/akn/my/judgment/high-court/2026/34b33e57-ddf4-4e19-9772-683f46c0f2fc
High Court of Malaysia30 Apr 2026KA-33JP-107-09/2021
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“substantial undisclosed assets. The PW has successfully demonstrated that the PH remains a named director and shareholder in at least fifteen (15) active family-controlled companies. [26] Under the Companies Act 2016, a director owes strict statutory and fiduciary duties, rendering it both legally and factually implaus”
“of Yeoh Wee Siam **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 JC (later, JCA) in Shela Nair Onikandan Nair @ Krishnan v Hariharan Tara Singh [2010] CLJU 348, which directly rejects the PH's argument: “The Defendant claimed that he registered his second marriage on”
“irth of a new daughter from that relationship have introduced fresh, unavoidable financial liabilities that heavily strain his limited resources. He relies on NAN v PAN [2024] 7 AMR 902 and ANH v ANI [2019] SGHC 170 to submit that the Court must make a fair and reasonable attempt to balance the limited budget between h”
“d the Consent Order on 03.10.2021. He cannot now recycle these historical, pre-existing liabilities to manufacture a sudden 'material change in circumstances' (see Woon Lee Lee v Michael Tie Siaw Kai [2024] CLJU 3353).”
“erial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 Table of Authorities Cases ANH v ANI [2019] SGHC 170 AXM v AXO [2014] 2 SLR 705 Chua Suzen v Eng Lai Leong [2025] MLJU 3942 Chung Fui Chu v Foo Ho Cheng & Another Case [2010] 10 CLJ 93 Gisela Gertrud Abe v Tan Wee Kiat [1986] 2 C”
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1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT ALOR SETAR IN THE STATE OF KEDAH DARUL AMAN DIVORCE PETITION NO.: KA-33JP-107-09/2021 BETWEEN CAH ...PETITIONER HUSBAND AND KOM …PETITIONER WIFE GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 62 - Petitioner’s Husband Notice of Application pursuant to s. 83, s. 84, s. 96 & s. 97 of Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce)1976) I. INTRODUCTION [1] This is the Petitioner Husband’s (“PH”) application in Enclosure 62 to vary several key terms of the Consent Order recorded before this Court on 3 October 2021 (“the Consent Order”). The PH seeks to vary and reduce his child maintenance obligations under Clause 9(e), his liability In the matter of s. 52, 88, 89 92, 93 and 95 Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976; and In the matter of Divorce and Marriage Proceedings Rules, 1980 18/07/2026 22:48:50 KA-33JP-107-09/2021 Kand. 112 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 for primary and tertiary educational expenses under Clause 9(f), and his obligation to provide a three-bedroom residential property under Clauses 9(j) to 9(m) of the Consent Order. The application is brought pursuant to Sections 83, 84, 96, and 97 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 (“the LRA 1976”). [2] The Petitioner Wife (“PW”) has vigorously opposed Enclosure 62 in its entirety. She asserts that the PH’s claims of financial ruin and mental incapacity are a fabricated smokescreen designed to starve his former wife and children—specifically his son, Child A, who has severe special educational needs arising from autism—of their lawful entitlements. The PW contends that the alleged changes in circumstances either existed prior to the Consent Order or resulted from the PH's own voluntary life choices. [3] After painstakingly evaluating the extensive affidavit evidence filed by both parties, the written submissions, the bundle of authorities, and hearing the oral submissions of both learned counsel, this Court found Enclosure 62 to be entirely devoid of merit and dismissed the application with costs. This Court now delivers its detailed grounds of judgment for the benefit of the Court of Appeal. II. BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE [4] The Petitioner Husband (“PH”) and the Petitioner Wife (“PW”) were married on 08.04.2015. There are two children of the marriage: Child A, a **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 boy, and Child B, a girl. The elder child, Child A, is a child with special needs who has been medically diagnosed with autism. [5] The marriage was dissolved via a decree nisi granted by this Court on 03.10.2021, and the mutually agreed terms of the divorce were recorded as a Consent Order on the same date (“the Consent Order”). The decree nisi was subsequently made absolute on 17.01.2022. [6] Under the Consent Order, several crucial ancillary provisions were made for the welfare and maintenance of the children. Specifically:
a
(a) Clause 9(e) requires the PH to pay the sum of RM7,500.00 every month for child maintenance until the children of the marriage reach twenty-one (21) years old, payable on or before the 7th of every month into the PW's designated Maybank account.
b
(b) Clause 9(f) binds the PH to bear the education expenses of the children of the marriage from primary, secondary, and right up to tertiary education.
c
(c) Clause 9(g) stipulates that the PH shall cover all of the children’s healthcare expenses.
d
(d) Clauses 9(j), (k), (l) and (m) obligate the PH to provide a residential property (a three-bedroom apartment or condominium in Kuala Lumpur City Centre) for the benefit of the PW and the children within six (6) months from the date of the decree nisi, to be held on trust for the children, with a valid trust deed executed and delivered to the PW within one (1) year. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 III. THE PH'S APPLICATION FOR VARIATION [7] By Enclosure 62, the PH seeks substantial downward variations and structural postponements of his agreed obligations, summarised as follows:
a
(a) Variation of Child Maintenance (Clause 9(e)): To reduce the monthly child maintenance retrospectively and prospectively from RM7,500.00 to (a) RM6,000.00 per month for the period from January 2022 to December 2024, and (b) RM3,000.00 per month commencing from January 2025 onwards.
b
(b) Variation of Education Expenses (Clause 9(f)): To cap his contribution towards the children's education expenses at a maximum of RM4,000.00 per annum commencing from January 2025; to limit his liability for international school fees to a mere 10% for the period from January 2022 to January 2025, and to absolve himself of any further liability for international schooling thereafter.
c
(c) Appointment of an Auditor: To direct the PW to submit all supporting documents and receipts for the children’s education expenses to an independent auditor, with the PH granted three
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(3) months to settle any certified outstanding sum.
d
(d) Variation of Housing Provision (Clauses 9(j)-(m)): To vary his obligation to provide the residential property, such that he shall only be required to acquire the property “if and when his financial circumstances permit”, thereby indefinitely postponing the performance of this obligation. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 IV. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES A. Submissions by the PH [8] The PH submits that a severe and material change in circumstances has occurred since the Consent Order was recorded on 03.10.2021, rendering the original terms excessively burdensome and unsustainable. He contends that the Court must assess the decrease in the paying party's means and make proportional adjustments, relying on Gisela Gertrud Abe v Tan Wee Kiat [1986] 2 CLJ (Rep) 133; [1986] 2 MLJ 297 and AXM v AXO [2014] 2 SLR 705 to support the Court's jurisdiction to backdate maintenance reductions and write off accrued arrears. [9] The PH asserts that he has zero statutory income, survives entirely on an estimated RM4,000.00 monthly allowance from his father, and that his family's principal corporate entities (Aman Frontier Sdn Bhd, 5 Star Room Hotel Sdn Bhd, and Prinsip Teguh Sdn Bhd), which previously funded his lifestyle and maintenance payments, have suffered a steady financial decline and have been wound up or liquidated. [10] The PH further claims that he is medically incapacitated from working due to bipolar mood disorder and cannabis-induced psychosis. His learned counsel argued that the PH only holds directorships and shareholdings because he is the “boss's son” and that no independent commercial company would ever employ someone suffering from these severe mental disorders. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [11] Additionally, the PH argues that his remarriage on 25.10.2022 and the birth of a new daughter from that relationship have introduced fresh, unavoidable financial liabilities that heavily strain his limited resources. He relies on NAN v PAN [2024] 7 AMR 902 and ANH v ANI [2019] SGHC 170 to submit that the Court must make a fair and reasonable attempt to balance the limited budget between his first and second families, without moralising on his decision to remarry. [12] Regarding the children’s schooling, the PH argues that the PW's decision to enrol the children in an expensive international school is a unilateral and unreasonable luxury, particularly when more affordable government Chinese schools or public schools are available. He relies heavily on Karen Young v Ng Tia Ching [2018] 5 CLJ 716 to contend that the financial difficulties arising from such a decision are self-induced hardships for which he should not be held liable. B. Submissions by the PW [13] The PW vehemently opposes the application. The crux of the PW's submission is that Enclosure 62 is fatally flawed due to the PH’s deliberate failure to comply with the mandatory disclosure provisions under Rules 61, 63, 65, and 66 of the Divorce and Matrimonial Proceedings Rules 1980 (“DMPR 1980”). She contends that the PH has actively concealed substantial properties, high-value corporate shareholdings, and actual income streams, which constitute a severe abuse of the Court's process. The PW relies on Ngu Chu Chiong v Lina Soo [2008] 3 MLJ 42, Re: Foo Kwong Shiong & Anor [2023] 1 LNS 660, and Chung Fui Chu v Foo **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 Ho Cheng & Another Case [2010] 10 CLJ 93 to assert that such non-disclosure warrants the immediate dismissal of the application. [14] The PW further submits that a Consent Order embodies a sacred mutual agreement voluntarily recorded before the Court, which must not be disturbed unless the applicant can prove exceptional, compelling, and involuntary changes in circumstances, citing Lau Hui Sing v Wong Chuo Yong [2008] 9 CLJ 232 and Ng Say Chuan v Lim Szu Ling [2010] 10 CLJ 371. [15] The PW argues that the alleged changes relied upon by the PH are entirely pre-existing or self-inflicted. Specifically, she notes that,
a
(a) The family companies were wound up or in steady decline before the Consent Order was signed;
b
(b) The PH’s psychiatric treatment began as early as 2015, and his psychosis is the direct result of a voluntary 15-year history of substance abuse;
c
