Tan Yean Kuen v Lee Gee Lam (JB-22NCVC-10-02/2021 (Enclosure 7))

This is an application to strike out the Writ of Summons and the Statement of Claim pursuant to Order 18 Rule 19(1) (c) and / or (d) Rules of Court 2012 by the Defendant. November 29, 2021 2

The Writ of Summons and the Statement of Claim of the Plaintiff are seeking the following reliefs: i. An Order that the name of the Defendant be removed from the Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 3 May 2019 in respect of the sale and purchase of a property that is held under the Title HS(D) 67596 PTD 60300 (formerly Title No. 566775 Lot No. 67118) Simpang Kanan Sub District (“the said property”). ii. A Declaration that the Plaintiff is to pay the full purchase price of RM1,188,000-00 in respect the sale and purchase of the said property vide the Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 3 May 2019. iii. General Damages to be assessed. iv. Cost of this action. v. Other reliefs that the Honourable Court deems fit and just.

The Defendant then filed the Notice of Application to strike out the Writ of Summons pursuant to Order 18 Rule 19(1)(c) and (d) Rules of Courts 2012 for the following orders: a. The Statement of Claim dated 15 February 2021 be struck out. b. The reply to the Defence dated 5 April 2021 be struck out. c. The Plaintiff to bear the cost of this application. d. Any other orders that the Court deems fit and just.

The Cause Papers are as follows: i. Writ of Summons (Enclosure 1). ii. Statement of Claim (Enclosure 2). iii. Statement of Defence (Enclosure 5). November 29, 2021 3 iv. Notice of Application (Enclosure 7). v. Affidavit-in-support (Enclosure 8). vi. Affidavit-in-opposition (Enclosure 9). vii. Affidavit-in-reply (Enclosure 11).

The Plaintiff is a Malaysian citizen, of full age and has his address for service at No. 14 Jalan 14/1, Taman Sri Kluang, 86000 Kluang in the State of Johore.

The Defendant is a Malaysian citizen, of full age and has his address for service at No.18 Jalan B/H 2, Taman Banang Heights, 83000 Batu Pahat, Johore.

The Plaintiff along with the Defendant entered in to a Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 3 May 2019 (“the SPA”) with Countryland Realty Sdn Bhd (“Vendor”) and Pamer Development Sdn Bhd (“Land Owner”) for the sale and purchase of a property that is held under the Title HS(D) 67596 PTD 60300 (formerly Title No. 566775 Lot No. 67118) Simpang Kanan Sub District (“the said property”).

The Plaintiff claimed that he alone paid for the purchase price although the Defendant was also listed as a buyer. The Plaintiff and Defendant were said to enter into an oral agreement on or about April 2019 on the following terms: i. The Plaintiff is to pay the purchase price and the cost of renovating / improving the said property. November 29, 2021 4 ii. The Defendant is to repay the Plaintiff 50% of the purchase price and the cost of renovations before the end of 2019. iii. As a consideration the Plaintiff is to add the name of the Defendant as one of the buyers in the Sale and Purchase Agreement (“the SPA”).

The Plaintiff paid the purchase price amounting to RM1,188,000-00 as follows: DATE AMOUNT (RM) PARTICULARS PAYMENT METHOD 29 April 2019 118,800-00 10% as deposit HSBC Transfer 17 July 2019 59,400-00 Progress Payment CIMB Remittance No. 90499161 17 July 2019 1,009,800-00 Balance of Progress Payment HSBC Fund Transfer

The Plaintiff made renovations and improvements on the property with a cost of about RM600,000-00. The Plaintiff then was said to put in the name of the Defendant as a buyer in the SPA.

The Defendant then failed and / or refused to pay half of the purchase price as well as cost of improvement / renovation on the property until to date. As a result, the Plaintiff suffered huge losses due to the breach of contract by the Defendant.

On 22 July 2020 the Plaintiff filed an Originating Summons No. JB- 24NCVC-155-07/2020 (“the said OS”) at the High Court in Muar November 29, 2021 5 against a few parties including the Defendant to remove the name of the Defendant from the Sale and Purchase Agreement which was entered together.

The Defendant here was the 3rd Defendant in the said OS. The said OS was fixed for hearing on 31 January 2021 where the Defendant raised a preliminary objection on the unsuitability of the mode because of the contradictory material facts that requires a full trial. The Honourable Judge then ordered the Plaintiff to change the mode from the said OS into a Writ of Summons in order that a full trial be carried out.

