Tan Si Hai @ Tan Si Yen v Liow Keng Luan (WA-12ANCvC-134-07/2024)

TAN SHING YI

LIOW KENG LUAN (NO. K/P: 590602-04-5592) ...RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (BAHAGIAN SIVIL) GUAMAN SIVIL NO.: WA-A53-11-04/2024 ANTARA TAN SI HAI @TAN SI YEN (NO. K/P: 590904-04-5475) …PLAINTIF 28/01/2026 16:50:21 WA-12ANCvC-134-07/2024 Kand. 26 Page 2 of 27 TAN SHING YI (NO. K/P: 910304-87-5002) …DEFENDAN LIOW KENG LUAN (NO. K/P: 590602-04-5592) …PENCELAH GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT

The Appellant-Plaintiff in the Sessions Court (P) sued the 1st Respondent-Defendant in the Sessions Court (1st Respondent). P is the father. The 1st Respondent is his daughter. The suit is to evict the 1st Respondent from the house she is presently residing in.

The 2nd Respondent-Intervener in the Sessions Court (R2) is P’s wife, and the 1st Respondent’s mother. R2 also resides in the same house. R2 applied to intervene in the Sessions Court suit. In her application, R2 prayed for leave to intervene, and for an Order to stay the Sessions Court proceeding, pending her Page 3 of 27 matrimonial dispute with P in a Family Court Judicial Separation Petition.

The Sessions Court granted R2 leave to intervene, as well as the Order to stay the Sessions Court proceeding.

P appeals against the Sessions Court’s Order. Should his appeal be allowed or dismissed?

P and R2 are husband and wife. They were married and have two daughters, one of whom is the 1st Respondent.

The family resided together at various addresses during the marriage. In May 2021—P, R2 and the 1st Respondent moved to the house at No. 80, Jalan Seri Beringin 2, Bukit Damansara, 50490 Kuala Lumpur ("Damansara House"). The Damansara House is registered in P’s sole name.

The marriage between P and R2 broke down. In April 2023, R2 commenced the Kuala Lumpur High Court (Family Court) Judicial Separation Petition No. WA-33-205-04/2023 (JS Petition). The Damansara House is one of the properties that R2 claims as a matrimonial asset, which is subject to division in the Family Court.

In April 2024, P commenced the Sessions Court suit against the 1st Respondent, seeking a declaration that the 1st Respondent is a trespasser, an Order to evict her from the Damansara House, and for payment of mesne profits. Mesne profits are damages (such as rent) payable by a trespasser to the owner(s) of a property.

R2 then filed the subject application, praying for leave to intervene, and to stay the Sessions Court proceeding, pending the outcome of the JS Petition, namely, pending the Family Court’s Order on the division of matrimonial assets.

On 5.7.2024, the Learned Sessions Court Judge granted R2’s application. P appeals to the High Court. THE LAW ON INTERVENER APPLICATIONS AND STAY OF PROCEEDINGS Leave to intervene

The law on granting leave to intervene in a proceeding is particularly governed by Order 15 Rule 6 of the Rules of Court 2012 (ROC 2012). Order 15 Rule 6(2)(b) of the ROC 2012 provides that a person should be allowed to be joined as a party, i.e. to intervene—when their “presence before the Court” is “necessary” to ensure that “all matters in dispute in the cause Page 5 of 27 or matter” can be “effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon”.

Also, a person should be allowed to intervene when it is “just and convenient” to determine a question or issue relating to the relief or remedy sought in the suit, as between that person (here: R2) and a party in the suit (here: P), or between the parties in the suit (here: between P and the 1st Respondent).

