Where an award directs a sum to be paid, that sum shall, unless the award otherwise directs, carry interest as from the date of the award and at the same rate as a judgment debt. [25] Section 31 (1) AA 2005 expressly stipulates that an Award must be made in writing and further provides as stated under Section 33 (3) of the same Act that an Award shall state the reasons upon which it is based. The only exceptions are if the parties agree that no reasons ought or need to be given or the award is an award on agreed terms under Section 32 AA 2005. [26] The learned High Court Judge however, opined that since there is no expressed provision in the Act as to when a written award is to be delivered, in particular where bifurcation of proceedings is adopted the Arbitrator cannot be compelled to deliver his decision prior to the completion of the arbitration proceeding which in this case would be until the completion of the assessment of damages. Therefore, in the absence of any provision in the Act, the failure of an Arbitrator to deliver one final award after the completion of the arbitration proceedings is not a violation of the Act. The Act does not have any restriction if the Arbitrator decides to deliver an oral decision. Furthermore, the subject matter of the oral decision does not fulfil the criteria of an award in so far as the form and content as stipulated in Section 33 of the Act. [27] The learned Judge further reasoned that it was premature for Telekom even to speculate that its rights would be infringed. Furthermore, Telekom did not raise any complaint before the Arbitrator that they could not proceed with the hearing on quantum because there was no written award published by the Arbitrator. [28] Her Ladyship was of the considered view that the continuation of the arbitration proceeding in relation to the quantum of damages would not be oppressive, vexatious and unconscionable. Restraining the arbitration proceeding would delay the hearing of the assessment of damages and the arbitration proceedings which commenced in 2016. Furthermore, there must be minimal intervention by the Court as stipulated in the AA 2005. Premised on the reasons stated above, the equitable relief sought for injunction was refused. The burden is on Telekom to show special circumstances which warrant this court to exercise its discretion to grant a stay. Telekom failed to do so, and thus the application was dismissed. [29] The pertinent question for determination before this Court deals with a fundamental point of importance in an arbitration commenced under AA 2005 and the Rules 2021. In essence, whether an oral decision by an Arbitral Tribunal on liability is a decision on the substance of a dispute is a valid decision within the meaning of the Act and the Rules. [30] On 16.7.2020, the Arbitrator informed the parties there was no requirement for an award to be published after he had delivered his oral decision on liability. The Arbitrator opined that the practice in the High Courts should be followed, where a written judgment is only published at the conclusion of the hearing on quantum. The issue is whether to constitute a valid decision on the substance of a dispute, in this case, on liability, must the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal /Arbitrator be delivered in the form of an 'Award', within the meaning of Section 33 of the AA 2005. [31] The provision of Section 2 of AA 2005 is plain and unambiguous that is, the decision of an Arbitrator on the "substance of the dispute" constitutes an Award whether it is a final, interim or partial award and any award on costs or interest. However, as the law expressly provides it does not include interlocutory orders. Interlocutory orders by the Arbitrator deal with procedural issues such as scheduling of hearings, security for costs, and discovery etc. In his book UNCITRAL Model Law & Arbitration Rules, The Arbitration Act 2005 (Amended 2011 & 2018) and The AIAC Arbitration Rules 2018 (Sweet & Maxwell 2018) pp. 57 and 58, Datuk Professor Sundra Rajoo explained that the definition of 'award' in Section 2 lays down the test to be employed by courts in ascertaining whether an arbitral tribunal's decision is an award, interlocutory order or otherwise. The important test is that the decision must relate to the substance of the dispute. The main purpose of the test is to distinguish awards from procedural orders. An Award as defined under the Act must relate to the substantive legal rights and duties of the parties. [32] Therefore, an order of a procedural nature is not an Award as envisaged under the Act. An Award can either be final, interim or partial, and, irrespective of the type of Award, the Award must necessarily have the effect of finality on the issue it disposes. In the appeal before us the determinative issue decided by the Arbitrator is that of the liability of the parties to the dispute. [33] His Lordship KC Vohrah J (as he then was) in MCIS Insurance Bhd v Associated Cover Sdn Bhd [2001] 2MLJ 561 referred to Halsbury's Laws of Singapore, Vol. 2 at 83, para [20.095] that an award is final in its terms in that in so far as it relates to the issues decided therein it is final whatever one might call the award. The relevant passage reads as follows: [20.095] 'Interim', 'partial' and 'interlocutory' The terms 'interim', 'partial' and 'interlocutory' have no statutory definition. All awards are final in their terms in that in so far as relating to the issues decided therein, they are final. In practice, the term 'interim award' is generally used to describe any award that is not final (last) award in the arbitration. Decisions on issues of the applicable proper law, time-bar defences, joinder of parties and arbitral jurisdiction have been described as interim awards, as have awards made on part of the claims only, either on the basis of admission or following a decision of a part only of the issues in dispute. The terms 'partial award' is sometimes used to describe awards on part of the claims only. An interlocutory award would normally be an award that deals with certain issues such as liability (being final on the issue) leaving quantum to be further assessed. Partial awards and interlocutory awards could also be termed 'interim awards'. An award dealing with all the issues in the claim and the counterclaim but leaving the issue of costs to be argued is nevertheless often termed an interim award. [34] Section 33(1) AA 2005 mandates that the Award must be made in writing. If the Award is not in writing, it cannot be enforced, set aside or even form the basis for reference of law. In this case, on the facts the Arbitrator has decided on liability which means that he has decided issues relating to a substantive dispute on liability. As far as liability is concerned, it is final and binding. [35] The Singapore Court of Appeal in PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) v Dexia Bank SA [2006] SGCA 41 held that the nomenclature or label used by the Arbitral Tribunal to describe its decision is irrelevant. What is important is whether the decision delivered by the Arbitrator is a decision on the substance of the dispute. The words 'substance of the dispute' distinguish procedural and practical matters on one hand, and substantive matters affecting the rights of the parties on the other. It must be contrasted with orders and directions that address the procedural aspects of arbitration. [36] Under the Model Law, there is no concept of an arbitral tribunal delivering a decision on the substance of dispute, in any form other than an award. It is unarguable that an arbitral tribunal's decision on liability is a decision on the substance of the dispute as it determines a substantive issue between parties to the arbitration, and the parties' legal rights and obligations. Any other interpretation would be absurd. The Arbitrator's decision to bifurcate the proceedings does not in any manner absolve him from the provisions of the Act. Thus, he must comply with the provisions of the Act mandating him as an Arbitrator that when he delivers his decision on liability that decision is an Award under which can be enforced under section 38 of the Act. The argument that it was not an Award as the issue of quantum had yet to be determined is untenable. Article 34 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules provides that the arbitral tribunal may make separate awards on different issues at different times. However, Awards must be made in writing and shall be final and binding on the parties. The arbitral tribunal shall state the reasons upon which the award is based unless the parties have agreed that no reasons are to be given. Therefore, any decision of an arbitral tribunal, in this case, the Arbitrator on the substance of a dispute which does not comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 33 of the Act must be regarded as being invalid. [37] Section 33(1) of the AA 2005 excludes the possibility of the Arbitrator making an oral award. An Award other than in the form prescribed in the section will necessarily be invalid. Once again, we have to examine the provisions of AA 2005. The AA 2005 does not recognise an oral award as being an Award as there is no expressed provision enabling an Arbitrator to give an oral decision on matters which are the substance of the dispute. Thus, a decision on matters which are the substance of the dispute must be an Award and that Award must be in writing and duly signed. The form and contents of the award must satisfy the requirements as provided under Section 33 of the AA 2005 notwithstanding the decision by the Arbitrator to bifurcate the proceedings. [38] Datuk Professor Sundra Rajoo in his book Law, Practice and Procedure of Arbitration $ (2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ edn, LexisNexis 2016) p. 580 said: Most arbitral institution rules do require the award to be in writing. The writing requirement has not given rise to any dispute in Malaysia and Singapore...Conversely, no arbitral tribunal will attempt to render an oral award in the style of the court rendering its decision orally or reading out its judgment. The old common law rule which permitted oral awards is no longer applicable. The Arbitration Act 2005 does not apply to oral awards. [39] He further explains in his book that the classification of an arbitral tribunal's decision as an award or otherwise is important as it will determine whether such a decision is enforceable or susceptible to intervention by the Courts or whether it is binding on parties and the arbitral tribunal; and finally, the extent of which an arbitral tribunal can validly recall or vary such decision. [40] Section 2 of AA 2005 expressly excludes 'interlocutory orders' from the definition of Awards. 'Interlocutory orders' by the Arbitral Tribunal deal with procedural issues such as scheduling hearings, security for costs, and discovery etc. An Award must be interpreted to mean a "final determination of a particular issue or claim in the arbitration and must be contrasted with orders and directions which address the procedural aspects in an arbitration proceeding. The oral decision by the Arbitrator in the appeal before us is clearly not an interlocutory order but a final determination on liability in the dispute between Telekom and Obnet. [41] Section 8 AA 2005 reads: No court shall intervene in matters governed by this Act, except where so provided in this Act. [42] The statutory regime of AA 2005 intends minimal intervention by the Courts. Jeffery Tan, FCJ delivering the majority judgment of the Federal Court in Far East Holding Bhd. & Anor v Majlis Ugama Islam Dan Adat Resam Melayu Pahang & Other Appeals [2018] 1 CLJ 693; [2018] 1 MLJ 1 observed: The principle of minimal interference by the court, which is an ingrained aspect of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, is reflected in s. 8. That principle was accepted in Perwira Bintang, Government Of The Lao People's Democratic Republic v. Thai-lao Lignite Co Ltd ("TLL"), A Thai Company & Anor [2013] CLJU 83; [2013] 1 LNS 83; [2014] 2 AMR 375, Ajwa For Food Industries, Taman Bandar Baru Masai Sdn Bhd. V. Dindings Corporations Sdn Bhd [2010] 5 CLJ 83, Rmarine Engineering (M) Sdn Bhd.v. Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd. [2012] 7 CLJ 540, and Chain Cycle. The model law requires recognition of the principles of party autonomy, minimal court intervention and international harmonisation of laws. [43] To ensure minimal intervention or ideally no intervention at all by the courts, the AA 2005 sets out the procedures which must be followed and complied with not only by the Arbitrator but also by the parties involved in the arbitration. Under the AA 2005 an Award by an Arbitrator whether interim or final must be in writing giving reasons for its decision. Generally, the Courts will not intervene in arbitral proceedings which is the domain of the arbitrator. There is also no requirement under the AA 2005 and the Rules 2021 that empowers an Arbitral Tribunal to mimic or adopt Court procedures as what happened in this appeal before us. The Arbitrator must, therefore,at all times comply strictly with the provisions of the AA 2005. [44] We, therefore, agree with the arguments advanced by learned counsel for Telekom that having found that the Arbitrator's decision on liability amounts to a decision on the "substance of the dispute", the High Court and Court of Appeal ought to have held the decision must be published in the form of an award as mandatorily required by Sections 2 and 33 AA 2005 for it to be valid and have any legal effect. The High Court and Court of Appeal erred in holding that the Act does not prescribe a timeline for an award to be published and that the Arbitrator can publish an award on liability at the end of arbitral proceedings. [45] After giving much consideration to this issue, we are satisfied that there is a good deal of substance in the argument put forward by learned counsel for Telekom that a decision on liability is a decision on the substance of the dispute and thus an Award under the Act. We reiterate that the AA 2005 excludes the possibility of the Arbitrator delivering an oral Award. Undeniably, the Arbitrator is the master of the arbitration proceedings and can decide to bifurcate the proceedings or otherwise. However, the provisions of the AA 2005 must be strictly complied and the Arbitrator must carry out his functions and duties as expressly required under the Act. The Arbitrator is required to give a sufficiently reasoned Award to demonstrate the reasons for the decision and more importantly, as a prerequisite for any appeal against the arbitral tribunal's decision. Further with a written Award, there will be certainty for the parties to proceed with the next stage of the arbitration. Thus, any failure to comply is a violation of the Act and will taint any decision made by an Arbitrator. [46] Without a valid decision on liability, the parties to the dispute and the Arbitral Tribunal cannot proceed with the assessment of damages. The AA 2005 does not give the discretion to defer or delay publication of an award. Furthermore, the publication of an award on liability is necessary to ensure the Arbitral Tribunal is functus officio on the issue of liability. [47] As alluded to earlier, the decision on the substance of the dispute must be published in the form of an Award, as mandatorily required by Sections 2 and 33 AA 2005, for it to be valid and have any legal effect. The moment the Arbitrator delivers his decision as what had transpired in this appeal before us, the Arbitrator is functus officio on the issue of liability. Had the High Court Judge carefully examined the provisions of the AA 2005, she could not have concluded that an Arbitrator can deliver an oral decision. [48] In conclusion, and based on the reasons we have articulated, the oral pronouncement made by the Arbitrator on liability is the final determination on liability. Henceforth, the Arbitrator must comply with the requirements of the AA 2005 and must publish a written Award. Injunction [49] Injunctions can be granted to restrain arbitration in situations where: It does not cause any injustice to the parties in an arbitration and where if an injunction is not granted the continuance of the arbitration would be oppressive, vexatious, unconscionable or an abuse of process. The Federal Court in Jaya Sudhir a/l Jayaram v Nautical Supreme Sdn Bhd & Ors [2019] 5 MLJ 1 approved the higher threshold test as stated in J Jarvis and Sons Ltd v Blue Circle Dartford Estates Ltd to injunct an arbitration as follows: The J. Jarvis line of cases, parties seeking an injunction to restrain arbitration proceedings are the contracting parties to the arbitration agreement. This feature and distinction are crucial. In such cases, where a party to arbitral proceedings seeks to restrain the continuance of the arbitration proceedings a higher or different test or threshold imposed would be a logical and sensible requirement given the contractual obligations entered into by the party seeking to restrain the arbitral proceedings. [50] Learned counsel for Telekom argued that Telekom has a statutory right to immediately apply to set aside an award on liability under Section 37 AA 2005 without waiting for the assessment of damages to be heard. Obnet's insistence on assessing damages without an award of liability is, therefore, a plain denial of Telekom's rights under the Act. [51] We have given our utmost consideration to the submissions of learned counsels as well as the authorities cited and, we have carefully perused the grounds of judgment of the learned judge we are satisfied that the balance of convenience lies in favour of Telekom to safeguard their rights under the Act. [52] The Arbitrator had delivered his decision on liability and must provide as mandated by the Act a written Award before commencing the assessment of damages. We agree with the submissions of learned counsel for Telekom that without an award on liability, it would be a plain denial of Telekom's rights under the AA 2005. An interim injunction is, therefore, necessary to restrain Obnet from taking any further steps to proceed with the arbitration proceedings and that the arbitration proceedings be stayed pending the issuance of a written Award. Conclusion [53] Having carefully considered the submissions and authorities of all parties and based on the aforementioned reasons and in the light of the above settled principles we found merits in the issues raised by the Appellant. We, therefore, allow the appeal with costs to Telekom as the Appellant. We set aside the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the High Court. [54] We answer the question posed before us in the following manner. Where an Arbitral Tribunal, in this case, the Arbitrator, directs proceedings to be bifurcated, an oral pronouncement on liability by the Arbitrator is a decision on the substance of dispute between the parties. However, it does not entitle the Arbitrator to proceed with the determination of quantum until a written Award on liability is given as mandatorily required under the AA 2005. We hereby make the following orders as prayed by the Appellant in the OS (Encl. 34 in the Common Core Bundle Vol. 1):