Tan Kok Soon (TA-32NCvC-12-06/2025)

This is an application by Tan Kok Soon (“the Applicant”) for a Grant of Probate in respect of the Last Will and Testament dated 30 March 2023 (“the 2023 Will”) of the deceased, Ten Boon Jong @ Tan Boon Yong (“the Deceased”). The application is contested by the Deceased’s brothers, Tan Ah Mee and Ten Mong Huoi (“the Caveators”), who entered a caveat against the application. The Caveators contend that the Deceased died intestate, lacked testamentary capacity, and that the 2023 Will was executed under suspicious circumstances. The central issue before this Court is whether the dispute should be summarily disposed of under Order 71 Rule 38 of the Rules of Court 2012 (“the Rules”) or directed to proceed as a contentious probate action under Order 72 of the Rules.

The Deceased passed away on 4 March 2025 at the age of 75. He was a bachelor and resided at No. 2520, Jalan Bukit Mentok, Kemaman, Terengganu. The Applicant is the Deceased’s nephew, being the son of the Deceased’s late brother, Tan Boon Ying @ Tan Boon Sing (“TBY”). The Caveators are also brothers of the Deceased.

Sometime in 2013, the Deceased suffered an ischaemic stroke resulting in left-sided paralysis. Thereafter, the Applicant’s family, who lived next door, took over the care of the Deceased, including renovating the adjoining wall to facilitate access. The Deceased was never completely bedridden but was wheelchair-bound and required assistance.

On 10 March 2015, the Deceased and TBY entered into a Share Sale Agreement (“SSA”) with the Caveators and other shareholders to acquire all shares in Tan Choon Eng & Sons Realty Sdn Bhd (“the Company”). Under the SSA, the Caveators sold their shares for substantial consideration (Tan Ah Mee received RM6,694,242.69 and Ten Mong Huoi received

The Deceased had previously executed a Will on 4 September 2014 (“the 2014 Will”) bequeathing all his assets to TBY. However, TBY passed away on 13 February 2023. Consequently, on 30 March 2023, the Deceased executed the 2023 Will, appointing the Applicant as executor and bequeathing all his assets to his nephew, Tan Kok Wei (TBY’s son), with the Applicant as the alternate beneficiary.

On 27 March 2025, the Caveators entered a caveat against the estate, asserting that the Deceased died intestate. On 30 June 2025, the Applicant filed the present Originating Summons seeking probate pursuant to Order 71 Rule 5 of the Rules and Section 3 of the Probate and Administration Act 1959. Following a warning issued to the Caveators, they entered an Appearance on 22 July 2025, raising three grounds:

the Deceased died without a Will;

the Deceased lacked testamentary capacity due to stroke; and

the Will was made under suspicious circumstances.

During case management on 21 August 2025, this Court directed the parties to file affidavits and written submissions, with a view to determining whether the matter could be summarily disposed of under Order 71 Rule 38 of the Rules. Further to the filing of written submissions, the Court heard the parties on 9 February 2026 and delivered its decision in favour of the Applicant on 6 April 2026.

The issues for determination are as follows:

Whether the dispute between the parties should be summarily disposed of under Order 71 Rule 38 of the Rules or directed to proceed as a contentious probate action by way of writ.

(ii) If summarily disposed of, whether the Applicant has established a prima facie case that the 2023 Will was duly executed, that the Deceased had testamentary capacity, and that there are no suspicious circumstances.

(iii) Whether the Caveators have raised any triable issues that would necessitate a full trial with oral evidence. COUNSELS’ CONTENTIONS The Applicant’s Submissions

Learned counsel for the Applicant, Joy Wilson Appukuttan submits that this Court has jurisdiction under Order 71 Rule 38 of the Rules to dispose of contested probate matters summarily. Counsel relies on Leong Chee Kong & Anor v Tan Leng Kee [1999] 4 MLJ 537 (HC) for the proposition that the discretion to hear a matter summarily is vested in the judge. The Applicant also cites Re Chua Tong Boon [2000] 7 MLJ 738 (HC) for the principle that the same test as in summary judgment applications applies, namely, whether there are real or substantial unresolved questions.

Learned counsel for the Applicant contends that the Applicant has discharged the burden of proving due execution of the 2023 Will. The two attesting witnesses, Jang Say Tong (an advocate and solicitor of 12 years’ standing) and Tan Lai Yee (an administrative clerk), have each affirmed two affidavits stating that they attended at the Deceased’s home on 30 March 2023, that Jang Say Tong read, interpreted, and explained the contents of the Will to the Deceased, and that the Deceased understood the same, signed, and affixed his thumbprint in their presence.