The governing principles under case law on leave to intervene were propounded in the Privy Council case of Pegang Mining Co Ltd v Choong Sam & Ors [1969] 2 MLJ 52 (PC); [1968] 1 MLRA 925; [1968] CLJU 96; [1969] 1 WLUK 531. The principles are that—

the principal object of the rule of court on intervening in a suit (here: Order 15 Rule 6) is “to prevent injustice being done to a person whose rights will be affected” by the judgment of the Court in the suit, by giving them “an opportunity to be heard”— at MLJ page 55, right column, paragraph G-I;

“to achieve this object” of preventing such an injustice, there is a need for a “flexibility of approach”—at MLJ, the same page, column and paragraph;

it is not “helpful” to find a “dichotomy” (distinction) between whether it is the proposed intervener’s “legal” or “commercial” interest that will be affected if they are not permitted to intervene. The “better” test is: will the proposed intervener’s “rights against Page 6 of 27 or liabilities to any party” in the suit concerning “the subject matter” of the suit “be directly affected by any order which may be made” in the suit?—at MLJ page 56, left column, paragraph A-B.

To put this test in the context of this appeal—the proposed intervener is R2; the suit is the Sessions Court suit by P to evict the 1st Respondent from the Damansara House, which R2 asserts is a matrimonial asset in her marriage with P; the subject matter of the suit is the Damansara House; and R2 asserts that her rights against P, or conversely her liability to P, concerning the Damansara House, will be affected by the Sessions Court’s judgment in the suit.

I find that R2 has satisfied these requirements and principles. I will elaborate on my reasons below. Stay of proceedings

Section 99A of the Subordinate Courts Act 1948, read together with Paragraph 1 of the Third Schedule, provides that the Sessions Court has the “powers and jurisdiction” to “stay proceedings” where the proceedings “ought not to be continued” because of a “multiplicity of proceedings”.

Order 92 Rule 4 of the ROC 2012 provides that the Court has the “inherent powers” to “make any order as may be necessary to prevent injustice or to prevent an abuse of the process of the court”.

The case law principle governing the grant of a stay of proceedings is the same as that for the grant of a stay of execution, which is: are there “special circumstances to justify the grant of a stay”? The “special circumstances” test was affirmed in the Federal Court case of Kosma Palm Oil Mill Sdn Bhd & Ors v Koperasi Serbausaha Makmur Bhd [2004] 1 MLJ 257 (FC); [2003] 5 AMR 758; [2003] 4 CLJ 1, [2003] 1 MLRA 536 at MLJ page 269, paragraph 23.

On the leave-to-intervene issue—P submits that the Sessions Court Judge erred in law. He argues that R2 has no legal interest in the Damansara House simply by virtue of her claim in the JS Petition for the division of matrimonial assets, which remains undetermined. He contends that R2’s interests are merely prospective and contingent on the outcome of the JS Petition. He asserts that as the sole registered proprietor, he has an indefeasible title and the right to evict the 1st Respondent.

On the stay of proceedings issue—P submits that the Sessions Court suit and the JS Petition involve different subject matters, parties, and reliefs. He argues that there is no multiplicity of proceedings and no risk of conflicting decisions. He contends that the stay will indefinitely delay the Sessions Court suit and cause him financial hardship.

P also raises a preliminary objection that R2 improperly combined two distinct applications—intervention and stay—in a single application. And that the Sessions Court Judge should have required R2 to elect which application (which of the two prayers) to pursue.

On the leave-to-intervene issue—R2 submits that as she is P's wife, she has rights over the Damansara House, which is the matrimonial home. She argues that these rights exist throughout the marriage and are recognised by statute and case law. She contends that her rights are not merely prospective but subsist during the marriage by virtue of the marriage contract itself.

R2 also submits that the subject matter of the Sessions Court suit is the Damansara House. And any order made in that proceeding will directly affect her rights over the house. She argues that the Page 9 of 27 Sessions Court Judge correctly exercised discretion to allow her to intervene, to protect her interests.

