TANG HENG KIT v Cindy Ong Pik Yin (WA-24F-294-09/2021)

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28 December 2022 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY, MALAYSIA ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24F-294-09/2021 Dalam Perkara mengenai seksyen 24(d) Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 Dan Dalam Perkara mengenai seksyen-seksyen 3, 4, 5, 10, 11 dan 19A Akta Penjagaan Kanak-Kanak 1961 Dan Dalam Perkara mengenai seksyen-seksyen 88, 89, 93, 99 dan 101 Akta Membaharui Undang-Undang (Perkahwinan dan Penceraian) 1976 Dan Dalam Perkara mengenai anak-anak END, EEL, dan ENO BETWEEN TANG HENG KIT …PLAINTIFF AND CINDY ONG PIK YIN …DEFENDANT 28/12/2022 11:40:55 Kand. 62 28 December 2022 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 2 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] This was an application (“this Application”) by the Plaintiff husband for, inter alia, sole guardianship, custody, care, and control of the three children of the marriage. [2] In the interest of privacy, and considering the sensitivity of the issues in these proceedings, the three children of the marriage have been anonymised in this judgment as END, EEL, and ENO respectively. The factual background [3] The Plaintiff, an IT Director currently based in Malaysia is an American citizen, whilst the Defendant, a Malaysian citizen who is a swimming coach and a competitive swimmer, were married in 2013. There were three children in the marriage, namely, ENO, 5 years old, EEL, 8 years old, and END, 12 years old, (“the Children”), although it was undisputed that END was not the biological son of the Plaintiff. [4] By August 2021, the marriage had broken down and in September 2021, the Defendant had left the matrimonial home with the Children, after obtaining an interim protection order against the Plaintiff from the Kuala Lumpur Magistrate’s Court. The interim protection order was subsequently discharged in January 2022. 28 December 2022 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 3 [5] On 30 September 2021, the Plaintiff filed this Application, which was dismissed for the following reasons. Contentions, evaluation, and findings [6] The nub of the Plaintiff’s contention was that the Defendant was unfit, based on the claim that she led a very liberal and exhibitionist lifestyle, indulged in extra marital affairs, and that she had brainwashed and abused the Children, especially END. Admissibility of documents produced by computer [7] In support of the averments made against the Defendant, the Plaintiff had adduced as evidence, pictures, computer printouts and screen shots of WhatsApp messages, and an audio recording inclusive of its transcript. [8] At the outset, the Defendant’s counsel objected to this evidence on the basis that the computer printout of WhatsApp messages (or documents produced by a computer) were not accompanied by a certificate pursuant to section 90A(2) of the Evidence Act 1950 (“the Evidence Act”) which reads: Section 90A – Admissibility of documents produced by computers, and of statements contained therein ...