On testamentary capacity, the Applicant relies on the Federal Court decision in Chin Jhin Thien & Anor v Chin Huat Yean @ Chin Chun Yean & Anor [2020] 4 MLJ 581 (FC), which reaffirmed that testamentary capacity is not to be equated with contractual capacity, and that mere bodily ill-health or imperfect memory is insufficient to vitiate capacity. The Applicant notes that the Deceased had sufficient capacity to enter into the SSA in 2015 (two years post-stroke) and to execute the 2014 Will, which the Caveators themselves witnessed. The Applicant also points out that the Caveators’ own medical report dated 18 March 2024 (the “SCA Report”) states that the Deceased was “partially capable of making decision” even one year after the 2023 Will was executed.

On suspicious circumstances, the counsel submits that the Caveators have failed to provide any particulars in their Appearance as required under Order 71 Rule 37(8) of the Rules, citing Re Yeow Chow Beng, Deceased [1998] 2 MLJ 330 (HC). The Applicant argues that the Caveators’ allegations regarding mismanagement of the Company are collateral and irrelevant, as the Caveators sold their shares in 2015 and no longer have any locus standi. Moreover, the Caveators have withdrawn the civil suit they commenced against the Applicant’s family members in the Kuantan High Court (Civil Suit No. CA-22NCVC-5-02/2025), which undermines their credibility.

The Applicant therefore prays that the caveat be lifted, that costs be awarded against the Caveators, and that the Originating Summons be allowed summarily.

Learned counsel for the Caveators, Mr Ong Siew Wan submits that the nature of the objections raised cannot be properly adjudicated by affidavit evidence alone. They rely on Ting Ling Kiew & Anor v Tang Eng Iron Works Co Ltd [1992] 2 MLJ 217 (SC) for the proposition that conflicts in affidavit evidence can only be resolved by oral evidence and cross-examination. Counsel also cites Chang Shu Hua (p) v Goon Fook Heng [2008] 3 MLJ 10 (CA) and Neoh Ah Yan v Ong Leng Choo & Anor [2008] 7 MLJ 151 (HC) for the principle that originating summons is not the appropriate mode where serious factual disputes exist.

On testamentary capacity, learned counsel for the Caveators points to the Kuantan High Court Order dated 28 May 2024 made under Section 52 of the Mental Health Act 2001, which declared the Deceased as a person suffering from brain injury and degenerative brain changes, and appointed the Caveators as Committees to manage his affairs. Counsel also relies on the SCA Report of Dr Tan Keng Yew, which states that the Deceased had expressive aphasia, was unable to express himself verbally, and was “incapable of making any relevant decisions in respect of his affairs.” Although the assessment was conducted one year after the Will was executed, counsel argues that the Deceased’s condition had been deteriorating since his stroke in 2013, giving rise to a “real doubt” as to his capacity.

Learned counsel for the Caveators further argue that the 2023 Will is irrational because it leaves all assets to a single beneficiary, Tan Kok Wei, who was adjudicated a bankrupt on 5 December 2022. They question why the Will excludes other family members who cared for the Deceased. On suspicious circumstances, the Caveators note that the Deceased’s signature on the 2023 Will differs from his signature on the 2014 Will and the SSA. They also highlight the fact that the Deceased both signed and affixed his thumbprint, which they suggest indicates uncertainty on the part of the witnesses. The Caveators further submit that the attesting witnesses failed to adopt the “golden rule” by not arranging for a medical examination of the Deceased prior to execution, citing Kong Kin Lay & Ors v Kong Kin Siong & Ors [2025] 6 MLRA 782 (CA) which applied Re Simpson (deceased) (1977) 121 SJ 224 per Templeman J.

Learned counsel for the Caveators also raises extensive allegations concerning the disposal of the Company’s assets by the Applicant’s family members, including that proceeds of sale amounting to RM3,007,000.00 were not accounted for, and that the Company’s bank account had only RM12.74 as at 14 February

Counsel submits that these matters demonstrate a motive for the Applicant’s family to procure a Will in their favour to cover up their wrongdoing.

