TAN CHENG KIT v Pendakwa Raya (J-05(SH)-507-11/2024)

Pendakwaan terhadap perayu bermula di Mahkamah Tinggi Johor Bahru di atas lima (5) pertuduhan seperti yang berikut: No. Kes J-05(SH)-507-11/2024 Bahawa kamu pada 03/01/2020, lebih kurang jam 1000 hrs, bertempat di alamat B-01-17B, Residensi Masai, Jalan Masai 2, Plentong di dalam Daerah Johor Bahru, di dalam Negeri Johor Darul Takzim, telah mengedar dadah berbahaya jenis 3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) dengan berat bersih 545.35gram, dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 39B(2) Akta yang sama. No. Kes J-05(SH)-509-11/2024 Pertuduhan Pertama Bahawa kamu pada 03/01/2020, lebih kurang jam 1000 hrs, bertempat di alamat B-01-17B, Residensi Masai, Jalan Masai 2, Plentong di dalam Daerah Johor Bahru, di dalam Negeri Johor Darul Takzim, telah didapati memiliki dadah berbahaya dengan berat bersih 1033.06gram Ketamine, oleh yang demikian kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 12(2) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 12(3) Akta yang sama. Pertuduhan Kedua Bahawa kamu pada 03/01/2020, lebih kurang jam 1000 hrs, bertempat di alamat B-01-17B, Residensi Masai, Jalan Masai 2, Plentong di dalam Daerah Johor Bahru, di dalam Negeri Johor Darul Takzim, telah didapati memiliki bahan dengan berat bersih 276.41gram yang mengandungi Kesan 3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) dan Ketamine, oleh yang demikian kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 12(2) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 12(3) Akta yang sama. Pertuduhan Ketiga Bahawa kamu pada 03/01/2020, lebih kurang jam 1000 hrs, bertempat di alamat B-01-17B, Residensi Masai, Jalan Masai 2, Plentong di dalam Daerah Johor Bahru, di dalam Negeri Johor Darul Takzim, telah didapati memiliki racun berjadual dengan berat bersih 535.18gram Caffeine, iaitu satu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 9(1) Akta Racun 1952 (disemak pada 1989) yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 32(3) Akta yang sama. No. Kes J-05(SH)-511-11/2024 Bahawa kamu pada 03/01/2020, lebih kurang jam 1000 hrs, bertempat di alamat B-01-17B, Residensi Masai, Jalan Masai 2, Plentong di dalam Daerah Johor Bahru, di dalam Negeri Johor Darul Takzim, telah didapati memiliki berat bersih 122.71gram Etizolam dimana Etizolam disenaraikan dalam Jadual Ketiga (bahan psikotropik) Akta Racun 1952 suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 30(3) Akta yang sama Akta Racun 1952 yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 32(5) Akta yang sama.

Perayu tidak mengaku bersalah terhadap kesemua pertuduhan-pertuduhan tersebut dan memohon untuk dibicarakan. Perbicaraan bagi kesemua kes ini telah dijalankan secara bersama di dalam satu perbicaraan.

Di akhir kes pembelaan, pada 29 Oktober 2024, perayu telah didapati bersalah dan disabitkan di atas kelima-lima pertuduhan tersebut dan dikenakan hukuman seperti berikut:

No. Kes J-05(SH)-507-11/2024: Hukuman pemenjaraan seumur hidup (30 tahun) mulai tarikh tangkap 3 Januari 2020 dan 12 kali sebatan rotan;

No. Kes J-05(SH)-509-11/2024:

Pertuduhan pertama: Tiga (3) tahun pemenjaraan mulai tarikh tangkap 3 Januari 2020;

(ii) Pertuduhan kedua: Tiga (3) tahun pemenjaraan mulai tarikh tangkap 3 Januari 2020; dan

(iii) Pertuduhan ketiga: Enam (6) bulan pemenjaraan mulai tarikh tangkap 3 Januari 2020.

No. Kes J-05(SH)-511-11/2024: Satu (1) tahun pemenjaraan mulai tarikh tangkap 3 Januari 2020.

Kesemua hukuman pemenjaraan berjalan secara serentak bagi kesemua pertuduhan.

Terkilan dengan keputusan tersebut, pada 1 November 2024, perayu memfailkan satu notis rayuan ke Mahkamah Rayuan terhadap sabitan sahaja terhadap pertuduhan mengikut seksyen 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 39B(2) Akta yang sama (Kes No:

Bertindak di atas maklumat yang diterima, pada 3 Januari 2020 lebih kurang pukul 10.00 pagi, Inspektor Shahrul Rizal bin Abd Kadir (SP2) beserta pasukan dari Jabatan Siasatan Jenayah Narkotik Ibu Pejabat Kontinjen Johor telah pergi ke tempat letak kereta di Tingkat 1 Residensi Masai, Jalan Masai Jaya 2, Plentong, Johor Bahru, Johor.

Apabila sampai di situ, SP2 dan pasukannya telah membuat pemerhatian terhadap sebuah kereta jenis BMW dengan nombor pendaftaran JNW 73 yang diletakkan di situ. Setelah membuat pemerhatian hampir 2 jam 30 minit telah datang satu

lelaki Cina (perayu) lalu membuka pintu kereta tersebut.

SP2 dan anggota pasukannya telah menyerbu ke arah perayu dan SP2 telah memperkenalkan dirinya sebagai pegawai polis kepada perayu. Pemeriksaan badan yang dilakukan terhadap perayu menjumpai satu (1) alat kawalan jauh kereta, satu (1) kunci berserta kad akses yang berada di dalam genggaman tangan kanan perayu.

Hasil pemeriksaan di dalam kereta tiada menjumpai apa-apa barang salah. Selanjutnya, perayu telah memandu arah SP2 dan pasukannya ke alamat rumah di No. B-01-17B di tingkat dan bangunan yang sama. Setelah sampai di alamat tersebut, perayu telah membuka kunci rumah tersebut dengan menggunakan kunci yang dijumpai pada perayu.

Setelah pintu rumah dibuka, SP2 dan anggota pasukannya telah membuat pemeriksaan di dalam rumah tersebut dan menjumpai bahan-bahan yang disyaki pelbagai jenis dadah seperti pil ecstasy, serbuk putih disyaki dadah ketamine, pil Erimin 5, rokok yang disyaki mengandungi ganja dan serbuk ecstasy dalam longgokan di atas lantai sebelah katil di ruang tamu rumah tersebut. Rampasan barang kes dan tangkapan terhadap perayu dibuat dan dibawa balik ke pejabat.