The Plaintiff was said to failed to comply with the order of the High Court Judge which are enumerated as follows: i. The Plaintiff pleaded new facts that was not pleaded in the previous Cause Papers in the said OS. ii. The Plaintiff failed to comply with the payment of cost to the Defendant.

The Rules of Court provides for Striking Out in O. 18 r. 19 and we reproduced the same for ease of reference.

Striking out pleadings and endorsements (O. 18 r. 19)

The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any pleading or the endorsement, of any writ in November 29, 2021 6 the action, or anything in any pleading or in the endorsement, on the ground that -

it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case may be;

it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious;

it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action; or

it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court. and may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly, as the case may be.

No evidence shall be admissible on an application under subparagraph (1)(a).

This rule shall, as far as applicable, apply to an originating summons as if it were a pleading. [16] In explaining Order 18 Rule 19, the Federal Court in TAN WEI HONG (A MINOR SUING THROUGH GUARDIAN AD LITEM AND NEXT FRIEND CHUANG YIN E) & ORS v. MALAYSIA AIRLINES BHD AND OTHER APPEALS [2018] 9 CLJ 425; [2018] 6 AMR 529, referred to the case of BANDAR BUILDERS SDN BHD v. UNITED MALAYAN BANKING CORPORATION BHD [1993] 4 CLJ 7; [1993] 1 MLRA 611 which said the following: “The tests for striking out application under O. 18 r. 19 of the ROC, as adopted by the Supreme Court in Bandar Builders are, inter alia, as follows: November 29, 2021 7

it is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under the rule;

this summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it obviously unsustainable;

it cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case in order to see whether the party has a cause of action or a defence;

if there is a point of law which requires serious discussion, an objection should be taken on the pleadings and the point set down for argument under O. 33 r. 3 of the ROC; and

the court must be satisfied that there is no reasonable cause of action or that the claims are frivolous or vexatious or that the defences raised are not arguable.” [17] The Court of Appeal, in SIVARASA RASIAH & ORS v. CHE HAMZAH CHE ISMAIL & ORS [2012] 1 CLJ 75; [2012] 1 MLRA 255, had adopted the well settled principle of striking out in the following passage: “A striking out order should not be made summarily by the court if there is issue of law that requires lengthy argument and mature consideration. It should also not be made if there is issue of fact that is capable of resolution only after taking viva voce evidence during trial (see: LAI YOKE NGAN & ANOR v. CHIN TECK KWEE & ANOR [1997] 3 CLJ 305; [1997] 1 MLRA 284; (FC)).” November 29, 2021 8 [18] In SERUAN GEMILANG MAKMUR SDN BHD v. KERAJAAN NEGERI PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR & ANOR [2016] 3 CLJ 1; [2016] 2 MLRA 263, where the Appellant filed an action against the Respondents regarding a claim which was related to a forest concession of 10,000 acres awarded to the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) Pahang (‘the 2002 suit’). The Appellant was granted approval by the second Respondent to extract timber under the said concession. However, the Appellant claimed that the second Respondent failed or neglected to prevent the extraction of timber by third parties trespassing into the said concession area. As a result of the second Respondent's breaches, the Appellant claimed to have suffered losses amounting to a sum of RM36,339,030-00. The trial judge ruled in favour of the Appellant and entered judgment against the Respondents whereby the Respondents were ordered to pay the Appellant a sum of RM37,127,471-60. The Court of Appeal dismissed the Respondents' appeal, and the Respondents’ application for leave to appeal to the Federal Court was also dismissed. Subsequently, the Respondents initiated a fresh action against the Appellant to impeach and set aside the earlier judgment on the premise that the said judgment was entered into as a result of fraud or perjured evidence by the Appellant’s witness based on fresh evidence which could not have been obtained and adduced at the earlier trial. The basis of the Respondents’ action was as clearly stated in paras 22- 29 of the statement of claim. The Appellant subsequently filed an application to strike out paras 22-29 of the statement of claim under O. 18 r. 19 of the Rules of Court 2012 ROC). The Federal Court ruled, inter alia, [25] The principles for striking out pleadings pursuant to O. 18 r. 19 of the ROC are well settled. It is only in a plain and obvious case November 29, 2021 9 that recourse should be had to the summary process under this rule; and this summary process can only be adopted when it can clearly be seen that a claim on the face of it is obviously unsustainable (see: BANDAR BUILDER (supra), HUBBUCK & SONS LTD v. WILKINSON, HEYWOOD & CLARD LTD [1899] 1 QB 86; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER v. LONDON AND NORTH WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY [1892] CH 274). [26] The tests for striking out application under O. 18 r. 19 of the ROC, as adopted by the Supreme Court in BANDAR BUILDER (supra) are, inter alia as follows:

