Tan Poh Yee v 1. ) Tan Boon Thien (WA-22NCvC-294-04/2021)

An interim injunction against the 1st Defendant and 2nd Defendant, whether by themselves, their servants or agents or otherwise restraining the 1st Defendant and/or 2nd Defendant from any dealings or disposal in any manner whatsoever of the Properties listed in the Schedule A annexed 35 hereto ("the said Properties") pending disposal of court proceedings herein; 22/06/2023 15:14:16

An interim injunction against the 1st Defendant and/or 2nd Defendant, whether by themselves, their servants or agents or otherwise restraining the 1st Defendant and/or 2nd Defendant from effecting the collection of any 40 and/or rental from the KO Dynamic Auto Sdn Bhd ("the Tenant") and/or any other tenant when the plaintiff enters into a valid and binding Tenancy of the said Properties pending disposal of court proceedings herein;

An interim injunction against the 1st Defendant and 2nd Defendant, whether 45 by themselves, their servants or agents or· otherwise restraining the 1st Defendant and/or 2nd Defendant from taking any action or steps to evict or remove or displace the Tenant from the said Properties and/or in any way interfering with the rights and obligations of the Tenant under the Tenancy Agreement dated 25.10.2017 ("the Tenancy Agreement") pending disposal 50 of court proceedings;

The cost of and incidental to this application be cost in the cause; and

Such further or other relief as this Honourable Court deems fit and just in 55 the circumstances." [3]

3.1 After perusing the cause papers and hearing the submission of counsels, this Court allowed the plaintiff's application 60 against D1 only, for prayers 1,2 and 3 with an order for cost in the cause.

3.2 D1, dissatisfied with the said decision, is now appealing. My reasons are as follows: 65 SALIENT FACTS [4] This case is pending a substantive hearing before this Court. In a nutshell, from the cause papers:

4.1 The plaintiff is the youngest daughter out of four living children of D2 (the father), while D1 is the eldest and the only living son 70 of D2.

4.2 D2 and his wife had, via Sale and Purchase Agreements dated 04.07.2001, purchased two shop lots (Unit G001 and Unit G002, Vista Shop, Jalan PJU 10/3C, Damansara Damai, 75 47830 Petaling Jaya, Selangor) from Medan Prestasi Sdn Bhd (the Developer):

On the passing of D1's wife on 31.07.2006, Unit G002, one of the shop lots, was bequeathed to D2 via a Deed of Assignment (10.10.2008) in compliance with the wishes 80 of the deceased in her last will (05.08.2004).

The transfer of the said Unit G002 to D2 was handled by the legal firm of Messrs Raja Darryl & Loh.

Subsequently, several years later, D2 transferred the shop lots, Unit G001 and Unit G002, to the plaintiff via two 85 Deeds of Assignment with the Strata Title pending (28.10.2015) that was also handled by the same firm of solicitors:

The consideration of the transfer was for love and affection.

(ii) On the execution of the Deeds of Assignment, D2 absolutely surrenders all rights and interests in the said impugned properties to the plaintiff.

(iii) Unit G001 was rented out to KD Dynamic Auto Sdn Bhd (the Tenant) from 16.02.2004, which was 95 continued with a subsequent tenancy agreement dated 11.6.2009.

(iv) D2 had by letter (15.11.2013) informed the Tenant of his intention to transfer Unit G001 to his youngest daughter (the plaintiff) from 04.11.2013 and 100 instructed the Tenant to remit all future rentals to the plaintiff from 15.11.2013.

The Deeds of Assignment for the transfer of the said properties were perfected and stamped on 07.04.2017, with the legal transfer pending 105 issuance of the Strata Title.

4.3 Grounded on the foregoing, the plaintiff began dealing with the said impugned properties in collecting the rentals from the Tenant, entered into a new tenancy agreement (25.10.2017), paid the quit rent and assessment, declared and paid taxes on 110 the income from the said rental since 2013.

4.4 Sometime in August 2015, D2 suffered a stroke, causing vascular dementia and mobility issues:

Initially, D2 was warded and cared for at the Gleneagles 115 Hospital but was unilaterally discharged by D1 and placed at the Tung Shin Hospital.

D1 instructed Tung Shin Hospital that he was solely in charge of D2 and prohibited anyone from exercising authority or intervention over D2.