Counsel for the Caveators prays that the Originating Summons be dismissed in limine with costs, or alternatively that the matter be directed to proceed as a contentious probate action by way of writ. COURT’S FINDINGS AND DECISION Preliminary Issue: Mode of Disposal under Order 71 Rule 38 of the

Order 71 Rule 38 of the Rules provides that every contested matter shall be referred to a Judge who may dispose of the matter in dispute in a summary manner or direct that the provisions of Order 72 (contentious probate proceedings) shall apply. The law is well settled that the same principles applicable to summary judgment applications under Order 14 apply to probate matters under this provision. In Re Chua Tong Boon (supra), the High Court held that if there are real or substantial questions to be resolved, whether of fact or law, then the matter should proceed as a contentious probate action. Conversely, if the issues raised are unarguable or based on bare assertions, the Court may dispose of the matter summarily.

The Federal Court in Voo Min En & Ors v Leong Chung Fatt [1982] 2 MLJ 241 (FC) emphasized that it is not enough for the respondent to raise any issue; the issue raised must be an arguable issue. Similarly, in Bank Negara Malaysia v Mohd Ismail & Ors [1992] 1 MLJ 400 (SC), the Supreme Court held that where an assertion or denial is equivocal, lacking in precision, inconsistent with undisputed contemporary documents, or inherently improbable, the Court has a duty to reject such assertion, thereby rendering the issue not triable.

Guided by these principles, this Court has carefully examined the affidavits and submissions of both parties. The Court concludes that the Caveators have failed to raise any genuine triable issue that would warrant a full probate action. The reasons are set out below.

The law on testamentary capacity is firmly established. In Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549, Cockburn CJ held that a testator must understand the nature of the act and its effects, understand the extent of the property of which he is disposing, and be able to comprehend and appreciate the claims to which he ought to give effect. However, the Federal Court in Chin Jhin Thien & Anor v Chin Huat Yean @ Chin Chun Yean & Anor (supra) clarified that testamentary capacity is not to be equated with contractual capacity, and that the material point of time for determining capacity is the time the will is executed. The Court also held that mere proof of serious illness is not sufficient to displace prima facie capacity; there must be clear evidence that the illness so affected the testator’s mental faculties as to make him unequal to the task of disposing of his property.

In this case, the Applicant has adduced prima facie evidence of the Deceased’s testamentary capacity through the affidavits of the two attesting witnesses. Jang Say Tong, an independent solicitor who acted for the Deceased’s company, stated unequivocally that he read, interpreted, and explained the contents of the 2023 Will to the Deceased, and that the Deceased understood the same, including the revocation of his earlier Will. The Deceased then signed and affixed his thumbprint in the presence of both witnesses. This is precisely the kind of evidence that the Court of Appeal in Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors v Gan Yook Chin & Anor [2003] 2 MLJ 97 (CA) held as sufficient to prove testamentary capacity.

The Caveators’ reliance on the Kuantan High Court Order dated 28 May 2024 is misplaced for two reasons. First, that Order was made ex parte without notice to the Applicant’s family, who were the Deceased’s primary caregivers. Second, and more fundamentally, the Order was made more than one year after the 2023 Will was executed. The law is clear that subsequent deterioration of health does not retroactively vitiate capacity at the time of execution. The Court of Appeal in Kong Kin Lay & Ors v Kong Kin Siong & Ors (supra) affirmed this principle, citing Billinghurst v Vickers (1810) ER 956 and Choo Ah Pat v Chow Yee Wah & Anor [1974] 1 MLJ 62 (HC).

The SCA Report of Dr Tan Keng Yew dated 18 March 2024 is equally unhelpful to the Caveators. While the report notes that the Deceased had expressive aphasia and was unable to express himself verbally, it also explicitly states that the Deceased was “partially capable of making decision.” This assessment was conducted one year after the Will was executed, and it does not purport to opine on the Deceased’s capacity on 30 March 2023. Moreover, the Caveators themselves have admitted through their affidavits and the SSA that the Deceased had sufficient capacity to execute the 2014 Will (witnessed by Ten Mong Huoi) and to enter into the SSA in 2015, both of which occurred after his stroke. If the Deceased had contractual capacity in 2015, it is difficult to see how he could lack the lesser threshold of testamentary capacity in 2023, especially given that the Applicant’s family provided continuous care for him throughout that period.

The Caveators’ argument that the “golden rule” from Re Simpson (deceased) (supra) should have been followed is also without merit. The “golden rule”, as laid down by Templeman J, provides that the making of a will by an old and infirm testator ought to be witnessed by a medical practitioner who satisfies himself as to the capacity and understanding of the testator and makes a record of his examination and findings.

