisions are not found in Singapore or India (Malaysian Civil Procedure 2015, Volume 1, page 689). [24] The 1st appellant's counsel submitted that the philosophy behind the introduction of r.2B appears to be that the proposed contemnor should be given an opportunity to explain himself to the putative applicant well before proceedings are launched. If the explanation is unacceptable, the Court may be moved and the explanation or the lack of it placed before the Court. It appears that this rule is intended to provide additional protection to the alleged contemnor. Counsel further submitted that based on the decided cases, it was held that procedural rules governing committal proceedings must be strictly adhered to as the liberty of the individual is at stake [Tan Sri Dato' (Dr) Rozali Ismail & Ors v. Lim Pang Cheong @ George Lim & Others [2012] 3 MLJ 458; Tan Sri G Darshan Singh v. Tetuan Azam Lim & Pang [2013] 5 MLJ 541]. [25] There was no dispute that all the cause papers filed under O.52 r.2 and the Leave Order were served on the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ appellant. It was served on 2.8.2019 to the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ appellant personally by the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ respondent's solicitors at the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ appellant solicitor's office (paragraph 6 of enclosure 88). However, learned counsel for the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ respondent admitted that no notice to show cause as envisaged under r.2B was served. In any case learned counsel submitted that the service of all documents under O.52 .r3 as required to be served under O.52 r.4 is to be regarded as sufficient form of the notice to show cause. Hence, the notice to show cause as required under r.2B is no longer necessary. The service of the cause papers and the Leave Order personally on the proposed contemnor are already sufficient safeguards and information for the contemnor to answer the charge against him. Further, there was no provision in relation to the manner, time limit and form to be used in the show cause procedure under rule 2B that are required to be adhered to. A stringent procedure is already provided for under O.52 r.3 and r.4. Therefore, rule 2B is actually superfluous. [26] We are mindful of the earlier decided cases before the amendment of the RHC 1980 that, the putative applicant was considered as having met all the threshold requirements for leave if:

all the cause papers required under O.52 r.2 have been complied with - see Kesatuan Pekerja-Pekerja Perusahaan Dunlop Malaysia v. Md Jaafar bin Abdul Carrim & Anor [1998] 2 MLJ 244, HC;

(ii) the application was made in the court where the contempt was allegedly committed - see Ipmuda Trading Sdn Bhd v. Khoo Kiat Piau t/a Ying's Trading Co & Arior [1996] 5 MLJ 637; and Karam Singh Veriah v. Karpal Singh [1988] 2 MLJ 603;

(iii) the grounds for which leave sought were particularized in the Statement and verified by the affidavit - see Helen Yeap Poh Sim & Ors v. Universal Trustee (M) Bhd [2001] 7 CLJ 14;

(iv) the Statement in support of the notice of motion was filed contained sufficient information as to what the alleged breach was, for the contemnor to know what the alleged contempt was against him and to enable him to meet the charge and prepare the defence - see Syarikat M Mohd v. Hahindapal Singh & Ors [1991] 2 MLJ 112; Arthur Lee Meng Kwang v. Faber Merlin Malaysia Bhd & Ors [1986] 2 MLJ 193. [27] In the case of TO Thomas v. Asia Fishing Industry Pte Ltd [1977] 1 LNS 126; [1977] 1 MLJ 151, the Federal Court ruled that in the matter of contempt arising out of disobedience to an injunction, the test is to ask whether the proposed contemnor knows of it. It need not be necessary that he should be served. The former Supreme Court in Puah Bee Hong & Anor v. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur & Anor (Robert Teo Keng Tuan, Intervener) & Another Case [1994] 2 CLJ 705 ruled that service of the relevant court order was not essential, for all that is required is for the proposed contemnor to have notice of the order said to have been breached. [28] In Nicholls v. Nicholls [1997] 147 NLJ 61, Lord Woolf MR expressed that if there is non-compliance with the procedural requirements which does not prejudice the proposed contemnor, setting aside the order purely on the grounds of technicality is contrary to the interest of justice. This was followed in Chandra Sri Ram v. Murray Hiebert [1997] 3 CLJ Supp 518; [1997] 3 MLJ 249]. The Supreme Court in Arthur Lee Meng Kwang v. Faber Merlin (M) Bhd & Ors [1986] 2 CLJ 109; [1986] 2 MLJ 193 had earlier expressed similar views, making a distinction between non-observance of rules and mere technical irregularity. [29] We noted that the above cases were decided before the amendment to O.52 RHC 1980 where rules 2A and 2B were introduced (now adopted by ROC 2012). The decision quoted to us by the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ respondent's counsel which was directly on point based on O.53 r.2B of the ROC 2012 is the High Court case of Tang Hak Ju v. Pengarah Tanah Dan Galian Pulau Pinang & Ors [2016] MLJU 696, where Lim Chong Fong JC (as he then was) as stated in the paragraph 45 of his lordship's judgment held, inter alia that the notice to show cause referred to in O.52 r.2B meant the documents referred to in O.52 r4 (3). To further support the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ respondent's position, learned counsel referred us to the meaning or definition of the term "notice to show cause" in Mitra's Legal & Commercial Dictionary (quoting from Black's Law Dictionary $ 8^{\mathrm{th}} $ edition). As an analogy, counsel also referred to other provisions of the former RHC 1980 and the ROC 2012 pertaining to the provisions to show cause. Counsel referred to O.49 r.12 in respect of garnishee proceedings and O.50 r.2 (2) in respect of charging orders. Based on these observations counsel submitted that the decision of Tang Hak Ju $ [supra] $ is the correct proposition of law even after r.2B was inserted in the ROC 2012 as opposed to the decision in IOI Pelita Plantation Sdn Bhd v. Lah Anyue Ngau & Ors [2015] 9 MLJ 278. [30] With respect, both counsel did not address us on the effect of the clear wording of rule 2B that is "a formal notice to show cause why he should not be committed to the prison or fined shall be served personally." [31] It is trite law that the statutory provisions should be given effect to its plain meaning. The word used in rule 2B is "shall". There are plethora of authorities on the meaning of the word "shall". Azizah Nawawi JC (now JCA) in Code Brialliant Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Heng Jeng Ki [2014] 6 CLJ 502, when her ladyship had to deal with the issue on whether the notice to convene the creditors' meeting to all its creditors is mandatory under section 260 of the Companies Act 1965; her ladyship opined that the use of the word "shall" in section 260 of the Act clearly imposes a mandatory statutory duty on the company to send the notice to all its creditors. In paragraph 27 of the judgment her ladyship stated the following: [27] The use of the word "shall" in s. 260 of Act 125 clearly imposes a mandatory statutory duty on CBSB to send the notice to convene the creditors' meeting to all its creditors. Therefore, the failure to send the requisite notices had deprived SNA Consult of its statutory right to attend the creditors' meeting. The failure to issue the statutory notice under s. 260 of Act 125 means that the creditors' meeting and all the resolutions passed during the meeting, including the appointment of the liquidators are a nullity. [32] Mary Lim J (now JCA) in ZAQ Construction Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Putrajaya Holdings Sdn Bhd [2014] 4CLJ 895, where her ladyship dealing with section 10 of the Arbitration Act 2005 stated that: [26] It will be appreciated that the language in sub-s. 10(1) is couched in mandatory terms with the use of the word "shall". Where the terms of sub-s. 10(1) are met, the court is obliged to stay court proceedings and refer the parties to arbitration... [33] In Azman bin Jufri v. Medtronic Australasia Pty Ltd & Another [2015] 5 CLJ 1026, this Court in the judgment of Vernon Ong JCA (now FCJ) which concerned r.18(1) of the Bankruptcy Rules 1969 where the mode of application is expressly stipulated in the following terms:

Applications to be made by summons in chambers.

Except where these Rules or the Act otherwise provide, every application to the Court shall, unless the Chief Justice otherwise directs, be made by summons in chambers supported by affidavit. (Emphasis added) His lordship opined that the order obtained by improper mode of proceedings was invalid. In Azman bin Juffri [supra] the judgment creditor had applied for the substituted service of bankruptcy notice and creditor's petition by notice of application instead of way of a summons-in-chambers as provided under r.18. In paragraph [38] of the judgment, his lordship stated the following: [38] We now return to the arguments on the correct mode of application. Applying the authorities cited above, it is settled law that the word 'shall' is mandatory and thereby imposes an obligation to comply with what is required to be done. We do not consider that since r.110 of the BR 1969 is silent on the mode of application, the applications made by notices of application are correct and regular. There is a clear stipulation in r.18(1) of the BR 1969 making it mandatory for an application to be filed by summons in chambers. In the circumstances, the filing of a notice of application by the JC as opposed to a summons in chambers is a clear breach of a mandatory provision. The breach is not a mere irregularity or formal defect capable of being cured. The application is in a sense the originating process upon which the JC seeks to obtain an order for substituted service. As such the wrong mode adopted by the JC undermines the very stratum of the application for substituted service itself and consequently, any order obtained thereunder must be equally tainted and rendered null and void. [34] Based on the foregoing reasons we are of the considered view that rule 2B requires mandatory compliance and its failure will render the subsequent proceedings invalid. We are of the view that the Rules Committee in its wisdom enacted rule 2B with the purpose that the proposed contemnor be given the first opportunity of answering to the notice to show cause before any application for leave is made. The leave application should be made only after the expiry of the period that the answer should be given and it is only when and where there is no reply or no satisfactory explanation given that any ensuing action is taken. Further, we say that as the result of contempt proceedings being criminal in nature involving the liberty of the proposed contemnor (see the Federal Court decision in Tan Sri Dato' (Dr) Rozali Ismail & 2 Ors v. Lim Pang Cheong @ George Lim & 4 Ors [2012] 2 AMR 429; [2012] 2 CLJ 849), any ambiguity and uncertainty must be resolved in favour of the alleged contemnor (see the Supreme Court decision in Huong Hai Hong & Anor v. MBf Holdings Bhd & Anor (and 3 Other Appeals) [1995] 4 CLJ 427). Thus, r.2B should be read in favour of the proposed contemnor. We therefore disagree with the High Court in Tang Hak Ju [supra] and prefer the view and approach in IOI Pelita Plantation Sdn Bhd v. Lah Anyue Ngau & Ors [supra]. [35] Based on the above reasons we also opine that failure to comply with r.2B is not curable under O.1A and O.2 of the ROC 2012.

whether the AG's consent is required in contempt proceedings initiated by a party in a civil proceedings; and

(ii) whether the cause papers should be served on the AG. [36] Learned counsel for the 1 $ ^{1 s t} $ appellant submitted that the consent of the AG should be sought in the light of Article 145 (3) of the Federal Constitution and section 376 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The reason being that the present proceedings are also of a criminal contempt, as there is an allegation of an interference with the due administration of justice. Counsel submitted that the AG stands in a constitutional role of guardian of public interest as a Public Prosecutor and also plays the function of disinterested prosecutor. Therefore, while a private individual was entitled to constitute contempt proceedings for criminal contempt, such individual was obliged to first consult the AG before commencing proceeding under r.3 or at least, to notify the AG in writing, of the proposed proceedings. It is then up to the AG as to whether his office will participate in the proceedings. Learned counsel suggested that we should adopt similar approach taken by the courts in Singapore and the United Kingdom. Counsel submitted on the Singapore case of Aurol Anthony Sebastian v. Sembcorp Marine Ltd [2013] 2 SLR 246 and the United Kingdom case of Attorney General v. Times Newspaper Ltd [1974] AC 273 at page 306. Hence, the Leave Order should be set aside as a matter of right as the papers were not served on and the consent of the AG was not sought. [37] Counsel admitted that both Singapore and the United Kingdom have statutory provisions that require the consent of the AG. Section 30 read together with section 3(1)(e) of the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016 of Singapore, and section 7 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 of the United Kingdom, both provide for the mandatory consent of the AG before the institution of any contempt proceedings. We find that there is no equivalent provision under our law, that contempt proceedings initiated by the parties in civil proceedings require the prior consent of the AG. Therefore, we disagree with learned counsel on this point. [38] A breach of a Court order amounts to civil contempt. A criminal contempt is where the Public Prosecutor initiates the action or where the contempt is in the face of the Court, and it is in that sense that the conduct in question interferes with the due administration of justice. [39] In our view, in the case of civil contempt, its exercise is largely to compel the contemnor to perform what is stipulated in a Court order, often for the benefit of the applicant. On the other hand, the overriding purpose of criminal contempt is more to uphold and vindicate the authority of the Court whereby the action may be initiated by the AG. It will be unreasonable if not impractical, if all contempt proceedings initiated by the concerned parties in any civil proceedings require the involvement of the AG. CONCLUSION [40] In view of the reasons we have set out in the foregoing analysis, we are constrained to hold that the ex parte application for leave to issue contempt proceedings against the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ appellant was not made in a proper manner. As such, the Leave Order granted on 25.07.2019 is invalid and should be set aside. Consequently, we allow enclosure 81. Dated: 30th October 2019 (HAS ZANAH BINTI MEHAT) Court Of Appeal Malaysia COUNSEL/SOLICITORS FOR THE 1ST APPELLANT: Vijaya Segaran together with him Nicole Wee, Norazali Nordin and Ling Li Ching (Messrs. Chooi & Company + Cheang & Ariff) FOR THE RESPONDENTS: For the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Respondent Michael Chow together with him Sunita Sankey, Wendy Yeong & Surachetth Jostsuwan (Messrs. Liza Khan & Sankey) For the $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ & $ 3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Respondents Ng Thiang Tuan together with him Keith Kwan, Chia Poh Yee & Tan Sin Yee (Messrs. Tuan, Mohd Zain & Co)