TAN HOO ENG v Ng Siew Wee (A-05-561-12/2022)

The appellant (Appellant) was charged in the Ipoh Sessions Court (SC) with various offences under the Penal Code and Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 (SC Case).

The Appellant applied to the Ipoh High Court to transfer the SC Case to the High Court (Appellant’s Transfer Application) under s 417(1)(a), (b) and/or (e) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC).

The learned High Court Judge dismissed the Appellant’s Transfer Application (High Court’s Decision).

The Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal against the High Court’s Decision [Appeal (Court of Appeal)].

When the Appeal (Court of Appeal) was first heard (1st Panel) on 12.1.2021, the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor (DPP), Puan Hanim bt. Mohd. Rashid (1st DPP), raised a preliminary objection that the Appeal (Court of Appeal) was incompetent (PO).

The Appellant alleged that the 1st Panel stated that the 1st Panel was prepared to hear the merits of the Appeal (Court of Appeal). The 1st DPP then informed the 1st Panel that she was prepared to withdraw the PO but she applied for an adjournment of the hearing of the Appeal (Court of Appeal) (DPP’s Adjournment Application). This was because the 1st DPP had not filed any written submission to oppose the Appeal (Court of Appeal) on its merits.

The DPP’s Adjournment Application was allowed by the 1st Panel.

When the Appeal (Court of Appeal) was heard by a second panel (2nd Panel), DPP Ms. Ng Siew Wee (Putative Respondent) did not withdraw the PO and proceeded to oppose the Appeal (Court of Appeal) based on the PO.

The 2nd Panel accepted the PO and dismissed the Appeal (Court of Appeal) [Court of Appeal’s Decision (PO)].

The Appellant appealed to the Federal Court against the Court of Appeal’s Decision (PO) [Appeal (Federal Court)].

The Appeal (Federal Court) was allowed and the Court of Appeal was ordered to hear the Appeal (Court of Appeal) on its merits. B. Ex parte application by the Appellant in the Court of Appeal (Court Enc. 31)

In Court Enc. 31, the Appellant filed an ex parte notice of motion for leave of the Court of Appeal to cite the Putative Respondent for contempt of the Court of Appeal as follows:

the Putative Respondent had deliberately, willfully and intentionally misled the Court of Appeal with regard to the PO and the Appeal (Court of Appeal);

the Putative Respondent had “approbated and reprobated” in respect of the PO; and

the Putative Respondent had obstructed and interfered with the due administration of justice in the Appeal (Court of Appeal) by maintaining the PO which led to the Court of Appeal’s Decision (PO). C. Issues

On 23.5.24, when Court Enc. 31 was heard, we posed the following five questions to the Appellant’s learned counsel:

whether O 1 r 2(2) of the Rules of Court 2012 (RC) bars the application of RC in Court Enc. 31;

can the Putative Respondent rely on the rebuttable presumption in s 114(e) of the Evidence Act 1950 (EA) that all the acts of the Putative Respondent regarding the PO as a DPP were regular;

whether the equitable doctrine of estoppel apply in criminal cases;

s 376(3) CPC provides that all DPPs, including the Putative Respondent, “shall be under the general control and direction” of the Public Prosecutor (PP). Hence, any complaint regarding a DPP’s “misconduct” should be made to the PP and not by filing committal proceedings in court against the DPP in question; and

committal proceedings should only be invoked as a last resort. Is Court Enc. 31 a last resort for the Appellant in this case? [5 Questions (Court)].

The Appellant’s learned counsel had submitted, orally and in writing, regarding the 5 Questions (Court). In other words, in accordance with the second rule of natural justice, the Appellant had exercised her right to be heard in respect of the 5 Questions (Court).