Sometime between midnight of 06.04.2016 and the morning of 07.04.2016, D1 physically removed D2 from the Tung Shin Hospital.

Since then, D1 has denied his sisters' access to D2.

D2 medical condition requires tube feeding and needs 125 constant physical care 24/7.

The familial feud can be seen in several suits filed at the KL HC, SA HC, Ipoh HC and the Industrial Court: -KL HC Civil Suit No: 22NCC-383-11/2015, concerning shares in a family-owned company: Tan Kim Choo 130 Holdings Sdn Bhd; -KL HC OS No: WA-24NCVC-137-01/2016, proceedings under the Mental Health Act 2001 to ascertain D2’s mental capacity; -HC Criminal Application No:44-111-09/2016, an 135 action for a writ of habeas corpus to release D2 from the unlawful detention by D1; -KL HC Criminal Application No:44-135-10/2016 is an action for habeas corpus re-filed; -KL HC Civil Suit: WA-22NCVC-58-01/2017 concerning 140 the Parent's Primary Trust and the 2004 Family Trust Arrangements; -KL HC Winding-Up Petition: 28NCC-173-03/2016, concerning winding-up petition of Tan Kim Choo Holdings Sdn Bhd; 145 -Several cases for the extension of Caveat in KL HC OS: WA-24NCVC-1851-11/2017; SA HC OS: BA- 24NCVC-662-11/2017; KL HC OS: WA-24NCVC-90- 01/2018; KL HC OS: WA-24NCVC-91-01/2018; Ipoh HC OS: AA-24NCVC-14-01/2018; Ipoh HC OS: AA- 150 24NCVC-15-01/2018.

4.5 The plaintiff claims:

4.5.1 That D1 had acted with impropriety over the affairs of D2 and his assets. 155 4.5.2 The impugned properties that D2 had already been transferred/assigned to the plaintiff and have been unlawfully caused to be transferred to D1:

Although the conveyancing solicitor is the legal firm of Messrs Raja, Daryl & Loh. The Strata Titles to the 160 said impugned properties had been released to the firm of Messrs Suaidah Adawiyah & Co, who refused to entertain the request to surrender the Strata Titles to Messrs Raja, Daryl & Loh to complete the transfer to the plaintiff.

After an official land search, it was discovered that the Developer transferred the titles to D2 sometimes on 31.07.2017 and 29.09.2017 (Unit G001 and Unit G002), respectively.

The said Units (G001 and G002) were allegedly 170 transferred fraudulently to D1 on 12.10.2017 and 15.11.2017 respectively.

These alleged fraudulent transfers were carried out after the Court of Appeal's determination to direct an inquiry into the mental health of D2 in the MHA 175 suit KL HC OS No: WA-24NCVC-137-01/2016.

It is argued that D1 attempts to sell off the impugned properties unless restrained. The Tenant had been asked to vacate the property. 180 4.6 The plaintiff seeks, amongst others, for specific performance on the Deeds of Assignment and several declarations on the validity of the Deeds of Assignment and the position of the plaintiff as the legal/beneficial owner of the said properties by revoking the fraudulent transfer of property by D2, status quo 185 on the tenancy to be maintained and the collection of the rental by the plaintiff, and injunctive reliefs.

4.7 With that factual backdrop, it had led to the filing the present application (enclosure 3) for injunctive reliefs, pending the 190 determination and substantive hearing of this suit. THE PLAINTIFF’s SUBMISSIONS [5] The plaintiff argued that:

5.1 The alleged fraudulent transfers of Unit G001 (the plaintiff's 195 unit) and G002 from D2 to D1 were carried out after Messrs Raja, Daryl & Loh issued a letter inquiring about the Strata Titles to the said property to Messrs Suaidah Adawiyah & Co, the firm who acted in concert with the defendants in fraudulently carrying out the transfer of the said properties to 200 D1. The plaintiff pleaded particulars of the fraud in paragraph 39 of the SoC.

5.2 Premised on these fraudulent property transfers to his name, D1 had notified the Tenant to vacate the premises of the said 205 properties by 23.01.2018. Consequently, the plaintiff had registered a caveat on the two property units to challenge the fraudulent transfer of ownership by D1 and D2, especially when D2 is already subject to an inquiry under the Medical Health Act as ordered by the Court of Appeal.

