Teh v Ceh (WA-24F-262-07/2022)

This was the Defendant-Wife’s application in enclosure 115 (“this Application”) pursuant to Order 52 rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 (“Rules of Court”) to cite the Plaintiff-Husband for contempt for having allegedly breached the terms of a court order dated 7 February 2023.

In the interest of privacy of the parties concerned and sensitivity of the issues, the Plaintiff and Defendant have been anonymised respectively as TEH and CEH, whilst the children of the marriage have been anonymised as YIN and MIN. The factual background [3] The Plaintiff, and Defendant (collectively “the Parties”), aged 46 and 43 respectively at the time of the hearing of this Application, were married in 2007 and were blessed with twins, a daughter, YIN, and son, MIN, born in October 2016 (“the Children”).

In February 2022, the Defendant and the Children left the matrimonial home claiming that the marriage had broken down due to the conduct to the Plaintiff.

According to a medical report dated 14 July 2022, MIN was diagnosed with ‘epilepsy, left hemiparesis with global developmental delay, Klinefelter syndrome and variant of unknown significance in HUWE1 gene.’

In July 2022, the Plaintiff filed a custody application, whilst the Defendant counterclaimed for the same in October 2022. In 8 September 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 3 February 2023, the Court granted sole custody, care and control to the Defendant whilst access was given to the Plaintiff (“the Court Order”). The terms of the Court Order read:

Bahawa Plaintif dan Defendan diberikan hak penjagaan secara bersama (joint guardianship) terhadap anak-anak mereka yang bernama YIN dan MIN (“Anak-Anak tersebut”) dan Defendan diberikan hak pemeliharaan dan pengawalan (custody, care, and control) terhadap Anak-Anak tersebut.

Plaintif diberikan akses Anak-Anak tersebut seperti berikut: a. akses melalui panggilan video (video call) pada tiap-tiap hari dari pukul 7 malam hingga 8 malam tetapi tidak melebihi 30 minit; b. akses bermalam tanpa mengawasan bermula pada hari Khamis dari pukul 4 petang hingga hari Isnin pukul 8 malam pada minggu yang berselang-seli; c. akses pada tiap-tiap hari Rabu dari pukul 4 petang hingga 8 malam; dan d. akses bermalam tanpa pengawasan bermula pada hari sebelum cuti umum dari pukul 4 petang hingga akhir cuti umum pada pukul 8 malam yang berselang-seli, bermula dengan Plaintif.

Sekiranya mana-mana pihak ingin bawa Anak-Anak tersebut keluar negara (overseas) pihak tersebut mesti memberi notis sebanyak 7 hari kepada pihak yang lain. Defendan akan menberi semua dokumen-dokumen berkenaan kepada Plaintif dan Plaintif memulangkan semua dokumen-dokumen berkenaan setelah pulang ke Malaysia. [7] In July 2023, the Plaintiff filed an application to vary the Court Order ("the Variation Application"). The hearing of the Variation Application was scheduled for 29 November 2023, following an adjournment requested by the Plaintiff. The adjournment was necessitated by the 8 September 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 4 Plaintiff's filing of additional applications, which he claimed were necessary for the hearing of the Variation Application. [8] During the hearing of the Variation Application, the Court was informed that the Plaintiff had lodged a police report against the Defendant, alleging sexual abuse of the Children. Consequently, the hearing was adjourned to 8 December 2023 to allow the Defendant time to review the police report and respond to the additional affidavits filed by the Plaintiff. [9] In the interim, the Defendant’s Counsel notified the Court by letter dated 29 November 2023 that the Defendant had provided a statement to the police in response to the Plaintiff's allegations of sexual abuse against the Children. [10] On 8 December 2023, the Court was informed that, despite being directed to do so, the Plaintiff's Counsel refused to provide a copy of the police report to the Defendant’s Counsel, citing instructions from the police not to disclose the report. As a result, the Court had to pause proceedings and summon the investigating officer, Inspector Maimun, and the officer from the Jabatan Kebajikan Malaysia (JKM), Puan Nor Azlina, to verify the Plaintiff's claim. It was also noted that the police report was used by the Plaintiff to secure an interim protection order (IPO) against the Defendant. [11] Contrary to what the Plaintiff had said, Inspector Maimun indicated to the Court that no such prohibition had been placed by the police on the Plaintiff or his Counsel from providing the police report to the Defendant. Given the Court's previous directive, the Plaintiff was 8 September 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 5 ordered to provide a copy of the police report to the Defendant by 6 pm that day, failing which he would be deemed in contempt of court. [12] In January 2024, the Defendant was granted leave to initiate committal proceedings against the Plaintiff for breaching the terms of the Court Order in the following manner: a) That the Plaintiff had failed to return the Children on the following dates and times, namely (i) 12 April 2023, (ii) 19 April 2023 and

