Tan Shee Peng v Lee Bee AI (KA-33-77-10/2022)

This is a divorce petition under section 53 and 54 of Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 (“the Law Reform Act”) seeking a dissolution of his marriage and other prayers.

All the names of those involved are anonymised herein to protect their privacy. The factual background

The Petitioner and the Respondent were lawfully married on 25.6.2006. The marriage has produced two sons, THX and THC, who were born in 2007 and 2011 respectively.

The Respondent and the two sons have been living at their matrimonial home located at XXX Alor Setar, Kedah Darul Aman (“the House”) for a period of more than 10 years.

It is an agreed fact that the marriage between the Petitioner and the Respondent has irretrievably broken down and should be dissolved. The issues 6. A primary issue is to determine whether there is irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, which covers the ultimate cause of all: whether the Respondent assaulted the Petitioner.

Besides, as in any typical matrimonial disputes, the court must also decide on both spousal and child maintenance, including whether it should be paid and in what amount as well as determining the status and division of the House. Contentions, findings and evaluations Whether the marriage has broken down 8. The Petitioner has cited sections 53 and 54(1)(b) of the Law Reform Act in his petition. He claimed that the marriage has irretrievably broken down due to the Respondent’s intolerable behaviour.

The fundamental fact that the marriage has irretrievably broken down is not in dispute. Both the Petitioner and the Respondent have agreed that the marriage should be dissolved. The Petitioner's own written submission explicitly stated that the dissolution of the marriage is not an issue for the court to considered.

While both parties agreed that the marriage is over, they strongly disagree on why it broke down. This is where the Respondent's “intolerable behaviour” becomes a key issue for the court to determine, as it influences other decisions.

The Petitioner's entire case for initiating the divorce is based on the Respondent's alleged unreasonable behaviour. He claimed that the Respondent frequently hit him and that he was forced to leave the House out of fear for his safety.

He specifically mentioned an incident on 19.1.2021, after which he claims he received medical treatment in Hospital Sultanah Bahiyah (See PWS1, Q5, p. 4) (See also NOP, p.49). Q 34. Pempetisyen, dalam kes ini, bolehkah awak terangkan kepada Mahkamah mengapa awak nak bercerai dengan Lee Bee Ai? Dia pukul saya sudah banyak kali YA, satu kali saya tercedera saya bawa kereta sendiri untuk jumpa doktor. Masa tahun 2021, dia pernah cekik saya sebab saya tidak basuh pinggan mangkuk. Saya lari dari rumah sebab dia kata saya tidak buat kerja rumah. Saya pun takut dia akan bunuh saya YA. Masa MCO, cedera masa tu ada buat xray ada buat MRI. Dia juga bising pasal duit YA. [Emphasis added]

The Respondent first made a general denial of aggression in her written statement. She firmly denied these allegations, stating they are untrue and intended to tarnish her image. She testified that there was pushing during arguments but that she did not hit the Petitioner (See RWS1, Q.40, p.15).

Later, during cross-examination, the Respondent acknowledged some physical contact during arguments, describing it as "tolak mai tolak pi" (pushing here and there), but distinguished this from "pukul" (hitting). [See NOP, p.92] Q 73. Sekarang Tan Shee Peng tak pukul Lee Bee Ai, Lee Bee Ai pun tak pukul Tan Shee Peng, betul? Suami tak pukul awak, awak tak pukul suami? Maksudnya pukul macam mana pukul, tolak mai tolak pi, ni kira pukul?

The court is of the view that while this is an admission of mutual antagonism, it falls short of the serious and frequent beatings alleged by the Petitioner.

The Respondent further claimed in her submission that the Petitioner's allegations of being a “battered husband” are a fabrication to deflect the blame for the marriage's failure.

Now, the court must weigh these conflicting testimonies, for, this determination is crucial as it directly impacts the assessment of maintenance under Section 78 of the Law Reform Act which reads: “Assessment of maintenance In determining the amount of any maintenance to be paid by a man to his wife or former wife or by a woman to her husband or former husband, the court shall base its assessment primarily on the means and needs of the parties, regardless of the proportion such maintenance bears to the income of the husband or wife as the case may be, but shall have regard to the degree of responsibility which the court apportions to each party for the breakdown of the marriage.” [Emphasis Added]

It is apt to note that, despite the specific claim, the Petitioner failed to substantiate it with credible evidence. The medical report he sought to rely on was not admitted as an exhibit and was only marked for identification (“ID-P8”) because the doctor who authored it was not called to testify.