5.3 D1 is attempting to quickly dispose of the properties by putting up sale/rental banners for the properties, which requires injunctive relief to arrest this abuse pending the full trial. 215 5.4 Citing Alor Janggus Soon Trading Sdn Bhd & Ors v Sey Hoe Sdn Bhd & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 241, the plaintiff argued that as the actual beneficial and legal owner of the properties, she has serious issues to be tried. The property had been lawfully assigned to her pending the issuance of the Strata 220 Title. The facts of which had been corroborated by the affidavit of the solicitor in charge, Mr Kong Weng Kuen of Messrs Raja, Daryl & Loh at the time, who was also the solicitor for D2 on the property transaction before being taken over by Messrs. Suaidah Adawiyah & Co, that had refused to respond to 225 repeated inquiries from the former.

5.5 The plaintiff submitted that the impugned transfers of the properties by D1 and D2 are invalid and were done with intent to deny the plaintiff her rights and interests in the said 230 properties. She cited Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd v Monatech (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [2014] 11 MLJ that the properties were transferred when the plaintiff was the legal and beneficial owner in such suspicious circumstances to indicate fraud. In Kho Ah Soon v Ooi Kar Seng (properties) Sdn Bhd [1995] 235 3 MLJ 293, it was held that there were serious issues to be tried. The trial judge was in error by not maintaining the caveat and the injunction. Land being a valuable commodity, once lost, might not be adequately compensated by damages. The balance of convenience lies in favour of maintaining the status 240 quo. [6] To further support her application:

6.1 The plaintiff cited Kuching Waterfront Development Sdn Bhd v Superintendent of Land and Surveys, Kuching 245 Division & Ors [2008] 10 CLJ 231 that reaffirmed the guiding principles in granting an interim injunction, i.e.:

On the totality of the facts, there exists bona serious issues to be determined;

Whether damages are an adequate remedy if the 250 applicant loses the suit,

Where does the justice of the case lie?

6.2 Unless restrained by an injunctive order, there is imminent danger that D1 would dispose of the said properties to deny 255 the plaintiff's rights and interests, including the tenancy established with the Tenant. It is argued that such transgressions by D1 cannot be adequately compensated with damages. The balance of convenience lies with the plaintiff in maintaining the status quo pending determination by this 260 Court after the substantive hearing of this suit. The plaintiff cited Splendid Wave Sdn Bhd & Anor v Song Hwa Sub & Ors [2015] 8 MLJ 612 that had referred to and followed American Cynamid Co. v Ethicon Ltd [1975] 1 All ER 504. 265 6.3 In response to D1's arguments to oppose enclosure 3, the plaintiff argued:

6.3.1 Consent of the Developer required for the two Deeds of Assignment to be valid:

The impugned properties fall under the category 270 of housing accommodation under s.2 Housing Development (Control & Licensing) Act 1966 HDA 1966).

It defines housing accommodation as any building 275 intended for human habitation or partly for human habitation and business.

Section 22D (1) HDA 1966 clearly determines that consent from the developer is not required for the 280 absolute assignment of rights or interests in a housing accommodation.

The said s.22D(1) must be read with s.22D(2) HDA 1966, which provides that the assignor or his 285 solicitors shall deliver every notice of assignment given to the developer to the housing developer at or after the completion of the SPA between the assignor and the new purchaser. The executed deed of absolute assignment of the housing 290 accommodation shall accompany it.

Messrs Raja, Daryl & Loh issued a notice of assignment on 19.07.2017 and served two Deeds of Assignment dated 28.01.2015 to the developer, 295 Medan Prestasi Sdn Bhd.

Section 22D (9) HDA 1966 provides that the provisions of s.22D shall apply to any housing accommodation where the appropriate authority 300 has not yet issued separate or strata title for the housing accommodation.

6.3.2 Injunction not required as the impugned properties are listed under the Deed of Gift (27.09.2016), 305 Administrator Pendente Lite (APL).

D1 argued that the said properties fall under the purview of the APL, appointed by the Court on 17.12.2018 in WA-22NCVC-703-10/2018.

The plaintiff argued that the said properties could not fall within the purview of APL since they had been absolutely assigned by D2 on 28.01.2015, years before the appointment of APL.

The timeline of events supports this assertion:

15.11.2013: D2 notified the Tenant that he intends to transfer the properties to the plaintiff from 04.11.2013.