Kesemua barang kes telah diserahkan kepada Inspektor Syed Mohd Safrizat (SP5) pada tarikh yang sama pukul 6.45 petang. SP5 telah membuat serahan barang kes untuk dianalisis ke Jabatan Kimia Malaysia dan Liew Chyi ahli kimia (SP6) telah mengesahkan bahan-bahan mengandungi racun dan dadah berbahaya sepertimana pertuduhan terhadap perayu.

Pihak perayu menafikan dadah yang dijumpai oleh SP2 adalah miliknya bersandarkan kepada keterangan-keterangan berikut:

Ee Yong Seng tinggal di tempat kejadian dan perayu ke tempat kejadian bersama-sama Caroline Tan untuk memulangkan kunci kereta dan untuk meminta Ee Yong Seng memulangkan kunci rumah tersebut;

Sebelum ditahan, perayu dan Caroline Tan serta anaknya menunggu di kafe pangsapuri tersebut namun Ee Yong Seng tidak menjawab panggilan dan membalas mesej Caroline, lalu perayu berhasrat untuk pulang ke rumahnya di alamat No.19, Jalan Danau 22, Taman Desa Jaya, 81100 Johor Bahru;

Apabila perayu dan Caroline Tan berjalan ke arah kereta di tempat letak kereta, mereka telah ditahan oleh SP2 dan pasukannya dan perayu ada memberitahu SP2 bahawa kunci kereta adalah kepunyaan Ee Yong Seng dan kad akses dan kunci adalah kepunyaan Caroline Tan. Perayu tidak pernah ke rumah tersebut sebelum tangkapan dibuat ke atasnya.

Apabila dadah dijumpai, perayu memaklumkan kepada SP2 bahawa beliau tidak pernah ke rumah tersebut pada hari tangkapan dan Caroline Tan juga tidak tinggal di situ lagi.

Perayu tidak nampak dadah itu pada masa kejadian dan tidak mempunyai pengetahuan terdapat dadah dan racun di dalam rumah tersebut. Dadah dan racun tersebut berkaitan dengan Ee Yong Seng dan Caroline.

Di antara lain dapatan beliau adalah seperti yang berikut dan kami petik: “[54] Since the accused is presumed to be trafficking under s37(da) DDA, the accused will have to rebut the presumption on the balance of probabilities in respect of the charge for the case JA-45A-26-10/2020. In the case of JA-45A-27-10/2020 and JA-45A-160-12/2020, the accused will have to raise reasonable doubt as to whether he had direct possession of the drugs, poisons and psychotropic substance. [55] The accused elected to give sworn testimony from the witness box as well as tendered a witness statement (PSSD1). The brief facts as alluded to in his testimony can be summarised as follows:

He was helping his sister in a furniture business and also worked part time as a lottery ticket seller every Wednesday, Saturday and Sunday since 2010. He earned roughly around RM 1,000 a month.

At the time of the arrest he was living with Caroline Tan (Caroline) in a house at No 19, Jalan Danau 22, Taman Desa Jaya, 81100, Johor Bahru (Taman Desa Jaya House) which belonged to Caroline's mother. He had been in a relationship with Caroline since December 2019.

Before his relationship with Caroline, he was living with his parents at No 13A, Lorong Dua, Jalan Gajah, 28300 Triang, Pahang (Lorong Dua House).

He had moved in to help Caroline as she had just delivered her baby a month prior to that and was still in her confinement.

Caroline had rented the Apartment since June 2019 and was living in the Apartment with Ee Yong Seng (Yong Seng) before they broke up in November

After the breakup, Caroline had shifted out to the Taman Desa Jaya House and Yong Seng continued to stay on in the Apartment.

When the accused came to know that the Apartment was rented under the name of Caroline and the Car which was being driven by Caroline was in the name of Yong Seng, he told Caroline that she should return the Car to Yong Seng and to ask Yong Seng to vacate and return the access card and keys to the Apartment. Besides the set of keys and access card held by Yong Seng, there was another set of keys and access card with Caroline.

On 2.1.2020, Caroline had informed the accused that Yong Seng had agreed to a meeting at Residensi Masai on the 3.1.2020 at 10am to return the keys and access card to her and at the same time Caroline was to return the Car to Yong Seng. The accused told Caroline that he would go with her to help her to settle the matter.

On 3.1.2020, Caroline and the accused waited at the GC Parc Cafe until 11.30am. However, when there were no responses from Yong Seng to Caroline's phone calls or messages, they decided to go home as Caroline had her 2-month-old baby with her.

When they were in the carpark walking towards the Car, they were stopped by the police. The accused was arrested and the search of the accused's body and Car revealed no incriminating items. However, SP2 found the remote control for the car, Access card (P5B) and Apartment keys (PA) tied together in the Accused's right hand. In the accused pocket, SP2 found the accused's handphone and wallet which had his identification card, driver license and some cash in it. No search was carried out on Caroline.

When the accused and Caroline were asked about the P5A and P5B, they had informed SP2 that the Car belonged to Yong Seng and P5A and P5B were for the Apartment which was rented by Caroline. Thereafter the police directed Caroline and the accused to bring them to the Apartment.

Before the arrest, the accused had visited Caroline a couple of time prior to the arrest. He had done so at the request of Caroline who had quarrelled with Yong Seng. As ordered by SP2, the accused led the police to the block B lift lobby from the car park. It was Caroline who led SP2 and the police team to the Apartment. With the keys (P5A) from the accused, SP2 and the police team managed to unlock the door and gained entry into the Apartment.

Inside the Apartment, the accused saw SP2 found the drugs on the floor beside the bed. The accused was surprised and shocked as he has never been to the Apartment before and has no knowledge of the drugs found in the Apartment.

During the time when the accused was in remand for the drugs offences under s39B DDA, he was brought for further remand in the Magistrate Court, Johor Bahru, on 2 different occasions namely on 13.1.2020 for involvement in a kidnapping offence under s365 Penal Code (PC) and on 15.1.2020 for involvement in a murder offence under s 302 PC. It was during the remand under s302 PC that the accused had met Yong Seng for the first time. The accused did not know Yong Seng prior to this meeting.

Both he and Yong Seng were remanded together as they were both suspected to be in the same gang and involved in both the offences. However, the accused was never charged for the offences under s 365 PC nor s 302 PC. [56] The accused's defences consist of the following:

The accused does not stay at the Apartment but instead at Lorong Dua House.

It is the accused's contention that Yong Seng was staying in the Apartment and he had gone with Caroline to the Apartment on 3.1.2020 to take back the Keys (P5A) and access card (P5B) from him. However other than the testimony of SP4 (landlady) of the bank in slip for rental payments by Yong Seng which has been dealt with in para 34 above, the accused did not adduce any further evidence to support this contention. Like it is said "one swallow does not make a summer." The act of banking in the rental payment does not mean that he was staying in the Apartment at the material time. In SP4's testimony, she said that she only knew Yong Seng was the former boyfriend of Caroline.