Crucially, during cross-examination, when asked to produce evidence that he was beaten and injured by his wife, the Petitioner admitted he had no proof. [See NOP, p.67] Q 155. Macam ini En Tan, jangan bazir masa. Saya cadangkan kepada awak, sebenarnya kamu tidak mempunyai apa-apa dokumen untuk membuktikan pernyataan kamu di sini. En Tan, jangan bazir masa, setuju atau tidak?

For someone who claims he was frequently beaten and left the home out of fear for his safety, the complete absence of police reports or any other evidence is a significant omission.

The Petitioner's credibility was severely undermined by his contradictory excuses for not lodging police reports. He initially claimed it was because he did not understand Bahasa Malaysia.

However, when confronted with a police report he had successfully filed on another matter (Exhibit P15), he conceded his ability to do so. He then changed his reasoning, stating he did not want to escalate the issue for the sake of the children and the marriage. This inconsistency suggests his excuses were not genuine.

Therefore, I find that the Petitioner has failed to prove his allegations on the balance of probabilities. His case is founded on bare assertions that crumbled under the scrutiny of cross-examination. His failure to produce any admissible medical evidence, his lack of police reports, his contradictory and implausible excuses, and his own admission that he had no proof are fatal to his claim.

The Court must rely on credible evidence to arrive at its findings, and the Petitioner's testimony on this matter was found to be unreliable.

Conversely, the Respondent’s testimony was more consistent. While she admitted to a level of physical altercation that involved pushing, this does not support the Petitioner's narrative of being a "battered husband" who feared for his life.

Therefore, the court finds that the Petitioner's unilateral departure from the House on 1.10.2021 was not justified by the reasons he provided. His subsequent filing of the divorce petition based on unsubstantiated allegations of serious violence places the primary responsibility for the breakdown of the marriage on him.

The Respondent's actions, including the admitted "pushing," suggest a degree of mutual conflict, but this does not equate to the level of unreasonable behaviour alleged by the Petitioner, which he failed to prove.

Therefore, in apportioning responsibility under Section 78 of the Law Reform Act, I find that the greater degree of responsibility for the breakdown of the marriage lies with the Petitioner.

His actions of abandoning the family and then attempting to justify it with unproven, serious allegations are the primary cause of this dissolution. This finding will be a key consideration in the subsequent assessment of spousal and child maintenance. Custody, care and control of the children 30. The Petitioner requested that the Respondent and him, be granted joint custody of their two sons, THX and THC. He also requested that both of them be granted reasonable access to the children.

During trial, the Petitioner affirmed that he loves his children and would have no objection if the children themselves chose to live with him after the divorce.

On the other hand, the Respondent prayed for sole custody, care, and control of both children to be granted to her. In her witness statement, she specifically prays for the custody of the younger son, THC. She had nevertheless agreed that the Petitioner should be granted reasonable access, subject to the children's wishes.

The Respondent strongly argued against joint custody, premising the Petitioner's request as inconsistent with his actions. Her key arguments include that the Petitioner unilaterally and abruptly departed from the House on 1.10.2021, leaving her to solely care for the children.

She described him as a "peripheral figure" who has not dedicated meaningful time or genuine care to the children since leaving.

The Respondent argued that the Petitioner has consistently prioritized his own self-interest and financial benefit over the fundamental welfare of his children.

The Respondent further submitted that the Petitioner’s initial prayer to pay zero maintenance for the children is cited as evidence of his disregard of his parental duties.

Furthermore, his subsequent offer of RM700 per month for both children (RM350 each), which he himself admitted was insufficient, is presented as proof of his lack of concern for their needs and well being. Even then, this payment only began after a court order compelled him to do so.

The Respondent's submission invokes Section 88(2) of the Law Reform Act and she has also cited the case of Nithianandha Rao Atchanan v. Kavitha Rajandran [2025] MLRHU 553, to support her argument that stability and continuity of residence are important for children.

In reply, the Petitioner addressed the court to the case of GOS v. GOW [2023] MLRHU 90, which defines the legal concept of the welfare of a child. The Petitioner emphasized that this concept must be interpreted in its widest and most holistic sense, extending beyond mere financial considerations.

The learned counsel for the Petitioner asserted that the law recognizes that a child’s best interests are best served in a nurturing and supportive environment, where he is provided with love, guidance, and stability.