On the stay issue— R2 submits that there is a multiplicity of proceedings. Both proceedings concern the parties' rights over the Damansara House. These are the special circumstances that warrant a stay of the Sessions Court proceeding, particularly to avoid conflicting decisions and to ensure that the Family Court determines the parties' rights over the matrimonial home first. MY FINDINGS

At the outset, I will address the applicable principle for an appellate review of the Sessions Court Judge’s exercise of discretion. The grant of leave to intervene and the grant of a stay are matters of discretion. It is well established that an appellate court should be slow to interfere with a lower court's exercise of discretion.

In Vasudevan v. T Damodaran & Anor [1981] 2 MLJ 150 (FC); [1981] CLJ Rep 101; [1981] 1 MLRA 24, the Federal Court, through Justice Eusoffe Abdoolcader, citing case law authorities, held (at MLJ page 151, left column, paragraph G-I, right column, paragraph A-B) that--

an appellate court can review questions of discretion exercised by a lower court “if it is clearly satisfied that the judge was wrong”;

there is a “presumption” that the lower court judge “has rightly exercised his discretion” and “the appellate court must not reverse the judge’s discretion” on a “bare balance”, since “the mere idea of discretion involves room for choice and for difference of opinion;

an appellate court “can only interfere” if the lower court has applied “a wrong principle”, or where “no court, properly instructing itself in the law, could have come to the conclusion which in fact was arrived at."

Put in another way, P must satisfy this Court that the Sessions Court Judge failed to take into account material matters, or took into account irrelevant matters, or arrived at a decision that no reasonable judge could have reached. Simply put, the test is whether the decision is "plainly wrong". THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION: MULTIPLE APPLICATIONS IN

I deal first with the P's preliminary objection that R2 improperly combined two applications in one notice of application. P relies on Mohd Azam Shuja v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1995] 2 MLJ 851 (CA); [1995] 3 AMR 2175; [1995] 2 MLRA 706, for the proposition that applications founded on distinct legal bases cannot be consolidated.

R2 submits that bringing both applications together was in the interests of time and efficiency. She argues that the intervention application had to be determined first, and the stay application followed logically if leave to intervene was given.

I find no merit in P’s objection. Firstly, the case cited by P deals with fundamentally incompatible applications, such as striking out and summary judgment, which require mutually exclusive findings. Here, the intervention and stay applications, while distinct, are not incompatible. The Sessions Court Judge correctly considered the intervention prayer first and then proceeded to consider the stay prayer. This sequential consideration does not constitute procedural irregularity.

Secondly, P suffered no prejudice. He had a full opportunity to respond to both prayers and did so. The Sessions Court Judge considered both prayers on their merits. The subject application involves related prayers that could sensibly be heard together, or one after the other.

I therefore reject this preliminary objection. Page 12 of 27 THE LEAVE TO INTERVENE PRAYER Rights of a wife over the matrimonial home

The central issue in the leave-to-intervene prayer is whether R2 has rights in the Damansara House that will be directly affected by the Sessions Court proceeding.

P argues that R2 has no present rights in the Damansara House. He contends that her rights are merely prospective and depend on the outcome of the JS Petition. He relies on Manokaram Subramaniam v. Ranjid Kaur Nata Singh [2009] 1 MLJ 21 (FC); [2008] 6 AMR 177; [2008] 6 CLJ 209; [2008] 2 MLRA 135, for the proposition that rights to matrimonial assets only arise on the grant of a decree for divorce or judicial separation.

R2 argues that she has existing rights to the matrimonial home throughout the subsistence of the marriage. These rights derive from the marriage contract and are recognised by statute and case law.

I accept R2's submissions. First—section 76(1) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 (LRA) provides for the division of matrimonial assets. It provides that the Family Court has the power “to order the division between the parties of any assets acquired by them during the marriage”.

Second—section 76(2) of the LRA provides that in the division of matrimonial assets, the Family Court “shall incline towards equality of division”. This means that R2, as the wife, has rights over the Damansara House, as it is part of matrimonial assets.