In addition to the 5 Questions (Court), a sixth issue arose from the Appellant’s appeal to the Federal Court [Appeal to Federal Court (Court Enc. 31)] against this decision of the Court of Appeal in Court Enc. 31 [Court of Appeal’s Decision (Court Enc. 31)], namely, whether the Appeal to Federal Court (Court Enc. 31) is competent under s 87(1) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (CJA) on the following two grounds:

the subject matter of Court Enc. 31 was not a “criminal matter”

the Court of Appeal’s Decision (Court Enc. 31) was not made in the Court of Appeal’s “appellate jurisdiction in respect of any criminal matter decided by the High Court in its original jurisdiction” as required by s 87(1) CJA. D. Court Enc. 31 was heard on an “opposed ex parte” basis

Although Court Enc. 31 was an ex parte application, the Court of Appeal had a discretion to allow the learned DPP, Datin Asmah binti Musa, to attend and present written as well as oral submission to assist the Court of Appeal to decide Court Enc. 31 in a just manner. When the court allows a defendant, respondent or putative respondent to appear in an ex parte application, the ex parte application becomes an “opposed ex parte application”. This is clear from the following two judgments of the Court of Appeal:

the decision of Hasnah Hashim JCA (as she then was) in Mukhriz Mahathir v Datuk Seri Mohd Najib bin Tun Hj Abdul Razak (putative contemnor) & Anor [2018] 3 MLJ 715, at [9(a)], [18] and [24]; and

it was decided in Edisijuta Parking Sdn Bhd v TH Universal Builders Sdn Bhd & Anor [2025] 5 MLJ 524, at [28], as follows - “[28] In an Ex Parte Application, the Court of Appeal has a discretion to adopt any one of the following three options (3 Options):

the Court of Appeal may proceed to hear the Ex Parte Application (1st Option);

the Court of Appeal may direct the Ex Parte Application to be heard as an “opposed Ex Parte Application” (2nd Option). The exercise of the 2nd Option is illustrated in the following judgment of Hasnah Hashim JCA (as she then was) in the Court of Appeal case of Mukhriz Mahathir v Datuk Seri Mohd Najib bin Tun Hj Abdul Razak (putative contemnor) & Anor [2018] 3 MLJ 715, at [9(a)], [18] and [24] - “[9] The determinative issues in this appeal are as follows:

whether the learned judge erred when he heard the matter as opposed ex parte; … [18] In order for the court to be able to make a fair and just decision all the relevant facts must be before it. In an ex parte application, there must be full and frank disclosure of material facts by the applicant. The applicant must only make submissions in support of the application and also highlight potential arguments against the grant of the application, including the facts that are likely to be raised by the proposed alleged contemnor in objecting to the application if it were an inter parte application. Whilst O 52 r 3 of the ROC provides that an application must be made ex parte the court nevertheless still retains the discretion to order that the matter be heard inter-parte with the necessary directions if the circumstances so warrant and this discretion must no doubt be exercised judiciously. … [24] Hence, the learned High Court judge cannot be faulted for ordering that the matter be heard as opposed ex parte. Based on the above cited authorities the approach taken by the High Court judge is not without precedent. Therefore, on the first issue we find no error on the part of the High Court judge in deciding to hear the matter as an opposed ex parte.” (emphasis added). When the Court of Appeal exercises its discretion to hear an Ex Parte Application on an “opposed ex parte” basis -

learned counsel for the respondent or putative respondent (X) is invited by the Court of Appeal to be present and to assist the Court of Appeal on issues of law and/or fact with regard to the Ex Parte Application as the Court of Appeal considers just and appropriate (Court’s Invitation). Needless to say, it is entirely up to X to attend the hearing of the Ex Parte Application [Hearing (Ex Parte Application)]. No adverse inference can be drawn against the respondent or putative respondent if X does not accept the Court’s Invitation. Notwithstanding the fact that there is no Court’s Invitation, there may be two instances where X may be present at the Hearing (Ex Parte Application), namely -

X is expressly informed by the applicant’s solicitors of the Hearing (Ex

(ii) for whatever reason, X happens to know of the Hearing (Ex Parte Application) and consequently, X attends the Hearing (Ex Parte Application) [2 Instances (Opposed Ex Parte)]. In the 2 Instances (Opposed Ex Parte), the Court of Appeal still has a discretion to proceed with the 1st Option. In such an event, X must leave the Hearing (Ex Parte Application);

the respondent or putative respondent is not entitled to file any affidavit to oppose the Ex

if X is present and has submitted at the Ex Parte

any order made by the Court of Appeal at the Ex Parte Application is still an ex parte order; and

(ii) the respondent or putative respondent is entitled to apply subsequently to the Court of Appeal pursuant to r 49 RCA to set aside the ex parte order; or

by virtue of r 50 RCA, the Court of Appeal may direct the Ex Parte Application to be heard as an inter partes application (3rd Option).” (emphasis added). OUR DECISION E. Does O 1 r 2(2) RC bar the application of RC in Court Enc. 31?