it is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under the rule;

this summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it 'obviously unsustainable’ [Emphasis Added];

it cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case in order to see whether the party has a cause of action or a defence; and

If there is a point of law which requires serious discussion, an objection should be taken on the pleadings and the point set down for argument under O. 33 r. 3 of the ROC: and

The court must be satisfied that there is no reasonable cause of action or that the claims are frivolous or vexatious or that the defences raised are not arguable. November 29, 2021 10 [27] The Court of Appeal, in SIVARASA RASIAH & ORS v. CHE HAMZAH CHE ISMAIL & ORS; 2012] 1 CLJ 75; [2012] 1 MLRA 255, had adopted the well settled principle of striking out in the following passage: A striking out order should not be made summarily by the court if there is issue of law that requires lengthy argument and mature consideration. It should also not be made if there is issue of fact that is capable of resolution only after faking viva voce evidence during trial, (see LAI YOKE NGAN & ANOR v. CHIN TECK KWEE & ANOR [1997] 3 CLJ 305; [1997] 1 MLRA 284; [1997] 3 AMR 2458 (Federal Court)). [28] The basic test for striking out as laid down by the Supreme Court in BANDAR BUILDER (supra) is that the claim on the face of it must be ‘obviously unsustainable’. The stress is not only on the word ‘unsustainable’ but also on the word ‘obviously’ ie, the degree of unsustainability must appear on the face of the claim without having to go into lengthy and mature consideration in detail. If one has to go into lengthy and mature consideration in detail of the issues of law and/or fact then the matter is not appropriate to be struck out summarily. It must be determined at trial. [29] The established rule on this point is that the court should not examine the evidence in this summary proceedings in such a way as to amount to conducting a trial on the conflicting affidavit evidence. As rightly said by Lord Diplock in the House of Lords in AMERICAN CYANAMID CO v. ETHICON LTD [1975] AC 396 at p 407: ... The court no doubt must be satisfied that the claim is not frivolous or vexatious; in other words, that there is a serious question to be tried. It is no part of the November 29, 2021 11 court's function at this stage of the litigation to try to resolve conflicts of evidence on affidavit as to facts on which the claims of either party may ultimately depend nor to decide difficult questions of law which call for detailed argument and mature considerations. These are matters to be dealt with at the trial... This passage was cited with approval by the Privy Council in a Malaysian case of ENG MEE YONG v. LETCHUMANAN [1979] 1 LNS 18; [1979] 1 MLRA 143. [19] Hence the conditions under which the Court may exercise the powers to strike out an action are (but not limited to):

it is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be made to the summary process under the rule;

the summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is, on the face of it “obviously unsustainable”;

it cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case in order to see whether the party has a cause of action or a defence;

If there is a point of law which requires serious discussion, an objection should be taken on the pleadings and the point set down for argument under O. 33 r. 3 of the ROC; and