(ii) 28.01.2015: D2 signed the deeds of Assignment.

(iii) August 2015: D2 suffered a massive stroke, causing vascular dementia.

(iv) 27.09.2016: D2 purportedly signed the Deed 325 of Gift (that is denied).

07.12.2018: APL was appointed in KL HC WA-22NCVC-703-10/2018. The properties are not listed in Schedule A of the Court Order. 330

The plaintiff argued that it was an attempt by D1 to mislead the Court on the facts.

6.4 In the circumstances, the plaintiff submits that:

There are serious issues to be tried in this suit.

The loss of the said properties may not be adequately compensated with damages; and 340

The balance of convenience or justice lies with the plaintiff. Therefore, the plaintiff prays for an order in terms of enclosure 3 for injunctive relief against the First Defendant. 345 THE FIRST DEFENDANT'S SUBMISSIONS [7] In opposing enclosure 3, D1 argued that:

7.1 The plaintiff's suit is founded on the two Deeds of Assignment over the impugned properties. The invalidity of these two 350 assignments would similarly bring an end to this injunction application.

7.2 D1 asserts that (1) The two Deeds of Assignment are invalid for want of the developer's consent, and (2) Section 22D HDA 355 1966 and s.4(3) of the Civil Law Act do not apply in the present case.

7.3 Clause 15 of the SPA with the developer requires the consent of the developer in any assignment of the SPA. Pending the 360 issuance of the Strata Titles to the impugned properties, the developer's consent is a pre-condition to perfect the said assignments. This requirement of consent can be seen in Housing Development Board v Lee Sem Yoong Sdn Bhd [1987] 1 LNS, SC that had observed neither in law nor in 365 equity could the burden of a contract be shifted off the shoulders of a contractor without the consent of the contractee.

7.4 In the present suit, D2 had, through the two Deeds of 370 Assignment (28.01.2015), absolutely assigned all his rights and obligations in the said impugned properties to the plaintiff. At the time, the relevant authorities had not issued the Strata Titles, and the impugned properties had not yet been transferred to D2. In the circumstances, the developer's 375 consent is required.

7.5 This has the effect of revoking the assignment not incompliance (unsupported legal postulation). Therefore, the two Deeds of Assignments are invalid for want of the 380 developer's consent. [8] D2 further argued that:

8.1 Section 22D HDA 1966 does not override Clause 15 of the Sale & Purchase Agreement because it only requires a 385 notification to the developer, whereas Clause 15 requires consent to be obtained. The impugned properties are commercial lots, not housing accommodations that would preclude s.22D HDA 1966. Clause 15 still binds the parties. 390

8.2 The plaintiff may argue that the developer must only be notified of the assignment (s.4(3) Civil Law Act. However, the two assignments are rights and obligations over the impugned properties that can be construed as a novation and, therefore, should fall under s.63 Contracts Act 1950, thereby precluding 395 the application of the Civil Law Act. D1 cited LYL Hooker Sdn Bhd v Tevanaigam Savisthri & Anor [1987] 2 MLJ 52, SC that observed a novation agreement is a new contract. Being a new contract, it must be consented to by all parties. 400 8.3 Therefore, it was argued by D2 that s.4(3) CLA does not apply. Prior consent from the developer is required to perfect the assignment and not merely by notification.

8.4 Illustration (a) to s.63 CA 1950 aptly describes the position of 405 the new contract. In the circumstances, D1 asks that enclosure 3 be dismissed with costs. THE LAW 410 [9] An interim injunction:

9.1 May be granted if the requirements in Keet Gerald Francis Noel John v Mohd Noor@Harun Bin Abdullah & 2 Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 193, CA, are met.

9.2 The Federal Court in Jaya Sudhir a/l Jayaram v Nautical 415 Supreme Sdn Bhd & 2 Ors [2019] 5 MLJ 1; [2019] 7 CLJ 395, FC, held that the applicable test for the grant of interim injunctions is the "Keet Gerald Francis test":

9.2.1 There must be a serious question to be tried:

Applicant must satisfy the Court that there is a 420 serious question to be tried. That is, the claim is not frivolous or vexatious.

The Court is not required to decide on the merits of the claim. Instead, it will consider whether the issues are serious enough to warrant a trial.

