It came out of the blue in the appellant’s evidence in court for the first time. [70] In such event, we would fully endorsed the learned trial judge’s findings that the appellant’s failure to provide information of the said motorcar being stolen, that the drugs inside the said motorcar were not his and that prior to his arrest he was driving a ‘Toyota Wish’ belonging to Datok Cina at the earliest opportunity to the police (SP-7, SP-13), would render the said evidence lacking in credibility and equally detracting from the weight to be accorded therein. It is worthy to add the Federal Court’s ruling in Alcontara a/l Ambrose Anthony v PP (supra) of the effect of keeping one’s defence ‘up its sleeve’: “Speaking generally, in a criminal trial, the whole point and purpose of the defence having to put its case to such of the prosecution witnesses as might be in a position to admit or deny it, is to enable the prosecution to 30 check on whether the accused’s version of the facts is true or false, and thus avoid the adverse comment, that the defence is a recent invention, in other words ‘kept up its sleeve’, as it were and revealed for the first time when the accused makes his defence from the witness box or the dock, thus detracting from the weight to be accorded to the defence”. [71] In addition, in regard to the brown coloured bag (exhibit P30) containing the drugs found next to his own red coloured bag, both of which were found on the front passenger seat, the learned trial judge found that it would be illogical for the appellant not to notice the brown bag which was right beside his own red bag. We agreed with her observation though. Surely the appellant would have opened the brown bag when he stole the said motorcar. It also makes complete sense to surmise that the appellant must have examined/inspected the said motorcar after he had stolen it and must have seen the red coloured plastic bag at the foot rest at the back of the driver’s seat, also containing drugs. In addition, he had ample time to check the contents of said bags, as he was arrested only about one hour later. The course of event in the narrative of the appellant’s defence goes a long way to show that, verily, the defence was tainted with elements of afterthought. 31 [72] At the end of the defence’s case, the learned trial judge opined that although the appellant is free to choose how he wish to give his defence, however, his evidence, being an unsworn statement from the dock, suffers from lack of credibility and weight on account that it was not subjected to the acid test of cross-examination. The learned trial judge then alluded to the following ruling in Rewang Tempe v PP [2016] 1 LNS 223: “[21] Recently this court in the case of Zulkifli Abdullah v PP, Criminal Appeal No: Q-05-102-4/2015 had the occasion to consider the evidential value of the dock statement. It was observed as follows: “[34] The appellant gave an unsworn statement from the dock. His statement is not subject to cross examination by the prosecution, nor can he be questioned by the trial judge. Its veracity is not tested. The trial judge is free to give the dock statement such weight as he thinks fit and he can take it into consideration in deciding whether the prosecution had proved its case. In Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim v PP v Another Appeal [2015] 2 CLJ 145, the Federal Court observed at p. 199 as follows: “In law, a trial judge will not give much weight to what an accused has said in his unsworn statement as he is not subject to cross-examination by the prosecution nor can he be questioned by the trial judge (Lee Boon Gan v Regina [1954] 1 LNS 151; [1954] 1 MLJ 103, Udayar Alogan & Ors v PP [1962] 1 MLJ 39, Mohamed Salleh v PP [1968] 1 LNS 80; [1969] 1 MLJ 104, Juraimi Husin v PP [1998] 2 CLJ 383 [1998] 1 MLJ 537”. 32 [73] It is noted that the appellant did not offer any evidence/defence in relation to the trafficking in the said drugs. He only denied having knowledge of the drugs inside the car. However, based on the huge amount of drugs recovered from the possession of the appellant, it is an irresistible inference that the appellant had possession of the drugs for the purpose of trafficking. [74] The learned trial judge found the appellant’s statement to be a bare denial and assertion and negligible in weight. In addition, she found the evidence of DW-2 and DW-3 incapable of rebutting the prosecution’s case. Finally the learned trial judge found that the appellant had failed to cast a reasonable doubt upon the prosecution’s case and was found guilty and convicted upon both the charges. [75] We could find no appealable error in the discourse of the law and facts undertaken by the learned trial judge enumerated above. 33 Ground (iii) – want of maximum evaluation of the evidence pertaining to (a) the Toyota Wish motorcar where he was arrested with; (b) the other Toyota Wish motorcar belonging to Datok Cina; (c) contradictions in the testimonies of SD-3 and SP-13; and (d) uncertainties surrounding the recovery of the appellant’s wallet. Grounds (iii) (a) and (b) – the Toyota Wish motorcars [76] We have dealt with the above two (2) grounds of appeal at great length at paras. 