The Appellant had relied on, among others, O 52 RC, as one of her bases to file Court Enc. 31.

O 1 r 2(2) RC provides as follows: “O 1 r 2 Application

…

These [RC] do not have effect in relation to proceedings in respect of which rules have been or may be made under any written law for the specific purpose of such proceedings or in relation to any criminal proceedings.” (emphasis added).

We accept the submission by the Appellant’s learned counsel that committal proceedings [Court Enc. 31 which had been commenced by the Appellant in the Appeal (Court of Appeal)] are not “criminal proceedings” within the meaning of O 1 r 2(2) RC. In this regard, we adopt the following judgment of the Court of Appeal by Vazeer Alam Mydin Meera JCA (as he then was) in Uthayakumar Ponnusamy v Abdul Wahab Abdul Kassim (Pengarah Penjara Kajang) & Ors [2020] 1 CLJ 82, at [18], [19], [24] and [26]: “[18] The appellant contended that both CA No. 1 and CA No. 2 have to be revisited on grounds that the Court of Appeal in both cases had erroneously applied the [RC] in its determination, when according to the appellant, these Rules are not applicable to contempt proceedings emanating from criminal proceedings. In this regard, learned counsel for the appellant has referred to O. 1 r. 2(2) [RC] that states: … The appellant argued that since the orders alleged to have been breached emanate from criminal proceedings, ie, a criminal appeal, which is governed by the [CPC], then it would necessarily follow that the breach of such orders would amount to criminal contempt. Learned counsel for the appellant therefore submitted that the [RC], which is applicable only for civil proceedings, has no application. However, the learned Senior Federal Counsel appearing for the first respondent contended otherwise and submitted that by virtue of the Federal Court’s affirmation of the Court of Appeal’s decision in CA No. 1, the learned High Judge had correctly exercised his discretion in refusing the reinstatement motion. The learned Senior Federal Counsel further argued that the [RC] is applicable to the contempt proceedings initiated by the appellant as it is not a criminal contempt but rather civil in nature. Our Decision [19] We are unable to accept the appellant’s contention. It is well established that contempt of court can be classified into two distinct categories, that is, civil or criminal. See the Federal Court’s decision in Tan Sri Dato’ (Dr) Rozali Ismail & Ors v. Lim Pang Cheong & Ors [2012] 2 CLJ 849. … [24] Hence, we do not find any merit in the appellant’s contention that the application for contempt grounded on the alleged breach of the High Court’s directives/orders contained in the letter dated 12 December 2013 is criminal contempt, merely because it arose from criminal proceedings. In fact the orders were not made in the course of the criminal proceedings relating to the appeal against sentence, and has no bearing to the criminal charge, conviction or appeal at hand. We find that it is at best a complaint of civil contempt which is governed by O. 52 [RC]. The mere fact that the contempt complained of emanates from a criminal proceeding does not, without more, make it a criminal contempt. Proceedings for contempt are separate and distinct from the proceedings as regards the main matter before the court, be it civil or criminal. If the contempt proceedings are initiated by an aggrieved or affected party against a party in breach to enforce the order, then, it would with limited exception, be inevitably a civil contempt and the proceedings are civil in nature. Thus, O. 52 [RC] is applicable. And that is the case here. … [26] Having regard to the above, since the present motion for contempt by the appellant was party initiated, whether it be categorised as civil or criminal contempt, it was entirely correct for the learned High Court Judge to have held that the procedural requirements under O. 52 [RC] must be strictly adhered to. This was also the finding of the Court of Appeal in CA No. 1, which was subsequently affirmed by the Federal Court. The appellant argued that O. 52 [RC] has no application to his application for reasons discussed earlier. However, the fact that the appellant had applied for ex parte leave to commence committal proceedings is in itself an acknowledgment by the appellant that the applicable procedure is that which is stipulated in O. 52 [RC]. Further, when queried as to what other procedures were available in law to handle an application for contempt, other than that provided in O. 52 [RC], learned counsel for the appellant was unable to show us any. Hence, the applicable procedure when the court is moved for contempt by the Attorney General or an interested party is that which is found in O. 52 [RC]. The process has to start with a formal show cause notice under O. 52 r. 2B [RC].” (emphasis added).