However, as Briggs J explained in Re Key (deceased) [2010] 1 WLR 2020 at [8], compliance with the golden rule does not operate as a touchstone of the validity of a will, nor does non-compliance demonstrate its invalidity. Its purpose is to assist in the avoidance of disputes, or at least in the minimisation of their scope. This principle has been consistently applied in recent English authorities, which remain highly persuasive in our courts.

The irony of the Caveators' position is brought into sharp relief by Re Templeman [2020] EWHC 632 (Ch). Lord Templeman, who in Re Simpson (deceased) (supra) first articulated the golden rule as a matter of best practice for solicitors taking instructions from elderly or infirm testators, was himself the subject of a contested will. In 2008, at the age of 88 and already suffering from the early effects of Alzheimer's disease, Lord Templeman executed a will. His solicitor, bearing the responsibility to follow the golden rule, did not arrange for a medical examination prior to execution. Yet the English High Court upheld the will. Fancourt J held that the solicitor, as an experienced private client practitioner, had made an independent assessment that Lord Templeman was cogent and the will rational, and that the failure to obtain a medical examination was not fatal. The irony is inescapable: the very rule given to the profession to protect vulnerable testators was not observed when its author became a vulnerable testator, and the court nevertheless gave effect to his testamentary wishes. This serves as a powerful reminder that the golden rule is a tool for avoiding disputes, not a sword to strike down wills that are otherwise valid. If Lord Templeman's will could survive non- compliance with his own rule, a fortiori, so too can the Deceased's 2023 Will

Even more strikingly, in Clitheroe v Bond [2020] EWHC 1185 (Ch), the court set aside two wills on grounds of incapacity – but expressly held that the failure to follow the golden rule played no part in that analysis. The court found that the failure by the will-writing solicitors to follow the golden rule was explicable in light of the apparently rational reasons the deceased gave for cutting out her daughter, and in light of the deceased’s strong and forthright character. Thus, even where the deceased was ultimately found to lack capacity, the absence of a medical examination prior to execution was not itself determinative.

The Court of Appeal in Kong Kin Lay & Ors v Kong Kin Siong & Ors (supra) (at para 39(18)) adopted the Federal Court's holding in Chin Jhin Thien & Anor v Chin Huat Yean @ Chin Chun Yean & Anor [2020] 4 MLJ 581 (FC) that the golden rule is merely guidance for solicitors; non-compliance does not signify lack of capacity. Accordingly, the absence of a prior medical examination is not fatal to a will's validity. This is particularly so where, as here, the solicitor who prepared the Will (Jang Say Tong) had a pre-existing professional relationship with the Deceased, attended at his home, read, interpreted, and explained the contents to him, and formed his own independent assessment of the Deceased's capacity.

The attesting solicitor expressly deposed that the Deceased understood the nature of the act, the extent of his property, and the claims he ought to give effect to. The Deceased signed and affixed his thumbprint in the presence of two independent witnesses. The Will was rational, continuing the Deceased's long-established pattern of favouring his late brother TBY's family, who had cared for him for over a decade. In these circumstances, the failure to obtain a prior medical examination does not create a triable issue. To hold otherwise would elevate a rule of practice into a substantive legal requirement, contrary to the clear weight of authority.

The Caveators bear the burden of raising suspicious circumstances, but as held in Tho Yow Pew & Anor v Chua Kooi Hean [2002] 4 MLJ 97 (CA), “suspicious circumstances” in the context of wills relate to circumstances surrounding the making of the will, not circumstances surrounding the testamentary capacity of the testator. Examples include where the solicitor who drafted the will is a substantial beneficiary (Wintle v Nye [1959] 1 All ER 552 (HL)) or where the writer of the will took a very active part in its preparation and obtained a substantial advantage (Sarat Kumari Bibi v Rai Sakhi Chand 1929 AIR PC 45 (PC)).

In this case, none of the classic suspicious circumstances exist. The sole beneficiary, Tan Kok Wei, is the Deceased’s nephew and the son of TBY, to whom the Deceased had left all his assets in the 2014 Will. The Applicant is the executor and alternate beneficiary. The solicitor who prepared the Will, Jang Say Tong, is not a beneficiary. The Will was executed at the Deceased’s own home, in the presence of two independent witnesses. The fact that the Deceased both signed and affixed his thumbprint does not give rise to suspicion; on the contrary, it is consistent with the practice of ensuring authenticity, especially for a person with physical limitations following a stroke. The Court of Appeal in Kam Woon Lin & Anor v Cheah Chor Bok [2013] 4 MLRA 135 (CA) upheld a will executed by thumbprint, holding that it is valid if there is evidence that the testator intended and approved the will.