9.2.2 Damages are not an adequate remedy:

If damages are an adequate remedy and the defendant is financially able to pay such damages, an interim injunction will not be granted, regardless of 430 how strong the plaintiff's claim appears to be.

The onus is on the applicant to establish that damages are not an adequate remedy: Gerak Indera Sdn Bhd v Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd [1997] 4 AMR 4244; [1997] 3 MLJ 90 at 99, CA.

If the Court is in doubt as to the adequacy of damages, it should proceed on the basis that damages are not an adequate remedy and move to consider the balance of convenience: Tenaga Nasional Berhad v Teobros Development Sdn 440 Bhd [2008] MLJU 415, CA.

9.2.3 Balance of convenience lies in favour of the Injunction: The test of balance of convenience is that the Court 445 should take whichever course appears to carry the lower risk of injustice: Alor Janggus Soon Seng Trading Sdn Bhd & 6 Ors v Sey Hoe Sdn Bhd & 2 Ors [2003] 1 MLJ

The risk that if the interlocutory injunction is refused 450 and the plaintiff succeeds at trial, the harm, inconvenience, and monetary loss suffered by the plaintiff cannot be adequately compensated by damages; and

The risk that if the interlocutory Injunction is granted 455 and the plaintiff later fails at trial, the harm and inconvenience suffered by the Defendant is compensable: Tenaga Nasional Berhad v Teobros Development Sdn Bhd [2008] MLJU 415, CA.

Public interest has been a relevant consideration in 460 weighing the balance of convenience between the parties.

9.2.4 Applicant can meet undertaking in damages financially:

The Applicant must provide an undertaking as to damages to mitigate the apparent risk of unfairness to the party against whom an injunction is ordered when the issues have not been entirely determined and when usually the merits have not been 470 thoroughly ventilated.

Failure to provide an undertaking or the inability to pay damages could be adverse to the Applicant: Jaks Island Circle Sdn Bhd v Star Media Group Bhd & Anor (and Another Originating 475 Summons) [2019] 6 AMR 638; [2020] 1 CLJ 839.

Some evidence of the ability to give effect to an undertaking as to damages should be included when the financial ability is challenged: Asia General Equipment and Supplies Sdn Bhd & 6 Ors v Mohd 480 Sari bin Datuk OKK Hj Nuar & 3 Ors [1998] AMEJ 0027; [1998] MLJU 423; [1998] 1 LNS 5.

The inability of the plaintiff to give a viable undertaking as to damages is not a determining factor in refusing an injunction.

In a case where the injustice to the plaintiff is so manifest, the Court may dispense with the usual undertaking as to damages: Dunggon Jaya Sdn Bhd v Aeropod Sdn Bhd & Anor (and Another Appeal) [2019] 3 AMR 729; [2019] 4 MLJ 466; 490 [2019] 9 CLJ 734 at para [36], CA.

9.2.5 Other factors to consider:

In seeking an ex-parte relief, the applicant must make full and frank disclosure of material facts for the 495 Court's exercise of its discretion: Noor Jahan bt. Wahab v Md Yusoff b Amanshah [1994] 1 MLJ 156, HC, citing and following Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson VC in Dormeuil Feres SA & Anor v Nocolian International (Textiles) Ltd [1988] 500 2 All ER 197.

There must be no inordinate delay in applying for an injunction: Haji Wan Habib v Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul Taib Mahmud [1986] 2 MLJ 198, SC. The Court will only assist the vigilant and not an indolent 505 litigant. FINDINGS [10] The Federal Court in Jaya Sudhir a/l Jayaram v Nautical Supreme Sdn Bhd & 2 Ors [ 2019] 5 MLJ 1; [2019] 7 CLJ 395, FC, ruled that the 510 applicable test for the grant of interim injunctions is the "Keet Gerald Francis test," (Keet Gerald Francis Noel John v Mohd Noor & Ors [1995] 1 CLJ 293, CA) which requires an applicant to satisfy the following requirements:

There must be a serious question to be tried;

Damages are not an adequate remedy;

The balance of convenience lies in favour of the Injunction; and

The applicant can meet its undertaking in damages financially. In determining the facts before the Court, a finding will be rendered 520 according to the facts and the law where the justice of the case matters. [11] The learned counsel asserted that the plaintiff had met the required threshold in canvassing for the Injunction. On the totality of the facts argued: 525 11.1 From the facts presented before me, I find that there are bona fide serious issues between the parties that would need to be canvassed and ventilated at the substantive hearing of this suit to appropriately and justly determine the legal position and rights of parties. These issues are as ruled in Expro Marine 530 Sdn Bhd v Amalgamated Plant Engineering Sdn Bhd [2022] 1 CLJ 61, CA, as issues fit for the trial proper with viva voce evidence, not by a contest of conflicting affidavit evidence. 535 11.2 In the circumstances of the facts of the case before me, injunctive relief to preserve the parties' status quo is required, pending the proper determination of this suit.

