Undang-undang berhubung dengan keterangan mengikut keadaan adalah jelas. Dalam kes Jayaraman & Ors V Public Prosecutor [1982] 2 MLJ 306, Mahkamah Persekutuan berdepan dengan persoalan undangundang berhubung dengan keterangan mengikut keadaan seperti berikut: Whether it is correct law that in dealing with a case which relies on circumstantial evidence it does not make any difference if a court finds that in considering all the evidence it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of the offence or if the court says that the evidence points only to the irresistible conclusion that the accused is guilty. Mahkamah Persekutuan, melalui keputusan yang disampaikan oleh Suffian LP telah membuat pemerhatian dan seterusnya memutuskan sepertimana berikut: Mr. Vijandran submits that the answer to this question is that it is not correct meaning that in a case depending on circumstantial evidence the conviction cannot stand if the court merely says that the prosecution case has been proved beyond reasonable doubt; the court must go further and say that the facts proved irresistibly point to one and only one conclusion, the guilt of the accused. Encik Mokhtar on the contrary submits that it is correct - meaning that it is enough if the court merely says that it is satisfied of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt without further saying that the facts proved irresistibly point to one and only one conclusion, the guilt of the accused. With respect we agree with Encik Mokhtar, following the House of Lords decision in McGreevy v Director of Public Prosecutions [1973] 1 WLR 276; [1973] 1 All ER 503, and thus modifying the ruling of this court in several local cases which seems to lay a heavier burden of proof on the prosecution where it depends on circumstantial evidence than where it depends on direct evidence. Some of these local cases are mentioned by Professor Ahmad Ibrahim in a note on Circumstantial Evidence at [1973] 1 MLJ xlvi and they are Kartar Singh & Anor v Public Prosecutor [1952] MLJ 85, Idris v Public Prosecutor [1960] MLJ 296, Chan Chwen Kong v Public Prosecutor [1962] MLJ 307, Sunny Ang v Public Prosecutor [1966] 2 MLJ 195, Karam Singh v Public Prosecutor [1967] 2 MLJ 25, Chang Kim Siong v Public Prosecutor [1968] 1 MLJ 36 and Muniandy v Public Prosecutor [1973] 1 MLJ 179 Setelah merujuk dan meneliti keputusan-keputusan terdahulu yang diputuskan berdasarkan keterangan ikut keadaan, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah mengemukakan pandangan sepertimana berikut; In our view the irresistible conclusion test only seems to place on the prosecution a higher burden of proof than in a case where it depends on direct evidence, for in fact to apply the one and one only irresistible conclusion test is another way of saying that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. As Syed Othman F.J., said in the instant case this is only a "play on words". If the facts proved point to a reasonable alternative to the guilt of the accused, that is only another way of saying that there is a doubt in the prosecution case and so the prosecution has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. Similarly if the facts proved show some reasonably possible explanation, for example an accident, or if they are inconsistent with any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused or if they are capable of an innocent interpretation or if they are ambiguous as being equally consistent with guilt or innocence. In all these cases the facts proved do not point to the guilt of the accused, the trial court is or cannot be sure that the accused is guilty and must acquit because the prosecution has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. We respectfully agree with what Menzies J., said in the Australian case already cited Plomp v The Queen (1963) 110 CLR 234 that the customary direction to a jury was not something separate and distinct from the direction that the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, and that the giving of the particular direction stemmed from the more general requirement that proof must be established beyond reasonable doubt. So, in a case tried without a jury and depending on circumstantial evidence, in our judgment, respectfully following McGreevy [1973] 1 WLR 276; [1973] 1 All ER 503, it is enough for the trial judge to remember only that the prosecution need prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, and failure by him to also say that the circumstances are not only consistent with the accused having committed the crime but also such that they are inconsistent with any other reasonable explanation, is not fatal. In other words, we agree with Encik Mokhtar that the answer to question 1 is yes, it is correct - meaning that in a case depending on circumstantial evidence it is enough if the court merely says that it is satisfied of the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, without further saying that the facts proved irresistibly point to one and only one conclusion, namely the accused's guilt.