The court must be satisfied that there is no reasonable cause of action or that the claims are frivolous or vexatious or that the defences raised are not arguable. November 29, 2021 12 [20] In HENDERSON v. HENDERSON [1843] 3 Hare 100, 67 ER 313; [1843] UKPC 6, Sir James Wigram gave the judgment of the Court, held that, inter alia, “where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a Court of competent jurisdiction, the Court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter(s) which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the Court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time.” [21] It is important to note that “the Court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter[s] which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case.” [22] Any claim or defence filed in Court can be struck out, if any of the grounds for a strike out has been satisfied. November 29, 2021 13 [23] At the end of a hearing of a strike out application, the Court may do one or more of the following: i. allow an opportunity for the defaulting party to amend the statement of case, to set out a legally sustainable claim: ie, a cause of action recognised by law, whether it’s: a. breach of contract claim. b. claim for civil fraud. c. negligent misrepresentation. d. negligent mis-statement, for a misleading statement prior to a contract (a form negligence). e. tort of conspiracy. f. tort of conversion (i.e. civil theft). g. claim under an indemnity. ii. make an “unless order” to allow an opportunity to make good the defect in the particulars of claim or defence. If the unless order is not complied with, enter judgment on the claim. iii. stay the claim on its own initiative and require a hearing before the claim form is issued or served or iv. strike out part of the pleading. v. strike out the entire statement of case. (see TAY ENG TIAN & ANOR v. KOH KOH KIAN [2021] 1 LNS 774). November 29, 2021 14 [24] In the Court of Appeal case FREY v. LABROUCHE [2012] EWCA Giv 884, it was held: [25] It is vital that justice is seen to be done, but that is by no means the only, or even the main, reason for this. It is also because it is vital that justice is done. THE ISSUES IN THIS APPLICATION i. Whether in a case where an Originating Summons has been ordered to be converted into a Writ of Summons, the pleadings may be expanded to include any other facts. ii. Whether the failure to pay cost in the earlier Originating Summons is a basis to strike out a Writ of Summons. I shall deal with the issues accordingly i. Whether in a case where an Originating Summons has been ordered to be converted into a Writ of Summons, the pleadings may be expanded to include any other facts [26] When a Court is unable to find sufficient evidence to decide one matter or to conclusive decision based on the material before it, then the Court may want to convert from the Originating Summons to a Writ Action, if justice so demands. [27] The yardstick is what would the demand of justice of the case be, in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. This power is pursuant to Order 28 Rule 8 which stipulates as follows: November 29, 2021 15 Continuation of proceedings as if cause or matter begun by writ (O. 28 r. 8)

Where, in the case of a cause or matter begun by originating summons, it appears to the Court at any stage of the proceedings that the proceedings should for any reason be continued as if the cause or matter had been begun by writ, it may order the proceedings to continue as if the cause or matter had been so begun and may, in particular, order that pleadings shall be delivered or that any affidavits shall stand as pleadings, with or without liberty to any of the parties to add thereto or to apply for particulars thereof.

Where the Court decides to make such an order referred to in rule

(1), Order 34 shall apply with the necessary modifications.

This rule applies notwithstanding that the cause or matter in question could not have been begun by writ.

Any reference in these Rules to an action begun by writ shall, unless the context otherwise requires, be construed as including a reference to a cause or matter proceedings in which are ordered under this rule to continue as if the cause or matter had been so begun. [28] The Court could have on its own motion, order that the claim raised in the Originating Summons to be converted to a Writ action pursuant to Order 28 R. 8 (1) Rules of Court 2012 with the affidavits filed, to stand as pleadings. [29] In NATIONAL LAND FINANCE CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY LTD v. SHARIDAL SDN BHD [1983] CLJ Rep 282; [1983] 2 MLJ 211, the Federal Court held, inter alia, November 29, 2021 16 Counsel for the appellants objected to the respondents taking the proceedings by an Originating Summons instead of a writ. He argued that there are matters of credibility of witnesses and issues of facts which can only be decided by oral evidence instead of sworn affidavits. With respect, we disagree with the submission. The issue involved in this case is purely a matter of construction of the sale and purchase agreement between the parties. No other evidence is needed to determine the issue than the massive correspondence that passed between them and their solicitors. We think that the learned judge was right in holding that the issue can be decided on the basis of the documents exhibited in court together with the undisputed facts disclosed and that there are no issues relevant to the case which require evidence to be called at a trial. [30] In TING LING KIEW & ANOR v. TANG ENG IRON WORKS CO LTD [1992] 1 CLJ Rep 331; [1992] 2 MLJ 217, the Supreme Court held, Apart from the various inconsistencies in the affidavits of the appellants and the respondents in the court below, we also observe other matters which have not been satisfactorily explained in the affidavits and could be resolved if the proceedings have been begun by writ. Apart from the various inconsistencies in the affidavits of the appellants and the respondents in the court below, we also observe other matters which have not been satisfactorily explained in the affidavits and could be resolved if the proceedings have been begun by writ. [31] This power is unbridled if the Court finds that it is just to all parties. [32] The guiding rule is Order 28 Rule 8(1) which reads – November 29, 2021 17 Where, in the case of a cause or matter begun by originating summons, it appears to the Court at any stage of the proceedings that the proceedings should for any reason be continued as if the cause or matter had been begun by writ, it may order the proceedings to continue as if the cause or matter had been so begun and may, in particular, order that pleadings shall be delivered or that any affidavits shall stand as pleadings, with or without liberty to any of the parties to add thereto or to apply for particulars thereof. [33] It is important to appreciate the length and breath of this procedure which may be enumerated as follows: a. In a case of a cause or matter begun by originating summons, b. it appears to the Court that the proceedings should for any reason be continued as if the cause or matter had been begun by writ, c. it MAY order the proceedings to be converted into a Writ action’ d. the Court MAY order that pleadings shall be delivered or that any affidavits shall stand as pleadings, e. this MAY be done with or without liberty to any of the parties to add thereto or to apply for particulars thereof. [34] The Cambridge Dictionary (© Cambridge University Press 2021) defines the word “may” as