The Rules of the Court of Appeal 1994 (RCA) are silent regarding the procedure for committal proceedings which have been filed in the Court of Appeal. In view of this lacuna in RCA, r 4 RCA allows the application of O 52 RC for contempt of court proceedings which have been instituted in the Court of Appeal (such as Court Enc. 31).

We have not overlooked Datin Asmah’s reliance on the following judgment of the Federal Court delivered by Arifin Zakaria CJ in Tan Sri Dato’ (Dr) Rozali Ismail & Ors v Lim Pang Cheong & Ors [2012] 3 MLJ 458, at [24]: “[24] Contempt of court has traditionally been classified as being either criminal or civil. In England, the general approach has been that a criminal contempt is an act which so threatens the administration of justice that requires punishment whereas by contrast, a civil contempt involves disobedience of a court order. However, O 52 of the RHC is inapplicable for contempt in criminal proceedings where the contempt is in the face of the court or consists of disobedience to an order of the court or a breach of an undertaking to the court (see O 52 r 1(2)(a)(ii) of the RHC). One thing is clear, be it civil or criminal contempt, the standard of proof required in either type is the same, which is beyond reasonable doubt.” (emphasis added).

It is to be noted that Tan Sri Dato’ (Dr) Rozali Ismail concerned allegations that the respondents were involved in the affirmation and filing of a false affidavit in civil proceedings in the Federal Court. It is clear that Tan Sri Dato’ (Dr) Rozali Ismail did not involve a committal application which arose from criminal proceedings (unlike Court Enc. 31). Hence, the above dictum by the Federal Court in Tan Sri Dato’ (Dr) Rozali Ismail is purely obiter. F. What is the test for the Court of Appeal to grant leave for committal applications?

On the test to be applied by the Court of Appeal in deciding whether leave of the Court of Appeal should be granted or not (for an applicant to commence committal proceedings in the Court of Appeal), we adopt the following judgment of the High Court in Tan Kang Ho v Mao Sheng Marketing (M) Sdn Bhd [2015] 4 CLJ 113, at [22] and [23]: “[22] I am unable to find any Malaysian case which explains the meaning of “prima facie” case and the standard of proof required for leave to commence committal proceedings (Leave Requirement). [23] I am of the following view regarding the Leave

the purpose of the Leave Requirement is to ensure that there is no abuse of the committal procedure. The Leave Requirement acts as a sieve to ensure that there is a prima facie basis for the committal application;

for criminal cases, the prima facie case requirement at the end of the prosecution case as laid down by ss 173(f)(i), (ii), 180(1), (2) and (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) is only satisfied if there is proof beyond all reasonable doubt of the charge against the accused - please see, for example, the judgment of Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as his Lordship then was) in the Federal Court case of PP v Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar [2006] 1 CLJ 457, at 467. I do not think that the high standard of proof beyond all reasonable doubt is appropriate for the Leave Requirement. My opinion is based on the following reasons -

according to s 3 CPC, the provisions of CPC, including ss 173(f)(i), (ii), 180(1), (2) and (3) CPC, only apply to inquiries or trials of “offences”. Section 2(1) CPC defines an “offence” as “any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force”. It is clear that committal proceedings under Order 52 RC and the Leave Requirement do not concern any criminal offence within the meaning of s 2(1) CPC; and

(ii) the purpose of the Leave Requirement is to prevent abuses of the committal procedure. Such a purpose may be fulfilled without the need for such a high standard of proof beyond all reasonable doubt;

a prima facie case of contempt of court is satisfied if -

the Statement and Verifying Affidavit show that the respondent in question has committed a specie of contempt of court, for example, the respondent has - … In Monatech (M) Sdn Bhd v Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd [2002] 4 MLJ 241, at 248, Haidar FCJ (as his Lordship then was) held in the Federal Court that the categories of contempt of court are never closed; and

(ii) the contents of the Verifying Affidavit should not be inherently improbable; and

the court should keep an open mind and not make any finding of fact as an application for leave to commence committal proceedings is made on an ex parte basis (without hearing the respondent) and the respondent may still raise a reasonable doubt at the end of the committal proceedings - Wee Choo Keong, at p. 222.” (emphasis added).

Court Enc. 31 is premised on the Appellant’s allegation that the Putative Respondent had committed a contempt of the Court of Appeal by obstructing and interfering with the due administration of justice in the Appeal (Court of Appeal) by maintaining the PO [which led to the Court of Appeal’s Decision (PO)].

In deciding Court Enc. 31, we adopt the following test - was there a prima facie case which was not inherently improbable that the Putative Respondent had committed a contempt of the Court of

by obstructing and interfering with the due administration of justice in the Appeal (Court of Appeal); and

by proceeding with the PO which then led to the Court of Appeal’s Decision (PO) [Prima Facie Case (Putative Respondent’s Contempt)]? G. Had the Appellant satisfied the Court of Appeal that there was a Prima Facie Case (Putative Respondent’s Contempt)?

Without hesitation we are of the view that the Appellant had failed to establish a Prima Facie Case (Putative Respondent’s Contempt). Our reasons are as follows:

we are unable to see how the conduct of the Putative Respondent by maintaining the PO (Putative Respondent’s Conduct) had obstructed and/or interfered with the administration of justice. The Appellant’s learned counsel had a right, in accordance with the second rule of natural justice, to resist the PO by submitting to the 2nd Panel. Indeed, the Appellant’s learned counsel did submit before the 2nd Panel with regard to the PO;

the 2nd Panel had accepted the PO. In other words, the PO was neither frivolous nor vexatious;

the Appellant had a right to appeal to the Federal Court against the Court of Appeal’s Decision (PO) and she had indeed lodged the Appeal (Federal Court);

the mere fact that the Appeal (Federal Court) was allowed, did not ipso facto mean that the Putative Respondent’s Conduct had obstructed and/or interfered with the administration of justice. If we have accepted the Appellant’s submission on this point, this will open the floodgates of committal proceedings wherein every time a court dismisses a PO -

the Advocate and Solicitor;

DPP; and/or

individual litigant who raises the PO, can be easily cited for contempt of court by obstructing and/or interfering with the administration of justice (by raising the PO); and

in this case, the Putative Respondent may rely on s 114(e) EA. We reproduce below s 114(e) EA - “s 114. Court may presume existence of certain fact The court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct, and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. ILLUSTRATIONS …

that judicial and official acts have been regularly performed;” (emphasis added). It is not disputed that the Putative Respondent is a public officer who was merely performing her “official act” as a DPP by proceeding with the PO against the Appeal (Court of Appeal). Hence, by virtue of s 114(e) EA, the Putative Respondent can rely on a rebuttable presumption the Putative Respondent’s Conduct had been “regularly performed”. According to s 4(1) EA, the evidential burden is on the Appellant to adduce evidence to rebut the rebuttable presumption the Putative Respondent’s Conduct had been “regularly performed”. Reproduced below is s 4(1) EA - “s 4.

Whenever it is provided by this Act that the court may presume a fact, it may either regard the fact as proved unless and until it is disproved, or may call for proof of it.” (emphasis added). No evidence had been adduced by the Appellant to rebut the rebuttable presumption the Putative Respondent’s Conduct had been “regularly performed” in accordance with s 114(e) EA.

We have not overlooked the contention by the Appellant’s learned counsel that the learned 1st DPP had informed the 1st Panel that she would withdraw the PO (1st DPP’s Representation). The PP and DPPs (including the 1st DPP) (referred collectively in this judgment as “PP/DPPs”) are not bound by the 1st DPP’s Representation. Nor are the PP/DPPs (including the 1st DPP) estopped by the 1st DPP’s Representation. The PP/DPPs have a discretion to act in the interest of justice without being shackled by any previous representation by the PP/DPPs [Previous Representation (PP/DPP)] unless the Previous Representation (PP/DPP) has caused an injustice to any party. With respect to the Appellant’s learned counsel, notwithstanding the 1st DPP’s Representation, we are unable to foresee any injustice to the Appellant when the Putative Respondent merely performed her public duties and proceeded with the PO in the Appeal (Court of Appeal).