The Caveators’ allegations regarding the mismanagement of the Company’s assets are, with respect, collateral and irrelevant to the validity of the 2023 Will. The Caveators sold their shares in the Company in 2015 and have no remaining interest in the Company. The proper forum for those grievances, if any, is a derivative action under Section 347 of the Companies Act 2016, not a probate proceeding. The fact that the Caveators withdrew the civil suit they had commenced against the Applicant’s family members (Civil Suit No. CA-22NCVC-5-02/2025) further undermines the seriousness of those allegations. Moreover, as held by Mohd Nazlan JC (as His Lordship then was) in Chenna Gounder A/L Kandasamy v Angamah A/P Sunappan [2017] 10 MLJ 387 (HC), a circumstance is “suspicious” when it is not normal or not normally expected of a normal person. Here, it is entirely normal for a bachelor who has been cared for by his nephew’s family for over a decade to leave his assets to that family, and specifically to the son of the brother to whom he had previously left everything.

The Caveators’ bare allegation that the Deceased’s signature on the 2023 Will is a forgery is not supported by any expert evidence. The law is clear that a bare allegation of forgery, without more, does not constitute a triable issue. In Kuantan Flour Mills Berhad v Wee Tuck Lee Food Industries [2007] 8 MLJ 117 (HC), Low Hop Bing J (as His Lordship then was) held that a mere assertion unsupported by evidence is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. The Caveators have had ample opportunity to obtain a handwriting expert’s report but have not done so. This Court is therefore not obliged to accept their speculative assertion.

The Court notes that the Caveators, as brothers of the Deceased, have a contingent interest in the estate. If the 2023 Will (and the 2014 Will, the beneficiary of which predeceased the Deceased) were both set aside, the Deceased would be deemed to have died intestate. Under the Distribution Act 1958, the Caveators would then be entitled to share in the estate as siblings, there being no surviving parents or issue. Accordingly, the Caveators have sufficient locus standi to enter a caveat and oppose the grant. However, locus standi alone does not entitle them to obstruct probate on unsubstantiated allegations. Having found that they have raised no genuine triable issue on capacity or suspicious circumstances, their contingent interest does not compel a full trial. The Court must balance the right of a caveator to be heard against the public policy of giving effect to a testator's duly executed will.

This Court must reconcile two competing imperatives: deference to testamentary autonomy on the one hand, and protection of the vulnerable testator from predatory conduct on the other. Guided by these competing imperatives, the Court has carefully examined the affidavits and submissions of both parties. Having done so, this Court is satisfied that the matter is suitable for summary disposal under Order 71 Rule 38 of the Rules. The Caveators have failed to raise any genuine triable issue. Their allegations of lack of testamentary capacity and suspicious circumstances are based on a medical report that post-dates the Will by one year and that actually acknowledges partial capacity, and on collateral matters concerning the Company that are irrelevant to the validity of the Will. The affidavits filed by the Caveators contain bare assertions, inconsistencies, and a clear departure from their original position that the Deceased died intestate. As held in Bank Negara Malaysia v Mohd Ismail & Ors (supra), where an assertion is inconsistent with undisputed contemporary documents or is inherently improbable, the Court has a duty to reject it.

The cases cited by the Caveators are distinguishable. In Ting Ling Kiew & Anor v Tang Eng Iron Works Co Ltd (supra), the central issue was fraud, and the Supreme Court found that particulars of fraud were absent. In this case, the Caveators have not pleaded any particulars of fraud with specificity. In Neoh Ah Yan v Ong Leng Choo & Anor (supra), letters of administration had already been issued, and the plaintiff sought to be added as an administrator, which is a fundamentally different procedural context. In Haco Far East Pte Ltd v Ong Heh Lai Francis [2000] 1 SLR 315 (CA), the dispute was between two shareholders actively involved in the management of a company, which is not analogous to the present case where the Caveators are estranged brothers who sold their shares years ago.

Conversely, the Applicant’s authorities are directly on point. In Leong Chee Kong & Anor v Tan Leng Kee (supra), the High Court upheld the summary disposal of a probate matter under Order 71 Rule 38. In Re Chua Tong Boon (supra), the Court applied the summary judgment principles and dismissed the originating summons where there were unresolved questions. In this case, there are no unresolved questions. The evidence of the two attesting witnesses is clear, consistent, and uncontradicted by any contemporaneous medical evidence. The Caveators have not produced any witness who was present at the execution of the 2023 Will to contradict the Applicant’s witnesses. They have not produced any medical report from March 2023 indicating incapacity. They have not produced any handwriting expert to support their forgery allegation. In the absence of such evidence, there is no triable issue.