(ii) The fact that Yong Seng was the former boyfriend of Caroline and had allowed Caroline to use the Car does not confirm that Yong Seng was staying in the Apartment at the time of the accused's arrest. More evidence would be required but none was adduced by the accused.

(iii) The accused had admitted in his witness statement PSSD1 and D25 that since December 2019 after Caroline and Yong Seng's relationship had broken up, she had shifted out from the Apartment and stayed at the Taman Desa Jaya House. Hence Caroline was not staying in the Apartment at the time of the arrest.

(iv) This would mean that the accused was the person staying in the Apartment. After all, SP4 had testified that she had seen the accused in the Apartment during her visits. Also, SD3 in her test report (D25) had confirmed the presence of the accused in the Apartment namely his DNA on a toothbrush (P6G1) and underwear of the accused (P6E1) as well as on a bedsheet (P6B1) and pillow case (P6D1).

The accused claimed that the police knew that he was staying at the Lorong Dua as shown in the police report D29 and D30 and not the Apartment. However, a perusal of D29 and D30 shows that the address of the accused stated in it was as per the particulars in his identity card.

(vi) Hence the accused's contention that the police knew that he was staying in Lorong Dua House and not the Apartment is not true. The address in the police report (D29 & D30) was obviously copied from the NRIC given to the police. As a formality the police would merely record the particulars as stated in the NRIC. In any event it is not unusual for someone to stay at a different address from that which is stated in NRIC. In fact, the accused himself had alleged in his defence that he was staying with Caroline in the Taman Desa Jaya House, and not in the Lorong Dua House. vii) It is interesting to note that in the police report lodged by the accused D15, the accused had stated that he had never been to the Apartment prior to the arrest.

(vili) The inconsistency between D15 and PSSD1 shows that the accused had shifted his testimony in an attempt to address the evidence adduced.

DNA of third parties found in the Apartment.

The accused had adduced the DNA test report (D25) which was carried out by the science officer Puan Adrianee Reeza Alwi (SD3). In D25, SD3 had confirmed the presence of the accused from the sample taken from the toothbrush (P6G1) underwear (P6E1), pillowcase (P6B1) and bed sheet (P6D1). In addition, SD3 had also confirmed that there was presence of DNA of a female from the same sample namely P6E1, P6B1 and P6D1 as well as from the toothbrush (P6F1).

(ii) Since it is not disputed that Caroline was in a relationship with the accused, the presence of DNA of a female in the Apartment is not surprising. Without the benefit of the blood sample from Caroline, there is no way to know whether the presence of the female as mentioned in D25 is that of Caroline or another person. However, there is no requirement that the accused must have sole possession of the drugs before he can be liable for trafficking in dangerous drugs. It has been decided that possession can be sole or joint.

(iii) It is also to be noted that although SD3 could derive the presence of an unknown female DNA from some of the items seized, no other unknown male DNA was derived. The Court cannot ignore the odds for the police to accurately pick up the items in the Apartment that contained the DNA of the accused and an unknown female DNA, and yet no other male DNA profile that could be positively derived. If the contention of the accused that Yong Seng had been staying in the Apartment is true, why was there not even one unknown male DNA that could be derived from any of the items tested for DNA especially in the bedsheet (P6B1) and pillow case (P6C1) and (P6D1). The case of Thivasalim a/l Abdul Majeed v Public Prosecutor [2014] 3 MLJ 124 cited by the accused's counsel can be distinguished. In that case, a partial male DNA profile was derived from the t-shirt and sweater which did not match the DNA of the accused.

(iv) The defence counsel also submitted that there were 4 shirts and 1 pants that were seized by the investigating officer but not sent for DNA analysis. The shirts and pants were actually seized for test- fitting as shown in P23. In any event after the test-fitting exercise, the DNA of the accused will remain on those shirts and pants.

As to the DNA found on the other pillow case (P6C1) which had the profile of 3 contributories, one of which is the unknown female and the other two contributories which could not be positively distinguished (D25).

Hence SD3 had explained that due to the incomplete profile of the DNA taken from P6C1, she could not positively distinguish whether the one of the contributors was the accused or someone else. However, it is interesting to note that SD3 did not derive any unknown male DNA as well.

(vi) The DNA tests which were carried out by SP3 on the intimate items like underwear (P6E1) and toothbrush P6G1 together with the identification by SP4 firmly placed the accused in the Apartment. [57] Looking at the evidence in totality, this court finds the evidence and explanation from the accused to be bare denials and an afterthought. A credible defence is a defence that raises a reasonable doubt on the Prosecution's case. Ultimately it is a question of fact whether the explanation as provided by the accused has a reasonable doubt. See the case of Azhar Lazim v. PP [2012] CLJU 262. The accused has failed to rebut the presumption of trafficking under s37(da) DDA on balance of probability and has failed to cast any reasonable doubt on the Prosecution's case. Conclusion [58] The prosecution has succeeded to prove the offences of trafficking under s.39B(1)(a) DDA, offences of possession under s. 12(2) DDA, offences of possession under s.9(1) and s.30(3) Poisons Act 1952 against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the accused is found guilty and convicted of the offences as charged in all charges in JA-45A-26-10/2020, JA-45A-27- 10/2020 and JA-45A-160-12/2022. Prinsip Undang-Undang Berkaitan Dapatan Fakta Di Peringkat Rayuan

Secara prinsipnya, mahkamah di peringkat rayuan jarang sekali campurtangan atau mengganggu dapatan fakta yang dibuat oleh hakim bicara melainkan terdapat alasan-alasan yang kukuh dan mendesak untuk berbuat demikian.

Di dalam kes PP v. Mohd Radzi bin Abu Bakar [2005] 2 MLRA 590, Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan seperti yang berikut: “Now, it settled law that it is no part of the function of an appellate Court in a criminal case or indeed any case - to make its own findings of fact. That is a function exclusively reserved by the law to the trial Court. The reason is obvious, an appellate Court is necessarily fettered because it lacks the audio-visual advantage enjoyed by the trial Court."

Di dalam kes Che Omar Mohd Akhir v. Public Prosecutor [2007] 3 CLJ 281, Mahkamah Persekutuan melalui penghakiman yang disampaikan oleh Nik Hashim HMP (beliau pada ketika itu) memutuskan seperti yang berikut: “It is trite law that an appellate court should be slow in disturbing a finding of facts by the trial judge unless such finding is clearly against the weight of evidence which is not the case here".

