Teh Teng Cheng v Lam Lai Fun (BA-21NCvC-26-06/2025)

KERAJAAN MALAYSIA … DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT A.

These Grounds of Judgment concern two interlocutory applications filed in the present suit, namely: 22/06/2026 12:20:29 BA-21NCvC-26-06/2025 Kand. 39

(a) Enclosure 12, being the application by the 1st and 2nd Defendants to strike out the Plaintiff’s Amended Writ and Amended Statement of Claim as against them under Order 18 rule 19(1)(a), (b), (c) and/or (d) of the Rules of Court 2012; and

(b) Enclosure 24, being the application by the 3rd to 8th Defendants to strike out the Plaintiff’s claim against them under Order 18 rule 19(1)(a) and (b) of the Rules of Court

2012.

Both applications arise from the Plaintiff’s Amended Writ and Amended Statement of Claim, each dated 16.6.2025, whereby the Plaintiff, Teh Teng Cheng, seeks reliefs against all eight Defendants, including declarations that the Defendants maliciously prosecuted him, that the 4th to 8th Defendants abused statutory powers in relation to AMLA measures, and that the freezing orders dated 4.1.2023 and 5.1.2023 were unlawful.

The applications, although interlocutory in form, raise issues of considerable legal significance. At the centre of the dispute lies the Plaintiff’s attempt to attach private law liability to: first, a private complainant who lodged a police report; second, enforcement officers who commenced investigation upon receipt of complaint and subsequent material; and third, prosecutorial authorities exercising powers said to arise under Article 145(3) of the Federal Constitution.

In my judgment, the Plaintiff’s pleading suffers from fundamental legal defects. Even taking the pleaded case at its highest, the claims as framed are plainly unsustainable. This is particularly so where the pleading effectively seeks, through the medium of a civil action, to challenge or interfere with:

(i) the making or receipt of complaints to lawful authorities;

I was also informed that there was an intention to withdraw Enclosure 24, or part of it. However, after considering the Plaintiff’s pleaded reliefs and the main legal issue raised, I was of the view that the Court should still decide whether the Plaintiff’s claim against the 3rd to 8th Defendants is maintainable in law. A pleading that is clearly defective in law does not become immune from the Court’s scrutiny merely because an application relating to it is sought to be withdrawn. B.

The Plaintiff’s own pleading traces the origin of the dispute to a business relationship and later fallout involving Intelzen Engineering Sdn Bhd. The Plaintiff pleads that around 2006 he and the 2nd Defendant agreed to establish a company to conduct, among other things, the business of supplying and installing fire protection systems. He further pleads that Intelzen was incorporated on 11.8.2006, and that the shareholding structure stood at 400,000 shares each for the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant.

The 1st and 2nd Defendants, in their Defence, admit only certain limited matters, namely that the Plaintiff and D2 were friends or colleagues in Intelzen, that Intelzen was incorporated on 11.8.2006, and that the Plaintiff and D1 were equal shareholders and directors. They maintain, however, that D1 was a passive director and that the management and operations of Intelzen were, at all material times, undertaken by the Plaintiff and D2.

It is common to the parties’ materials that a project relating to fire protection works at the Alliance Steel plant in Kuantan became central to the later dispute. The 1st and 2nd Defendants’ written submissions state that Alliance Steel awarded the contract for the design and installation of a Fire Protection System to Intelzen and Sureland Equipment on 29.1.2018, and that the works were completed on or about 1.9.2019. The same submissions further state that, without the knowledge or consent of D1 and D2, the Plaintiff caused Alliance Steel to disburse RM7,382,813.00 to Sureland Malaysia, a company incorporated and controlled by the Plaintiff and not a party to the award contract.

The 3rd to 8th Defendants’ defence and supporting affidavit broadly adopt the position that the investigation which followed was prompted by documentary material indicating that Alliance Steel funds had been diverted to Sureland (Malaysia), and thereafter channelled into multiple other accounts. In particular, the affidavit at Enclosure 25 exhibits what is described as a “money trail” and asserts that RM7,382,813.00 paid by Alliance was transferred into Sureland (Malaysia) and thereafter moved into fifteen accounts totalling RM5,945,342.44, including RM190,005.00 to the Plaintiff’s own Maybank account and RM690,000.00 to the account of Inzen Engineering Sdn Bhd, said to be linked to the Plaintiff’s wife.

