Content
1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) SUIT NO: WA-22NCC-510-11/2021 BETWEEN TEMPERLITE INSULATION SDN BHD (Company No: 227465-T) ...PLAINTIFF AND AMGENERAL INSURANCE BERHAD (Company No: 44191-P) … DEFENDANT
WA-22NCC-510-11/2021
High Court of Malaysia17 Jun 2025
The written judgment as the court issued it, with the coram, case number, and source links. Every paragraph has its own anchor.
Citations and treatment detected automatically from later judgments and the authorities this decision relies on.
Later cases and laws citing this decision
Not yet cited by a later decision.
Earlier cases and laws this decision relies on
“s may shift back again to the plaintiff...”. [42] It is my view that the Defendant has failed to discharge the evidential burden to prove delivery despite bearing the burden under Section 103 of the Evidence Act 1950. Adverse Inference Under Section 114(g) [43] Under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950, adverse inf”
Auto-detected from judgment text; not a substitute for a citator check.
Content
1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) SUIT NO: WA-22NCC-510-11/2021 BETWEEN TEMPERLITE INSULATION SDN BHD (Company No: 227465-T) ...PLAINTIFF AND AMGENERAL INSURANCE BERHAD (Company No: 44191-P) … DEFENDANT
1
This is an action by the Plaintiff against the Defendant for payment of an insurance claim under a Contractors' All Risk ("CAR") Policy No. GB-8-19-H-000192. The claim arises from a structural collapse that occurred on 22 July 2020 during construction works.
2
The Plaintiff seeks payment of RM1,775,845.50 being the amount claimed under the CAR Policy, together with interest, costs and other relief deemed fit by this Court.
3
The Defendant repudiated the claim primarily on the basis of Special Exclusion 1(c) contained in what the Defendant alleges to be the Policy Jacket that forms part of the insurance contract.
4
At the conclusion of the trial, I found in favour of the Plaintiff and allowed the claim.
5
The parties agreed to the following main triable issues for determination: a) Whether the Policy Jacket tendered in Court was referring to Policy Schedule No. GB819H000192 issued to the Plaintiff; b) Whether the Policy Jacket was ever given to the Plaintiff; c) Whether there was any complaint by the Plaintiff of not having knowledge of the contents of the Policy Jacket when the Defendant repudiated the claim; d) Whether the Policy Schedule and Policy Jacket formed the entire policy and whether the Plaintiff is bound by Special Exclusion 1(c); and e) Whether the Plaintiff has proven their claim for losses incurred and costs to rectify damages suffered.
6
Despite the issues agreed by the parties, it is my observation that the Plaintiff rests its case solely (not withstanding an alternative argument) on the issue of whether they were bound by Exclusion 1(c) contained in the Policy Jacket.
7
This case concerns an insurance dispute arising from a structural collapse during construction of a warehouse project in Sepang, Selangor. The Plaintiff, Temperlite Insulation Sdn. Bhd., seeks recovery of RM1,801,845.50 from the Defendant insurer under the CAR Policy following the collapse of a steel portal frame structure on 22 July 2020.
8
The Plaintiff was the owner of a construction project for a 2-storey warehouse building valued at RM3,500,000.00 with Amweld Jaya Sdn. Bhd. appointed as contractor and Malaysian Industrial Development Finance Berhad as financier. To protect against construction risks, the Plaintiff purchased CAR Policy No. GB-8-19- H-000192 from the Defendant, providing coverage of RM3,500,000.00 for the period from 1 December 2019 to 30 November 2020.
9
On 22 July 2020, when the construction project was approximately 70% complete with a certified value of RM2.37 million, a catastrophic structural collapse occurred. The evidence established that workers were engaged in installing roof purlins and horizontal bracing when the steel portal frame structure collapsed during heavy rain and strong winds. The collapse occurred while workers were 4 using a lever block to adjust the portal frame position, with possible causes identified as overtightening of the adjustment mechanism combined with adverse weather conditions.
10
Following the incident, the Plaintiff submitted a formal insurance claim for RM1,801,845.50, supported by comprehensive documentation including police reports, incident reports, photographic evidence and architect certifications. The Defendant initially engaged in standard claims processing procedures but ultimately repudiated the claim based on Special Exclusion 1(c) in what it alleged to be the Policy Jacket, contending that the collapse was due to faulty design rather than weather-related causes.