(iii) 29 November 2023; and b) That the Plaintiff had failed to return the Children’s passports to the Defendant since March 2023. The issues [13] The issues for consideration were as follows, namely (a) whether there was inordinate delay in filing this Application; (b) whether the Plaintiff had willfully refused to comply with terms of the Court Order; (c) whether this Application was filed in bad faith; and (d) whether contempt had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. [14] This Application was allowed with costs for the following reasons. Contentions, evaluation, and findings Whether there was inordinate delay in filing this Application [15] At the outset, the Plaintiff contended that there was delay by the Defendant in filing this Application. 8 September 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 6 [16] I am mindful that, as a general rule, courts should not tolerate indolence on the part of the litigant. Courts are expected to promote the swift and efficient resolution of disputes, ensuring that all parties adhere to prescribed timelines and procedural requirements. When a party fails to act promptly or delays the proceedings without valid reason, it not only hampers the judicial process but may also negatively impact the opposing party. Consequently, courts are generally disinclined to excuse such delays unless there are compelling reasons for doing so. The judicial system places a high value on diligence and expediency, and any failure to meet these standards must be critically examined to determine whether it is excusable or warrants sanction. This was emphasised in several cases including Khor Cheng Wah v. Sungai Way Leasing Sdn Bhd [1997] 1 CLJ 396; [1996] 1 MLJ 223, and Tuan Haji Ahmed Abdul Rahman v. Arab-Malaysian Finance Bhd [1996] 1 CLJ 241; [1996] 1 MLJ 30. [17] However, in the present case, I was unable to accept the Plaintiff’s contention for the following reasons. Firstly, the issue of inordinate delay in the filing of this Application was not previously raised by the Plaintiff in his affidavit in reply, and had only been raised for the first time in his written submission. Premised on the cases of Samuel Naik Siang Ting v Public Bank Bhd [2015] 6 MLJ 1 and Arab Malaysian Bank Berhad v Lee Chiong Woo & Anor [2000] MLJU 750, the Plaintiff was estopped and/or barred from raising the issue of inordinate delay in the Plaintiff’s Written Submissions. [18] Secondly, in the present case, the breaches complained of were in March 2023, when he failed to return the Children’s passports, and April and November 2023, when he failed to return the Children 8 September 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 7 according to the terms of the Court Order. The ex-parte application to initiate committal proceedings was filed on 5 December 2023, and this Application on 11 January 2024. [19] In my view, even if the Plaintiff had pleaded the issue of inordinate delay on the part of the Defendant in filing this Application, there was no basis for such contention. Whether there was wilful refusal on part of Plaintiff to comply with terms of the Court Order [20] The first two breaches complained of were that the Plaintiff had failed to return the Children to the Defendant at the dates and times stipulated in Court Order as follows:

On 12 April 2023, the Plaintiff failed to return YIN to the Defendant at 8 pm;