“used to talk about what is possibly true or will possibly happen”

“used to ask or give permission” November 29, 2021 18 [35] Therefore, where the word “may” is used in law, it convey the meaning that it is not mandatory but rather it serves as an empowering clause on a matter which would not be allowed before this or which confers upon the party mentioned in the clause, a discretion to do or otherwise. [36] In essence, “may” as a adverb means that “a choice to act or not, or a promise of a possibility, as distinguished from “shall”, which makes it imperative, OR in statutes, and sometimes in contracts, the word “may” must be read in context to determine if it means an act is optional or mandatory, for it may be an imperative”. [37] Since “may” does not connote a mandatory requirement, failure to do the act that follows the word “may” cannot be construed as fatal to the cause or illegal or null and void. [38] Hence in pith and substance, the usage of the word “May” is as “an enabling clause” or “an empowering clause”. [39] In the Court of Appeal case of KEKATONG SDN BHD V. BANK BUMIPUTRA MALAYSIA BHD [1998] 2 CLJ 266, it was held that: When a provision in a statute uses permissive language such as “may”, it is a question of legislature intent, dependent upon a number of factors, whether the intended result is mandatory or directory. It is therefore wrong to assume as a matter of course that whenever Parliament uses the word “may” in a statute it never means “must”. November 29, 2021 19 [40] In METROBUS NATIONWIDE SDN BHD V. LEMBAGA PELESENAN KENDERAAN SEMENANJUNG MALAYSIA & ANOR [2001] 8 CLJ 416, the High Court held that: In general acceptation, a proceeding is an act which is done by the authority or direction of the court, express or implied, an act necessary to be done in order to attain a given end; a prescribed mode of action for carrying into effect a legal right... including all possible steps in action from its commencement to the execution of judgement. [41] Unless the context requires otherwise, the use of the word “may” does not invite compulsion under the law, failing which, it becomes null, void and of no effect. [42] Since the word “may” has been used in Order 28 Rule 8, it clearly indicate that while the pleadings is the basis of the cause of action, obviously upon conversion to a Writ action, it cannot be limited to that of the affidavits only. Otherwise it makes no sense that conversion is encouraged on the basis that “it appears to the Court at any stage of the proceedings that the proceedings should for any reason be continued as if the cause or matter had been begun by writ...”. [43] The underlying tone is to do justice which is the overriding factor as stipulated in Order 1A, 2 and Order 92 Rule 4 Rules of Court 2012. [44] As such, I am unable to see why failure to comply with the pleadings is fatal to the Writ action. November 29, 2021 20 [45] I keep in mind that the Defendant did not or failed to strike out the said OS if there was any grounds under Order 18 Rule 19(1) Rules of Court 2012 ii. Whether the failure to pay cost in the earlier Originating Summons is a basis to strike out a Writ of Summons. [46] Cost has been awarded in the earlier action which was in the form of an OS. It was not paid. [47] I am unable to see whether the recovery of cost is a basis for Order 18 Rule 19 to operate. [48] The conditions under which the Court may exercise the powers to strike out an action are (but not limited to):

it is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be made to the summary process under the rule;

the summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is, on the face of it “obviously unsustainable”;

it cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case in order to see whether the party has a cause of action or a defence;

If there is a point of law which requires serious discussion, an objection should be taken on the pleadings and the point set down for argument under O. 33 r. 3 of the ROC; and November 29, 2021 21