Di dalam kes Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v. Wendy Tan Lee Peng, Pentadbir Kepada Harta Pusaka Tan Ewe Kwang, Simati & Ors [2020] 12 MLJ 67, Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan seperti yang berikut: “[33] It was a long-settled principle, stated and restated in domestic and wider common law jurisprudence, that an appellate court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless satisfied that he was plainly wrong' (the Supreme Court of United Kingdom in McGraddie v. McGraddie and another [2013] 1 WLR 2477).

The 'plainly wrong' test operated on the principle that the trial court had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses on their evidence as opposed to the appellate court that acted on the printed records. The 'plainly wrong' test was not intended to be used by an appellate court as a means to substitute its own decision for that of the trial court on the facts. As long as the trial court's conclusion could be supported on a rational basis in view of the material evidence, the fact that the appellate court felt like it might have decided differently was irrelevant. In other words, a finding of fact that would not be repugnant to common sense ought not to be disturbed. The trial judge should be accorded a margin of appreciation when his treatment of the evidence was examined by the appellate courts (see paras 34, 76 & 148)."

Di dalam kes Magendran Mohan v. PP [2011] 1 CLJ 805, Mahkamah Persekutuan melalui penghakiman yang disampaikan oleh Alauddin Mohd Sheriff PMR (beliau pada ketika itu) memutuskan seperti yang berikut: "[140] Normally, the appellate court does not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact of the courts below, in absence of very special circumstances. But where the courts below ignore, overlook or commit errors of law apparent on the face of the record which results in serious and substantial miscarriage of justice to the accused, it is the duty of the appellate court to step in and correct the legally erroneous decision of the courts below."

Terdapat empat (4) isu utama yang diketengahkan oleh peguam perayu iaitu:

Pihak pendakwaan telah gagal untuk membuktikan bahawa perayu mempunyai kawalan dan jagaan terhadap dadah dan racun tersebut;

(ii) Pihak pendakwaan telah gagal untuk membuktikan bahawa perayu mempunyai pengetahuan terhadap dadah dan racun tersebut;

(iii) Keterangan perayu bukan suatu penafian (bare denial) atau bersifat pemikiran terkemudian (afterthought); dan

(iv) Kegagalan pihak pendakwaan untuk memanggil Caroline Tan sebagai saksinya telah menyebabkan inferens yang menentang mengikut seksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 terpakai terhadap pendakwaan. Dapatan Kami

(A) Kawalan, jagaan dan pengetahuan

Isu pertama dan kedua ini akan kami satukan kerana kedua-duanya (kawalan, jagaan dan pengetahuan) mempunyai pertalian yang sangat rapat yang sukar untuk dipisahkan.

Menyentuh mengenai kedua-dua isu ini, ingin kami tegaskan bahawa bahawa terdapat keterangan melimpah ruah yang membuktikan bahawa perayu mempunyai kawalan atau jagaan dan pengetahuan terhadap dadah ini. Dapatan ini dibuat berpaksikan kepada keterangan-keterangan yang berikut:

Perayu tidak menafikan bahawa semasa perayu ditangkap oleh SP2 kad akses (ekshibit P5A) dan kunci rumah (ekshibit P5B) berada di dalam genggaman tangan kanan perayu.

SP2 mengesahkan bahawa perayu telah memandu arah SP2 dan pasukannya ke rumahnya di Unit B-01-17B dan perayu sendiri yang telah membuka kunci rumah tersebut dengan menggunakan kunci rumah yang dijumpai pada dirinya.

Setelah pintu rumah dibuka, SP2 dan anggota pasukannya telah menjumpai pelbagai barang-barang salah dalam longgokan di atas lantai sebelah katil di ruang tamu rumah tersebut. Barang-barang tersebut adalah seperti berikut: i. Tiga (3) paket plastik lutsinar besar di dalamnya berisi pil-pil berwarna hijau berlogo katak disyaki dadah jenis pil ecstacy di mana setiap satu paket plastik berisi (1000) biji pil (jumlah keseluruhan 3000 biji pil) (tandaan D1 hingga D3) (anggaran berat: 984g) - (ekshibit P4(A1-A3); ii. Dua (2) paket plastik lutsinar besar di dalmanya berisi pil-pil berwarna biru berlogo tulisan cina disyaki dadah jenis pil ecstacy dimana setiap satu paket plastik berisi

biji pil (jumlah keseluruhan 2000 biji pil) (tandaan E1 dan E2) (anggaran berat: 540g) - (ekshibit P4(C1-C2); iii. Satu (1) paket plastik lutsinar besar di dalamnya berisi (570) biji pil berwarna merah berlogo Rolex disyaki dadah jenis pils ecstacy (tandaan F1) (anggaran berat: 214g) - (ekshibit P4E); iv. Satu (1) paket plastik lutsinar besar di dalamnya mengandungi serbuk putih disyaki dadah jenis Ketamin (tandaan G1) (anggaran berat: 122g) - (ekshibit P4G(1-7); v. Enam (6) paket plastik lutsinar besar di dalamnya mengandungi serbuk putih disyaki dadah jenis Ketamin (tandaan G2 hingga G7) (anggaran berat:

609.6g - (ekshibit P4G(1-7) ; vi. Dua (2) paket plastik lutsinar besar di dalamnya mengandungi hablur Kristal disyaki dadah jenis Ketamin (tandaan G8 hingga G9) (anggaran berat: 408g) - (ekshibit P41 (1-4); vii. Satu (1) paket plastik lutsinar besar di damanya mengandungi hablur Kristal disyaki dadah jenis Ketamin (tandaan G10) (anggaran berat: 140.8g) - (ekshibit P4l (1-4)); viii. Satu (1) paket plastik lutsinar besar di dalamnya mengandungi hablur Kristal perang disyaki dadah jenis Ketamin (tandaan G11) (anggaran berat:

101.7g) - (ekshibit P41 (1-4); ix. Empat (4) paket plastik lutsinar di mana setiap plastik berisi 50 batang rokok dipercayai rokok yang mengandungi dadah disyaki jenis Ganja, jumlah keseluruhan 200 batang rokok (tandaan H1 hingga H4) (anggaran berat: 150g) - (ekshibit P4K (1-4); x. Enam puluh

kerajang timah berwama merah/perak mengandungi (600) biji pil disyaki dadah jenis pil Erimin 5 (tandaan J1 hingga J60) (anggaran berat: 179g) - (ekshibit P4M(1-60); xi. Enam (6) paket plastik tertera tulisan Chinese Tea berwarna kekuningan/merah berisi serbuk disyaki dadah jenis serbuk Ecstacy (tandaan K1 hingga K6) (anggaran berat: 192g) - (ekshibit P40(1-6); xii. Satu (1) paket plastik tertera tulisan Tie Guan Yin berwarna kekuningan/putih berisi serbuk disyaki dadah kenis serbuk Ecstacy (tandaan K7) (anggaran berat: 32.1g) - (ekshibit P4Q); xiii. Satu (1) paket plastik tertera tulisan Tea Gift berwarna merah berisi serbuk disyaki dadah kenis serbuk Ecstacy (tandaan K8) (anggaran berat:

32.1g) - (ekshibit P4S); dan xiv. Satu (1) paket plastik tertera tulisan Chinese Tea Gift berwarna putih berisi serbuk disyaki dadah jenis serbuk ecstacy (tandaan K9) (anggaran berat:

30.4g) - (ekshibit P4U).