On 19 April 2023, the Plaintiff failed to return MIN to the Defendant at 8 pm. [21] The Plaintiff argued that his failure to return the Children on both occasions was not due to any intentional act of defiance or disregard of the agreed-upon arrangements. Instead, he maintained that unforeseen and urgent medical emergencies arose, which required immediate attention and rendered him unable to comply with the scheduled return times. [22] On the first occasion of non-compliance, the Plaintiff claimed that YIN had suddenly developed a high fever, which caused serious concern for the child’s health and well-being. Recognising the situation, the 8 September 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 8 Plaintiff claimed that he had promptly taken YIN to Pantai Hospital, for professional care. Upon arrival, YIN's condition warranted admission for further observation and treatment. The Plaintiff argued that this medical emergency was beyond his control, thereby justifying the delay in returning the child. [23] On the second occasion of non-compliance, the Plaintiff claimed that MIN had contracted viral conjunctivitis. Concerned about the potential spread of the infection and the discomfort it was causing MIN, the Plaintiff claimed that he had acted unilaterally to secure the necessary medical care and treatment. [24] The Plaintiff contended that as a responsible guardian, he was obligated to prioritise the health and safety of the Children, above all else. He asserted that addressing their medical conditions promptly, without delay, was not only necessary but also a reasonable exercise of his guardianship duties. He argued that his actions were guided by a duty of care and a genuine concern for the Children’s well-being. The Plaintiff emphasised that in light of the medical emergencies that arose, it was both prudent and appropriate for him to take immediate steps to secure medical attention, underscoring that any reasonable person in his position would have acted similarly under such circumstances. He further argued that his decisions were consistent with his legal and moral responsibilities as a guardian, focusing on protecting the Children from potential harm and ensuring their swift recovery from the medical issues they faced. He invoked section 3 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1961 (“Guardianship of Infants Act 1961”), which outlines the duties and rights of a guardian in protecting the welfare of the children. The provision reads: 8 September 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 9 Section 3 – Duties of guardian of a person The guardian of the person of an infant shall have the custody of the infant, and shall be responsible for his support, health, and education. [Emphasis added.] [25] In my view, the Plaintiff's contention was untenable and without merit. While it is undeniable that, as the father, the Plaintiff had a duty to ensure the health and well-being of the Children, he also bore a clear and fundamental responsibility to promptly inform the Defendant of any circumstances that caused a delay in returning the Children, especially when those circumstances involved medical emergencies. [26] The need for such communication was paramount, given that the Defendant holds sole custody, care, and control of the Children, as explicitly established by the Court Order. This arrangement placed an additional obligation on the Plaintiff to ensure that the Defendant was immediately made aware of any developments that could affect the Children's return. Moreover, the Defendant's status as a joint guardian reinforced her legal and rightful entitlement to be fully informed about the Children's whereabouts, health, and well-being at all times. The Plaintiff's failure to communicate such critical information not only disregarded the Defendant's custodial rights but also undermined the legal framework established to protect the best interests of the Children. [27] It was also pertinent to remind the Plaintiff that, as a joint guardian, the Defendant possessed equal parental rights and responsibilities 8 September 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 10 concerning the Children, in accordance with section 5 of the Guardianship of Infants Act. The provision reads: Section 5 – Equality of parental rights

In relation to the custody and upbringing of an infant …. a mother shall have the same rights and authority as the law allows to a father, and the rights and authority of the mother and father shall be equal.