In Ching Seng Woah @ Cheng Song Huat v. Lim Shook Lin (F) [1997] 1 MLJ 109 (CA); [1997] 1 AMR 214; [1997] 1 CLJ 375; [1995] 2 MLRA 487; at MLJ page 122, the Court of Appeal, through Justice Mahadev Shankar, held that in a marriage, the expression “matrimonial assets” refers to “the matrimonial home and everything which is put into it by either spouse with the intention that their home and chattels should be a continuing resource for the spouses and their children to be used jointly and severally for the benefit of the family as a whole”. And, it does not matter whether the asset is “acquired by the one party or the other or by their joint efforts”.

In Jayakumari a/p Arul Pragasam v. Suriya Narayanan a/l V Ramanathan [1996] 4 MLJ 421 (HC); [1996] 2 AMR 2127; [1996] 4 MLRH 572; [1996] CLJU 74, at MLJ page 427, paragraph D, Justice James Foong held that even though the matrimonial home belongs to the husband, “a wife is not without rights”. And “her right to stay in the matrimonial home is presumed in law” and “conferred upon her by her husband flowing from the concept of a marriage”.

More comprehensively, in Devi Vejaya Raman v. Krishna Murthi Govindasamy [2018] 10 MLJ 657 (HC); [2017] 3 AMR 842; [2017] 4 MLRH 263; [2017] 1 LNS 494, at paragraphs [18] to [23], Justice Choo Kah Sing stated that—

section 76 of the LRA shows that “our law recognises” that in the division of matrimonial assets, the husband and wife should have “equal sharing”;

it is inferred that “a married woman should also have a right over the matrimonial assets during the subsistence of the marriage”;

it is “unjust to say that a married woman will have a right over the matrimonial assets only when the marriage comes to an end”;

both husband and wife “shall have the same equitable right to enjoy the matrimonial home”;

the husband cannot “take advantage of his legal right as sole proprietor” of the matrimonial home “to do what he likes with it”.

In Devi Vijaya Raman (supra), the High Court granted an interim injunction to prevent the husband from evicting the wife and the three children (aged 21, 12 and five).

I hence find that the matrimonial home is a continuing resource for the family. It is not merely property held by P, subject to future Page 15 of 27 division. It is property impressed with R2’s present rights conferred by the marriage contract and the law.

Put differently, R2, as wife, has existing, enforceable rights over the matrimonial home (the Damansara House), during the marriage. These rights are not merely prospective or contingent. They exist by operation of law, from the marriage contract itself.

R2’s rights over the Damansara House include her rights to enjoy, stay and remain in the matrimonial home. And as the matrimonial home remains a continuing resource for R2 and the family as a whole, R2 has a say in who should be granted a licence to occupy the Damansara House. In other words, R2 has a say in whether the 1st Respondent should be evicted from the Damansara House. Direct effect on rights

On the issue of whether R2's rights will be directly affected by the judgment of the Sessions Court, P argues that the Sessions Court proceeding only concerns the 1st Respondent, and that R2’s rights to occupy the Damansara House remain unaffected.

This submission is untenable. One—I reiterate that in Ching Seng Woah (supra), the Court of Appeal held that the matrimonial home is a continuing resource "for the spouses and Page 16 of 27 their children to be used jointly and severally for the benefit of the family as a whole." This establishes that the wife's (R2’s) rights in the Damansara House extend to maintaining it as a family home, for herself and the children.

R2 has allowed her daughter, the 1st Respondent, to reside with her in the matrimonial home. This is part of her right to maintain the home as a continuing family resource. An order evicting the 1st Respondent directly affects R2’s right to maintain the matrimonial home for the benefit of the family.

Two—P’s submission that his rights as registered proprietor are indefeasible and override any claim by R2 is misconceived. The LRA is specific legislation dealing with matrimonial matters. It takes precedence over general property law principles, where matrimonial rights are concerned.