The affidavit further specifies the three transfers totalling RM190,005.00 into the Plaintiff’s Maybank account as follows:

(a)

10.10.2019 – RM150,005.00;

(b)

17.2.2020 – RM20,000.00; and

(c)

15.6.2020 – RM20,000.00.

The same affidavit identifies seven transfers totalling RM690,000.00 into the account of Inzen Engineering Sdn Bhd, said to be connected to the Plaintiff’s wife, Ooi Lean Yong, and further states that the Plaintiff himself had control over the Public Bank account in question, having applied to open it jointly with his wife.

The 3rd to 8th Defendants also rely on SSM-related materials exhibited to the affidavit showing, among other things, that the Plaintiff had previously been the 100% shareholder of Sureland (Malaysia) before a change of shareholding on 3.11.2020 in favour of Wang Dahong, and that he had served as a director of that company until 7.10.2020.

It is against this general factual background that the Plaintiff alleges that D1’s report, D3’s complaint, D4’s investigation, D5’s AMLA investigation and freezing action, and D7’s prosecutorial decisions were all tainted by bad faith and legal wrongdoing. The Defendants deny this and contend that the action is a legally defective attempt to convert dissatisfaction with criminal investigative and prosecutorial processes into a private law action for declarations and damages. C.

The Plaintiff’s Amended Statement of Claim pleads, in substance, that:

(a) the 1st Defendant made a false police report against him;

(b) the 3rd Defendant made a complaint to the 6th Defendant against him on 6.9.2021;

(c) the 4th Defendant, acting on the police report and complaint, caused him to be arrested on 15.11.2021 and remanded for four days;

(d) the 4th Defendant recommended that he be charged under section 420 of the Penal Code;

(e) the 7th Defendant caused the Kuantan charge to be preferred;

(f) the Kuantan case later resulted in a DNAA;

(g) notwithstanding that, a Shah Alam charge under section 409 of the Penal Code was later preferred against him; and

(h) the 5th Defendant caused freezing orders dated 4.1.2023 and 5.1.2023 to be issued against his and his wife’s assets under AMLA.

The Plaintiff then pleads malice, lack of reasonable and probable cause, abuse of statutory power, and damage, culminating in the reliefs in paragraph 47 of the Amended Statement of Claim, namely declarations of malicious prosecution, declarations against the 4th to 8th Defendants in relation to AMLA powers, a declaration that the freezing orders are unlawful, and claims for special, general, aggravated and exemplary damages, interest and costs.

Insofar as the 1st and 2nd Defendants are concerned, the Plaintiff’s case is effectively that D1’s police report and the acts allegedly done by D1 and D2 thereafter were part of a malicious misuse of the criminal process. Insofar as the 3rd to 8th Defendants are concerned, the Plaintiff’s case amounts to an attack on the investigative and prosecutorial steps taken after complaint and during the course of ongoing criminal process. D. THE DEFENCES AND APPLICATIONS D1 and D2 17. The 1st and 2nd Defendants filed a Defence making clear, among other things, that they deny the Plaintiff’s allegations of bad faith, deny responsibility for investigation, prosecution or freezing action, and contend that any such acts were undertaken by authorities outside their control. They also reserve their right to seek to strike out the claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action and as constituting an abuse of process.

Enclosure 12 was then filed to strike out the claim against D1 and D2. The grounds stated in the Notice include that the Amended Writ and Amended Statement of Claim disclose no reasonable cause of action, contain insufficient material facts and particulars, are scandalous, frivolous and vexatious, may prejudice or embarrass the fair trial of the action, and amount to an abuse of process.

In the written submissions filed in support of Enclosure 12, D1 and D2 contend that the Plaintiff’s claim is hopeless because the criminal proceedings did not terminate in his favour, the only pleaded act attributable to D1 is the making of a police report, D1 and D2 did not institute or control the prosecution, and the allegations of malice are bare and unparticularised. They further argue that the suit is an abuse of process and that malicious prosecution, as pleaded, is not a recognised cause of action in civil proceedings in Malaysia. D3 to D8 20. The 3rd to 8th Defendants filed their Defence taking the position that D1 made the police report, D3 made a complaint on 6.9.2021 under the statutory framework of the MACC Act, D4 was merely the investigating officer, D5 was an SPRM officer, D6 was the statutory body established under the MACC Act, and D7 and D8 were sued in their official capacities. They deny wrongdoing and plead that their actions were undertaken lawfully and in accordance with statute.