The mother of an infant shall have the like powers of applying to the court in respect of any matter affecting the infant as are possessed by the father. [Emphasis added.] [28] The Plaintiff's failure to acknowledge and respect these equal parental rights was a significant oversight. By not informing the Defendant of the delays caused by the medical emergencies, the Plaintiff disregarded her entitlement to be involved in decisions affecting the Children’s welfare. The statutory framework provided by the Guardianship of Infants Act underscored the importance of cooperation and communication between both guardians to safeguard the best interests of the Children. In this context, the Plaintiff's actions not only contravened the spirit of joint guardianship as intended by the legislation but also undermined the Defendant's legal standing as an equal partner in all matters concerning the Children's care, custody, and control. [29] The Plaintiff's failure to communicate with the Defendant about the Children's situation constituted not only a serious breach of his parental duties but also inflicted considerable emotional distress upon the Defendant. As a mother with sole custody, her natural and rightful 8 September 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 11 concern for the Children’s safety was compounded by the uncertainty and lack of information regarding their location and condition. This lack of communication left her in a state of helplessness, forcing her to grapple with unnecessary fear and anxiety about the well-being of her Children. The Plaintiff’s actions effectively deprived the Defendant of her legal right to be informed and involved in critical decisions affecting the Children’s welfare, further aggravating her distress and undermining the principles of joint guardianship. [30] The Plaintiff’s lack of transparency was wholly unjustifiable, particularly given the ease with which he could have fulfilled his obligation by simply informing the Defendant of the circumstances. The situation was further exacerbated by the fact that MIN's health was already compromised, which heightened the urgency for clear and timely communication [31] The third instance of the Plaintiff's breach of the Court Order occurred on 29 November 2023. On that morning, a hearing was scheduled to address the Variation Application. During the hearing of the Variation Application, the Court was informed that the Plaintiff had lodged a police report against the Defendant, alleging sexual abuse of the Children. However, despite being legally obligated to do so, the Plaintiff refused to furnish the Defendant with a copy of the police report, which contained the allegations made against her. This refusal effectively prevented the Defendant from understanding the nature of the accusations and from responding to such allegations. As a result, the Court adjourned the matter to 8 December 2023, specifically instructing the Plaintiff to provide the police report to the Defendant. It 8 September 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 12 was only after further explicit directions from the Court on the adjourned date that the Plaintiff finally complied and shared the report. [32] In the interim, on 29 November 2023, the Children underwent a medical examination. The Defendant, however, despite being their joint guardian, was barred from accompanying the Children during the examination. The Plaintiff, on the other hand, was granted unrestricted access to the Children throughout this period. This differential treatment further exacerbated the situation, leaving the Defendant in a position of helplessness and concern. [33] Adding to the gravity of the situation, the Defendant's repeated and urgent requests for the return of the Children were blatantly ignored by the Plaintiff. It was not until 20 December 2023 that the police concluded their investigation, deciding not to pursue any further action against the Defendant. This decision strongly implied that the allegations of abuse lacked any credible evidence. [34] It was crucial to underscore that at no point, whatsoever, was the Defendant informed by the police or any other relevant authority that the Children were prohibited from being returned to her custody. The absence of such a notification was significant because it established that there was no legal basis or directive preventing the Defendant from regaining custody of the Children. Despite this, the Plaintiff chose to take unilateral action by refusing to return the Children, even in the face of the Defendant’s repeated and consistent requests. This refusal was not only unjustified and unwarranted, but also a clear violation of the Defendant’s legal rights as a parent or guardian. 8 September 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 13 [35] Moreover, the Plaintiff’s actions were conducted without any apparent legal authority or support, effectively disregarding the established legal processes and the rights of the Defendant. By acting independently and without the necessary legal backing, the Plaintiff undermined the fundamental principles of fairness and due process. Such behaviour is particularly concerning as it disrupted the rightful custodial arrangements which could have had significant emotional and psychological consequences for the Children involved. [36] In my view, this incident represented yet another flagrant breach of the Court Order by the Plaintiff. His refusal to return the Children, despite clear legal obligations, was not only a violation of the Court Order but also a deliberate and calculated act. It became evident that the police report he lodged had no substantial basis. The only reasonable inference that this Court could draw from his conduct was that he had intentionally sought to deprive the Defendant of access to the Children, using unsubstantiated allegations as a means to achieve this aim. This behaviour underscored a pattern of contempt for the Court's authority and disregard for the rights of the Defendant, further damaging the trust and cooperation that should exist between co-parents in the best interest of the Children. [37] The fourth instance of the Plaintiff's breach of the Court Order involved his failure to return the Children’s passports, despite a clear obligation to do so. According to the Plaintiff's own solicitors, as outlined in a letter dated 15 February 2023, the passports were to be promptly returned to the Defendant after the Children’s trip to Singapore for a medical check-up. This commitment was not fulfilled, as the Plaintiff failed to return the passports within the agreed timeframe. 8 September 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 14 [38] Instead, the Children’s passports were only handed over to the Defendant’s solicitors on 15 March 2024, which was almost a full year later, and only after the Defendant had filed this Application. The Plaintiff's claim that this significant delay was merely an oversight was not only unconvincing, but also unacceptable. Given the nearly twelve-month gap between the promised return date and the actual return of the passports, it was evident that this was not a simple error or misunderstanding. It was wilful refusal to comply with the terms of the Court Order. [39] This prolonged delay suggested a wilful disregard for the terms of the Court Order and the rights of the Defendant. The Plaintiff’s failure to return the passports in a timely manner effectively restricted the Defendant’s ability to make decisions regarding the Children’s travel and other important matters that require possession of the passports. Such conduct undermined the spirit of cooperation that was essential in co-parenting arrangements and reflected a continued pattern of non-compliance with court-mandated obligations by the Plaintiff. This behaviour further eroded the trust necessary for the proper execution of shared parenting responsibilities and demonstrates a persistent disregard for the legal processes intended to protect the best interests of the Children [40] This Court is mindful that contempt must be based on willful refusal to comply with an order of the Court. This is based particularly on the words of Lee Hun Hoe (Borneo) CJ, where in citing the case of Fairclough & Sons v. Manchester Ship Cane Co. (No 2) [1897] WN 7 in TO Thomas v Asia Fishing Industry Pte Ltd [1977] 1 LNS 126 Ltd [1977] 1 MLJ 151 (“TO Thomas”), his Lordship had stated that ‘an order 8 September 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 15 of court must have been contumaciously disregarded. It is no good if it is casual, accidental and unintentional.’ [41] In my view, however, ‘intention’ referred to by Lee Hun Hoe (Borneo) CJ in TO Thomas was addressed in the context of clarity and unambiguity of an order of the court. In the present case, the terms of the Court Order, which the Plaintiff in the present case was fully aware of, were crystal clear. [42] In any event, in TO Thomas, it was further stated by Lee Hun Hoe (Borneo) CJ, in the following passage: Intention is of no consequence in the matter of contempt by disobedience to a court order: A-G v. Walthamstow Urban District Council; [1895] 11 TLR