In Balakrishnan a/l Kaliappan v Shameena a/p Nathesan [2019] 5 MLJ 661 (CA); [2019] 7 CLJ 762; [2019] 5 MLRA 40, at paragraph [10], the Court of Appeal, through Justice Rhodzariah Bujang held that as the purpose of the LRA is to provide for “matters relating to and incidental to marriages” contracted under the LRA, “recourse to rights provided outside of the LRA” concerning rights specifically spelt out in the LRA, such as rights over matrimonial property, “should not be allowed”.

This recognises the principle that the LRA takes precedence over other laws in family matters. The husband cannot take refuge in his registered proprietorship to defeat the wife's statutory and common law rights arising from the marriage.

I find that any order or judgment made in the Sessions Court suit will directly affect R2's rights in the matrimonial home. The Sessions Court Judge correctly concluded that R2 has the requisite interest to intervene, and granted her leave to do so. Conclusion on leave to intervene

I therefore find that the Pegang Mining (supra) test for allowing R2 to intervene in the Sessions Court proceeding is satisfied. R2’s rights against P concerning the Damansara House (the subject matter of the Sessions Court proceeding) will be “directly affected” by the Sessions Court’s judgment in the suit.

I also find that the requirements under Order 15 Rule 6(2)(b) of the ROC 2012 are also satisfied. R2’s “presence” before the Sessions Court is “necessary”, so that “all matters in dispute” between R2 and P, and between P and the 1st Respondent, concerning the Damansara House can be “effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon”.

I further find that R2 should be given leave to intervene, as it is “just and convenient” to have R2 in the Sessions Court proceedings, to determine the issues concerning whether to evict the 1st Respondent from the Damansara House THE STAY OF PROCEEDINGS PRAYER Multiplicity of proceedings should be avoided

In Lesco Development Corp Sdn Bhd v Malaysia Building Society Bhd [1988] 2 MLJ 184 (SC); [1987] CLJ Rep 160; [1987] 1 MLRA 26, at MLJ page 185, left column, paragraph C-D, the Supreme Court, through Justice Wan Hamzah, propounded that “it is undesirable to allow a situation where two different courts would try and determine the same issues arising between the same parties relating to the same subject matter”.

In Tai May Chean v. New Way Capital Sdn Bhd & Anor and another appeal [2020] 12 MLJ 471 (CA); [2019] 3 AMR 469; [2019] 9 CLJ 477; [2019] 5 MLRA 252, at paragraph [25], the Court of Appeal, through Justice Harmindar Singh, held that "the objection to multiplicity of proceedings is well-founded”. “It is in the public interest to avoid conflicting decisions by two different courts on the same issue between parties”. “Conflicting decisions on the same issue” is an “embarrassment to the court”. And it “may also undermine public confidence in the administration of justice”. Page 19 of 27 Application to the present facts

P argues that there is no multiplicity because the Sessions Court suit and the JS Petition involve different subject matters, parties, and reliefs. He submits that the Sessions Court suit concerns the eviction of the 1st Respondent, while the JS Petition concerns matrimonial asset division between P and R2.

R2 submits that both proceedings concern the parties' rights over the Damansara House. She argues that there is duplicity, which may lead to conflicting decisions.

I accept R2’s submissions. First, both the Sessions Court suit and the JS Petition concern the fundamental issue of rights over the Damansara House.

In the Sessions Court suit, P seeks to assert his sole right to control the property by evicting the 1st Respondent. The Sessions Court would have to determine whether P has the unilateral right to evict the 1st Respondent from the Damansara House (the matrimonial home).

In the JS Petition, R2 claims the Damansara House as a matrimonial asset. The Family Court will determine R2’s and P’s respective rights to the property and will make orders for its division or disposition. The Family Court may also consider R2’s Page 20 of 27 need for housing, and the 1st Respondent's circumstances as part of the overall determination.

These determinations are closely related. If the Sessions Court orders eviction on the basis that P has sole control of the Damansara House, this could conflict with the Family Court's determination that R2 has rights to the property and that it should be maintained as the family home, or even awarded to her.