Subsection

(2) For the purposes of this section it may be proved that a document was produced by a computer in the course of its ordinary use by tendering to the 28 December 2022 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 4 court a certificate signed by a person who either before or after the production of the document by the computer is responsible for the management of the operation of that computer, or for the conduct of the activities for which that computer was used. [Emphasis added.] [9] It is trite law that the Evidence Act, by virtue of section 2, does not apply to affidavit evidence. The section reads: Section 2 – Extent This Act shall apply to all judicial proceedings in or before any court, but not to affidavits presented to any court or officer nor to proceedings before an arbitrator. [Emphasis added.] [10] This was made clear in a plethora of authorities including Securities Commission v Lee Kee Sien, Albert & Ors [2009] 8 CLJ 70, and Amanah Raya Capital Sdn Bhd v Siti Zaharah bt Sulaiman [2013] MLJU 490. In fact, in Securities Commission v Lee Kee Sien, Albert & Ors, the application of section 90A of the Evidence Act in an interlocutory application involving affidavit evidence was addressed by Nallini Pathmanathan JC (as she then was) in the following passage: It is trite that the provisions of the Evidence Act 1950 do not apply to affidavit evidence in the course of interlocutory civil proceedings. It is therefore incorrect, in an interlocutory application for an injunction; to invoke the various provisions of the Evidence Act 1950 including s. 90A and object to affidavit testimony on the grounds that it is hearsay. [Emphasis added.] 28 December 2022 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 5 [11] Although I agreed with Counsel for the Plaintiff that the provisions of the Evidence Act do not apply to affidavit evidence, I have to state, at this juncture, that since the issues in the present case, such as abuse and adultery were highly contentious, it would be extremely unsuitable to establish it by way of affidavit evidence, especially where it was based unconvincingly on messages and photographs alone. [12] In trying to convince the Court that the Defendant was an unfit mother, the Plaintiff had attempted to adduce evidence to show that the Defendant had an affair with a Swedish national, one Frederic Liljestrom, whom she had coached and trained with. [13] Besides alluding to my ruling above that the audio recording, WhatsApp messages and transcript could not be relied upon, the terminology used by the Plaintiff such as ‘affair’ and ‘extra martial relations’ were vague and ambiguous. If what the Plaintiff meant was an adulterous relationship, then reference should be made to Clarkson v Clarkson [1930] 143 LT 775, 46 TLR 623, which defined the concept as ‘voluntary sexual intercourse between a man and woman, who are not married to each other, but one of them is at least a married person’. [14] ‘From the definition, other forms of sexual contacts short of sexual intercourse is not adultery, though parties may be said to have an affair or that they have been unfaithful to their spouse. In other words, it is not adultery of the mind that is being made punishable with a damages award against the adulterer or adulteress, but the physical act that had 28 December 2022 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 6 resulted in the breakdown of the marriage of the innocent party.’ per Lee Swee Seng J (as he then was) in GGC v CCC [2016] 1 LNS 885. [15] Since the Plaintiff had the legal burden to prove such adulterous relationship by virtue of section 103 of the Evidence Act, it was important to state, at this juncture, that the evidence adduced by the Plaintiff had not reached the threshold of proof. [16] In any event, even if the Plaintiff’s allegation of the Defendant’s adulterous relationship was true, it may have rendered the Defendant an immoral and promiscuous person, but not an unfit parent. It must be borne in mind that there is a plethora of authorities, including the Federal Court cases of Chai Sau Yin v Kok Seng Fatt [1966] 1 LNS 25 and Manokaram Subramaniam v Ranjid Kaur Nata Singh [2008] 6 CLJ 209, to remind parties that this is a Court of law and not of morals. As such, unless the Defendant’s purported adultery had contravened the law, or had a negative effect on the welfare of the Children, it would be unfair to deem her an unfit parent. [17] Reference was made also to Khoo Cheng Nee v Lubin Chiew Pau Sing [1996] 1 LNS 579, where Abdul Wahab Patail JC (as he then was) had opined in the following passage: ... Adultery, although frowned upon by our society, by itself is not a sufficient ground to disqualify a mother from having custody of her children. Merely that another person has emerged in the Petitioner's life was not necessarily by itself bad for the children... 28 December 2022 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 7 [Emphasis added.] [18] In fact, as stated in Leong Sam Moy v Low Chee Thiam [1997] 2 CLJ Supp 212, ‘the Plaintiff’s allegation that the Defendant was having an adulterous relationship was not very relevant as this was not a divorce petition’: per Zainun Ali JC (as she then was). Admissibility of audio recording [19] The Defendant had also objected to the audio recording adduced by the Plaintiff to establish inter alia, the brainwashing of the Children. With regard to the admissibility of the audio recording, it has been established and is now part of Malaysian jurisprudence via cases such as Mohd Ali Jaafar v PP [1998] 4 MLJ 210, PP v Balveer Singh a/l Mahindar Singh [2009] 1 MLJ 386, Sahari bin Masrom v PP [2009] 2 MLJ 859, Jambri bin Abd Hamid v PP [2009] 9 MLJ 683, and Datuk Nur Jazlan Bin Tan Sri Mohamed & Ors V T Gopala Krishnan [2017] 1 LNS 402, that the following common law rules pertaining to a tape recording are applicable before the same is admissible: a) the equipment was in proper working order; b) that the recording was not tampered with or altered in any way and it should be established in whose possession the recording was at all times; 28 December 2022 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 8 c) that the witnesses played the recording over after making it, and heard voices which they can identify; d) that a transcript was prepared of the voices; and e) that the witnesses played over the recording and checked it with the transcript as to the identity of the voices and as to the conversation: [20] Although the common law rules enumerated above are in respect of tape recordings, courts must be cautious and test the authenticity of any type of recording, bearing in mind that although technology has been responsible for remarkable breakthroughs in several disciplines, it remains a double-edged sword, and has provided various methods of doctoring and tampering with evidence. [21] In my view, the recording of conversations and its transcript adduced by the Plaintiff was inadmissible as the authenticity had not been established. In any event, conversations in isolation and taken out of context cannot be considered by this Court in concluding that there was abuse, brainwashing or even adultery. The overriding factor – welfare of the Children [22] It was apparent in this Application that the Plaintiff had focused mostly on the Defendant’s private life, in his attempt to convince this Court that the Defendant was not fit to have guardianship and custody, or even care and control of the Children. 28 December 2022 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 9 [23] At this juncture, it was apt to state that in determining who should have guardianship and custody of the Children, the factor that must be given priority is the welfare of the Children, as prescribed by section 88 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 (“Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act”) and section 11 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1961 (“Guardianship of Infants Act”), both of which read: Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 Section 88 – Power for court to make order for custody