(c) The child from his new relationship was born in August 2021, before the Consent Order was signed; and
d
(d) His bank statements reveal massive, unexplained personal expenditures and capital investments that completely shatter his plea of poverty. [16] Regarding education, the PW submits that international schooling is an absolute necessity for the autistic child, Child A, who requires a **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 specialised inclusive program and a shadow aide, which public government schools cannot provide. She contends that the PH was fully aware of and consented to this enrollment, and that his persistent default has cruelly left the autistic child stranded at home without schooling, while the younger daughter, Child B, was moved to a government Chinese school to save costs. V. DECISIONS AND FINDINGS OF THE COURT [17] After a meticulous perusal of the extensive cause papers, bank statements, corporate records, and psychiatric evaluations, and having heard the robust oral submissions of learned counsels, this Court dismissed Enclosure 62 in its entirety with costs. The detailed reasons for my decision are set out below. [18] Under Section 96 of the LRA 1976, this Court possesses the discretionary power to vary or rescind any order for the custody or maintenance of a child. However, this statutory power is strictly contingent upon the applicant proving on a balance of probabilities that “there has been any material change in the circumstances”. As established by the Supreme Court in the landmark case of Gisela Gertrud Abe (supra), the proper judicial approach is to start from the date of the original order and determine what changes, financial or otherwise, have taken place since that date. George Seah SCJ at p. 137 (para. b-c) clarified: “In our opinion, when an application is made to the Court to vary an existing order for maintenance, the proper approach is to start from the original order and see what changes financial or otherwise, have taken place since that date **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 including any changes which the Court is required to have regard to under s. 78 of the Act as well as any increase or decrease in the means of either of the parties to the marriage and make adjustments roughly in proportion to the changes, if that is possible.” [Emphasis added] [19] In determining what constitutes a valid change, the courts have consistently emphasised that the operative statutory word is “material”. In Sivajothi a/p K. Suppiah v Kunathasan a/l Chelliah [2006] 5 CLJ 318, Azahar bin Mohamed JC (later CJM) held at p. 325: “The meaning of the section is plain and very clear. It is apparent that under s. 96, in so far as it relates to the case at hand, there must be a material change in the circumstance in order for the court to vary or rescind any order for maintenance. The section says any “material change” and not simply “change”. There is no ambiguity whatsoever. It means a change in an essential part... the requirement in this section does impose a legal obligation on the defendant to prove on the balance of probability that there had been a material change in the circumstances...” [Emphasis added] [20] Furthermore, because the order sought to be varied is a consent order, the threshold for judicial intervention is exceptionally high. A consent order is a formal, binding contract between the parties that has been sealed by the Court. It must not be lightly disturbed. As enunciated **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 by Yeoh Wee Siam JC (later, JCA) in Ng Say Chuan (supra), as far as possible, a consent order must rarely be disturbed unless there are exceptional, compelling, and unforeseen circumstances that warrant the Court's intervention (see also Sim Bee Khim v Eugene Leong Weng Kong [2021] 1 LNS 916). [21] Applying these strict legal standards to the present case, this Court finds that the PH has utterly failed to prove any legitimate material change in circumstances occurring after the recording of the Consent Order on 03.10.2021. His application represents a bad-faith attempt to rely on pre-existing circumstances, voluntary expenditures, and active financial concealment to evade his parental and moral duties to his special-needs child and former wife. A. THE ALLEGED FINANCIAL DOWNHILL AND CONCEALMENT OF
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1. WEALTH The Alleged Financial Downhill is a Pre-Existing Circumstance [22] The PH’s primary argument that he has suffered a severe financial downturn due to the collapse of his family's corporate entities must fail in limine. The law is clear that a variation application cannot be used to rewrite a voluntarily agreed order based on hardships or facts that already existed and were known to the applicant when the order was recorded. [23] During oral submissions, the PH's learned counsel openly and properly conceded to this Court that two of the three companies characterised by the PH as his principal corporate sources of income— **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 namely, Prinsip Teguh Sdn Bhd (wound up in 2018) and Aman Frontier Sdn Bhd (wound up in January 2021)—were liquidated well before the Consent Order was recorded on 3 October 2021. Thus, at the time the PH voluntarily signed the Consent Order in October 2021, he was fully aware that these entities had collapsed. [24] Similarly, the PH’s claim of being crippled by massive tax liabilities to the Inland Revenue Board (LHDN) is highly disingenuous. The documentary evidence shows that these tax debts accrued between 2017 and 2022, meaning that the vast majority of these overdue liabilities were already outstanding and overdue long before he recorded the Consent Order on 03.10.2021. He cannot now recycle these historical, pre-existing liabilities to manufacture a sudden 'material change in circumstances' (see Woon Lee Lee v Michael Tie Siaw Kai [2024] CLJU 3353).