P argues that no conflict can arise because the JS Petition only concerns the division of assets between P and R2, not the eviction of the 1st Respondent. I find that this is an artificial distinction. R2’s right to the matrimonial home includes her right to maintain it for the family's benefit, which includes her daughter's residence.

Second, if the Sessions Court grants an eviction order and mesne profits against the 1st Respondent, this would effectively determine that P has the right to exclude family members from the matrimonial home during the subsistence of the marriage. This determination would undermine R2's equal right to enjoy the matrimonial home.

Third, I find that it is appropriate for the Family Court to determine P’s and R2’s rights over the matrimonial home in the JS Petition Page 21 of 27 before the Sessions Court proceeds to determine the eviction of a family member from that home. Proper forum for the determination of rights

Another consideration is: which Court should properly determine P’s and R2’s rights over the matrimonial home. The Family Court has jurisdiction over matrimonial matters, including division of matrimonial assets under section 76 of the LRA.

The Sessions Court would only be determining rights over the matrimonial home as an ancillary issue in an eviction action. The Family Court would be determining those rights directly in the context of matrimonial asset division.

It is more appropriate for the Family Court to determine P’s and R2's rights to the matrimonial home first. The Family Court has the jurisdiction and expertise to consider all relevant factors, including their respective contributions, needs, and the welfare of the family. Balance of justice

I think it is important for me to consider also the balance of justice between the parties. One—P argues that a stay will cause him financial hardship as he continues to bear the costs of the Page 22 of 27 Damansara House while the 1st Respondent occupies it. He submits that the stay will indefinitely postpone the determination of the Sessions Court suit.

I find that these concerns do not outweigh the need to avoid conflicting decisions on overlapping issues. P's financial burden arises from his ongoing matrimonial obligations. He cannot avoid these obligations by bringing an eviction action against his daughter in the Sessions Court, while matrimonial proceedings are pending in the Family Court.

Two—the stay is not indefinite. It is pending the determination of the JS Petition. The JS Petition is actively being prosecuted. There is no suggestion that R2 is using the stay as a delaying tactic.

Third—the balance of justice favours a stay. If the Sessions Court suit proceeds and an eviction order is granted, the 1st Respondent would suffer immediate hardship. If the Family Court subsequently determines that R2 has rights to maintain the home for the family (including the 1st Respondent), the eviction order would have caused unnecessary hardship.

On the other hand, if the stay is granted and the Family Court determines P’s and R2’s rights to the property first, the Sessions Court can then proceed with full knowledge of the competing Page 23 of 27 matrimonial position between P and R2. This approach avoids conflicting decisions and ensures that all relevant rights are properly considered. Conclusion on stay

I find that special circumstances exist, warranting a stay. There is a multiplicity of proceedings concerning overlapping issues. There is a real risk of conflicting decisions. The Family Court is the proper forum to determine the parties' rights to the matrimonial home first. The balance of justice favours a stay. The alleged contradiction between intervention and stay

Finally, P submits that the intervention and stay orders are “inherently contradictory” and “legally irreconcilable”. He argues that by allowing intervention, the Sessions Court Judge recognised that R2 has existing rights. By granting a stay, however, the Sessions Court Judge held that those rights are undetermined, as they are subject to the JS Petition. And, R2’s rights in the JS Petition are irrelevant to the eviction issue in the Sessions Court. He submits that no reasonable judge would have made both orders.

This submission is misconceived. Firstly, there is no contradiction between the orders. The intervention order recognises that R2 Page 24 of 27 has rights in the subject matter that will be affected by the Sessions Court suit. The stay order recognises that R2’s rights should be definitively determined by the Family Court before the Sessions Court proceeds.

Secondly, the intervention test asks whether R2's rights will be “directly affected”. It does not require that those rights be fully crystallised or finally determined. R2 has subsisting rights that require further definition or quantification. She has standing to intervene to protect those rights.