As the Appellant had failed to prove a Prima Facie Case (Putative Respondent’s Contempt), the fact that the Putative Respondent had not filed an affidavit to oppose Court Enc. 31, was immaterial. H. Whether Court Enc. 31 was a matter of last resort for the

It is decided in Tan Kang Ho, at [68] and [69], as follows: “[68] In McLeod v St Aubyn [1899] AC 549, at 561, an appeal from St Vincent and the Grenadines, Lord Morris delivered the opinion of the Privy Council as follows: “The power summarily to commit for contempt of Court is considered necessary for the proper administration of justice. It is not to be used for the vindication of the judge as a person. He must resort to action for libel or criminal information. Committal for contempt of Court is a weapon to be used sparingly, and always with reference to the interests of the administration of justice.” (emphasis added). [69] The power to punish for contempt of court should be used sparingly and as a last resort in the interest of administration of justice where all other reasonable avenues have failed.” (emphasis added).

According to s 376(1) and (3) CPC - “s 376. [PP]

The Attorney General shall be the [PP] and shall have the control and direction of all criminal prosecutions and proceedings under this [CPC]. …

The [PP] may appoint fit and proper persons to be [DPPs] who shall be under the general control and direction of the [PP] and may exercise all or any of the rights and powers vested in or exercisable by the Public Prosecutor by or under this Code or any other written law except any rights or powers expressed to be exercisable by the Public Prosecutor personally and he may designate any of such Deputy Public Prosecutors as Senior Deputy Public Prosecutors.” (emphasis added).

By reason of s 376(3) CPC, the Putative Respondent, as a DPP, “shall be under the general control and direction” of the PP [who is the Attorney General according to s 376(1) CPC]. With regard to the PO, the Appellant has a right to complain to the PP against the Putative Respondent [Appellant’s Right to Complain (PP)].

In view of the Appellant’s Right to Complain (PP), committal proceedings should not have been resorted to by the Applicant in Court Enc. 31. I. Outcome of Court Enc.

Premised on the above reasons, the Court of Appeal’s Decision (Court Enc. 31) is reached, namely, a dismissal of Court Enc. 31. J. Whether the Appeal to Federal Court (Court Enc. 31) is competent

We reproduce below s 87(1) CJA: “s 87. Jurisdiction to hear and determine criminal appeals.

The Federal Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any appeal from any decision of the Court of Appeal in its appellate jurisdiction in respect of any criminal matter decided by the High Court in its original jurisdiction subject to any rules regulating the proceedings of the Federal Court in respect of appeals from the Court of Appeal.” (emphasis added).

Firstly, according to s 87(1) CJA, an appeal to the Federal Court can only be filed in respect of a “criminal matter”. We are of the firm view that Court Enc. 31 concerned an alleged contempt of the Court of Appeal and did not concern a “criminal matter” - please refer to the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Uthayakumar Ponnusamy (stated in the above paragraph 19) On this ground alone, the Appeal to Federal Court (Court Enc. 31) is not competent.

There is a second reason why the Appeal to Federal Court (Court Enc. 31) cannot be filed pursuant to s 87(1) CJA. It is not disputed that Court Enc. 31 had been filed as an “originating” Notice of Motion in the Court of Appeal. Consequently, the Court of Appeal’s Decision (Court Enc. 31) was not made in the Court of Appeal’s “appellate jurisdiction in respect of any criminal matter decided by the High Court in its original jurisdiction” [as required by s 87(1) CJA].

A draft of this judgment (Draft) had been previously forwarded to Ahmad Zaidi bin Ibrahim and Azhahari Kamal bin Ramli JJCA. Both my learned brothers had approved the Draft. DATE: 4 SEPTEMBER 2025 sgd WONG KIAN KHEONG Judge Court of Appeal For the Appellant: Mr. Gurbachan Singh a/l Bagawan Singh, Encik Amir Faliq bin Mohamad Jamil, Mr. Gobindeep Singh a/l Gurbachan Singh & Cik Afina binti Abdul Hakim (Messrs Bachan & Kartar) For the Public Prosecutor: DPP Datin Asmah binti Musa & DPP Mohd. Fuad bin Abdul Aziz (Attorney General’s Chambers)