Accordingly, the welfare of a child cannot be measured solely in monetary terms, rather, it is attained through the presence of a loving parent and a stable home that together ensure the child’s healthy and balanced growth into adulthood.

The Respondent contended that she has been fully responsible for the children's daily care, upbringing, education, and medical needs since the Petitioner left. She manages their school routines, prepares them for school, takes them to and from school, and handles all their daily necessities (See RWS1, Q.25, p.7).

Her testimony is supported by numerous receipts for expenses such as groceries, petrol, tuition fees, school supplies, clothing, and medical costs.

The Petitioner stated that after moving out, he attempted to visit his children at the matrimonial home (the House). He also claims to have continued to pay for some expenses, including half of the monthly housing loan instalments and utility bills for the House where the children live (See PWS1, Q.8, p.5).

The court's primary duty to prioritize the child's welfare is mandated by two key pieces of legislation. First, Section 88 of the Law Reform Act which empowers the court to make custody orders and explicitly states that in deciding custody, "the paramount consideration shall be the welfare of the child".

On other words, the court must also have regard to the wishes of the parents and the wishes of the child, if the child is old enough to express an independent opinion (See also Section 11 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1961).

Second, Section 92 of the Law Reform Act establishes the duty of a parent to maintain their children, providing for their accommodation, clothing, food, and education in a manner reasonable to their means and station in life.

Next, the court is granted the power to order a man to pay maintenance for his child, reinforcing the father's primary obligation while the mother has a secondary obligation to contribute if her means make it reasonable to do so, as vested in Section 93 of the Law Reform Act.

It is worth noting that the case of GOS (supra), cited by the Petitioner, was guided by the Federal Court decision in Sean O'Casey Patterson v. Chan Hoong Poh & Ors [2011] MLJU 76, where James Foong FCJ, adopting the definition from the Singaporean case, could not have been clearer: “And in respect of the welfare of the child, we would adopt what was stated by Chan Sek Keong JC (as he then was) in the Singapore case of Tan Siew Kee v Chua Ah Boey (1988) 3 MLJ 20, 21: "The expression 'welfare' under section 3 of the Guardianship of Infant Act (Cap 122, 1985 Ed.) is to be taken in its widest sense. It means the general well-being of the child and all aspects of his upbringing, religious, moral as well as physical. His happiness, comfort and security also go to make up his well-being. A loving parent with a stable home is conducive to the attainment of such well-being. It is not to be measured in monetary terms.” [Emphasis added]

Based on the above, welfare of a child also encompasses the child's happiness, comfort, and security, which are best attained with a loving parent in a stable home and cannot be measured in monetary terms.

I am in full agreement with the Respondent in her reliance on the case of Nithianandha Rao (supra), which reinforces the legal principle that stability and continuity of residence are vital to the welfare of children. In that case, my learned brother Abdul Wahab Mohamed J delivered a remarkable ruling underscoring the importance of providing children with a secure and consistent home environment: “[85] The Court recognizes that stability and continuity of residence are important for the children, and therefore, the Respondent's request to remain in the home is reasonable, provided that she continues to fulfil her obligations in maintaining the property.” [Emphasis added]

The Respondent invoked this principle by emphasizing that the children have resided in the matrimonial home for more than a decade, and that any displacement would cause serious disruption and be detrimental to their emotional well-being.

During oral submissions, the Respondent reiterated that the prayer to remain in the matrimonial home was intended to provide critical stability for the children, particularly the younger son, THC, who has known no other home.

This submission aligns with the well-established legal and social recognition that children are generally nurtured more effectively under the care of their mother, whose role as a natural caregiver fosters both emotional security and moral development. I find no qualm with this.

In light of these considerations, the court granted the Respondent sole custody, care, and control of both children, while affording the Petitioner reasonable access. Such access is to take place once a week and/or at other times mutually agreed upon by the parties, subject always to the wishes and welfare of the children. Maintenance for the children 56. The Petitioner's position on child maintenance evolved throughout the proceedings, starting with a prayer for no financial obligation and gradually increasing to a modest offer under legal pressure.

In his original divorce petition and witness statement, the Petitioner's primary prayer was that he should not be required to pay any child maintenance to the Respondent. The Petitioner justified his stance by claiming he had a very limited income.

He testified during trial that as a chicken noodle hawker, his maximum monthly profit was only around RM2,700.00 (See PWS1, Q.9, p.7).