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(1) The court may at any time by order place a child in the custody of his or her father or his or her mother or, where there are exceptional circumstances making it undesirable that the child be entrusted to either parent, of any other relative of the child or of any association the objects of which include child welfare or to any other suitable person. … ***** Guardianship of Infants Act 1961 Section 11 – Matters to be considered The Court or a Judge, in exercising the powers conferred by this Act, shall have regard primarily to the welfare of the infant and shall, where the infant has a parent or parents, consider the wishes of such parent or both of them, as the case may be. [Emphasis added.] 28 December 2022 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 10 [24] The meaning of ‘welfare of the child’ was referenced in a plethora of cases including Teh Eng Kim v. Yew Peng Siong, Mahabir Prasad v. Mahabir Prasad [1982] 1 MLJ 189, Tan Sherry v Soo Sheng Fatt [2016] 1 LNS 1586, and Tan Erh Ling v. Ong Khong Wooi [2021] 1 LNS 1325. [25] I was also guided by the Federal Court in Sean O'Casey Patterson v Chan Hoong Poh & Ors [2011] 3 CLJ 722, in its reference to the Singapore case of Tan Siew Kee v. Chua Ah Boey [1987] 1 LNS 77, wherein the expression ‘welfare of the child’ was explained in the following manner by Chan Sek Keong JC (as he then was), in the following passage: The expression 'welfare'... is to be taken in its widest sense. It means the general well-being of the child and all aspects of his upbringing, religious, moral as well as physical. His happiness, comfort and security also go to make up his well-being. A loving parent with a stable home is conducive to the attainment of such well-being. It is not to be measured in monetary terms. [Emphasis added.] [26] The Federal Court in Sean O'Casey Patterson v Chan Hoong Poh & Ors, through the opinion of James Foong FCJ, proceeded to explain ‘welfare of the child’ in the following passage: [53] According to Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th edn, reissue (Mackay edition), para 443 the term, "welfare principle" is a set of factors used when "a court determines any question with respect to the upbringing of a child or the administration of a child's property or the application of any income arising from it, the child's welfare must be the court's paramount consideration". In the English Children Act 1989, under the heading ‘welfare 28 December 2022 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 11 of the child’ is a set of factors that must be taken into account when deciding on such cases. These are for example: the wishes of the child; his feelings; his age; his sex and his background and the capabilities of the parties involved. Thus, this term "welfare principle" relates to certain factors to be considered and their priority during deliberation in such cases. [Emphasis added.] [27] The meaning of ‘welfare of the child’, therefore, must be considered in the widest sense, and all factors necessary must be weighed against one another for this Court to arrive at a decision. It would be impossible to enumerate specifics, since circumstances in each case are varied. [28] The Plaintiff had also made several averments regarding the Defendant’s attitude and her exhibitionist behavior, especially on social media, where she regularly uploaded partially or fully nude pictures of herself in various poses, for public viewing. The Plaintiff claimed that such behavior rendered her unfit to have guardianship and custody or even primary care and control of the Children. The Plaintiff had also made an unsettling and alarming allegation that the Defendant had tasked END to take such photographs. [29] I was unable to accept the Plaintiff’s contention, as the photographs of the Defendant uploaded on social media, although brazen and unconventional, had nothing to do with her parenting skills. The Defendant’s conduct in flaunting her body may make her an exhibitionist and even a narcissist at most, but I am unable to conclude that such behavior would compromise her parenting skills. In fact, the Defendant, through her Counsel, was even reprimanded by this Court 28 December 2022 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 12 for uploading, on social media, a photograph of herself and the Children taken in the courtroom on the day that the Children were interviewed by the Court. Although I had taken a dim view of the Defendant’s conduct, the focus of this Court was the welfare of the Children, and not the Defendant’s irksome behaviour. [30] The Plaintiff’s allegation that END had taken the nude and semi-nude photographs of the Defendant was merely speculative and unsubstantiated, and as such, this Court was unable to entertain what appeared to be the Plaintiff’s mere hunch. [31] I am mindful that the welfare of the Children encompasses their moral upbringing. However, it was my view that this Court must be cautious so as not to impose its own moral values on the parties and their Children. [32] Furthermore, a distinction must be drawn between private and public morality. The private conduct of a person which does not affect the community, society or public, does not warrant sanction or censure, and definitely not by this Court. In my view, although it was inevitable for this Court to wade into the realm of morality, this Court should not assume the role of moral police and judge any litigant for moral transgressions, committed in private, save except where such moral transgressions descend into the arena of the child’s life, and as a result, compromises the child’s welfare. 28 December 2022 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 13 [33] The Plaintiff was understandably irked by the Defendant’s liberal lifestyle and exhibitionist behaviour online, but those were issues between the Plaintiff and Defendant, and had nothing to do with the fitness (or otherwise) of the Defendant as a mother. Whether presumption in section 88(3) of Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act had been rebutted [34] Since the youngest child, ENO, was 5 years old at the time of the hearing, the starting point is the application of the ‘tender years’ doctrine, found in section 88(3) of the Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act, which reads: Section 88 – Power of court to make order for custody …

Subsection

(3) There shall be a rebuttable presumption that it is for the good of a child below the age of seven years to be with his or her mother but in deciding whether that presumption applies to the facts of any particular case, the court shall have regard to the undesirability of disturbing the life of a child by changes of custody. [Emphasis added.] [35] The presumption in section 88(3) of the Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act favours the Defendant as the mother, and it was, therefore, for the Plaintiff to rebut the presumption on a balance of probabilities, by adducing evidence to convince this Court that the 28 December 2022 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 14 Defendant should be denied custody, care and control of ENO, on the ground that she was an unfit mother. [36] However, after perusing the evidence adduced by both parties, I was of the view that the disputes and increasing acrimony between the Plaintiff and Defendant were caused by unresolved issues between themselves, and had nothing whatsoever to do with the Defendant’s fitness (or otherwise) as the mother of ENO. [37] It was also crucial to note that although the parties had separated, all three Children had continuously been with the Defendant. She was the primary caregiver for the Children since birth, while the Plaintiff was mostly away working abroad. It was, therefore, undeniable that the Children, even those older than seven years, continue to depend on the Defendant for their physical, emotional and mental development, bearing in mind that the Defendant is also their swimming coach. [38] Hence, it would not be in the interest of the welfare of the Children to remove them from their current environment, where they also have the comfort and love of extended family members, such as the Defendant’s mother. It was also crucial to note that the Defendant had a more flexible work schedule, which enables her to address the Children’s needs. The Plaintiff, on the other hand, with his schedule, had not convinced this Court that he would be in a better position to care for the Children. 28 December 2022 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 15 [39] There is a plethora of cases including K Shanta Kumari v Vijayan [1985] 1 LNS 135, Gan Koo Kea v Gan Shiow Lih [2003] 1 LNS 440 and Teh Eng Kim v Yew Peng Siong, where it had been explained that, when dealing with young children, it would be in the interest of their welfare to be with their mother. In Teh Eng Kim v Yew Peng Siong, the relationship between a young child and mother was detailed by Raja Azlan Shah FCJ (as he then was), in the following passage: The youngest child, Bernard, is of tender years. In my opinion, his place right now is with the mother. "No thing, and no person," said Sir John Romilly MR, in the case of Austin v. Austin [1865] 35 Beav 259 263 "and no combination of them, can, in my opinion, with regard to a child of tender years, supply the place of a mother, and the welfare of the child is so intimately connected with its being under the care of the mother, that no extent of kindness on the part of any other person can supply that place.." This view has found judicial favour in many jurisdictions: in Australia, for example, in Kades v. Kades,(4) the High Court, in a joint judgment stated: "What is left is the strong presumption which is not one of law but is founded on experience and upon the nature of ordinary human relationships, that a young girl, should have the love, care and attention of the child's mother and that her upbringing should be the responsibility of her mother, if it is not possible to have the responsibility of both parents living together." In Canada, Muloch CJ in Re Orr [1973] 2 DLR 77 commented that, "In the case of a father and mother living apart and each claiming the custody of a child, the general rule is that the mother, other things being equal, is entitled to the custody and care of a child during what is called the period of nurture, namely, until it attains about seven years of age, the time during which it needs the care of the mother more than that of the father... [Emphasis added.] 28 December 2022 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 16 [40] In the final analysis, and based on my views regarding the Defendant’s behavior and conduct, as alluded to above, the Plaintiff had failed to rebut the presumption in section 88(3) of the Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act. Whether Plaintiff should have sole guardianship and custody, care and control of 8-year old daughter [41] The second Child, EEL, was eight and a half years old at the time this Application was heard. Although the presumption in section 88(3) of the Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act did not technically apply, since EEL was above 7 years of age, it was undeniable that she was still young and would be reaching puberty in a few years’ time. [42] In light of that, I was of the view that EEL would need her mother, the Defendant, for support. It is important to state, at this juncture, that in no uncertain terms am I making a general statement that fathers are incapable of providing the support required for their daughters. However, in this case, the Plaintiff would not be in a position to provide the mental and emotional support required of girl as precocious as EEL, who would also feel awkward and embarrassed to discuss female-oriented issues with her father. [43] On this point, I found instructive the case of Yong May Inn v. Sia Kuan Seng [1970] 1 LNS 176, where in granting custody of three children to their mother, Sharma J opined in the following passage: 28 December 2022 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 17 ... The children are all girls and although it is not absolutely essential that they should remain in the custody and care of their mother, they are bound to feel freer in her company than in the company of their father and more particularly so when one of them is reaching an age when she may need the advice of her mother most. [Emphasis added.] [44] The fact of the matter is, we live in a world where the comfort level of discussing certain delicate issues is dictated by the gender of the confidante, and when the choice of that confidante is a parent, a female pubescent child would tend to gravitate towards her mother. [45] As such, in light of EEL’s hormonal and physical development, the Defendant would be in a better position to understand and cater to EEL’s needs, and provide her the emotional support as the Defendant had been doing all along. Whether Plaintiff should have sole guardianship and custody, care and control of 12-year old son [46] The Plaintiff had, in a police report, made various allegations of abuse by the Defendant against END. [47] I was unable to accept the Plaintiff’s contention for the simple reason that the police report in relation to the alleged physical abuse of END was lodged only on 9 October 2021. However, the abuse, according to the Plaintiff’s narrative, allegedly occurred way back in 2019, 2016 and 28 December 2022 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 18

Subsection

(2) In deciding in whose custody a child should be placed the paramount consideration shall be the welfare of the child and subject to this the court shall have regard- …

Subsection

(1) In relation to the custody or upbringing of an infant or the administration of any property belonging to or held in trust for an infant or the application of the income of any such property, a mother shall have the same rights and authority as the law allows to a father, and the rights and authority of mother and father shall be equal.

Subsection

(2) The mother of an infant shall have the like powers of applying to the Court in respect of any matter affecting the infant as are possessed by the father. [Emphasis added.] [72] Pursuant to section 3 (Duties of guardian of person) of the Guardianship of Infants Act, both parents, therefore, have equal responsibilities for the Children’s support, health, and education. The correlation to the parties’ responsibilities is the rights of the Children, in this case, the right to bond with both parents. 28 December 2022 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 27 Conclusion [73] In the upshot, based on the aforesaid reasons, and after careful scrutiny of all the evidence before this Court, and submissions of both parties, this Application was dismissed, and it was ordered that the parties would have joint guardianship and custody with primary care and control to the Defendant; whilst the Plaintiff would have access to the Children, specifics of which have been stipulated in the Order. Dated: 28 December 2022 SIGNED …………………………………………. (EVROL MARIETTE PETERS) Judge High Court, Kuala Lumpur Counsel: For the Plaintiff – Ezane Chong; Messrs Ariff Rozhan & Co For the Defendant – Kamales Shanmugam; Messrs Kamales & Partner 28 December 2022 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 28 Cases referred to: ➢ Amanah Raya Capital Sdn Bhd v Siti Zaharah bt Sulaiman [2013] MLJU 490 ➢ APE v APF [2015] SGHC 17 ➢ Chai Sau Yin v Kok Seng Fatt [1966] 1 LNS 25 ➢ Clarkson v Clarkson [1930] 143 LT 775, 46 TLR 623 ➢ CX v CY [2005] 3 SLR 690 ➢ CY v CC [2015] MLJU 930 ➢ Datuk Nur Jazlan Bin Tan Sri Mohamed & Ors v T Gopala Krishnan [2017] 1 LNS 402 ➢ Gan Koo Kea v Gan Shiow Lih [2003] 1 MLRH 769 ➢ GGC v CCC [2016] 1 LNS 885 ➢ Jambri bin Abd Hamid v PP [2009] 9 MLJ 683 ➢ K Shanta Kumari v Vijayan [1985] 1 LNS 135 ➢ Khoo Cheng Nee v Lubin Chiew Pau Sing [1996] 1 LNS 579 ➢ Leong Sam Moy v Low Chee Thiam [1997] 2 CLJ Supp 212 ➢ Mahabir Prasad v. Mahabir Prasad [1982] 1 MLJ 189 ➢ Manokaram Subramaniam v Ranjid Kaur Nata Singh [2008] 6 CLJ 209 ➢ Mohd Ali Jaafar v PP [1998] 4 MLJ 210 ➢ Ooi Mei Chein @ Wei Mei Chein v. Micheal Tan Cheng Hai & Anor [2013] 1 LNS 1090 ➢ PP v Balveer Singh a/l Mahindar Singh [2009] 1 MLJ 386 ➢ PP v. Mohamed Terang bin Amit [1999] 5 CLJ 156; [1999] 1 MLJ 154 ➢ PP v. Paneerselvan [1990] 2 CLJ Rep 804; [1990] 2 CLJ 833; [1991] 1 MLJ 106 28 December 2022 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 29 ➢ PP v. Teo Eng Chan [1988] 2 CLJ Rep 793; [1988] 1 CLJ 425; [1988] 1 MLJ 156 ➢ Sahari bin Masrom v PP [2009] 2 MLJ 859 ➢ Sean O'Casey Patterson v Chan Hoong Poh & Ors [2011] 3 CLJ 722 ➢ Securities Commission v Lee Kee Sien, Albert & Ors [2009] 8 CLJ 70 ➢ Sivajothi K Suppiah v. Kunathasan Chelliah [2000] 3 CLJ 175 ➢ Tan Erh Ling v. Ong Khong Wooi [2021] 1 LNS 1325 ➢ Tan Sherry v Soo Sheng Fatt [2016] 1 LNS 1586 ➢ Tan Siew Kee v. Chua Ah Boey [1987] 1 LNS 77. ➢ Teh Eng Kim v Yew Peng Siong [1977] 1 MLJ 234 ➢ Yong May Inn v. Sia Kuan Seng [1970] 1 LNS 176 Legislation referred to: ➢ Guardianship of Infants Act 1961 – sections 3, 5, 11 ➢ Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act 1976 – sections 88 ➢ Evidence Act 1950 – sections 2, 90A, 103, 157 Other sources referred to: ➢ Claire, Sturge and Danya Glaser, Contact and Domestic Violence – The Experts’ Court Report [2000] Fam Law 615