63 to 71 above. We have no wish to repeat/duplicate the same currently. Suffice for us to reiterate that the defence anchored upon the above said 2 grounds are mere afterthoughts grounded upon the reasons enumerated therein. Ground (iii) – (c) - contradictions in the testimonies of SD-3 and SP-13. [77] Learned counsel submitted that the learned trial judge had failed to consider the evidence of SD-3 (ASP Juliana, the officer who arrested Nur Fazlira) who testified that she had taken the appellant from the Seremban IPD lock-up to his house at Sri Sendayan to arrest Nur Fazlira at about 12.30 p.m. However, the investigating officer (SP-13) testified that the appellant was detained at Seremban IPD lock-up at the material time. 34 Learned counsel submitted that this is a material contradiction that had occasioned a break in the chain of evidence. [78] In our view this contradiction should not be given exaggerated importance. What SD-3 did was only to bring the appellant from the IPD lock-up and brought him to his house at Sri Sendayan with the permission of SP-13, where she then effected the arrest of Nur Fazlira who happened to be in the house. She also recovered one straw tube containing substance suspected to be drugs from Nur Fazlira’s wallet. [79] SD-3 did not at any time handle the drug exhibits recovered from the appellant in the ‘Toyota Wish’ motorcar which was at all material times under the safe custody of SP-7 before he handed the same to SP-13 together with the appellant at about 2.45 p.m. on 30.7.2012. And, there is no dispute that DW-3 only recovered one straw tube from Nur Fazlira’s wallet. After effecting the arrest of Nur Fazlira and recovering the said straw tube, she went back to IPD Seremban and handed back the appellant to the IPD lock-up at about 2.00 p.m. Then at about 2.45 p.m., SP-7 handed the appellant together with the drug exhibits recovered from the appellant to SP-13. 35 [80] There is no evidence that the drug exhibits recovered from the appellant had been tampered with by SD-3’s act of taking the appellant out of the lock-up and taking him to his Sri Sendayan house. Equally there is no evidence that the investigation in respect of the appellant’s involvement in the commission of the crime has been compromised. More importantly, there is no evidence of any break in the chain of evidence emanating from SD-3’s act of taking out the appellant from the IPD lock-up. Finally, SP-13 cannot be discredited merely upon this singular contradiction. [81] We further opined that it is wrong for learned counsel to submit that the learned trial judge did not consider the aforesaid contradictions in the testimonies of SD-3 and SP-13. On the contrary, the learned trial judge had indeed considered the said contradictions at length as can be seen at pp. 64, 65, paras. 32 to 35, Jilid 1, RR, of her grounds of judgment. She was not on common ground though with the submissions posited by learned counsel. 36 Ground (iii) - (d) – uncertainties surrounding the recovery of the appellant’s wallet [82] Learned counsel submitted that SP-13 said that the wallet and the personal items of the appellant were found in the brown bag which contained the impugned drugs whereas SP-7, the arresting officer, said that the wallet and the personal items were found in the red bag belonging to the appellant. Hence, it was submitted that in the light of these 2 versions, both cannot be true. [83] However, the learned trial judge found that based on the Search List (exhibit P26), the wallet was recorded as ‘rampasan’ in column 3 of the said exhibit under the heading ‘tempat dijumpai’. According to the learned trial judge, in such event, it has created doubts as to where exactly the wallet was seized by SP-7. She further opined that it is highly probable that the wallet was seized from the appellant himself. Be that as it may, the learned trial judge found that it was not fatal to the prosecution’s case. [84] We were with Her Ladyship. The issue is too minor to have impacted significantly upon the substratum of the prosecution’s case. The evidence stacked against the appellant is overwhelming that the 37 impugned drugs were in his possession and by the huge amount of drugs recovered from his possession, it led to the irresistible inference that the appellant was trafficking in the said drugs. Conclusion [85] For all the reasons given, we dismissed the appellant’s appeal and affirmed the convictions and sentences handed down upon him by the learned trial judge. Dated: 2nd April 2018 ( AHMADI HAJI ASNAWI ) Judge Court of Appeal, Malaysia 38 Counsel Solicitor:- For the Appellant: Satwan Singh a/l Joginder Singh & Kartikayan a/l Supramaniam Tetuan Morthi, Segaran & Co. Peguambela & Peguamcara For the Respondent: Dhiya Syazwani Izhan Bt. Mohd Akhir Timbalan Pendakwa Raya Jabatan Peguam Negara 62100 Putrajaya