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2. The Façade of the Bare Nominee and Material Non-Disclosure of Assets [25] The PH's attempt to portray himself as a mere “bare nominee” who holds zero real power, zero income, and no duties is completely shattered by his active corporate footprint and substantial undisclosed assets. The PW has successfully demonstrated that the PH remains a named director and shareholder in at least fifteen (15) active family-controlled companies. [26] Under the Companies Act 2016, a director owes strict statutory and fiduciary duties, rendering it both legally and factually implausible that he holds multiple directorships without any real involvement, power, or financial benefit. Crucially, the PW revealed that the PH was financially **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 capable of purchasing 122,500 fully paid-up shares in Timeless Century Sdn Bhd as recently as late 2023, showing an active, high-value investment capacity that is entirely inconsistent with his plea of financial ruin. [27] Under Rule 63 of the DMPR 1980, an applicant seeking to vary a maintenance order has a mandatory, absolute duty to make a full, frank, and clear disclosure of all properties, bank accounts, and actual income streams. This Court finds that the PH has deliberately failed to come to court with clean hands by actively concealing high-value assets and their respective financial yields. In particular:
a
(a) Omission of Property PN128 (Wisma Landag): While the PH disclosed his half-share in the commercial property under PN129, Lot 74, Alor Setar (Wisma Landag), which was rented to AmBank (M) Berhad for a substantial sum, a careful examination of the Deed of Assignment of Rental Proceeds (Enclosure 64, page 19) reveals that the property comprises two separate land titles, namely PN128 and PN129. Both are owned by the PH and his brother. The PH completely omitted to disclose the existence or status of the co-owned property under title PN128. He has failed to account for what occurred to the rental proceeds or the equity of this second title. Furthermore, Five-Star Room Hotel (the primary borrower for whom the property was assigned as collateral) was wound up in August 2024. As a separate legal entity, the company is legally obligated to return or repay any assigned rental sums to the PH, its shareholder, on a monthly **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 basis, yet the PH has remained silent on this, concealing this potential income stream from the Court.
b
(b) Omission of status of Cyberjaya Bungalow: The PH has a half-share in a high-value bungalow lot situated at Lot 15, Perdana Lakeview West, Cyberjaya, which was purchased in 2010 for an astronomical sum of RM2,094,643.00. In his affidavits, the PH merely stated that the property is charged to AmIslamic Bank Berhad, actively concealing its current status, market value, or rental yields. The loan facility agreement (Enclosure 64, page 57) shows that the PH and his co-owner borrowed only RM1.25 million against this RM2 million asset, and that the loan has a repayment tenure of 240 months (20 years) from 2010, meaning it will mature and be fully settled in 2030. Consequently, the outstanding loan balance is nominal, leaving the PH with substantial equity in this prime Cyberjaya bungalow. His half-share represents a highly realisable capital asset with significant equity value, which the PH could deploy to satisfy his agreed obligations to provide a residential property and maintain his special-needs child under the Consent Order. [28] This deliberate financial obfuscation and concealment of high-value capital assets blatantly violate Rule 63 of the DMPR 1980 and demonstrate the PH's complete lack of bona fides. This Court is guided by the resolute principle in Chung Fui Chu (supra), which dictates that where an applicant fails to disclose his true corporate income, actual asset values, and loan repayments, the Court must find that his conduct is deliberate, dishonest, and lacks bona fides. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14
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3. Enormous Unexplained Cash Flows and Spending Habits [29] The PH’s desperate plea of financial ruin and his claim that he survives on a mere RM4,000.00 monthly allowance are completely shattered by his own personal bank statements (Enclosure 80). The PW's scrutiny of the PH's Maybank statements revealed massive personal debit flows and discretionary expenditures that are entirely inconsistent with any genuine financial hardship:
a
(a) In May 2025 alone, the PH had personal debit card flows and bank withdrawals amounting to RM13,492.69 (comprising RM12,505.33 and RM987.36 from his respective bank statements).
b
(b) In June 2025, his personal spending was RM5,353.79 (comprising RM1,876.70 and RM3,477.09).
c
(c) In July 2025, he spent a total of RM7,948.36 (comprising RM3,974.19 and RM3,974.17).
d
(d) Additionally, the PH somehow managed to pay LHDN close to RM100,000.00 in outstanding tax arrears within a mere ten-month span—bringing his tax debt down from RM108,997.94 to just RM13,341.42 (and subsequently to RM7,000.00, according to his latest tax ledger), —which further shatters his plea of poverty and demonstrates access to substantial undisclosed funds. If the PH is truly broke and surviving on a limited fatherly allowance, he could not have conjured nearly RM100,000.00 to clear his personal tax debts while simultaneously claiming he cannot afford the mandated RM7,500.00 maintenance for his own children. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 [30] These figures show that the PH's actual monthly expenditures range from RM5,353.00 to RM13,492.69, which far exceed the RM4,000.00 allowance he claims to live on. Furthermore, his bank statements reveal frequent, highly discretionary expenditures, including dining out and luxury non-essential purchases for his current household, such as high-end cosmetics from Sephora for his new wife.
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4. Fatal Non-Compliance and Abuse of Court Process [31] The PH’s application is fatally flawed from the outset due to his blatant non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of Rule 63(1) and Rule 65 of the DMPR 1980. Specifically, Rule 63(1) mandates that any application for a variation order must be supported by an affidavit setting out the full and accurate particulars of the applicant's property and income. [32] In the Court of Appeal case of Ngu Chu Chiong (supra), Zulkefli JCA (later PCA) held that the failure to comply with the mandatory disclosure rules under Rules 63, 65, and 66 of the DMPR 1980 is an error in law that is absolutely fatal to a variation application: “We are also of the view the learned judge of the High Court has also erred in law in failing to consider the non-compliance by the petitioner of rr 63, 65 and 66 of the 1980 Rules. Rule 63(1) of the 1980 Rules provides that any application for a variation order shall be supported by an affidavit of the applicant setting out the full particulars of the applicant's property and income...” [Emphasis added] **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [33] Furthermore, during oral submissions, the PW's learned counsel raised a crucial procedural defect: under Rule 65 of the DMPR 1980, it is a mandatory requirement that upon filing an application for variation of ancillary relief, the matter must be scheduled before the Registrar for a formal investigation of the parties' assets, management accounts, and financial statements. The Registrar has the statutory powers to compel discovery, take oral evidence, and order the attendance of witnesses for cross-examination. Only after the completion of this investigation can the matter be properly referred to a Judge for decision under Rule 66. [34] In this case, the PH completely bypassed this mandatory investigatory stage, failed to schedule the matter for investigation before the Registrar, and instead rushed to have it heard directly by a Judge in Chambers. While this Court has inherent powers to hear matrimonial matters, the PH's deliberate failure to utilise the Registrar's investigatory mechanism—where his management accounts and financial records could have been properly scrutinised—has severely prejudiced the Court's ability to assess his true financial standing. In any event, because the PH has engaged in deliberate, material non-disclosure of his capital assets under Rule 63, any investigation would have been severely crippled by his dishonesty. [35] When an applicant attempts to disturb a mutually agreed consent order while actively hiding his wealth, such conduct transcends mere procedural non-compliance; it constitutes an oppressive abuse of the court's process. This Court is guided by the remarkable ruling of Hamid Sultan JC (later, JCA) in Lau Hui Sing (supra), endorsed in Chua Suzen v Eng Lai Leong [2025] MLJU 3942: when an ex-husband applies to **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 reopen old wounds and disturb a consent order but fails to disclose material evidence regarding his movable and immovable assets, the application is oppressive, constitutes a serious abuse of the court's process, and warrants an immediate dismissal in limine. B. BIPOLAR DISORDER AND MENTAL INCAPACITY [36] The PH relies heavily on his diagnosis of bipolar mood disorder and cannabis-induced psychosis to claim that he is wholly or partially incapacitated from earning a livelihood, calling himself a “useless person” who cannot fulfil his maintenance obligations. This argument is entirely untenable. [37] First, a variation application under Section 96 of the LRA 1976 strictly requires proof of a material change in circumstances that took place since the date of the original order. The medical evidence adduced by the PH confirms that his psychiatric treatment commenced in 2015 and continued through February 2021. Consequently, he entered into the Consent Order with complete, long-standing knowledge of his condition; it cannot now be repurposed as a sudden, unforeseen ‘material change' to defeat the Consent Order. [38] Secondly, the medical reports clearly state that the PH’s psychiatric condition is a self-inflicted illness. His doctors explicitly note that his cannabis-induced psychotic disorder stems directly from his voluntary consumption of illegal narcotics over a 15-year period, severely exacerbated by his repeated, voluntary refusal to comply with prescribed medical treatments and medication advice. It is a fundamental principle of **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 equity that a party cannot rely on his/ her own wrongdoing or voluntary self-destruction to seek equitable relief from the Court. The PW and his children must not be penalised, deprived, or made victims of the PH's voluntary substance abuse and personal irresponsibility. [39] Thirdly, the PH's claim of severe mental incapacity is flatly contradicted by his own active corporate engagements. It is factually and legally impossible for the PH to claim severe mental incapacity while simultaneously accepting new directorships, signing statutory declarations, and managing the acquisition of 122,500 company shares as recently as late 2023. Furthermore, his most recent medical report dated February 2025 explicitly states that his clinical condition is stable and that he is “calm, cooperative, good eye contact, speech coherent, relevant... mood happy”, completely undermining his attempt to portray himself as a severely incapacitated individual incapable of earning an income. C. REMARRIAGE AND A NEW CHILD [40] The PH advances a third argument, asserting that his subsequent remarriage on 25.10.2022 and the birth of a new daughter from that relationship have introduced fresh financial commitments that severely stretch his limited budget, constituting a material change in circumstances. [41] This Court notes a critical flaw in the timeline of the PH’s narrative. The child of the new relationship was born on 7 August 2021, prior to the recording of the Consent Order on 3 October 2021. This pre-existing **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 family dynamic was fully within the PH's contemplation when he executed the Consent Order. This means that the existence of this child and his relationship with his new wife were pre-existing circumstances fully within his knowledge and contemplation when he voluntarily signed the financial terms of the Consent Order. He cannot now invoke a preexisting family dynamic to fabricate a sudden 'material change' years later. [42] Even if the formal registration of his remarriage in October 2022 is treated as a subsequent event, it still fails to meet the strict legal threshold. This Court is guided by the resolute principle established by Suraya Othman J (later, JCA) in Lim Hong Bee v Mah Teck Oon [2010] 8 CLJ 473 at p. 481: “...retirement and remarriage per se does not constitute material change in circumstances if the applicant cannot show that he is financially adversely affected or suffers a financial detriment as a result of it. The court will not intervene to vary or discharge the maintenance payment, especially one which emanates from a mutual consent order...” [Emphasis added] [43] The PH attempted to rely on NAN v PAN (supra) to argue that the court must balance the budget between his first and second households. While any individual is free to remarry and take on new family responsibilities, doing so is a voluntary act. If an ex-husband chooses to assume new financial burdens, it must absolutely not prejudice the paramount legal obligations he owes to his first family. This Court is guided by the highly persuasive and remarkable ruling of Yeoh Wee Siam **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 JC (later, JCA) in Shela Nair Onikandan Nair @ Krishnan v Hariharan Tara Singh [2010] CLJU 348, which directly rejects the PH's argument: “The Defendant claimed that he registered his second marriage on 5.3.2010 and now has a wife and family to support... The new marriage of the Defendant should not be accepted as proof of a material change in his circumstances. His obligation to paying monthly maintenance for his children is an existing one which he has to fulfill even with his second marriage. It is morally and legally wrong to cut down the monthly maintenance for the children in the first marriage just because he has a second marriage.” [Emphasis added] [44] The PH cannot use the voluntary choice of starting a new family as a shield to evade his legal responsibilities to the children of his first marriage. His own bank statements reveal massive personal expenditures and share acquisitions, entirely contradicting his claim that he is financially crippled by his new family. Consequently, this ground completely fails. D. PROSPECTIVE AND RETROSPECTIVE VARIATION OF CHILD MAINTENANCE [45] The PH's application to retrospectively vary his child maintenance obligations under Clause 9(e) of the Consent Order by reducing it from RM7,500.00 to RM6,000.00 for the period from January 2022 to December 2024 is wholly devoid of legal basis. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 [46] Under Malaysian family law, accrued maintenance arrears constitute a vested debt owed directly for the benefit of the children. A variation order operates prospectively from the date of the Court's decision and cannot be used as a retroactive mechanism to absolve a defaulting party of past, voluntary non-compliance. Granting a retrospective reduction of accrued child maintenance arrears would severely penalise the PW, who was forced to undergo extreme personal hardship, borrow heavily from her late father, and make immense sacrifices to ensure the children's basic survival in the face of the PH's persistent default. [47] While the PH's learned counsel cited the Singapore High Court decision in AXM v AXO (supra) to support the proposition that courts have the power to backdate maintenance reductions and write off accrued arrears, that case is highly distinguishable. In AXM v AXO (supra), the Singapore court exercised its equitable jurisdiction to backdate a reduction under unique, established circumstances, namely genuine, involuntary insolvency and full, transparent financial disclosure by the husband. In stark contrast, the PH in the present case has failed to make full and frank disclosure of his massive undisclosed properties and shares, and his bank statements prove that his financial hardship is a manufactured façade. [48] Furthermore, the PH's proposal to prospectively reduce the child maintenance to RM3,000.00 per month for both children is grossly inadequate. One of the children, Child A, has special needs arising from autism, which require continuous medical, educational, and developmental support. The PH himself admits that his personal monthly expenditures exceed RM6,200.00 while residing rent-free with his parents **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 in Kedah, and his bank statements show discretionary luxury spending. It is highly inequitable and morally indefensible for the PH to spend over RM13,000.00 a month on himself and his new household while attempting to limit the maintenance of his first two children—including a special-needs child—to a meagre RM1,500.00 per child in Kuala Lumpur, where the cost of living is significantly higher. E. EDUCATION EXPENSES AND THE DISTINGUISHABILITY OF KAREN YOUNG [49] The PH strongly contends that the PW's decision to enrol the children in an international school was an unreasonable luxury, and that they should instead attend government Chinese or public schools. He relies on Karen Young (supra) to argue that his liability under Clause 9(f) must be capped at RM4,000.00 per annum and that his responsibility for international school fees must be written off or capped at 10%. [50] This Court has meticulously analysed the facts of Karen Young and finds that it is completely distinguishable from the present suit on three fundamental grounds:
a
(a) First, Confirmed Medical Diagnosis: In Karen Young, the mother made a unilateral, bare claim that the child was 'dyslexic' with no medical or psychological report to back up her assertion. The court in that case properly noted that a dyslexic diagnosis cannot be based on the mere 'hunches or feelings' of a parent. In stark contrast, Child A has an undisputed, confirmed medical diagnosis of autism, which is a severe neurodevelopmental **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 disorder requiring specialised, supportive, inclusive programs and a shadow aide.
b
(b) Second, Consent and Joint Decision: In Karen Young, the mother made a completely unilateral decision to transfer the child to an expensive international school without consulting or obtaining the consent of the father. In this case, the PH and his parents were actively involved in selecting and enrolling Child A in the school, and they raised no objections at the time. The choice was a joint decision made with the full awareness of Child A's special educational needs.
c
(c) Third, No Luxury but Essential Need: In Karen Young, the international school was deemed an unnecessary luxury. In the present case, the international school selected offers a specialised inclusive programme which is absolutely essential for Child A's development. Due to the PH’s persistent default, Child A has been cruelly removed from school and is now sitting at home with no schooling, severely hindering his developmental progress. Meanwhile, the PW has acted reasonably and prudently by moving the younger, healthy daughter, Child B, to a public Chinese government school to minimise expenses. This shows that the school choice is not an act of extravagance but a direct response to the medical needs of an autistic child. [51] Consequently, the education expenses under Clause 9(f) are necessary and appropriate expenses, not a 'self-induced hardship' on the part of the PW. The PH’s attempt to unilaterally cap his tertiary and primary education obligation to a meagre RM4,000.00 per annum is a **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 bad-faith attempt to run away from the clear, unlimited terms of the Consent Order he voluntarily signed. F. THE PROPOSED VARIATION OF THE HOUSING PROVISION [52] Under Clauses 9(j), (k), (l) and (m) of the Consent Order, the PH was strictly obligated to provide a 3-bedroom residential property in Kuala Lumpur City Centre on trust for the children within six (6) months of the decree nisi. He has failed to do so for over four (4) years. [53] The PH now seeks to vary this clause so that he shall be required to provide the property only “if and when his financial circumstances permit”. This Court finds that such a proposal is vague, highly subjective, lacks any definite timeline, and is legally unenforceable. Allowing such a variation would render the housing provision completely illusory, allowing the PH to indefinitely postpone his agreed obligations to the detriment of his children. [54] The housing provision was recorded to ensure long-term residential security for the PW and the children, particularly given Child A's special needs. By defaulting, the PH has forced the PW to rent, resulting in substantial rental debt. She now faces the threat of relocation as her landlord intends to raise the rent, which she cannot afford. The PH cannot invoke his longstanding default to justify reducing or postponing his obligations. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 [55] Furthermore, as established earlier, the PH’s plea of financial incapacity is a sham. His personal bank statements show significant discretionary expenditures and share acquisitions, and he holds substantial liquid equity in the Cyberjaya bungalow lot. He has ample financial and capital resources to fulfil his agreed housing obligations. G. THE PROPOSAL FOR AN INDEPENDENT AUDITOR [56] The PH's proposal to appoint an independent auditor to audit and certify the children's education expenses under paragraph 4 of his application is highly impractical and is hereby rejected. [57] First, appointing an independent auditor would introduce significant, unnecessary professional fees. The PH has not clarified who is to bear the costs of this audit. If the PH has the financial means to pay for an independent auditor, it is highly contradictory for him to claim an inability to meet his children's basic maintenance and school fees. The PW has already provided sufficient details of the expenses, and the school has shown immense goodwill by granting discounts and delaying payments. An audit is an unnecessary hurdle intended to further oppress the PW and delay the payment of accrued maintenance. [58] Second, there is an absolute lack of factual necessity or genuine dispute that would justify a professional audit. The PH's assertion that there are no documents showing the children's actual school fees is a deliberate misrepresentation. The PW has already transparently disclosed the relevant school fee invoices and letters, demonstrating that the school fees are RM16,820.00 per annum for Child A and RM16,400.00 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 per annum for Child B, rather than the grossly exaggerated sum of RM60,000.00 per child claimed by the PH. Crucially, the PW has categorically deposed in her Affidavit in Reply (Enclosure 72, paragraph 49) that the PH and his parents were actively involved in selecting and enrolling the children, had personally visited the school, and had consented to the enrolment. The PH failed to specifically or credibly rebut this material deposition of fact. In proceedings decided on affidavit evidence, unchallenged sworn assertions stand as uncontroverted truth. His demand for an auditor to verify expenses he previously consented to is entirely redundant and raised in bad faith. [59] Third, the PH’s proposal represents an impermissible and unilateral attempt to rewrite the Consent Order by inserting an extra-contractual "condition precedent" to his payment obligations. Clause 9(f) of the Consent Order is a clear, absolute, and unconditional term requiring the PH to bear the children's educational expenses. It does not contain any mechanism or proviso allowing the PH to withhold payments pending an audit of the PW's receipts. Sanctioning the appointment of an independent auditor would play directly into the PH's hands, establishing a dangerous precedent in which a defaulting party can indefinitely stall their financial obligations and escape contempt proceedings by dragging the custodial parent through endless administrative hurdles. The children's right to education and maintenance cannot be made a hostage to such dilatory tactics. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 VI. CONCLUSION [60] In the final analysis, the PH’s application in Enclosure 62 is a transparent and unmeritorious attempt to escape the clear, solemn, and binding legal obligations that he voluntarily and knowingly undertook when he entered into the Consent Order on 3 October 2021. [61] The law is resolute: a consent order represents a binding contractual agreement between the parties that has received the judicial seal of the Court, and it must rarely be disturbed unless the applicant can demonstrate exceptional circumstances or a genuine, involuntary material change in their financial or personal situation. The PH has failed to discharge this high burden on a balance of probabilities. [62] Instead of demonstrating a genuine change of circumstances, the evidence before this Court reveals a persistent pattern of bad-faith default, willful non-disclosure of high-value capital assets—such as the co-owned Wisma Landag title PN128 and his massive equity in the Cyberjaya bungalow lot—and a deliberate concealment of his actual expenditure. A party seeking equitable relief and the exercise of this Court's judicial discretion must come to court with clean hands; the PH has singularly failed to do so, breaching Rule 63 of the DMPR 1980 and rendering his application an abuse of the court process. [63] Furthermore, the PH cannot plead his subsequent remarriage or the birth of his new daughter as an excuse to starve his first family of their lawful entitlements. The children of his first marriage, particularly his special-needs son, Child A, who suffers from autism and requires **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 specialised care, have a vested and paramount right to be maintained and educated in accordance with the standard of life that the PH originally promised to provide [Enclosure 93, para 34; Enclosure 64, para 5; Enclosure 96, paras 50 & 64]. The PH's voluntary choice to assume new financial burdens must not, and shall not, prejudice the welfare of his existing children. The welfare of the children remains the golden thread that runs through the fabric of matrimonial law, and this Court will not allow that thread to be severed by the PH's personal whims (Gong v Hong [2025] 4 CLJ 598). [64] For the reasons stated above, this Court dismissed the PH’s application in Enclosure 62 in its entirety with costs of RM5,000.00 to be paid by the PH to the PW, subject to the allocator. Dated: 18th July, 2026 -------------------------------------------------------------------- YA Dr Hj JOHN LEE KIEN HOW @ MOHD JOHAN LEE JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA ALOR SETAR **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 Table of Authorities Cases ANH v ANI [2019] SGHC 170 AXM v AXO [2014] 2 SLR 705 Chua Suzen v Eng Lai Leong [2025] MLJU 3942 Chung Fui Chu v Foo Ho Cheng & Another Case [2010] 10 CLJ 93 Gisela Gertrud Abe v Tan Wee Kiat [1986] 2 CLJ (Rep) 133; [1986] 2 MLJ 297 Gong v Hong [2025] 4 CLJ 598 Karen Young v Ng Tia Ching [2018] 5 CLJ 716 Lau Hui Sing v Wong Chuo Yong [2008] 9 CLJ 232 Lim Hong Bee v Mah Teck Oon [2010] 8 CLJ 473 NAN v PAN [2024] 7 AMR 902 Ng Say Chuan v Lim Szu Ling [2010] 10 CLJ 371 Ngu Chu Chiong v Lina Soo [2008] 3 MLJ 42 Re: Foo Kwong Shiong & Anor [2023] 1 LNS 660 Shela Nair Onikandan Nair @ Krishnan v Hariharan Tara Singh [2010] CLJU 348 Sim Bee Khim v Eugene Leong Weng Kong [2021] 1 LNS 916 Sivajothi a/p K. Suppiah v Kunathasan a/l Chelliah [2006] 5 CLJ 318 Woon Lee Lee v Michael Tie Siaw Kai [2024] CLJU 3353 Statutes Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 Divorce and Matrimonial Proceeding Rules 1980 Rules Rules of Court 2012 Solicitor for the Petitioner Husband : Loo Hsien Yang Messrs. Y.K. Loo & Co. Advocates & Solicitors Solicitors for the Petitioner Wife : S Vasanthi & A. Darshana Messrs. K. Sugu & Associates Advocates & Solicitors **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal
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