He stated that his business was suffering due to a declining economy, which further impacted his earnings. This claim was supported by PW3, one of his family members, who testified that his income was “not much” (See PWS3, Q.5, p.3).

When questioned about what he could afford if ordered by the court, the Petitioner stated he could only pay a total of RM700.00 per month for both children combined (See PWS1, Q.9, p.7). He alleged that was the most he could manage after paying his own daily expenses and the monthly loan instalment for the House.

He began making this RM700.00 monthly payment only after the Respondent initiate committal proceedings against him for failing to comply with an interim maintenance order of RM3,000.00, which he claimed he could not afford.

In a letter from his solicitor dated 20.7.2025, the Petitioner later proposed to pay RM500.00 for each child per month, for a total of

The Respondent strongly contested the Petitioner's claims of financial hardship and argued that he had a duty to provide substantial maintenance based on the children's actual needs.

The Respondent prayed for the Petitioner to be ordered to pay monthly maintenance of RM1,000.00 for each child (totalling RM2,000.00 per month).

She requested that this maintenance to be continued until each child reaches the age of majority or obtains their first university degree, whichever is later.

The Respondent's submissions heavily criticized the Petitioner's position on maintenance. She highlighted his initial prayer to pay zero maintenance as evidence of his disregard for his parental duties from the very beginning of the proceedings.

She further argued that his offer of RM700.00 was "derisory" and only made under the threat of committal proceedings, not out of genuine concern.

She asserted that as a father, the petitioner has a primary duty under the law to maintain his children, a responsibility he was attempting to evade.

The court views the Petitioner's LHDN income tax (see Exhibit P10) returns with considerable skepticism. His declared income showed a steady increase up to RM51,600.00 in 2021, the year he left the matrimonial home. It then suspiciously dropped to RM39,000.00 in 2022 (the year he filed for divorce) and plummeted to RM24,000.00 in 2023. This was notwithstanding the fact that the most challenging time during covid was 2021 when Malaysia was still under tight movement restriction.

When questioned about the figures for 2023, he tellingly agreed with the counsel's suggestion that they were a fabrication. [See NOP, p.69] Q 171 Kita lihat bahagian atas total income, yang mengatakan freelance income dapat RM 18,000.00 sales commision RM 6,000.00. Benar YA Q 172 Bagaimana kamu mendapat angka ini, RM 18,000.00 tepat, RM 6,000.00 tepat? Saya tidak tahu YA Q 173 Jadi saya katakan kepada kamu angka yang diletakkan di sini merupakan satu rekaan? Rasanya ya YA Q 174 En Tan, kamu berniaga sebagai seorang penajaja dan kesemua urusniaga adalah dengan menggunakan wang tunai. Soalan saya, pernyata-penyata akaun atau pun bank statements yang kamu tunjukkan dan difailkan kepada Mahkamah sebenarnya langsung tidak menunjukkan apa-apa maklumat berkenaan dengan pendapatan kamu dari perniagaan? Benar YA Q 175 Kamu juga setuju apa-apa simpanan kamu sendiri dalam bentuk wang tunai kami tidak mengetahui sebab kamu tidak tunjukkan apa-apa dokumen di Mahkamah? Setuju YA [Emphasis added]

Given this lack of candour and the failure to produce credible evidence of his income, this court must draw an adverse inference against the Petitioner under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950, as supported by the principles in case like Parkunan Achulingam v. Kalaiyarasy Periasamy [2004] 2 MLRH 38. The court finds that his actual income is likely higher than the RM2,700.00 he declared.

The Respondent, on the other hand, has been transparent about her financial situation. She works as a hawker, earning an average daily profit of between RM80.00 and RM120.00 (See RWS1, Q.30 p.11).

The Respondent asserted that the fact that a wife is gainfully employed does not extinguish the husband's primary duty to maintain the children, as established in Lim Wan Ching v. Khor Tiang Chin [2025] MLRHU 636. To which I agree.

The Respondent further provided a detailed breakdown of the family's estimated monthly expenses to justify her claim, totalling approximately RM3,400.00 to RM4,000.00. The main child-related expenses include: a) Education: School fees, tuition, books, and co-curricular activities (RM450.00); b) Daily needs: School pocket money (RM200.00), food and groceries (RM1,500.00), and basic necessities like clothing and toiletries (RM300.00); and c) Other costs: Transportation (RM400-500), medical needs and optometry (RM400.00), and utility bills

This Court finds this estimate to be reasonable and reflective of the actual costs of raising two teenage sons. THX is 18 years old and has just completed his SPM, with aspirations for university, for he has achieved excellent results (4A+, 3A, 3A -). Under Section 95 of the Law Reform Act, the maintenance obligation continues until the completion of his first tertiary degree.

THC is 14 years old and in secondary school and thus, requiring ongoing support for his education and daily needs.

Section 93 of the Law Reform Act is crystal clear. The father bears the primary obligation to maintain his children, with the mother's duty being secondary and supportive (See also Lim Wan Ching (supra)).

Now, considering the demonstrated needs of the two children, which are reasonably estimated at approximately RM4,000.00 per month and the Petitioner's unreliable and likely understated declaration of income, against which an adverse inference has been drawn, the court finds the Respondent's request for RM1,000.00 per child to be fair, reasonable, and well within the Petitioner's means.

This amount represents a 50% contribution towards the children's total estimated expenses, which in this Court’s view is more than any equitable apportionment given the father's primary duty and the mother's significant non-monetary contributions as the sole caregiver. Maintenance for the Petitioner 80. The Respondent seeks monthly spousal maintenance of RM2,000.00. Her arguments in support of this claim are based on her contributions to the marriage, her current financial needs, and the Petitioner's means and conduct.

The Respondent testified that as a food hawker, her modest income is insufficient to support herself and the two children, especially after the Petitioner abandoned the family. In addition, her ability to work is limited to the morning session because she is solely responsible for all childcare duties, including school runs and daily care (See RWS1, Q.17, p.5).

The Respondent argues that for a significant period of the marriage, especially after the birth of their second child, she was a full-time homemaker who ceased working to care for the children and manage the household. She stated she was responsible for the daily care of the children and the Petitioner, managed household affairs, and made both direct financial contributions (through her hawker business and by paying for household expenses and improvements) and significant indirect contributions to the family's welfare.

She further submitted that after the Petitioner left the matrimonial home, his family members obstructed and drove her away from the food stall where she previously operated her business, forcing her to find a new location and impacting her earnings (See RWS1, Q.29 p.6).

The Respondent's case is that the Petitioner's abandonment of the family is the primary cause of the marital breakdown, placing the responsibility on him.

The Petitioner, expressly objected this claim as his arguments are centred on his alleged inability to pay and his assertion that the Respondent is financially self-sufficient. His primary argument is that the Respondent has a higher monthly profit than he does. He points to her fixed deposit savings (Exhibit P4), which he claims amounting to RM75,000.00, as proof of her financial capacity. He also argued that her bank statements showed that she is able to save money even after he left the House.

However, this has been credibly rebutted. Both the Respondent and her sister (SD1) provided consistent testimony that the principal sum belongs to the sister, with the Respondent only having access to the interest as a form of assistance (See RWS1, Q.35 p.12).

Learned counsel for the Petitioner’s further relied on the case of CSM v. TCC [2023] MLRHU 202 to argue that there is no automatic right for a woman to claim maintenance and that the court's decision must be based on the means and needs of both parties.

Section 77(1) of the Law Reform Act, inter alia, provides that the court may order a man to pay maintenance to his wife when granting a decree of divorce. The amount of maintenance is determined by having regard to section 78 of the Law Reform Act which states that: "...the court shall base its assessment primarily on the means and needs of the parties, regardless of the proportion such maintenance bears to the income of the husband or wife as the case may be, but shall have regard to the degree of responsibility which the court apportions to each party for the breakdown of the marriage."

The evidence overwhelmingly points to the Petitioner's abandonment of the matrimonial home on or around 1.10.2021 as the primary cause of the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. The primary responsibility for the breakdown thus lies with the Petitioner.

Taking into account the Respondent’s own earning capacity, an order for nominal maintenance of RM800 per month is more appropriate to acknowledge the husband's duty while recognizing her ability to contribute to her own support. Whether the House should be classified as a matrimonial home 91. The court take cognizance that there were significant disagreements between the Petitioner and the Respondent regarding the status and division of the House.

The Respondent considered the House to be the matrimonial home and has made several claims regarding it in the divorce proceedings. Among others, she avers that the House has been the matrimonial home where she has resided with her husband and their two children for over 12 years, since 2013.