Hasil analisis Ahli Kimia di Jabatan Kimia Malaysia telah mendapati berat bersih dadah adalah seperti yang berikut:

3, 4 Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) – 545.35 gram;

Ketamine – 1033.06 gram;

Kesan 3, 4 Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) dan Ketamine – 276.41 gram;

Caffein – 535.18 gram (racun); dan

Etizolam – 122.71 gram (racun).

Berdasarkan kepada keterangan di atas, inferens yang boleh dibuat adalah perayu mempunyai akses sepenuhnya terhadap tempat kejadian tersebut. Perayu bukan sahaja telah memandu arah SP2, malah kunci yang dijumpai dalam gengaman tangannya telah membuka pintu unit B-01-17B iaitu tempat dimana dadah dan racun tersebut telah dijumpai. Tanpa pandu arah daripada perayu mustahil pihak polis boleh menemui dan merampas dadah dan racun ini.

Pegawai Sains DNA, Puan Aedrianee Reeza Binti Alwi (SD3) juga turut mengesahkan di dalam keterangan dan laporan kimianya (ekshibit D5) bahawa terdapat DNA perayu pada item- item yang dirampas oleh pihak polis di tempat kejadian tersebut. Di antaranya adalah seperti yang berikut:

satu berus gigi (ekshibit P6F1);

(ii) sehelai seluar dalam (ekshibit P6D1);

(iii) sehelai cadar tilam (ekshibit P6B1); dan

(iv) sehelai sarung bantal (ekshibit P6C1).

Meskipun tidak dinafikan bahawa laporan DNA (Eksibit D25) menunjukkan bahawa di antara enam (6) barang yang dihantar ke Jabatan Kimia Malaysia untuk dianalisis tersebut, terdapat lima (5) barang iaitu item ii (berus gigi bertanda 5) [Ekshibit P6F(1)], item iii (seluar dalam bertanda 4) [Ekshibit P6E(1)], item iv (cadar tilam bertanda 1 [Ekshibit P6B(1)] dan sarung bantal bertanda 3 [Ekshibit P6D(1)]) dan item v (sarung bantal bertanda 2 [Ekshibit P6C(1)]) mempunyai DNA kepunyaan "Female 1" iaitu satu perempuan yang tidak dikenali, namun keterangan ini tidak menidakkan ( negate) jagaan dan kawalan perayu terhadap rumah dan barang-barang salah yang ditemui di dalam rumah tersebut selaku penghuni rumah kerana semasa tangkapan hanya perayu sahaja yang berada di dalam rumah tersebut.

SP4 (Siti Norzarina Binti Abu Zarif) yang merupakan pemilik rumah kejadian mengesahkan bahawa Caroline Tan adalah penyewa pertama rumah tersebut dengan sewa sebanyak RM850.00 sebulan. Mengikut SP4 kali terakhir SP4 membawa perjanjian sewaan (ekshibit P20) untuk diperbaharui selama setahun lagi dan untuk ditandatangani oleh Caroline Tan adalah pada 10 Oktober 2019.

Bila SP4 sampai di rumah tersebut dan pintu rumah diketuk, SP4 nampak perayu berada di dalam rumah tersebut dan kelihatan baru bangun dari tidur dan duduk di atas katil. SP4 dapat mengecam perayu berdasarkan kepada tatu yang terdapat di bahagian tangan perayu.

Orang terakhir yang memegang kunci rumah tersebut adalah perayu sendiri dan bukannya Caroline Tan. Kali terakhir Caroline Tan datang ke rumah tersebut adalah pada akhir bulan Disember 2019. Perayu ditangkap pada 3 Januari 2020 semasa perayu berada di dalam rumah tersebut. Jelas terserlah perayu seorang sahaja yang mempunyai kawalan atau jagaan terhadap rumah tersebut semasa tangkapan dan rampasan berlaku.

Disimpulkan, berdasarkan kepada rampasan kunci rumah beserta kad akses serta penemuan DNA terhadap item-item yang di dalam tempat kejadian seperti yang dinyatakan diatas, inferens yang boleh dibuat adalah perayu mempunyai akses sepenuhnya terhadap tempat kejadian tersebut. Perayu bukan sahaja telah memandu arah SP2, malah kunci rumah yang dirampas dari perayu telah digunakan untuk membuka pintu unit B-01-17B iaitu tempat di mana barang salah tersebut dijumpai. Tanpa pandu arah daripada perayu, adalah mustahil pihak polis boleh menemui dan merampas barang-barang salah ini. Sudah terang lagi bersuluh perayu mempunyai kaitan rapat dengan tempat kejadian serta dadah dan racun yang ditemui di tempat kejadian.

SP5 (Inspektor Syed Mohd Safrizat bin Syed Abdullah / Pegawai Penyiasat) juga mengesahkan tidak menjumpai pakaian wanita di dalam rumah tersebut semasa siasatan dibuat oleh beliau di tempat kejadian. Tiada barang peribadi Caroline Tan ditemui di tempat kejadian. SP5 di dalam siasatannya terhadap Caroline Tan mengesahkan bahawa sejak bulan Mei 2019 Caroline Tan telah tidak lagi tinggal di rumah tersebut, cuma kadang-kadang sahaja beliau ada datang ke situ.

Menyentuh mengenai elemen pengetahuan pula, inferens bahawa perayu sahaja yang menghuni di rumah tersebut adalah konsisten dengan tindakan / kelakuan perayu yang membuka pintu rumah itu dengan menggunakan kunci rumah yang ada padanya bukan hanya penting untuk membuktikan perayu mempunyai kawalan atau jagaan terhadap rumah tersebut tetapi relevan juga untuk menunjukkan pengetahuan perayu terhadap dadah yang dijumpai dalam keadaan terbuka di atas lantai di sebelah katil di ruang tamu rumah.