11
This claim pertains to claim amounting to RM1,775,845.50 which equates to the initial claim of RM1,801,845.50 less RM26,000.00 being the sum obtained as a result of a salvage exercise carried out by the adjusters, MSM International Adjusters (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd..
12
It is the case of the Plaintiff that they were only made aware of the Policy Schedule and not the Policy Jacket.
13
The Defendant however contended that the Policy Jacket was part of the CAR Policy and therefore the Plaintiff was bound by the terms contained in the said document, in particular clause 1(c). The Defendant therefore argued that there was a design flaw of the structure erected by the Plaintiff’s contractors which triggered clause 1(c) of the Policy Jacket. What is a Policy Jacket?
14
An insurance policy jacket is the main document that outlines the terms and conditions of an insurance contract. It is essentially a summary of the agreement between the insurer and the insured, specifying what is covered, what is excluded and other important details. It is the "umbrella" document that encompasses all the specific details and endorsements of the insurance policy. What is a Policy Schedule?
15
A policy schedule in an insurance contract is a document that outlines the specific details of the insurance coverage provided. It acts as a summary of the key aspects of the policy, such as the policyholder's information, the type of coverage, the sum insured, deductibles and the payment schedule. Essentially, it is a detailed record of what is insured and under what conditions.
16
It is therefore incumbent on this Court to determine if the Plaintiff can rely on the argument that they were not aware of the exclusion clause contained in Clause 1 (c) of the Policy Jacket as it was never furnished to them. Instead, they had at all times, relied on the Policy schedule as the only document that was binding between the parties.
17
Ultimately, this is a case of whether this Court believes the Plaintiff’s argument that they were never served with the said Policy Jacket and therefore were not aware of the design flaw exclusion.
a
Whether the Policy Jacket tendered in Court was referring to Policy Schedule No. GB819H000192 issued to the Plaintiff [18] It is undisputed that the Plaintiff purchased CAR Policy No. GB-8- 19-H-000192 from the Defendant and paid the requisite premium. The Policy Schedule was issued to and received by the Plaintiff. This is common ground between parties. [19] An examination of the Policy Schedule shows that it bears the policy number GB-8-19-H-000192 imprinted at the top of each page. [20] The eight (8) pages document does leave a reader to understand that it is the document that refers the Plaintiff as the insured and the Defendant as the insurer of the CAR Policy. It is also clear enough to allow a reader of the said Policy Schedule to understand the specific terms that relate to the CAR policy relating to the site for which it was taken for. [21] During cross examination, the Defendant argued that the Policy Schedule was not a stand-alone policy as there were express wordings to inform that the Policy Schedule was subject to “Attaching to and forms part of policy No: xxx)”. The Defendant solicitor cross examined PW1 to procure an admission that the Policy Schedule would also be subjected to another set of terms. This presumably was the Policy Jacket. [22] PW1 admitted that there was an express notation that the Policy Schedule was subjected to other terms and conditions outside of the Policy Schedule. However, he was steadfast in maintaining that the Plaintiff was never given any other document apart from the Policy Schedule. [23] In my assessment, PW1 testified truthfully when he disagreed with Defendant counsel that no other documents were given to him apart from the Policy Schedule and that the Policy Jacket was never given to the Plaintiff. As a person who testified directly before me, I find him to be truthful. [24] The Policy Jacket produced in Court shows that it was a generic set of terms and conditions. It can be observed that the exhibited Policy Jacket was never initialled at each page. It makes no reference to the policy with number GB-8-19-H-000192. [25] Based on the above, it is my finding that the exhibited Policy Jacket was a document reproduced for the sake of it being an exhibit for the trial. The Policy Jacket tendered in Court does not refer to Policy
Schedule
Schedule No. GB819H000192. DW1's own evidence confirmed that the Policy Jacket contains no policy number, no reference to the specific policy and no details of the insured (Temperlite or Amweld). The Policy Jacket is a generic document with no identifying features linking it to the Plaintiff's specific policy. [26] Therefore, it is my finding that the Policy Jacket tendered in Court does not refer to Policy Schedule No. GB819H000192 issued to the Plaintiff. It follows that the Policy Jacket cannot be linked to the Policy Schedule in the current suit. b) Whether the Policy Jacket was ever given to the Plaintiff [27] Corollary to the Plaintiff’s argument that the Policy Jacket referred was not part of the Policy Schedule is the argument that the said Policy Jacket was never given to them. [28] It is my finding that there was a critical failure of DW1 to prove the delivery of the Policy Jacket. The most damaging evidence against the Defendant's case came from their own witness, DW1 (Abu Bakar Bin Muhamad), the Defendant's Claims Manager. His cross-examination revealed a complete failure to prove delivery of the Policy Jacket to the Plaintiff. [29] When the Defendant received the Plaintiff's letter of demand specifically stating that the Policy Jacket was never received, DW1 admitted he made no effort to verify or investigate this crucial allegation-Notes of Evidence Vol. 3, pages 24 to 26: ZM: "Jadi soalan saya, apabila kamu dah terima ini, ada kamu semak, cakap dengan pihak yang telah berurusan dengan insured ataupun Plaintif tentang penyerahan polisi ini? Ada kamu semak atau tidak?" DW1: "We have requested our lawyer to look into this matter." ZM: "Soalan saya, dengar soalan, En Bakar. You ada semak ke tidak?" DW1: "Right, we have appointed the lawyer to look into this demand. So, En Zaini -" ZM: "Soalan saya, En Bakar, you ada semak tak dengan bahagian yang berurusan tentang penyerahan polisi ini? Ada buat semakan ke tidak?" DW1: "Kita orang tak sempat nak semak because we requested our lawyer to look at it." ZM: "Jadi you tak semak. Jawapan dia ialah kamu tak semak lah." DW1: "We have requested our lawyer to look at it first." ZM: "Saya kata you ada semak ke tidak dengan bahagian yang berurusan, soalan saya spesifik, En Bakar, kan. Soalan saya spesifik. Kalau tak jelas, saya ulang lagi." DW1: "Tidak." [30] Most critically, when pressed to produce evidence of Policy Jacket delivery, DW1 was forced to make the admission that no such evidence existed-Notes of Evidence Vol. 3, pages 24 to 26: ZM: "Jadi ada awak dapatkan sebarang bukti, dokumen yang menunjukkan bahawa policy jacket yang tadi dirujuk di muka surat 172 hingga 182 tadi, yang 11 page itu, ada kamu cuba dapatkan bukti, pihak Defendan dapatkan bukti bahawa ianya memang telah diserahkan kepada pihak Plaintif?" DW1: "En Zaini, can I explain?" ZM: "Ada atau pernah dapat bahan bukti?" DW1: "Can I explain, En Zaini?" ZM: "No. Saya tanya some information. Ada atau tak ada?" DW1: "It's our practice. We issue both, so we don't." ZM: "Ada awak cari bukti ke tak untuk mengesahkan bahawa -" DW1: "That is our procedure. That is our basic procedure we issue policy. So, that's why we never check with them also." ZM: "Ya, bila you kata prosedur, sekarang ini saya kata, kalau benda itu dah prosedur, mesti lah ada bukti bahawa dokumen itu diserahkan. Ada tak bukti yang menunjukkan -" DW1: "En Zaini, we have issued, we don't issue one or two policies here, En Zaini." ZM: "En Bakar -" DW1: "So, we issue thousands policy dekat sini." ZM: "En Bakar, you tak jawab soalan. En Bakar, saya tanya, you dapatkan bukti dokumen tak yang mengesah, sebab kita, sekarang ini Plaintif kata tak dapat. Dan En Bakar tadi beri keterangan, urusan polisi itu diuruskan melalui ejen, diserahkan kepada ejen. Ejen yang deal dengan insured atau Plaintif. The agent is the one dealing with the Plaintiff. Jadi tadi, satu, you kata tak semak dengan ejen. Kalau tak semak, tak apa. Tapi you ada cari bukti tak bahawa dokumen ini dan pengesahan dokumen policy jacket yang dikatakan ada kandungan special exclusion ini, diserahkan kepada Plaintif? Ada cari bukti tak, dokumen?" DW1: "Cari bukti, memang bukti saya dah bagi. Contoh, di mana saya nak cari bukti?" ZM: "Tak. Soalan saya, ada bukti atau tidak ada? Ada bukti atau tidak ianya diserahkan kepada Plaintif?" DW1: "En Zaini, tak ada bukti." [31] This frank admission stands in stark contrast to DW1's witness statement WSD-1, particularly at Question and Answer No. 10, where he had "strongly denied" the Plaintiff's allegation of non-delivery. When confronted with the reality of producing evidence, his position collapsed entirely. [32] DW1's repeated references to "procedure" and issuing "thousands of policies" demonstrated a concerning attitude that the Defendant could simply assert delivery based on general practice without any specific evidence. [33] The Defendant attempted to challenge the Plaintiff's witnesses on the issue of whether the Policy Jacket must have been provided, making several arguments that this Court finds unconvincing. [34] The Defendant argued that PW1 (Nik Khairil Azman) had admitted that insurance contracts generally consist of both policy jacket and policy schedule. However, the Court finds this challenge misconceived. When cross-examined, PW1's response was clear- Notes of Evidence Vol. 1, pages 11 to 13: WLW: "Dan setuju dengan cadangan saya tak jika saya katakan untuk kontrak insurans ni biasanya kontrak insurans ni terdapat dokumen-dokumen seperti polisi jaket, jadual polisi?" NIK: "Tidak setuju." WLW: "Tak setuju?" NIK: "Jaket polisi tidak pernah diberikan kepada saya." [35] This was not an admission that the Policy Jacket must form part of the contract, but rather a clear denial based on his actual experience with this particular policy. [36] The Defendant also argued that PW1 admitted the Policy Schedule contained wording stating it forms part of a larger policy. However, this challenge fails because the mere presence of standard wording in the Policy Schedule does not prove delivery of additional documents. [37] An insured cannot be bound by documents they have never received or been made aware of. The insurer being a large corporation is not exempted from the need to ensure that proper service of the contractual documents i.e. the complete policy is served and delivered to the insurer. [38] An insurer must also ensure that the insured understands the terms and conditions of the policy before accepting the premium. The insurer has a duty to provide and make available the entire policy irrespective of the number of attachments the policy contains. In short, the insurer cannot be too accept coverage and collect premiums without ensuring that the insured truly understands the entire policy. [39] Given that there was no delivery receipt, acknowledgment or any form of documentation produced to evidence delivery of the Policy Jacket to the Plaintiff, it is my conclusive finding that the said Policy Jacket was never given to the Plaintiff. Evidential burden on the Defendant [40] There is no dispute on this issue that the Plaintiff bears the burden of proving its claim. However, while the legal burden remains with the Plaintiff, the Defendant must also accept that the evidential burden shifts between the parties once the Plaintiff has put sufficient evidence before the Court which requires rebuttal from the Defendant. [41] The Federal Court in Letchumanan Chettiar Alagappan @ L Allagappan (as executor to SL Alameloo Achi alias Sona Lena Alamelo Acho, deceased) & Anor v Secure Plantation Sdn Bhd [2017] 4 MLJ 697 held - “[52] The ‘burden of proof’ in s 101 is the burden to establish a case which rests throughout on the party who asserts the affirmative of the issue. The ‘burden of proof’ in s 102 is the burden to adduce evidence, to make out or rebut the claim. The ‘burden of proof’ in s 102 shifts from one side to the other according to the weight of the evidence. To differentiate the sense used, the ‘burden of proof’ in s 101 is ‘burden of proof’, while the ‘burden of proof’ in ss 102 and 103 is dubbed ‘onus of proof’. In some jurisdictions, the s 101 ‘burden of proof’ is labelled ‘legal burden’ while the s 102 burden of proof’ is referred to as ‘evidential burden’. … [55] But ‘when (the plaintiff) gives such evidence as will support a prima facie case, the onus shifts on to the defendant, to adduce rebutting evidence to meet the case made out by the plaintiff. As the case continues to develop, the onus may shift back again to the plaintiff...”. [42] It is my view that the Defendant has failed to discharge the evidential burden to prove delivery despite bearing the burden under Section 103 of the Evidence Act 1950. Adverse Inference Under Section 114(g) [43] Under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950, adverse inference may be drawn against a party who withholds evidence that could be produced. The provision states: "The court may presume that evidence which could be and is not produced would if produced be unfavorable to the person who withholds it". [44] It is my finding that the Defendant's complete failure to call the agent who serviced the Plaintiff was a miscalculation on their part. The Defendant could have easily called the said agent to clarify what was agreed between the parties. However, they failed to call the said agent. [45] The Plaintiff’s witness had categorically testified that they purchased the policy from the Defendant’s agency. The testimony which stood in Court was - S15: Boleh terangkan bagaimana kamu mendapat dokumen jadual polisi CAR tersebut? J15: Kami telah perolehinya melalui agen Defendan iaitu Laiyinah Agency sepertimana yang tertera pada dokumen tersebut. S16: Selain dari Jadual Polisi tersebut, ada kamu diserahkan dengan sebarang dokumen lain? J16: Tiada dokumen lain diserahkan. Hanya Jadual Polisi tersebut. Apabila tindakan ini difailkan barulah saya diberitahu bahawa Defendan mendakwa ada dokumen yang disebut sebagai polisi jaket yang dikatakan mengandungi terma-terma pengecualian antaranya ‘faulty design’. S17: Apabila kamu mendapat Jadual polisi tersebut, adakah agen tersebut memberi sebarang penerangan berkenaan dokumen tersebut? J17: Agen Defendan telah menerangkan dan merepresentasikan kepada Plaintif dan kontraktor Plaintif bahawa polisi CAR tersebut akan melindungi Plaintif dari sebarang kerugian akibat sebarang kejadian kemalangan (accidental event) dalam tempoh yang dilindungi di dalam polisi CAR tersebut ketika pembinaan projek tersebut sepertimana dokumen Polisi CAR tersebut yang diserahkan kepada Plaintif. [46] From the above testimony, it is my view that there was an identifiable person who could have come to Court to rebut the Plaintiff’s claim. However, no such witness was called by the Defendant. [47] It is therefore my finding that the Policy Jacket was never delivered to the Plaintiff. This finding is based on - (i) the credible testimony of PW1 that only the Policy Schedule was received; (ii) DW1's frank admission that there was no evidence ("tak ada bukti") of Policy Jacket delivery; (iii) the Defendant's failure to call the insurance agent who would have been the best witness to prove delivery; and (iv) the absence of any delivery documentation to support the delivery of the said Policy Jacket. c) Whether there was any complaint by the Plaintiff of not having knowledge of the contents of the Policy Jacket when the Defendant repudiated the claim [48] The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff’s denial of receiving the Policy Jacket was an afterthought and was raised only at trial. The Defendant extended their argument by contending the Plaintiff should have complained about non-receipt of the Policy Jacket upon receiving the repudiation letter. [49] The case of the Plaintiff was simply that the said Policy Jacket never existed. As such, understandably, clause 1(c) was never brought to their attention. [50] The Plaintiff's Managing Director, PW1 (Nik Khairil Azman), testified credibly that the Plaintiff only received the Policy Schedule and was never given the Policy Jacket. The evidence shows that the Plaintiff first became aware of the existence of the Policy Jacket only upon receiving the Defendant's repudiation letter dated 27 November 2020. This was clearly established during cross-examination - "WLW: Jadi, saya cadangkan kepada kamu bahawa sebelum tindakan ini difailkan di Mahkamah, Plaintif sememangnya tahu tentang kewujudan polisi jaket. Setuju? NIK: Setuju hanya selepas surat ini dikeluarkan, ya". [51] The fact that the Plaintiff did not specifically challenge the existence of Special Exclusion 1(c) in their complaint to Bank Negara Malaysia also cannot constitute admission of knowledge of the Policy Jacket. The complaint to Bank Negara focused on the substantive ground of repudiation namely faulty design, which the Plaintiff disputed. [52] The evidence clearly shows the Plaintiff consistently complained about non-receipt of the Policy Jacket. In the Letter of Demand dated 8 September 2021 (Bundle C2, pages 1-3), the Plaintiff's solicitors specifically stated - "We are instructed by our client to put you on notice that from inception of the policy, our client was never furnished with the CAR policy jacket nor any other policy wordings save and except for the policy schedule... Hence, the Special Exclusion to Section 1(c) relied upon by you was never brought to our client's attention". [53] As such, the Plaintiff did raise the issue of not having knowledge of the Policy Jacket contents. This was evidenced through their solicitor's Letter of Demand dated 8 September 2021, which specifically stated that the Plaintiff was never furnished with the CAR policy jacket and that Special Exclusion 1(c) was never brought to their attention. The timing of this complaint was reasonable as it was made after obtaining legal representation to properly articulate the legal issues. d) Whether the Policy Schedule and Policy Jacket formed the entire policy and whether the Plaintiff is bound by Special Exclusion 1(c) The Policy Schedule as Complete Contract [54] With this Court’s finding that in the absence of proof that the Policy Jacket was delivered to or brought to the attention of the Plaintiff, the Policy Schedule stands as the complete contract between the parties as far as the Plaintiff is concerned. [55] The Plaintiff was entitled to rely on the terms contained in the Policy Schedule and to expect coverage for the risks covered thereunder, subject only to exclusions of which they had notice. The Policy Schedule contains a set of exclusions which to a layman would constitute the only exclusion operable under the policy. [56] I do not fault the Plaintiff for assuming that there were no other parts of the policy that would dictate the obligation of the Defendant apart from the said Policy Schedule. [57] A careful analysis of the said Policy Schedule will reveal that the document bears the following pertinent information: a) Policy No. GB819H000192; b) name and particulars of the insured under the Policy; c) the project title which is covered under the Policy; d) the specification of the details of what is covered for example the sum insured which is indicated as RM3,500,000.00; e) the limit of indemnity which is RM3,500,000.00 with the applicable deductibles as per memorandum; f) the quotes and descriptions of the clauses/warranties/endorsements applicable to the Policy; and g) Memorandum inter alia provides deductibles/access applicable to the Policy as follows (refer to page 3 of Bundle B) - [58] The Policy Schedule alone formed the complete contract. Contractual Formation and Notice [59] The fundamental principle in insurance law is that an insured is only bound by terms of which they have notice or which have been brought to their attention. This is consonant with the fact that an insurance agreement or policy is nothing more than a set of agreed terms between parties. [60] The Court of Appeal's guidance in Amanah Butler (M) Sdn Bhd v Yike Chee Wah [1997] 2 CLJ 79 that "a party is bound by its pleadings" applies equally to insurance contracts - parties are bound by terms they have agreed to and of which they have knowledge. [61] Allowing a general document (such as the exhibited Policy Jacket) which provenance is questionable, to be part of an agreement (such as the Policy Schedule) would be wrong in law as it fails to meet the principle of consensus ad idem which is essential for a valid contract formation. [62] Consensus ad idem or "agreement to the same thing" requires that contracting parties share a clear, mutual understanding of the contract's essential terms and subject matter. It forms the bedrock of contractual agreement, supporting the primary requirement that combines offer and acceptance. When parties lack agreement on identical terms in the same context, no genuine offer and acceptance exists, preventing contract formation. [63] Without consensus ad idem, contracts would lack the certainty and mutual understanding necessary for enforceable legal obligations. The principle protects parties from being bound to agreements they never truly accepted. [64] This requirement works alongside other essential elements such as consideration and intention to create legal relations, but remains fundamental because it addresses the very essence of what constitutes an agreement between parties. [65] An insurer bears a duty to explain what they were willing to insure. More importantly, they are also required to make clear as to what will result in them repudiating liability. [66] This principle is particularly important where exclusion clauses are relied upon. This is because the exclusion clause is the clause that entitles the insurer to repudiate liability despite having received payment for insurance premium. [67] A perusal of the Policy Jacket relied upon by the Defendant does spell out the exclusion in respect of a situation where there is a design flaw. It is my view that such an exclusion must be brought to the attention of the Plaintiff. An insured cannot be bound by exclusions in documents never brought to their attention, regardless of general insurance practice. [68] It is trite law that exemption and limitation of liabilities clause must be brought to the attention of the other party prior to the parties entering into the contract (see Thornton v. Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1971] 2 QB 163 and Sanggaralingam Arumugam v. Wong Kok Wah & Anor [1987] CLJ (Rep) 964). [69] However, given the finding of this Court that the Policy Jacket was never given to the Plaintiff, the issue of giving notice of the said Special Clause 1 (c) does not arise. Special Exclusion 1(c) cannot apply. Findings on the claim [70] After careful consideration of all evidence presented by the parties and thorough evaluation of the testimony of witnesses, this Court finds that the balance of probabilities clearly favors a finding for the Plaintiff. This conclusion is reached after weighing all the evidence, assessing the credibility of witnesses and applying the relevant legal principles to the facts established at trial. [71] In reaching this decision, this Court has taken into account the credible and consistent testimony of the Plaintiff's witnesses, particularly PW1 and PW2, who demonstrated honesty and forthrightness in their evidence. In contrast, I have also taken into consideration of the evasive testimony of the Defendant's witnesses, particularly DW1 and DW2, whose credibility was significantly undermined by their inability to provide straight answers and substantiate their claims. [72] Having carefully weighed all the evidence, this Court is satisfied that the Plaintiff's version of events is substantially more credible and probable than the Defendant's assertions. Thus, the Plaintiff has successfully proven its case on the requisite standard of a balance of probabilities. [73] Given this express finding, there is no reason to delve into the argument that there was a design flaw as the case of the Plaintiff as pleaded in the Statement of Claim rests on the inapplicability of the Special Clause 1(c) contained in the Policy Jacket. Whether the Plaintiff has proven their claim for losses Issue: Whether the Plaintiff's claim under the CAR Policy has been unreasonably exaggerated [74] In challenging the quantum claimed, the Defendant contended that the claim made by the Plaintiff was heavily exaggerated. Having carefully considered the evidence adduced before this Court, the submissions of both parties and the relevant law, this Court finds in favour of the Plaintiff on this issue for the reasons stated below. The Defendant's Unsubstantiated Allegation [75] The Defendant has pleaded in paragraph 9 of their Defence that Amweld Jaya Sdn. Bhd. (the contractor) had submitted a claim of RM798,498.63 and alleged that the Plaintiff had unreasonably exaggerated this claim to RM1,801,845.50. However, this Court finds that this allegation is nothing more than an unsubstantiated assertion that the Defendant has wholly failed to prove. [76] The burden of proof, as established under Section 103 of the Evidence Act 1950, clearly stipulates that "the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person.". The onus was therefore squarely on the Defendant to prove the existence of this alleged RM798,498.63 claim, which they have categorically failed to discharge. Critical Evidence from Cross-Examination [77] The most telling evidence came from the cross-examination of the Defendant's own witness, DW2 (Mr Wong Yoon Mak), the appointed adjuster. When challenged to provide documentary proof of the alleged RM798,498.63 claim, DW2's responses were damning to the Defendant's case. The verbatim cross-examination transcript from the Notes of Evidence (Vol. 3) at pages 110 to 111 reveals the following exchange: "ZM: So did, do they agree? DW2: That's why they have provided a RM800,000 claim. ZM: Where? Show me where? They have submit the RM800,000 claim. DW2: I couldn't confirm, I need to confirm that. But I received it from En Mohd Amin. ZM: Ya lah, show us lah. Like this one, RM1.8 million claim, it has been verified, there is a cover letter and all that. Show us, the submission by Amweld is RM799,000, where? Show us the proof that it was submitted by Amweld. DW2: I only received from En Mohd Amin. ZM: Ya? DW2: I only received it from En Mohd Amin. DW2: Sorry, I only received it from En Mohd Amin. ZM: So there's no proof? DW2: Unable to proof that, but like I said, I received it from En Mohd Amin. ZM: Ya lah, where is the document? Where is the proof?" [78] This exchange clearly demonstrates that DW2, despite being the Defendant's own witness and the appointed adjuster who investigated the claim, was unable to produce any documentary evidence to support the alleged RM798,498.63 submission. His repeated admissions that he "couldn't confirm," was "unable to proof that," and could only rely on alleged informal communications through "email or WhatsApp" from En Mohd Amin fundamentally undermines the Defendant's case. [79] Given DW2's inability to produce the documentary evidence tantamount to the Defendant's failure to produce any credible documentary evidence to support their allegation of the RM798,498.63 claim, despite this being specifically pleaded in their Defence. This failure materially weakens the Defendant’s challenge of the quantum claimed by the Plaintiff. Contrast with Plaintiff's Documented Claim [80] In stark contrast to the Defendant's unsubstantiated allegation, the Plaintiff has produced clear, documented evidence of their formal claim. The Plaintiff submitted a formal statement of claim dated 17 August 2020 for the sum of RM1,801,845.50, found at pages 79 to 82 of Bundle B. This document was titled "FORMAL STATEMENT OF CLAIM ON COLLAPSED PORTAL FRAME INCIDENT" and included supporting documents comprising damage reports and loss reports certified by the consultant architect and the engineering consultant Ir. Firdaus (PW4). [81] DW2 himself confirmed during cross-examination that he received this formal claim document. The cross-examination transcript from pages 101 to 103 of the Notes of Evidence reveals - "ZM: Mr Mark, look at this page, can you read to the Court the title of this, the caption in this letter? What does it state? DW2: Formal statement of claim on collapsed portal frame incident. ZM: Right, so when you received this, did you do adjustment on it? What happened to the adjustment of this? DW2: I cannot do any adjustment because there is no basis for me to adjust. ZM: Right, you are saying that yes, ok. Did you forward this to the client? To your principal insurer? DW2: I did not. ZM: You did not? DW2: I did not." [82] This evidence reveals that DW2 not only received the Plaintiff's properly documented claim but failed to perform his duty as adjuster by neither adjusting nor forwarding the formal claim to the insurer. Corroborating Evidence from PW2 [83] The Plaintiff's position is further strengthened by the evidence of PW2, the contractor, who during cross-examination confirmed that the document at page 257 of the adjuster's report purportedly showing a claim summary for RM798,000 was not his document. The Notes of Evidence (Vol. 1) at pages 158 to 159 records - "WLW: En Nik, saya cadangkan kepada kamu bahawa ini adalah claim summary yang telah kamu bagi kepada syarikat insuran untuk buat tuntutan dan jumlahnya adalah RM798,000. AMIN: Saya tak setuju. WLW: Tak setuju ya. AMIN: Saya tak setuju." [84] This testimony directly contradicts the Defendant's allegation and confirms that the alleged RM798,000 claim did not originate from the Plaintiff's side. Defendant's failure to raise the issue at the onset [85] Significantly, this Court notes that the Defendant never raised the issue of an unsubstantiated claim amount in their correspondence to repudiate the claim. A review of the correspondence found at pages 21 to 29 of Bundle B reveals that the Defendant relied solely on special exclusion 1(c) as the ground for repudiation in their letter dated 27 November 2020. There was no challenge or dispute raised by the Defendant regarding the claim amount or any details in relation thereto at the time of repudiation. [86] This fact that the Defendant had totally ignored the Plaintiff's formal claim from the very beginning and only raised this issue of exaggerated claim during the defence proceedings constitutes a clear afterthought. The Defendant cannot now be permitted to challenge the legitimacy of the claim amount when they had ample opportunity to do so at the material time but chose not to. Reasonableness of Plaintiff's Claim Amount [87] This Court also finds that the Plaintiff's claim amount is reasonable and justified when considered against the objective evidence. The architect's certificate of stage of completion dated 17 July 2020 at page 77 of Bundle B certified the value of work as at 17 July 2020 at RM2,374,154.61, representing 67% completion just before the loss occurred. DW2 himself confirmed during cross-examination that based on this certificate, the value at site was certified as RM2.374 million, and his own report acknowledged that construction had reached 70% completion at the time of the loss. [88] Given that the entire structure collapsed as evidenced by the photographs of the loss, the Plaintiff's claim for RM1,801,845.50 appears reasonable and proportionate to the certified value and extent of damage. Finding on damages [89] Having carefully considered all the evidence, this Court finds that the Defendant's allegation that the Plaintiff exaggerated their claim is entirely without merit and must be dismissed. The Defendant has failed to discharge their burden of proof under Section 103 of the Evidence Act 1950 to establish the existence of the alleged RM798,498.63 claim. [90] Conversely, the Plaintiff has successfully proven through clear documentary evidence their entitlement to claim for RM1,775,845.50. The Defendant's challenge to this amount is nothing more than an unsubstantiated rebuttal. [91] Therefore, this Court finds that the Plaintiff's claim under the CAR Policy is legitimate, properly documented and not an afterthought. The Defendant's version regarding the alleged exaggerated claim is dismissed. -Sgd- (AHMAD FAIRUZ BIN ZAINOL ABIDIN) Judge High Court of Malaya Kuala Lumpur Dated: 22nd October 2025 Counsel Mohd Zaini Marzuki and Riza Makhzan Arifin for the Plaintiff Messrs. Aznur Mazwin & Associates WL Wong and Asha Mohan for the Defendant Messrs. Azim, Tunku Farik & Wong
Wrong text, a broken link, out-of-date content, or a removal request — tell us and we'll check it against the official source.