Enclosure 24 was then filed to strike out the Plaintiff’s claim against D3 to D8. The grounds in the Notice of Application include that:

(a) the Plaintiff has no reasonable cause of action against D7 and D8 because the Attorney General has prosecutorial power under Article 145(3) and the Shah Alam charge under section 409 is lawful and distinct from the earlier charge;

(b) the Plaintiff has no reasonable cause of action against D3 and D4 because D3’s action in recording the complaint was lawful under section 29(2) of the MACC Act and the purpose was to investigate under section 18 of the same Act;

(c) the Plaintiff has no reasonable cause of action against D5 and D6 because D5 acted under section 29 AMLA and the freezing and seizure orders were lawfully made under sections 44 and 50(1) of AMLA; and

(d) the claim is scandalous because it is wholly unnecessary and irrelevant.

The supporting affidavit at Enclosure 25 elaborates on those points and exhibits documents said to support the legality and factual basis of the investigation and AMLA action. E.

The law governing striking out is trite. Order 18 rule 19(1) of the Rules of Court 2012 empowers the Court to strike out a pleading on four grounds, namely where it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, where it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, where it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action, or where it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court.

The leading authority cited by the Defendants is Bandar Builders Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36, which makes clear that striking out is a draconian and summary jurisdiction, to be exercised only in plain and obvious cases where the pleading is clearly unsustainable on its face. The principle is not controversial and I respectfully adopt it.

For limb (a), namely no reasonable cause of action, New Straits Times (Malaysia) Bhd v Kumpulan Kertas Niaga Sdn Bhd & Anor [1985] 1 MLJ 226 establishes that the Court looks to the pleading alone and asks whether the claim is obviously unsustainable. For limb (b), Middy Industries Sdn Bhd & Ors v Arensi-Marley (M) Sdn Bhd [2013] 3 MLJ 511 explains the meaning of scandalous, frivolous and vexatious pleadings. For limb (c), Hadi bin Hassan v Suria Records Sdn Bhd & Ors [2005] 3 MLJ 522 recognises that prejudice and embarrassment in pleadings are to be given a wide and liberal interpretation. For limb (d), Konsortium Lebuhraya Utara–Timur (KL) Sdn Bhd v Liew Choong Kin [2018] 6 CLJ 217 and Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd & Anor v Monotech (M) Sdn Bhd [1999] 4 MLJ 637 confirm that abuse of process is a wide and flexible concept directed at preventing misuse of the Court’s machinery.

I also bear in mind the caution in Solai Realty Sdn Bhd v United Overseas Bank (M) Bhd [2013] 4 MLJ 545 that the Court should not resolve substantial disputes of fact on affidavit evidence in a striking out application. However, where the defect is conceptual and legal, and where even the pleaded facts taken at their highest do not disclose a viable cause of action, striking out remains appropriate. F. WHETHER THE CLAIM AGAINST D1 AND D2 DISCLOSES A

The Plaintiff’s pleaded case against D1 and D2 is rooted in the assertion that D1 made a false report and that D1 and D2 thereafter “used” SPRM and the Attorney General’s Chambers to bring about his prosecution and the freezing of his assets. In my judgment, the fundamental weakness of this pleading lies in its failure to recognise the distinction between the making of a complaint by a private person and the later acts of investigation, prosecution and statutory enforcement undertaken by the authorities.

A private complainant does not, by the mere act of reporting suspected wrongdoing, become the prosecutor, the investigator, or the statutory authority responsible for later criminal or AMLA action. The law confers investigative powers upon designated enforcement agencies and prosecutorial discretion upon the Public Prosecutor. Those are public powers. They are not subsumed into the act of complaint itself.

The 1st and 2nd Defendants rely on Khairuddin bin Abu Hassan v Wan Aeidil bin Wan Abdullah & Ors [2025] 3 MLJ 339 for the recognised elements of malicious prosecution. Even if one were to proceed on the assumption that malicious prosecution remains in principle available in an appropriate civil context, the Plaintiff’s present pleading is plainly deficient in relation to the essential elements.

First, the Plaintiff has not pleaded material facts sufficient to show that D1 or D2 instituted or controlled the criminal proceedings. On the materials before this Court, the only direct act pleaded against D1 is the lodging of a police report. That cannot, without more, amount in law to institution or control of prosecution. D2’s role is even less directly pleaded in terms of actionable conduct.