Stancomb v. Trowbridge Urban District Council [1910] 2 Ch. 190. In particular, Donovan LJ expressed his view clearly in Re A-G's Application, A-G v. Butterworth [1963] 1 QB 696 in these words: - I conceive the position, however, to be this. Regina v. Odham's Press Ltd [1957] 1 QB 73 ex parte A-G [1956] 3 All ER 494 makes it clear that an intention to interfere with the proper administration of justice is not an essential ingredient of the offence of contempt of court. It is enough if the action complained of is inherently likely so to interfere. [Emphasis added.] [43] My attention was also brought to the case of Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd v. Monatech (M) Sdn Bhd [2001] 4 MLJ 577 where it was held that ‘mens rea is not an ingredient to be proved in contempt proceedings’ and that ‘the corollary of there being no necessity to prove mens rea is that lack of intention does not prevent an alleged contemnor from being found guilty of contempt’. Thus, the Plaintiff’s intention or lack of it, would not negate his conduct which amounted to contempt of court. 8 September 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 16 Whether this Application was filed in bad faith [44] The Plaintiff contended that this Application was filed mala fide as it smacked of ‘vindictiveness rather than enforcement’, especially since the Children were eventually returned to the Defendant on 16 April 2023, 24 April 2023, and 20 December 2023 respectively. [45] I was unable to accept the contention of the Plaintiff as the fact remains that he had blatantly disregarded and wilfully breached the terms of access in the Court Order without informing the Defendant of the whereabouts of the Children when he did not return the Children at the appointed time or as soon as practicable thereafter. The Plaintiff had evidently failed to provide cogent and/or convincing mitigating factors in this affidavit in reply, to justify his breach of the terms of access in the Court Order. [46] My attention was drawn to the pronouncement made by Raja Azlan Shah J (as his Lordship then was) in the case of Boon & Cheah Steel Pipes Sdn Bhd v Asia Insurance Co Ltd & Ors [1973] 1 MLJ 101, where it was stated: It is therefore unnecessary to do more than refer to the latest authority on the point i.e. the case of Margaronis Navigation Agency Ltd v Henry W Peabody & Co of London Ltd [1965] 2 QB 430, where Mr. Mustill himself appeared before the Court of Appeal. Mr. Gratiaen too has placed much reliance on that case. I think I can say without fear of contradiction that a principle to be gleaned from that case is that the de minimis rule is a rule of general application and its scope must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. It matters not that it is used as a shield or as a sword; the court must consider the substance of the matter and will not regard or give effect to something of a trivial and negligible nature. In that case, no attempt was made to give an exhaustive classification of the cases where the principle should be applied. Indeed it would be wrong to do so. [Emphasis added.] 8 September 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 17 [47] In reaching the conclusion that this Application was far from trivial, it was necessary to consider the deeply entrenched and highly contentious relationship between the Parties. The conflict between them has been both prolonged and exceptionally hostile, creating a volatile environment that has significantly complicated the existing custody arrangements. This enduring hostility has fostered an atmosphere of ongoing animosity, which appeared to have had a detrimental effect on the overall well-being and emotional stability of the Children involved. [48] The Parties had been engaged in a relentless pattern of behaviour aimed at undermining one another, with each side consistently levelling serious accusations against the other. These allegations have ranged from claims of neglect – suggesting a failure to provide adequate care and support for the Children—to more severe and damaging assertions of parental incompetence, and even allegations of sexual abuse. The persistence and severity of these accusations have not only deepened the divide between the Parties but have also created a toxic dynamic that has rendered any form of effective co-parenting nearly impossible. [49] It was evident, therefore, that the Plaintiff had willfully breached the terms of the Court Order. Despite the explanations and justifications put forth, the Plaintiff's actions demonstrate a clear disregard for the legal obligations set by the Court. The Court Order was explicit in its requirements, including the precise dates and times for the return of the Children to the Defendant. 8 September 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 18 [50] The Plaintiff had also displayed a vary cavalier attitude towards the Court Order and his failure to comply with these terms was not the result of mere oversight or unavoidable circumstances, but rather a conscious decision to prioritise other concerns over the Court's directives. [51] The nature of the issues raised in this Application, combined with the lack of any evidence suggesting bad faith, underscored its seriousness and the genuine need for judicial intervention. This reinforced the conclusion that this Application merited careful consideration and should not be dismissed lightly or treated as an attempt to manipulate the legal system for improper purposes. Whether contempt had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt [52] It was crucial to remind Parties that the Court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged contemnor had indeed breached the terms of the Court Order. This principle was firmly established in several cases including Re Bramblevale Ltd [1970] 1 Ch 125, Segar Restu (M) Sdn Bhd v Wong Kai Chuan & Anor [1993] 4 CLJ 177, and Tan Sri Dato' (Dr) Rozali Ismail v. Lim Pang Cheong @ George Lim & Ors [2012] 2 CLJ 849. It serves as a fundamental safeguard to ensure that contempt proceedings are conducted with the highest degree of fairness and accuracy. The rigorous burden of proof ensures that only those who have willfully and unmistakably violated a court order are held accountable, preserving the integrity of judicial processes and protect individuals from unjust penalties. In Tan Sri Dato' (Dr) Rozali Ismail v. Lim Pang Cheong @ George Lim & Ors, it was stated by Arifin Zakaria CJ in the following passages: 8 September 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 19 [24] Contempt of court has traditionally been classified as being either criminal or civil… One thing is clear, be it civil or criminal contempt, the standard of proof required in either type is the same, which is beyond reasonable doubt. [Emphasis added] [53] In the present case, the Defendant had successfully proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Plaintiff was in contempt of court. The evidence presented clearly demonstrated that the Plaintiff had wilfully disregarded the terms of the Court Order, thereby violating the Court's authority. Given the established contempt, the next critical issue before the Court was determining the appropriate sanction to be imposed for the Plaintiff's non-compliance. [54] At this juncture, it is essential to remind both Parties that the fundamental jurisprudence and rationale behind contempt of court are not meant to serve as a means of personal retribution for the aggrieved party, nor are they intended solely to vindicate the dignity of the Court. In this instance, this Application should not be viewed as an opportunity for personal redress or as a means to gain leverage over the Plaintiff. [55] Contempt of court is designed to prevent any actions that could impede or interfere with the fair and orderly administration of justice, thereby protecting the public’s interest in the effective functioning of the legal system. The integrity of the Court must be maintained, not for the sake of the Court's prestige, but to ensure that the rule of law is respected and that Court orders are obeyed without exception. [56] I also found instructive the case of Lee Chang Yong v Teng Wai Yee [2017] MLJU 1841, where it was stated: 8 September 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 20 The object of the law of contempt is not to protect Judges and their dignity but to protect the rights of the public by ensuring that the administration of justice is not obstructed or prevented. To constitute contempt of court, there must be some “act done, or writing published calculated to bring a Court or Judge of the Court into contempt or to lower his authority” or “calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process of the Courts”. [Emphasis added.] Conclusion [57] In conclusion, after a meticulous and judicious consideration of all the evidence presented before this Court, along with the arguments put forth by Counsel, this Application was allowed with costs. [58] The power of this Court to punish the Plaintiff for contempt of court is found in article 126 of the Federal Constitution, and section 13 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, both of which read: Federal Constitution Article 126 – Power to punish for contempt The Federal Court, the Court of Appeal or a High Court shall have power to punish any contempt of itself. ****** Courts of Judicature Act 1964 Section 13 - Contempt The Federal Court, the Court of Appeal and the High Court shall have power to punish any contempt of itself. 8 September 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 21 [59] The Plaintiff was, therefore, fined a total of MYR4,000 for all four breaches of the terms of the Court Order, which the Plaintiff was ordered to pay within seven days from today, that is 28 June 2024, failing which a two-day imprisonment term will be imposed on the Plaintiff. Dated: 8 September 2024 SIGNED …………………………………………. (EVROL MARIETTE PETERS) Judge High Court, Kuala Lumpur Counsel: For the Plaintiff – Tan Ai Vee; Messrs Hisham Yoong-KC Lim For the Defendant – Trevor Padasian and Wan Nabil Ikram; Messrs Skrine Cases referred to: ➢ Boon & Cheah Steel Pipes Sdn Bhd v Asia Insurance Co Ltd & Ors [1973] 1 MLJ 101 ➢ Fairclough & Sons v. Manchester Ship Cane Co. (No 2) [1897] WN 7 ➢ Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd v. Monatech (M) Sdn Bhd [2001] 4 MLJ 577 8 September 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… _______________________________________________________________________ 22 ➢ Khor Cheng Wah v. Sungai Way Leasing Sdn Bhd [1997] 1 CLJ 396; [1996] 1 MLJ 223 ➢ Lee Chang Yong v Teng Wai Yee [2017] MLJU 1841 ➢ Re Bramblevale Ltd [1970] 1 Ch 125 ➢ Samuel Naik Siang Ting v Public Bank Bhd [2015] 6 MLJ 1 and Arab Malaysian Bank Berhad v Lee Chiong & Anor [2000] MLJU 750 ➢ Segar Restu (M) Sdn Bhd v Wong Kai Chuan & Anor [1993] 4 CLJ 177 ➢ Tan Sri Dato' (Dr) Rozali Ismail v. Lim Pang Cheong @ George Lim & Ors [2012] 2 CLJ 849 ➢ TO Thomas v Asia Fishing Industry Pte Ltd [1977] 1 LNS 126 Ltd [1977] 1 MLJ 151 ➢ Tuan Haji Ahmed Abdul Rahman v. Arab-Malaysian Finance Bhd [1996] 1 CLJ 241; [1996] 1 MLJ 30 Legislation referred to: ➢ Courts of Judicature Act 1964 – section 13 ➢ Federal Constitution – article 126 ➢ Guardianship of Infants Act 1961 – sections 3 and 5 ➢ Rules of Court 2012 – Order 52