For all the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that the Applicant has established a prima facie case that the 2023 Will dated 30 March 2023 was duly executed by the Deceased, that the Deceased had testamentary capacity at the time of execution, and that there are no suspicious circumstances surrounding the making of the Will. The Caveators have failed to raise any genuine triable issue that would warrant the matter to proceed as a contentious probate action under Order 72 of the Rules.

Accordingly, this Court makes the following orders:

the caveat entered by Tan Ah Mee and Ten Mong Huoi on 27 March 2025 (Caveat No. WA-KAVEAT-869-03/2025) is hereby lifted with costs of RM5,000 payable by the Caveators to the Applicant, subject to allocator.

(ii) the Applicant’s application for a Grant of Probate in respect of the Estate of Ten Boon Jong @ Tan Boon Yong (NRIC No. 490801-11-5137/3107244) is allowed as prayed in paragraphs 1, 2 & 3 of Enclosure 1.

The Deputy Registrar shall extract the Grant of Probate forthwith upon payment of the requisite fees. Dated: 24 May 2026 Yusrin Faidz Bin Yusoff Judge High Court of Malaya Kuala Terengganu For the Applicant: Joy Wilson Appukuttan (Together with Kelvynn Foo Wai Tzen) Messrs KH Lim & Co. T3-22-01, Tower 3, 22nd Floor, Pusat Perdagangan Icon City, No.1B, Jalan SS8/39, 47300 Petaling Jaya, Selangor. For the Caveators: Ong Siew Wan Messrs Andrew-David Wong & Ong Room 102-1031, 1st Floor, Bangunan Tokio Marine Life, Jalan Teluk Sisek, 25000 Kuantan, Pahang

Leong Chee Kong & Anor v Tan Leng Kee [1999] 4 MLJ 537

Re Chua Tong Boon [2000] 7 MLJ 738 (HC).

Chin Jhin Thien & Anor v Chin Huat Yean @ Chin Chun Yean & Anor [2020] 4 MLJ 581 (FC).

Re Yeow Chow Beng, Deceased [1998] 2 MLJ 330 (HC).

Ting Ling Kiew & Anor v Tang Eng Iron Works Co Ltd [1992] 2

Chang Shu Hua (p) v Goon Fook Heng [2008] 3 MLJ 10 (CA).

Neoh Ah Yan v Ong Leng Choo & Anor [2008] 7 MLJ 151 (HC).

Kong Kin Lay & Ors v Kong Kin Siong & Ors [2025] 6 MLRA 782

Voo Min En & Ors v Leong Chung Fatt [1982] 2 MLJ 241 (FC).

Bank Negara Malaysia v Mohd Ismail & Ors [1992] 1 MLJ 400

Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549.

Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors v Gan Yook Chin & Anor [2003] 2 MLJ 97 (CA).

Billinghurst v Vickers (1810) ER 956.

Choo Ah Pat v Chow Yee Wah & Anor [1974] 1 MLJ 62 (HC).

Re Simpson (deceased) (1977) 121 SJ 224.

Re Key (deceased) [2010] 1 WLR 2020.

Re Templeman [2020] EWHC 632 (Ch).

Clitheroe v Bond [2020] EWHC 1185 (Ch).

Tho Yow Pew & Anor v Chua Kooi Hean [2002] 4 MLJ 97 (CA).

Wintle v Nye [1959] 1 All ER 552 (HL).

Sarat Kumari Bibi v Rai Sakhi Chand 1929 AIR PC 45 (PC).

Kam Woon Lin & Anor v Cheah Chor Bok [2013] 4 MLRA 135

Chenna Gounder A/L Kandasamy v Angamah A/P Sunappan [2017] 10 MLJ 387 (HC).

Kuantan Flour Mills Berhad v Wee Tuck Lee Food Industries [2007] 8 MLJ 117 (HC).

Haco Far East Pte Ltd v Ong Heh Lai Francis [2000] 1 SLR 315

O.14, O.71 r.5, O.71 r.37(8), O.71 r.38, & O.72 of the Rules of Court 2012.

Section 3 of the Probate and Administration Act 1959.

Section 52 of the Mental Health Act 2001.

Section 347 of the Companies Act 2016.