The court must be satisfied that there is no reasonable cause of action or that the claims are frivolous or vexatious or that the defences raised are not arguable. [49] The Defendant is unable to show that the Rule 19(1)(c) or (d) has been fulfilled. [50] With the greatest respect, the mode of recovery does not rest with striking out pursuant to Order 18 Rule 19 (1)(c) or (d). CONCLUSION [51] For the reasons aforesaid, I dismissed this application pursuant to Enclosure 7 with cost. [52] The views expressed in this judgment is entirely for the purpose of the application for striking out pursuant to Enclosure 7 and does not influence this Court for the evaluation of the evidence in the main trial or any other matters arising there from. Dated this 29th November 2021 at Muar in the State of Johore. t.t. AWG ARMADAJAYA BIN AWG MAHMUD Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya Muar Johor Darul Ta’zim Curia Advisari Vult November 29, 2021 22 Counsels: For the Plaintiff : Preakas a/l Sampunathan with Satchitanandan a/l Vedha Ratnam For the Defendant : Muhammad Zahier Bin Rosli Solicitors: For the Plaintiff Messrs Preakas & Partners Advocates and Solicitors A-32-05, Dataran 3 Two Square Jalan 19/1 46300 Petaling Jaya Selangor. [RUJ. : LT/CV-P/TYK/500-07/2020] For the Defendant Messrs Rosli Kamaruddin & Co. Advocates and Solicitors 89 & 89A, Jalan Pulai 7 Taman Pulai Utama 81300 Skudai Johor. [RUJ. : RK/CV/LEE GEE LAM/501-20] Hearing Date : 26th September 2021. Decision Date : 29th November 2021. LEGISLATURE: ➢ Order 1a, O.2. O.18 Rule 19(1) (c) and / or (d), O. 28 R8, O. 34, O.92 Rules of Court 2012 November 29, 2021 23 LITERATURE: ➢ The Cambridge Dictionary (© Cambridge University Press 2021) CASES REFERRED TO: ➢ METROBUS NATIONWIDE SDN BHD V. LEMBAGA PELESENAN KENDERAAN SEMENANJUNG MALAYSIA & ANOR [2001] 8 CLJ 416 ➢ KEKATONG SDN BHD V. BANK BUMIPUTRA MALAYSIA BHD [1998] 2 CLJ 266 ➢ TING LING KIEW & ANOR v. TANG ENG IRON WORKS CO LTD [1992] 1 CLJ Rep 331; [1992] 2 MLJ 217 ➢ NATIONAL LAND FINANCE CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY LTD v. SHARIDAL SDN BHD [1983] CLJ Rep 282; [1983] 2 MLJ 211 ➢ TAN WEI HONG (A MINOR SUING THROUGH GUARDIAN AD LITEM AND NEXT FRIEND CHUANG YIN E) & ORS v. MALAYSIA AIRLINES BHD AND OTHER APPEALS [2018] 9 CLJ 425; [2018] 6 AMR 529, ➢ BANDAR BUILDERS SDN BHD v. UNITED MALAYAN BANKING CORPORATION BHD [1993] 4 CLJ 7; [1993] 1 MLRA 611 ➢ SIVARASA RASIAH & ORS v. CHE HAMZAH CHE ISMAIL & ORS [2012] 1 CLJ 75; [2012] 1 MLRA 255, ➢ LAI YOKE NGAN & ANOR v. CHIN TECK KWEE & ANOR [1997] 3 CLJ 305; [1997] 1 MLRA 284; ➢ SERUAN GEMILANG MAKMUR SDN BHD v. KERAJAAN NEGERI PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR & ANOR [2016] 3 CLJ 1; [2016] 2 MLRA 263 ➢ HUBBUCK & SONS LTD v. WILKINSON, HEYWOOD & CLARD LTD [1899] 1 QB 86; ➢ ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER v. LONDON AND NORTH WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY [1892] CH 274 ➢ AMERICAN CYANAMID CO v. ETHICON LTD [1975] AC 396 ➢ ENG MEE YONG v. LETCHUMANAN [1979] 1 LNS 18; [1979] 1 MLRA 143 ➢ HENDERSON v. HENDERSON [1843] 3 Hare 100, 67 ER 313; [1843] UKPC 6 ➢ TAY ENG TIAN & ANOR v. KOH KOH KIAN [2021] 1 LNS 774 ➢ FREY v. LABROUCHE [2012] EWCA Giv 884,