11.3 On the question of the adequacy of damages as a remedy, I 540 am guided by the Court of Appeal in Tenaga Nasional Berhad v Teobros Development Sdn Bhd [2008] 4 MLJ 143, CA, that the justice of the case should take precedence and where there is any doubt as to the adequacy of the remedy of damages, it is incumbent upon the Court to regard 545 damages as an inadequate remedy and then move on to consider the question of the balance of convenience.

11.4 Grounded on the foregoing, I find that the balance of convenience lies in favour of granting enclosure 3. The numerous issues on the alleged serious impropriety of D1 are 550 matters to be canvassed, ventilated, and determined at trial.

11.5 The plaintiff's undertaking for damages for this Injunction is accepted. At this juncture, there had never been an issue on the financial ability of the plaintiff, nor had it been challenged 555 by the defendant. [12] In also my considered view:

12.1 The granting of this injunctive relief is not a substantive determination of this suit, nor has it decided on the respective 560 rights of the parties to this suit. The finding of serious issues besieging the parties are to be canvassed and ventilated at the substantive hearing of this suit. The finding of serious bona fide issues with the balance of justice tilting the scale for injunctive relief to be granted would preserve the parties' 565 status quo pending the required substantive hearing of the suit.

12.2 The allegation of impropriety and fraudulent transfer of the impugned properties are serious charges. Undoubtedly, from 570 the facts, there needs to be a proper determination with viva voce evidence. The plaintiff pleaded particulars of the fraud in paragraph 39 of the SoC and the legal position of the two absolute Deed of Assignments of the impugned properties to the plaintiff must be appropriately determined.

12.3 I take cognizance that some of the events (transfer of the impugned properties & the deed of Gifts) occurred while D2 is to undergo his mental health inquiry as ordered by the Court of Appeal in the MHA suit.

12.4 I am guided by the Court of Appeal in Kho Ah Soon v Ooi Kar Seng (properties) Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 293, CA that had observed the fact that there was in existence of an impending threat to dispose of the property in itself is sufficient 585 for status quo to be maintained. There is no reason why the appellant should be deprived of the benefit of specific performance of the agreement, which he says was concluded (in the present case, it's the Deeds of Assignment). The balance of convenience lies in favour of maintaining the status 590 quo. The balance of convenience lies with the plaintiff in maintaining the status quo pending determination by this Court after the substantive hearing of this suit.

12.5 The issue of whether Clause 15 of the SPA can supersede 595 statutory provisions under s.22D HDA 1966 needs to be fully canvassed and ventilated at trial. This is in itself a substantial issue for determination. CONCLUSION 600 [13] All things considered:

13.1 The facts, all-cause papers, and written and oral arguments of respective counsels, I find that enclosure 3 for an interim injunction by the plaintiff had satisfied the Keet Gerald Francis test for the grant of an interim injunction pending a full trial of 605 this suit with viva voce evidence.

13.2 The granting of the said injunctive relief would not be an injustice to D1 to preserve the status quo of parties pending the determination of the parties’ respective rights at full trial. Consequently, I allowed prayers 1, 2, and 3 in enclosure 3; 610 and 13.3 I ordered for cost in the cause. 615 Dated 22.06.2023. 620 HAYATUL AKMAL ABDUL AZIZ JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA 625 KUALA LUMPUR 630 PARTIES Mr Ng Thiang Tuan, together with Mr Keith Kwan & Ms Sarah Arina Messrs. Tuan, Mohd Zain & Co. 635 Counsels for the Plaintiff Mr Dinesh Arthinarayanan, together with Ms Sivashangary Messrs. Kanesalingam & Co. Counsels for the First Defendant 640 Ms Renu Zechariah Messrs. J Nee Counsel for the Second Defendant (APL) 645 Ms Husna binti Abdul Halim