Second, the Plaintiff has not pleaded a criminal termination in his favour of the kind necessary to sustain the cause of action. The 1st and 2nd Defendants’ written submissions correctly point out that the Kuantan proceedings resulted only in a DNAA, while the Shah Alam criminal proceedings remain pending. On the face of the pleaded case and the submissions before the Court, the criminal process has not terminated in the Plaintiff’s favour in any final or legally sufficient sense.

Third, lack of reasonable and probable cause is not supported by pleaded material facts. The defence case, whether ultimately true or not, is that the police report arose out of suspicious transactions involving Intelzen funds. The Plaintiff’s pleading merely labels the report false and malicious without setting out sufficiently particularised facts demonstrating the absence of any reasonable basis whatsoever for the complaint. That is not enough.

Fourth, the allegation of malice is pleaded in a conclusory manner. There are no sufficiently pleaded particulars of specific instructions, communications, overt acts, coordination or improper motive by which D1 and D2 are said to have manipulated the criminal justice machinery. The pleading thus amounts to imputation without factual underpinning. In the language of Middy Industries, such bare allegations are apt to stigmatise rather than to advance a coherent legal claim.

Fifth, the damage alleged by the Plaintiff is not shown by pleaded facts to be causally attributable to actionable conduct on the part of D1 or D2. The losses alleged by the Plaintiff flow, on his own case, from investigation, prosecution, freezing orders and court processes. Those are acts of statutory authorities and courts. The pleading does not show the requisite causal nexus between those losses and any legally recognised act of D1 or D2 amounting to institution or control of criminal proceedings.

I therefore agree with the 1st and 2nd Defendants that the Plaintiff’s pleading against them discloses no reasonable cause of action and is plainly and obviously unsustainable. G.

The 1st and 2nd Defendants further rely on the Federal Court decision in Ng Wai Pin v Ong Yew Teik & Other Appeals [2025] 7 CLJ 859. According to the extract reproduced in the written submissions, the Federal Court held, among other things, that “malicious prosecution as pleaded herein ought not be a recognised cause of action in civil proceedings and therefore was rightly struck out by the High Court.”

I do not consider it necessary, for the purposes of disposing of the present applications, to state the proposition in its broadest and most abstract form beyond what is necessary. It is sufficient for me to hold that, in the circumstances of the present case, and on the way this Plaintiff has framed his action, the civil claim for malicious prosecution is not maintainable. Even leaving aside the broader implications of Ng Wai Pin, the Plaintiff’s claim against D1 and D2 fails for the more immediate and obvious reasons already set out.

However, insofar as Ng Wai Pin reflects a principled judicial reluctance to allow civil claims to be used to relitigate or collaterally attack matters arising from judicial or prosecutorial processes, I respectfully regard that as reinforcing the conclusion which I have independently reached on the present pleading. H. WHETHER CLAIM AGAINST D1 AND D2 IS

I am also satisfied that the claim against D1 and D2 falls within the other limbs of Order 18 rule 19.

The allegations that D1 and D2 fabricated a police report and “used” SPRM and the AGC to maliciously prosecute the Plaintiff are grave allegations carrying obvious stigmatic force. Yet they are made without material particulars showing how private parties could legally direct the prosecutorial machinery of the State. Such pleading is not merely weak. It is scandalous and vexatious within the meaning explained in Middy Industries.

Further, the Plaintiff has impermissibly conflated the roles of private individuals and public authorities. As the 1st and 2nd Defendants correctly submit, they are being compelled to answer allegations of prosecutorial misconduct and enforcement action which, on the Plaintiff’s own narrative, were undertaken by other Defendants possessing statutory or constitutional authority. This renders the pleading prejudicial and embarrassing to a fair trial.

Finally, the Court is satisfied that the action against D1 and D2 is abusive. It is, in substance, an attempt to scapegoat private complainants for the decisions of public authorities and thereby to divert attention from ongoing criminal proceedings. Order 18 rule 19(1)(d) exists precisely to prevent the Court’s process from being used for collateral and oppressive purposes. The present pleading falls within that mischief. I. CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION PUBLIC

In considering the maintainability of the Plaintiff’s claim against the 3rd to 8th Defendants, and in particular against the 7th and 8th Defendants, the Court must begin with the constitutional framework. Article 145(3) of the Federal Constitution vests in the Attorney General, acting as Public Prosecutor, the power, exercisable at his discretion, to institute, conduct or discontinue any proceedings for an offence, other than proceedings before a Syariah court, native court or court-martial. That constitutional allocation of power is central to the administration of criminal justice.