Thirdly, the stay recognises that where overlapping proceedings are pending in different courts, it may be appropriate for one court to await the determination of the other to avoid conflicting decisions. This is particularly so where one court has primary jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Here, R2 has subsisting rights to the matrimonial home by virtue of the marriage relationship. Those rights require determination and quantification by the Family Court in the context of the JS Petition. It is appropriate for the Sessions Court to stay its hand pending that determination.

Fourthly, the two Orders are not contradictory; they are complementary. The intervention ensures that R2 can protect her interests in the Sessions Court, if and when it proceeds. The stay Page 25 of 27 ensures that her rights are definitively determined by the appropriate court (Family Court) first.

I find no contradiction between the intervention and stay orders. Both orders were properly made and serve legitimate purposes.

For these reasons, I dismiss the Appellant-Plaintiff’s appeal with costs of RM7K to be paid by the Appellant-Plaintiff to the 2nd Respondent-Intervener. Costs are subject to the allocatur. Dated: 28 January 2026 KENNETH ST JAMES HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR Page 26 of 27 Solicitors for the Appellant : Joseph Ting, Eileen Ooi Chia Ling Messrs. Joseph Ting & Co. Solicitors for the 2nd Respondent : Kiran Dhaliwal, Onnelea Dion Sandosam Messrs. Y N Foo & Partners Legislation referred to:

Order 15 Rule 6 of the Rules of Court 2012.

Order 15 Rule 6(2) of the Rules of Court 2012.

Section 99A of the Subordinate Courts Act 1948.

Order 92 Rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012.

Section 76(1) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976.

Section 76(2) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976. Cases referred to:

Pegang Mining Co Ltd v Choong Sam & Ors [1969] 2 MLJ 52 (PC); [1968] 1 MLRA 925; [1968] CLJU 96; [1969] 1 WLUK

531.

Kosma Palm Oil Mill Sdn Bhd & Ors v Koperasi Serbausaha Makmur Bhd [2004] 1 MLJ 257 (FC); [2003] 5 AMR 758; [2003] 4 CLJ 1; [2003] 1 MLRA 536.

Vasudevan v. T Damodaran & Anor [1981] 2 MLJ 150 (FC); [1981] CLJ Rep 101; [1981] 1 MLRA 24.

Mohd Azam Shuja v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1995] 2 MLJ 851 (CA); [1995] 3 AMR 2175; [1995] 2 MLRA

706.

Manokaram Subramaniam v. Ranjid Kaur Nata Singh [2009] 1 MLJ 21 (FC); [2008] 6 AMR 177; [2008] 6 CLJ 209; [2008] 2

Ching Seng Woah @ Cheng Song Huat v. Lim Shook Lin (F) [1997] 1 MLJ 109 (CA); [1997] 1 AMR 214; [1997] 1 CLJ 375; [1995] 2 MLRA 487.

Jayakumari a/p Arul Pragasam v. Suriya Narayanan a/l V Ramanathan [1996] 4 MLJ 421 (HC); [1996] 2 AMR 2127; [1996] 4 MLRH 572; [1996] CLJU 74.

Devi Vejaya Raman v. Krishna Murthi Govindasamy [2018] 10 MLJ 657 (HC); [2017] 3 AMR 842; [2017] 4 MLRH 263; [2017]

Balakrishnan a/l Kaliappan v Shameena a/p Nathesan [2019] 5 MLJ 661 (CA); [2019] 7 CLJ 762; [2019] 5 MLRA 40.

Lesco Development Corp Sdn Bhd v Malaysia Building Society Bhd [1988] 2 MLJ 184 (SC); [1987] CLJ Rep 160; [1987] 1 MLRA 26.

Tai May Chean v. New Way Capital Sdn Bhd & Anor and another appeal [2020] 12 MLJ 471 (CA); [2019] 3 AMR 469; [2019] 9 CLJ 477; [2019] 5 MLRA 252.