Tingkah laku perayu selepas tangkapan seperti yang telah dijelaskan di atas adalah berkaitan (relevant) mengikut seksyen 8 Akta Keterangan 1950. Justeru itu, adalah menjadi kewajipan perayu untuk memberikan penjelasan yang munasabah kepada mahkamah tentang kelakuannya itu mengikut seksyen 9 Akta yang sama.

Di dalam kes G Vasan Gunasegaran v. PP [2018] 1 LNS 1604, Mahkamah Rayuan melalui penghakiman yang disampaikan oleh Mohd Zawawi Salleh HMR (beliau pada ketika itu) menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “[26] It was clearly proved that the appellant was the sole occupant of WXV 8540 and was having the sole control of the vehicle from at about 4.00 p.m, until the time of his arrest whilst at the driver's seat inside the vehicle at about 5.20 p.m. by PW3 and his team. The keys and remote were recovered from the appellant. He was in physical proximity to the plastic bags containing the impugned drugs. All these factors, taken together, showed that the appellant could have dealt with the impugned drugs, though he was not the owner of the vehicle. For the same reason, the appellant was thus also having custody or control of the two plastic bags containing the said drugs. drugs (see PP v. Abdul Rahman Akif (supra); Parlan Dadeh v. PP [2008] 6 MLJ 19; Khairuddin Hassan v. PP [2010] 6 MLJ 145 and Aedy Osman v. PP [2011] 1 CLJ 273).” [27] The presence of the two plastic bags inside the vehicle which were under the exclusive control of the appellant at the material time, and the fact that he needed to guard the plastic bags, must necessarily give rise to a strong inference that the appellant had the requisite knowledge that the two plastic bags contained the said drugs. As said by the Federal Court in PP v. Abdul Rahman Akif (supra): “…again knowledge cannot be proved by direct evidence, it can be proved by inference from the surrounding circumstances. Again the possible variety of circumstances which will support such an inference is infinite...”

Di dalam kes Parlan Dadeh v. PP [2009] 1 CLJ 717, Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan seperti yang berikut: “[22] Reverting to the present case, it is therefore incumbent upon the court to scrutinize the entire evidence before the court to see whether an inference can be drawn against the respondent that he knew about the drug in the three packages found in the car. It is not in dispute that the three packages were found hidden in the car under the driver's seat and under the front passenger's seat. He was alone in the car at the material time. One other important factor of relevance is that the car had been in his possession for the past seven months prior to his arrest. [23] It is true that the trial judge did not make any finding on the issue of knowledge necessary to establish possession of the drugs, as he relied on the cautioned statement in coming to his finding. The Court of Appeal on the facts correctly found that there was sufficient evidence to find the respondent to be in custody and control of the three packages found in the car and relying on the presumption under s. 37(d) of the Act the Court of Appeal went on to hold that the respondent was in presumed possession of the drug. [24] Applying the observations set out in the authorities cited above to the facts in the present case, the irresistible inference that may be drawn in the circumstances is that the respondent all along knew about the drug found in the car. The fact that they were found hidden under the seats of the car and wrapped in Chinese newspaper would not assist him to negate such an inference. From the evidence of PW5 it is clear that little effort was required to uncover what was contained in the three packages. Therefore, we are of the view that on the facts and in the circumstances of this case the learned trial judge, properly directed on the law, would have come to the finding that prima facie the respondent had possession of the drug independent of the statutory presumption under s. 37(d) of the Act. … [38] In this case the reaction of the appellant in looking stunned or shocked upon being approached by the police is clearly admissible under s. 8 since it has a direct bearing on the fact in issue as the drugs found were tucked away in the front of the jeans worn by him. The explanation for his reaction must therefore be offered by he himself as required by s. 9. The court cannot, on its own, offer an explanation for his reaction. However, in his defence the appellant did not offer any explanation at all for his reaction upon being approached by the police. It can therefore be validly used as evidence against him. The inference to be drawn from the evidence of conduct of the appellant against the background of the other evidence is that he knew what he was carrying (see DPP v. Brooks [1974] 2 All ER 840). It follows that the stand taken by the appellant in relation to the evidence of conduct is not sustainable. Be that as it may, the evidence of conduct in this case is not very significant in view of the manner in which the appellant carried the drugs on his person from which it can reasonably be inferred that he had knowledge of the drugs in his possession (see the cases referred to earlier, and, in particular, Tunde Apatira & Ors v. PP [2001] 1 CLJ 381 and PP v. Abdul Rahman Akif [2007] 4 CLJ 337).”

Peguam perayu yang bijaksana menghujahkan bahawa tindakan perayu yang tidak cuba untuk melarikan diri semasa kejadian malahan telah dengan sukarela menunjukkan rumah tersebut kepada SP2 membuktikan bahawa perayu tiada pengetahuan mengenai dadah yang dijumpai di dalam rumah tersebut.

Dengan hormatnya kami tidak bersetuju. Sewajarnya ditekankan bahawa anggota pasukan serbuan termasuk SP2 adalah seramai sepuluh (10). Pada hemat kami, dengan jumlah seramai itu pastinya perayu tidak mempunyai peluang atau ruang untuk membolos dirinya daripada kepungan dan kawalan pihak polis.

Di dalam kes Teh Hock Leong v. PP [2010] 1 MLJ 741, 745, Mahkamah Persekutuan melalui penghakiman yang disampaikan oleh James Foong HMP (beliau pada ketika itu) memutuskan seperti yang berikut: “[4] First, he contended that the High Court and the Court of Appeal had failed to consider the contemporaneous conduct of the appellant in not trying to escape or putting up a struggle with the police when confronted by PW5 and his men or attempting to disassociate or discard the backpack containing the dangerous drugs. Such conduct, if considered by the courts below, could infer that the appellant had no knowledge of the said drugs in the backpack. [5] It is our view that in order to draw a favourable inference from the appellant’s contemporaneous conduct, his action or inaction must be examined in the light of the situation at the material time. The area where the appellant was confronted by PW5 was the arrival gate of an incoming flight in the KLIA. This was the only exit point where passengers disembarking the plane can enter the KLIA terminal. It is common knowledge that the area was tight and restricted with hardly any room for the appellant to make a successful escape even if he had tried. From here the appellant was then taken by PW5 and his men to PW5’s office in the KLIA. The approximate walking distance was 600–800 metres. Here again the appellant’s chances of a quick getaway were minimal since he was escorted and was within the restricted vicinity of the KLIA building. And, if the appellant were to attempt to throw away or disassociate himself with the backpack during this entire duration described it would evidently be noticeable. Of course, since the drugs were so cunningly concealed, there could be no necessity to take such drastic actions which may attract instant suspicion. So, against these circumstances, the appellant’s docile conduct throughout the period described could not have inferred an absence of knowledge of the said drugs. For this reason there is no misdirection by the courts below.”

Di dalam kes Public Prosecutor v. Badrulsham bin Baharom [1987] 1 LNS 72 [1987] CLJU 72, Lim Beng Choon H memutuskan seperti berikut: “It is appropriate at this stage for me to deal with two further points raised by the learned defence counsel in his submission. First, he drew the attention of this court to the fact that the accused did not put up a struggle or make any attempt to run away. The short answer to this point is that from the evidence I am satisfied that the accused had no opportunity to do so as he was suddenly surrounded by PW3 and PW5 before he could even begin to realize that he was in danger of being arrested. As he was caught red-handed with the dangerous drugs in his possession and he had knowledge of the said drugs, what else could he do apart from saying that there was nothing in the bag. In the present case, the prosecution had clearly established that the accused was in actual physical custody and control of P3 and its contents. From the totality of the evidence, the prosecution had also clearly established that the accused had the necessary knowledge of P6A-H and the nature of the dangerous drugs in question.”

(B) Sama ada keterangan perayu suatu penafian atau bersifat pemikiran terkemudian

Peguam perayu yang bijaksana menghujahkan bahawa perayu menafikan dadah yang dijumpai oleh SP2 adalah miliknya. Selain itu, perayu juga mengatakan bahawa dia tidak nampak dadah tersebut pada masa kejadian dan tidak mempunyai pengetahuan terdapat dadah dan racun di dalam rumah tersebut. Dadah dan racun tersebut berkaitan dengan Ee Yong Seng dan Caroline Tan.

Dengan hormatnya kami tidak bersetuju. Ini bersandarkan kepada keterangan-keterangan berikut:

Selain slip transaksi pembayaran sewa dengan nama Ee Yong Seng (bekas teman lelaki Caroline) tiada keterangan lanjut dari pembelaan yang menunjukkan bahawa Ee Yong Seng tinggal di rumah kejadian. Ini diperkuatkan dengan keterangan bahawa hanya DNA perayu dan ‘unknown female’ sahaja ditemui seperti di sarung bantal (ekshibit P6C1). Tiada DNA ‘unknown male’ yang dikesan di rumah kejadian terutamanya pada cadar dan sarung bantal. SP2 turut mengesahkan bahawa beliau tidak pernah mendengar nama Ee Yong Seng sebelum ia dibangkitkan oleh pihak pembelaan di mahkamah. SP5 juga mengesahkan bahawa sepanjang siasatan beliau, nama Ee Yong Seng tidak pernah ditimbulkan termasuklah siasatan beliau terhadap Caroline Tan.

Selepas hubungan Caroline Tan dan Ee Yong Seng berakhir, Caroline Tan telah berpindah dari rumah tersebut ke rumah Taman Desa Jaya. Oleh itu, Caroline Tan tidak lagi tinggal di situ semasa serbuan oleh pihak polis di rumah tersebut. Ini bermakna hanya perayu seorang sahaja yang tinggal di rumah tersebut.

Alamat perayu di dalam laporan polis (ekshibit P12) yang dibuat oleh SP2 adalah alamat yang diambil daripada kad pengenalan perayu iaitu di No. 13-A, Lorong 2, Jalan Gajah, 28300, Triang, Pahang. Alamat perayu ini juga bersamaan dengan alamat perayu di dalam ekshibit D29 dan D30. Namun begitu, pada hemat kami bukanlah sesuatu yang ganjil atau aneh untuk seseorang itu tinggal di alamat yang berbeza dari alamat di dalam kad pengenalannya sepertimana yang berlaku di dalam kes ini.

Perayu di dalam laporan polis yang dibuatnya pada 12 Februari 2023 (ekshibit D15) menyatakan bahawa dia tidak pernah pergi ke rumah B-01-17B tersebut sebelum tangkapan dibuat. Namun begitu, semasa pemeriksaan utama, perayu menyatakan pula bahawa dia pernah pergi ke rumah tersebut beberapa kali sebelum ditangkap. Di dalam keterangannya semasa pemeriksaan utama, perayu mengatakan seperti berikut: “S : Encik Tan adakah kamu pernah pergi ke rumah B-01-17B maksud saya selain daripada hari tangkapan, pernah ke kamu pergi ke rumah tersebut? Pernah Yang Arif beberapa bulan sebelum saya ditangkap. 1-2 kali saya pernah pergi ke rumah tersebut.” (Kandungan 8 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2 (2))

Penafian perayu berkenaan keberadaannya di rumah tersebut juga amat bercanggah dengan keterangan DNA perayu yang dikesan ada pada berus gigi, seluar dalam, cadar dan sarung bantal yang diambil di rumah tersebut yang ternyata berpadanan dengan perayu.

Tidak mungkin perayu boleh memandu arah SP2 dan anggota pasukan serbuan ke rumah tersebut dan membuka pintu rumah tersebut dengan menggunakan kunci yang dikatakan tidak pernah digunakannya.

Pengecaman oleh SP4 (saksi bebas) terhadap perayu yang dilihat baru bangun daripada tidur dan duduk di atas katil di rumah tersebut membuktikan perayu sememangnya tinggal di situ. Keterangan SP4 ini telah berjaya mematahkan pembelaan perayu yang menafikan pernah tinggal di rumah tersebut.

Laporan polis yang dibuat perayu pada 12 Februari 2023 (ekshibit D15), tiga (3) tahun selepas perayu ditangkap di mana perayu menafikan ada tinggal di rumah tersebut sebelum tangkapan adalah suatu pemikiran terkemudian. Alasan kelewatan yang diberikan oleh perayu amat sukar untuk kami terima. Perayu di dalam keterangannya semasa pemeriksaan balas di Kandungan 8 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2 (2) di m/s 216-217 menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “S : Kenapa kamu lambat untuk buat laporan polis ini ? Kerana peguambela saya yang sebelum ini tidak ada memberitahu saya apa-apa berkenaan dengan kes ini. Dan selepas itu pada tahun 2022 peguambela yang baru pada masa itu tanya saya apa sebenarnya yang berlaku pada hari tersebut. Dan kemudian saya memberitahu kesemuanya kepada peguam dan akhirnya dia beritahu ia adalah berlainan dengan apa yang dirakam oleh polis. S : Sebab kamu ambil masa 3 tahun untuk buat laporan polis. Sebelum itu kamu memang tak ada usaha untuk buat apa-apa? Ya Yang Arif kerana sebelum itu saya tidak ditunjuk apa-apa rakaman percakapan.”

(C) Kegagalan pihak pendakwaan memanggil Caroline Tan sebagai saksi pendakwaan

Peguam perayu yang bijaksana menghujahkan bahawa kegagalan pihak pendakwaan memanggil Caroline Tan sebagai saksi pendakwaan telah menyebabkan inferens yang menentang mengikut seksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 terpakai terhadap perayu. Dengan hormatnya kami tidak bersetuju. Dapatan ini dibuat bersandarkan kepada keterangan-keterangan berikut:

Walaupun Caroline Tan juga ditangkap bersama perayu di tingkat 1, tempat letak kereta di Residensi Masai, namun beliau bukan merupakan seorang saksi yang penting kerana pada hari tangkapan, Caroline Tan tidak tinggal lagi disitu. Justeru itu, rampasan dadah dan racun tersebut tiada kaitan dengan Caroline Tan atau Ee Yong Seng.

Perayu mengakui di dalam penyataan saksinya (ekshibit PSSD1) dan ekshibit D25 sejak Disember 2019 selepas hubungan Caroline Tan dan bekas teman lelakinya berakhir, Caroline Tan telah berpindah dari rumah tersebut ke rumah Taman Desa Jaya. Ternyata Caroline Tan tidak tinggal di situ semasa hari kejadian.

Mengambilkira keterangan DNA (ekshibit D25) dan keterangan SP4 yang mengesahkan perayu tinggal di rumah tersebut, maka ketiadaan keterangan Caroline Tan di Mahkamah dan kegagalan untuk memanggilnya tidak menyebabkan wujudnya kelompangan di dalam kes pendakwaan.

Justeru itu, kami memutuskan bahawa inferens yang menentang mengikut seksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 tidak terpakai terhadap pendakwaan.

Di dalam kes Amri Ibrahim & Anor v. PP [2017] 1 CLJ 617, Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan seperti yang berikut: “[56] The issue of the non calling of Phee Chin Guan was argued before the Court of Appeal by the defence. The Court of Appeal held inter alia that Phee Chin Guan was not an essential or material witness to the prosecution in order to establish a prima facie case at the close of its case or to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt at the end of the defence case and the non calling of Phee Chin Guan did not leave a gap in the prosecution's case. It was also held that on the facts of the case, the learned trial judge did not err in not invoking s. 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 against the prosecution. [57] The power of the court to draw an adverse inference under s. 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 is discretionary. It depends on the circumstances of the case and particularly in cases where the material witnesses are not produced (see Lau Song Seng v. PP [1998] 1 SLR 663]. The scope of s. 114(g) has been explained by the Supreme Court in Munusamy Vengadasalam v. PP [1987] 1 CLJ 250; [1987] CLJ (Rep) 221 at p. 223; [1987] 1 MLJ 492 at p. 494: ... It is essential to appreciate the scope of section 114(g) lest it be carried too far outside its limit. Adverse inference under that illustration can only be drawn if there Is withholding or suppression of evidence and not merely on account of failure to obtain evidence. It may be drawn from withholding not just any document, but material document by a party in his possession, or for non-production of not just any witness but an important and material witness to the case. [58] On the facts of the case we agree with the finding of the Court of Appeal that adverse inference under s. 114(g) of the Evidence Act ought not to be drawn against the prosecution for not calling Phee Chin Guan as its witness. We agree with the reasons given by the Court of Appeal.”

Di dalam kes Ghasem Hozouri Hassan v. PP [2018] 6 CLJ 133, Mahkamah Persekutuan melalui yang penghakiman yang disampaikan oleh Md Raus Sharif KHN (beliau pada ketika itu) memutuskan seperti yang berikut: “[47] Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the prosecution's failure to call or explain the non-calling of Javad @ Hasan Tiren and Samaneh Momen had resulted in 'huge gaps' in the prosecution's case. In light of this, learned counsel submitted that an adverse inference pursuant to s. 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 should be invoked against the prosecution. [48] The law pertaining to s. 114(g) of the Evidence Act is settled. Under s. 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950, the court may presume that evidence which could be and is not produced would if produced be unfavourable to the person who withholds it. The usage of the word 'may' gives the discretion to the court whether or not to invoke the adverse inference to a given set of facts. It is not a mandatory inference. To draw an adverse inference against the prosecution, the court must be satisfied that the witness that was not offered was a material witness, the prosecution purposely withholds evidence which it possessed and which was always available; and that what the prosecution did was done with an ulterior motive to frustrate the defence. (Nanda Kumar Kunyikanan & Anor v. PP [2011] 8 CLJ 406). [49] The aforesaid authority above set out is the correct position of the law, that is, court will not invoke an adverse inference against prosecution if it believes that the facts and/or the prosecution's reasons for not calling the supposed material witnesses show no cause for it. Moreover, the prosecution only needs to produce witnesses who are necessary in the unfolding of its complete narrative, that is, to prove the essential elements of the crime and in this case, custody, control, and knowledge. Applying the above principles to our present case, we are satisfied that there was no evidence to suggest even the slightest inkling that the prosecution withheld testimonies by Javad @ Hasan Tiren and Samaneh Momen in a deliberate scheme to impair the truth or frustrate the appellant's defence. [50] Further, in the case of Siew Yoke Keong v. PP (supra) this court had succinctly laid down that witnesses for prosecution are indispensable only insofar as they are necessary in establishing a prosecution's case beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, any calling of witness beyond that minimum requirement is within prosecutorial discretion. In the end, it is the sufficiency of the evidence that matters. As long as there are no unsatisfactory features or gaps in the prosecution's case, an order of adverse inference is not imperative. It is our view, on the facts of this case, adverse inference under s. 114(g) of the Evidence Act, could not be invoked against the prosecution.”

Setelah meneliti keseluruhan keterangan yang dikemukakan di peringkat kes pendakwaan dan pembelaan, adalah menjadi dapatan kami bahawa keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh saksi-saksi pendakwaan ternyata utuh dan tiada keraguan munasabah yang telah berjaya ditimbulkan oleh pihak pembelaan terhadap kebenaran kes pihak pendakwaan.

Kami juga mendapati pihak pembelaan telah gagal untuk mengakas anggapan mengedar dadah berbahaya mengikut seksyen 37(da) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952.

Dengan itu, kami sebulat suara memutuskan bahawa rayuan perayu terhadap sabitan tidak bermerit untuk mewajarkan kami mengganggu atau campurtangan terhadap keputusan yang telah dibuat oleh Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman yang bijaksana.

Sabitan adalah selamat untuk dikekalkan. Rayuan perayu terhadap sabitan ditolak. Tarikh: 26 Januari 2026 - Sgd - Azmi bin Ariffin Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia Kaunsel Bagi Perayu : Low Huy Theng [H.T. Low (Petaling Jaya)] Bagi Responden : Noor Farhana Binti Adham [Timbalan Pendakwa Raya]