Authorities long cited in Malaysia, including Long bin Samat & Ors v Public Prosecutor [1974] 2 MLJ 152, Johnson Tan Han Seng v Public Prosecutor & Associated Appeals [1977] 2 MLJ 66, Public Prosecutor v Zainuddin & Anor [1986] 2 MLJ 100, Karpal Singh & Anor v Public Prosecutor [1991] 2 MLJ 544, and Repco Holdings Bhd v Public Prosecutor [1997] 3 MLJ 681, have treated prosecutorial discretion under Article 145(3) as wide and constitutionally conferred. More recently, the Federal Court in Sundra Rajoo a/l Nadarajah v Menteri Luar Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2021] 5 MLJ 209 this is the more recent Federal Court authority often cited on the reviewability of prosecutorial discretion, while still recognising the strong constitutional position of the Public Prosecutor under Article 145(3).

The significance of that constitutional position is this: a private litigant cannot, by filing an ordinary civil action for declarations and damages, convert disagreement with a prosecutorial decision into a private law cause of action. The Constitution commits the decision whether to institute, continue or discontinue criminal proceedings to the Public Prosecutor, not to the accused person, not to the complainant, and not to the civil court sitting in an ordinary private law action.

This point is directly engaged on the facts here. Enclosure 24 expressly states that the Plaintiff has no reasonable cause of action against D7 and D8 because the Attorney General has power under Article 145(3) to commence or discontinue proceedings, that the Shah Alam section 409 charge is lawful and distinct from the earlier charge, and that the Shah Alam case remains pending. The Defence of D3 to D8 similarly pleads that the DNAA did not amount to full acquittal and that the prosecution lawfully exercised its power under Article 145(3) to proceed with the Shah Alam matter.

Whether the Plaintiff agrees with the prosecutorial choice is beside the point. That choice belongs, in law, to the Public Prosecutor. The Plaintiff cannot, through this civil suit, arrogate to himself a right to interfere with or challenge the continuation of a prosecution simply because he says it ought not to have been brought or maintained.

The same constitutional and institutional logic informs the position of D3 to D6. Once a complaint has been lawfully received and an investigation has been lawfully commenced under the relevant statutory scheme, the continuation of that investigation belongs to the competent authority. The Plaintiff has no private law right, by the present pleading, to obstruct or found civil liability upon the continuation of such investigation.

I therefore hold that the Plaintiff has no right in law, in the manner presently pleaded, to interfere with an investigation already commenced, a criminal prosecution already set in motion, or the constitutional exercise of prosecutorial discretion under Article 145(3). That conclusion is central to the disposal of Enclosure 24. J.

The Plaintiff’s claim against D3 to D8 raises an even more fundamental difficulty. It seeks to attach civil liability to the lawful receipt and recording of a complaint, the commencement of investigation under statute, the issuance of AMLA freezing action, and the continuation of criminal proceedings.

In my judgment, such a claim is misconceived in law. D3 and D4 52. The 3rd to 8th Defendants’ defence states that D3 made a complaint against the Plaintiff on 6.9.2021 and that this was a lawful procedure under section 29(2) of the MACC Act 2009, namely recording the complaint in writing to an officer of the Commission for further investigation. D4 is pleaded to have been the investigating officer.

Enclosure 24 repeats the same position, namely that the Plaintiff has no reasonable cause of action against D3 and D4 because the complaint process was lawful and undertaken for the purpose of investigation under section 18 of the MACC Act 2009.

I accept that, on the face of the pleadings and materials, the Plaintiff has disclosed no sustainable private law claim against D3 and D4 merely because a complaint was recorded and an investigation pursued. A subject of investigation does not, by reason only of being investigated, acquire a civil cause of action against the investigator or the person recording the complaint. D5 and D6 55. As regards D5 and D6, Enclosure 24 and the supporting affidavit state that D5 exercised AMLA investigative powers under section 29, that freezing orders were issued under section 44, and that seizure-related orders were issued under section 50(1). The affidavit further seeks to show factual basis for those steps through the alleged money trail and accompanying banking and company documents.

It is not the function of this Court, on these striking out applications, to determine whether every factual inference advanced by D5 and D6 will ultimately be proved in full detail. That is not necessary. The issue is whether the Plaintiff’s pleading discloses a tenable cause of action against them in civil law merely because they exercised statutory investigative and freezing powers. In my judgment, it does not.