Based on her position, the Respondent has asked the court to order that: a) She and the children be allowed to continue living in the House without any disturbance; b) The Petitioner continues to pay the monthly housing loan instalments; c) The Petitioner be prohibited from renting, mortgaging, leasing, or selling the House; d) The Petitioner's share in the House be transferred to their children once the loan is fully paid or when the children reach the age of majority, whichever is later.

The Petitioner, strongly disagrees with the Respondent's claims and characterization of the House. His arguments are supported by the testimony of his sister, TSC (See PWS2, Q.6, p.3).

The Petitioner and his sister, both testified that the House is not a matrimonial home. They consistently argue that they purchased the House together for investment purposes (See NOP, p.5).

To support this, the Petitioner’s learned counsel referred the court to the case of HAI v PAI & Anor [2025] 3 MLRH 479 to define what constitutes "matrimonial assets" (See also Ching Seng Woah @ Cheng Song Huat v. Lim Shook Lin (F) [1995] 2 MLRA 487).

Both the Petitioner and his sister asserted that they are the joint legal owners of the House. They claim to have paid for the purchase price and the monthly loan instalments together since the beginning.

The Petitioner disagreed with all of the Respondent's specific requests concerning the House, as it would be unfair to his sister.

In short, the Petitioner, supported by his sister, viewed the House strictly as a joint financial investment, and argued that the Respondent's claims unfairly prejudice his and his sister's rights as co-owners and investors.

Meanwhile, the Respondent argued that the long-term occupation establishes its status as the family home, a place that provided a stable and conducive environment for the children's upbringing.

She further claimed to have contributed both directly and indirectly to the matrimonial home throughout the marriage, including paying for monthly loan instalments (estimating between RM3,000 and RM8,000 in total), utility bills (Unifi, water, electricity), and purchasing furniture, a water pump, and a Smart TV (See RSW1, Q.38 p.14) (See Exhibits in Bundle C1).

Although the Petitioner’s counsel disputed the clarity of certain old receipts, I find that the essence of her claim that she contributed her own funds to turn the house into a home remains firm, as her testimony, was not challenged during cross-examination.

She alleged that that she has managed the household, caring for the husband and children on a daily basis, and overseeing home improvements and repairs.

It is undisputed that the House was acquired on 6.6.2010 during the subsistence of the marriage as the parties were lawfully married on 25.6.2006.

The Respondent cited the case of Nithianandha Rao (supra) to support her prayer for herself and the children to be allowed to continue living in the matrimonial home. The legal principle she relies on from this case is that stability and continuity of residence are important for the welfare of the children, and uprooting them would be detrimental to their emotional well-being.

The law as articulated in case like Ching Seng Woah (supra) defines matrimonial assets far more broadly than mere names or registered ownership on a title: “[148] In my view, the classification of assets as matrimonial cannot solely be determined by registered ownership. Drawing insight from the pertinent case of Ching Seng Woah @ Cheng Song Huat v. Lim Shook Lin (F) [1995] 2 MLRA 487; [1997] 1 MLJ 109; [1997] 1 CLJ 375; [1997] 1 AMR 214, Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) provided a definition of “matrimonial assets.” In that case, he outlined the concept beyond mere ownership, emphasising factors that contribute to matrimonial assets. The following passage from the case serves as a guiding principle in understanding the broader scope of matrimonial assets: “The Act does not define what matrimonial assets are. We think that during the subsistence of a marriage the expression refers to the matrimonial home and everything which is put into it by either spouse with the intention that their home and chattels should be a continuing resource for the spouses and their children to be used jointly and severally for the benefit of the family as a whole. It matters not in this context whether the asset is acquired solely by the one party or the other or by their joint efforts. Whilst the marriage subsists these assets are matrimonial assets. Such assets could be capital assets. The earning power of each spouse is also an asset.” [Emphasis added]

Based on the above, it is crystal clear that matrimonial assets are not confined to legal ownership but encompass the matrimonial home and all contributions made by either spouse, whether financial or otherwise, intended for the benefit of the family as a whole.

It is the finding of this Court that the Petitioner’s assertion that only him and SP1 serviced the loan cannot stand in light of the Respondent’s evidence and the glaring contradictions in SP1’s own testimony. The Petitioner’s and SP1’s conflicting accounts as to who actually made the payments fatally undermine the credibility of the alleged arrangement.

The Petitioner himself admitted under cross-examination that the house was for his own family's use right after he bought it. [See NOP, p.] Q 72 Kamu setuju selepas rumah ini dibeli, kamu dengan keluarga kamu, maksudnya isteri dan dua orang anak duduk di rumah tersebut? Benar YA Q 73 Jadi rumah itu adalah untuk kegunaan kamu sendiri? En Tan, saya tak tanya banyak, senang saja soalan saya. Soalan saya, rumah itu dibeli untuk kegunaan kamu sendiri? Benar YA [Emphasis added]

Hence, this supports the Respondent’s argument that the House must properly be regarded as a matrimonial asset, as it was acquired and enhanced during the marriage through the joint contributions of both the Petitioner and the Respondent, whether direct or indirect.

The Respondent further cited the case of REV v. JEV [2024] MLRHU 1243, to support the Respondent's request that the Petitioner be ordered to continue paying the monthly housing loan instalments. The Respondent argued that this case shows that such payments can be considered part of the husband's maintenance obligations to ensure the wife and children have stable accommodation.

The Petitioner’s suggestion that the family could rent a new place, for which he might contribute RM400-RM500, is wholly inadequate and introduces uncertainty that is detrimental to the children's well-being.

In REV (supra), I gained valuable insights when Evrol Mariette Peters J (now JCA) ruled that: [24] Ensuring the Respondent had a secure place to live was essential, as leaving her without a roof over her head would have been unjust and contrary to the principles of equitable maintenance. The need for accommodation is a basic necessity, and it is vital that it is addressed in maintenance arrangements. [Emphasis added]

Based on the above, it is clear that providing the Respondent with secure accommodation is a fundamental element of equitable maintenance, as leaving her without a home would be unjust and contrary to the principles of fairness.

In order to ensure stability for the children, which is the paramount duty of the court, and while acknowledging the Respondent’s contributions to the marriage and the matrimonial home, the Petitioner shall continue to be solely responsible for servicing the monthly housing loan instalments for the matrimonial home until the loan is fully settled and the House is fully redeemed. The Respondent shall, however, be jointly responsible for the payment of all quit rent and assessment taxes for the House.

Division of other matrimonial assets The Respondent has made a comprehensive claim for the division of all matrimonial assets acquired during the marriage, extending beyond the matrimonial house. Her argument is that she is entitled to a half-share (50%) of all other matrimonial assets, whether they are held in the Petitioner's sole name, or jointly with others.

This includes the Petitioner's Employees Provident Fund (EPF/KWSP) account, all monies in his savings and fixed deposit accounts, and his business interests trust for him. The Petitioner, objects to this prayer, deeming it "unreasonable". i) EPF/KWSP

The law is well-established that EPF savings accumulated during the subsistence of a marriage are considered matrimonial assets subject to division. This was articulated in the Parkunan Achulingam (supra) where Faiza Tamby Chik J (as he then was) held: “[21] EPF moneys is a matrimonial asset, as it is an asset acquired during the existence of a marriage and therefore is subject to division between the parties. In my article reported in the Malayan Law Journal [2003] 4 MLJ cxxix, on 'How Litigants Should Prepare Their Cases in Divorce Proceedings', where I said: Matrimonial assets are not only landed property but also car, shares, savings, unit trusts, insurance policies, EPF balances, club memberships, ….” [Emphasis added]

The underlying rationale of the EPF money is that, had the marriage subsisted and the parties entered their golden years together, both spouses would have been able to retire and enjoy the benefits of the savings accumulated through EPF contributions. On the facts before this court, the Respondent had ceased full-time employment as a clerk after their first child was born, in order to attend to the welfare and needs of the children as well as to care for the household and the Petitioner. In doing so, the Respondent sacrificed her career and prospects for advancement, and was consequently deprived of making further EPF contributions of her own. This decision, however, enabled the Petitioner husband to concentrate on and advance in his career for the benefit of the family. Hence, with the breakdown of the marriage, it would be inequitable to permit the Petitioner to solely benefit from the EPF, while the Respondent bears the loss of her career and retirement contributions.

The Petitioner's EPF statement shows a balance of RM47,891.92 as of 18.7.2024. These funds represent savings accumulated during the marriage through the Petitioner's employment, which was supported by the Respondent's contributions to the welfare of the family.

Therefore, I order that 50% of the total amount standing to the credit of the Petitioner's Employees Provident Fund (KWSP) account, as at the date the Decree Nisi is made absolute, shall be divided and transferred to the Respondent. ii)

Cash Savings and Bank Accounts The Respondent seeks a 50% share of all monies in the Petitioner's current, savings, and fixed deposit accounts, while the Petitioner objected and countered that the Respondent is financially better off, pointing to her fixed deposit savings of RM75,000.00 as proof. He argued that her bank statements show she was able to save money even after he left.

This issue turns on the credibility of both parties regarding their true financial means.

It is pertinent to note that the central principle of the amended Section 76 of the Law Reform Act is that after considering all relevant factors, the court shall incline towards equality of division: Power for court to order division of matrimonial assets.

This means that each spouse should generally receive half, or close to half, of the accumulated property and wealth, regardless of which spouse was the primary breadwinner. The division is not a strict financial accounting exercise but a fair and equitable distribution.

Therefore, in the interest of justice and inclining towards equality as mandated by Section 76 of the Law Reform Act, I order that 50% of all monies standing to the credit of the Petitioner's bank accounts, including savings, current, and fixed deposit accounts, as at the date the Decree Nisi is made absolute, shall be divided and paid to the Respondent.

I make no order for the division of the Respondent's fixed deposits, as I accept the evidence that these funds are not matrimonial assets but are held in a form of trust for her sister.

I hereby make the following orders: a) That the marriage solemnized on 25.6.2006, be dissolved; b) A Decree Nisi was granted, to be made absolute (finalized) within three months from the date of the decree, unless sufficient cause is shown as to why it should not be finalized; c) Sole custody, care, and control of the two children of the marriage, THX and THC, were granted to the Respondent, LBA; d) The Petitioner, TSP, was granted reasonable access to the children once a week or at other mutually agreed times, subject to the children's wishes; e) The Petitioner must pay the Respondent RM 800.00 per month for her maintenance, payable on or before the 7th of each month; f) The Petitioner must pay RM 1,000.00 per child per month (totalling RM 2,000.00) through the Respondent. This payment is due on or before the 7th of each month and continues until each child reaches the age of majority or obtains their first university degree, whichever is later.

The court also made several specific orders regarding the House, and other matrimonial assets as follows: a) The Respondent and the children are allowed to continue living in the matrimonial home (namely the House) without any disturbance from the Petitioner or his representatives; b) The Petitioner is ordered to continue paying the monthly loan instalments for the House; c) The Respondent is responsible for paying all utility bills, quit rent, assessment, and insurance for the property as long as she and the children live there; d) The Petitioner is prohibited from renting, mortgaging, leasing, or disposing of the House; e) The Petitioner's share in the House must subsequently be transferred to the children in equal shares. This transfer must happen upon the children reaching the age of majority or three months after the housing loan is fully paid, whichever is later. The Petitioner must bear all costs for this transfer; f) If the Petitioner fails to execute the transfer documents, the Registrar of the High Court is empowered to execute all necessary documents on his behalf; g) The Petitioner is ordered to divide and give the Respondent a one-half (50%) share of all other matrimonial assets; h) This includes assets held in the Petitioner's name alone or jointly with others, assets held in trust for him, movable and immovable property, money in bank accounts, unit trusts, and shares in companies or businesses; i) The order specifically includes all money in the Petitioner's Employees Provident Fund (KWSP) account up to the date the Decree Nisi is made absolute, and all funds in his current, savings, and/or fixed deposit accounts; j) Any disposal of the Respondent's share in the matrimonial assets that may have been done by the Petitioner without her knowledge or consent is to be set aside.

This Court also order the Petitioner to pay the costs of the proceedings on an indemnity basis. Dated: 16th October, 2025 -------------------------------------------------------------------- DR. JOHN LEE KIEN HOW @ MOHD JOHAN LEE JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA ALOR SETAR Solicitor : Wong Tai Hau For The Petitioner Messrs. T.H. Wong & Co. Advocates And Solicitors Solicitor : Fong Phooi Nam For The Respondent Messrs. Fong & Hakim Advocates And Solicitors Table of Authorities Cases CSM v. TCC [2023] MLRHU 202 GOS v. GOW [2023] MLRHU 90 HAI v. PAI & Anor [2025] 3 MLRH 479 Lim Wan Ching v. Khor Tiang Chin [2025] MLRHU 636 Parkunan Achulingam v. Kalaiyarasy Periasamy [2004] 2 MLRH 38