The Plaintiff has not mounted a proper legally recognised challenge to a discrete administrative decision in an appropriate form. Instead, he has folded the entire investigative and AMLA process into a broad plea of bad faith and abuse. In the present form, that does not amount to a sustainable cause of action. D7 and D8 58. The strongest point against the maintainability of the Plaintiff’s claim arises in relation to D7 and D8. Article 145(3) of the Federal Constitution vests in the Attorney General, as Public Prosecutor, the discretion to institute, conduct or discontinue criminal proceedings. Enclosure 24 expressly relies on that constitutional position and states that the Shah Alam section 409 charge is lawful and distinct from the earlier section 420 charge.

Once the law confers prosecutorial discretion in constitutional terms, a litigant cannot, by the expedient of filing a private law action for declarations and damages, convert dissatisfaction with that discretion into a civil cause of action in the manner pleaded here. A civil court is not to be used as an indirect forum to challenge, inhibit or second-guess prosecutorial choices that remain within the lawful domain of the Public Prosecutor.

In this regard, I agree with the position advanced in Enclosure 24 and the supporting affidavit that the Plaintiff has no sustainable cause of action against D7 and D8 based on the mere fact that criminal proceedings were instituted or continued under prosecutorial authority. K. COURT’S VIEW ON INTERFERENCE WITH

It is necessary for this Court to state clearly the legal position which, in my judgment, governs the present case.

Once a complaint has been made to the lawful authorities, and once an investigation has been lawfully commenced under the relevant statutory framework, the conduct of that investigation is a matter for the competent authority. A private litigant does not possess a free-standing civil right to interfere with, restrain or found damages upon that process merely because he disputes the allegations or considers the investigation unjustified.

Similarly, once criminal proceedings are set in motion by the lawful prosecuting authority, decisions as to whether to institute, maintain, amend, discontinue or otherwise proceed with such charges are matters falling within the constitutional and statutory province of the prosecuting authority, and not matters subject to private direction or private veto.

The Plaintiff’s pleading, insofar as it seeks to attribute civil liability to D3 to D8 for receiving complaint, investigating, freezing assets and continuing prosecution, is therefore legally misconceived. It is an attempt, through a civil pleading, to intrude into and impede the lawful functioning of the criminal justice process.

In my judgment, the Plaintiff has no right in law, in the manner pleaded, to interfere with an investigation already commenced, a criminal prosecution already in motion, or the constitutional exercise of prosecutorial discretion under Article 145 of the Federal Constitution. That proposition is central to the disposal of Enclosure 24 and, in practical effect, also confirms the untenability of the Plaintiff’s claim against D1 and D2 insofar as it depends upon attributing public acts of investigation and prosecution to private complainants. L. EFFECT INDICATED WITHDRAWAL

I now address the point that D3 and D7 were said to wish to withdraw Enclosure 24. In ordinary circumstances, a party may of course withdraw his own interlocutory application. However, the Court is not thereby precluded from addressing a fundamental defect that remains embedded in the pleading itself.

The Plaintiff’s reliefs against D3 to D8, particularly those in paragraph 47(a) to (c) of the Amended Statement of Claim, remained live on the face of the pleading. If Enclosure 24 were merely marked as withdrawn without any pronouncement on maintainability, the legally defective claim would remain intact despite its patent infirmity.

In the circumstances, and given the anterior nature of the legal question involved, the Court was justified in pronouncing upon the issue. This is not because the Court decides academic questions. It is because the Court must prevent its civil process from being used in a manner that is plainly misconceived and inconsistent with the structure of the law. M.

For all the reasons above, I find that the Plaintiff’s Amended Writ and Amended Statement of Claim are plainly unsustainable against the 1st and 2nd Defendants and likewise unsustainable against the 3rd to 8th Defendants.

As against D1 and D2, the claim discloses no reasonable cause of action, is scandalous, frivolous and vexatious, may prejudice or embarrass the fair trial of the action, and constitutes an abuse of process.

As against D3 to D8, the claim likewise discloses no reasonable cause of action and is scandalous. In particular, the Plaintiff has no sustainable private law basis, in the manner pleaded, to challenge or found liability upon the making or receipt of complaint, the conduct of investigation under statute, AMLA freezing and seizure action, or the exercise of prosecutorial discretion under Article 145 of the Federal Constitution. N.

Accordingly, this Court orders as follows: