Tenaga Nasional Berhad v 1. ) Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan Negeri Selangor (BA-25-107-10/2019)

SERIEMAS DEVELOPMENT SDN BERHAD (No.Syarikat: 122570-H)

DUSUN DURIAN PANTATIONS LIMITED (No.Syarikat: 990015-A) …PEMOHON-PEMOHON

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(No.Syarikat: 200866-W) DI DENGAR BERSAMA PERMOHONAN SEMAKAN KEHAKIMAN NO.: BA-25-107-10/2019 …PEMOHON

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DUSUN DURIAN PLANTATIONS SDN BHD 11/01/2023 16:49:39 Kand. 89 DI DENGAR BERSAMA

SERIEMAS DEVELOPMENT SDN BERHAD (No.Syarikat: 122570-H)

DUSUN DURIAN PANTATIONS LIMITED (No.Syarikat: 990015-A) …PEMOHON-PEMOHON

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(No.Syarikat: 200866-W) JUDGEMENT [1] This judicial review application seeks to quash the decision of Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan Negeri Selangor. Parties to this application [2] Seriemas Development Sdn. Berhad (formerly known as I & P Seriemas Sdn. Bhd.) (“Seriemas”) is a private limited company having its registered address at 4th Floor, Balai PNB, 201-A Jalan Tun Razak, 50400 Kuala Lumpur. [3] Dusun Durian Plantations Limited (“Dusun Durian”) is a private limited company having its registered address at Level 10, Main Block, Plantation Tower, No. 2 Jalan PJU 1A/7, Ara Damansara, 47301 Petaling Jaya, Selangor Darul Ehsan. [4] Tenaga Nasional Berhad (“TNB”) is a public listed company with its registered address at Company Secretary's Office, Level 2, Tenaga Nasional Berhad Headquarters, No. 129 Jalan Bangsar, 59200 Kuala Lumpur. [5] The Selangor State Executive Council (“MMKN”) with an address for service at Level 19, Bangunan Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah, 40503 Shah Alam, Selangor Darul Ehsan. [6] Pengarah Tanah & Galian Selangor Pejabat Tanah Dan Galian Selangor (“Pengarah PTG”), Bangunan Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah, 40576 Shah Alam, Selangor Darul Ehsan. [7] The District Officer of Kuala Langat, with an address for service at Pejabat Daerah/Tanah Kuala Langat (“PDT Kuala Langat”), Persiaran Sultan Abdul Aziz Shah, Kota Seri Langat (Sg. Sedu), 42700 Banting, Kuala Langat, Selangor Darul Ehsan. Factual Background [8] The facts of this application as adopted from documents filed with adaptations are that on 30.4.2009, TNB issued notices to the Seriemas and Dusun Durian pursuant to Section 13 of the Electricity Supply Act 1990 for the purpose of conducting purported upgrading works for the construction of an electrical tower from PMU Olak Lempit to PMU Banting in respect of the following lands (“Notices”):

Lot No. 7091 (Lot Lama No. 555) GRN 27284, Mukim Tanjong Dua Belas, Daerah Kuala Langat owned by Seriemas; and

(ii) Lot No. 44521 (PT 28453) (Lot Lama No. 7053) GRN 234139, Mukim Tanjong Dua Belas, Daerah Kuala Langat owned by Dusun Durian; (collectively referred to as "Lands"). [9] On 27.5.2009, an investigation as to the amount of compensation payable by TNB to Seriemas and Dusun Durian was carried out by the District Land Administrator of Kuala Langat (“DLA”) pursuant to the Notices. As a result of the investigation, a sum of RM1,670,127.00 was assessed as being payable to the Seriemas and Dusun Durian. [10] On 2.6.2009, Seriemas and Dusun Durian objected to the said assessment by essentially lodging an appeal against the same to the State Authority based on the following three grounds:

for TNB to compulsorily acquire the Lands pursuant to the Land Acquisition Act 1960 instead of compensation simpliciter (“1st Ground”);

(ii) the valuation of the Lands accepted by the DLA at a rate of RM3.25 per square feet to be replaced with the more competitive valuation conducted by Messrs. William Talhar at RM4.50 per square feet (“2nd Ground”); and

(iii) the rate of compensation payable by TNB to the Applicants be increased to 100% from the 40% assessed as being payable by the DLA (“3rd Ground”). [11] The State Authority had, on or around 18.3.2011, directed that the Lands belonging to Seriemas and Dusun Durian be acquired by TNB pursuant to the Land Acquisition Act 1960 (“Quashed Decision”). [12] Dissatisfied with the Quashed Decision, TNB then commenced a judicial review application to the High Court on 28.4.2011 to have the same quashed. The purported grounds and the subsequent litigation can be summarized as below:-

on 4.12.2013, the High Court allowed TNB’s judicial review application by, amongst others, quashing the Quashed Order and ordering the Seriemas and Dusun Durian’s Appeal to be remitted back to the MMKN for redetermination (“HC

(ii) on 30.12.2013, the Seriemas and Dusun Durian appealed against the HC Decision to the Court of Appeal;

(iii) on 4.8.2014, the Court of Appeal allowed the Seriemas and Dusun Durian’s appeal (“COA Decision”) by setting aside the HC Decision;

(iv) on 2.9.2014, TNB applied for leave to the Federal Court to appeal against the COA Decision;

on 23.3.2016, the Federal Court granted leave to TNB to appeal against the COA Decision;

(vi) on 28.11.2016, the Federal Court allowed TNB’s said appeal by setting aside the COA Decision and reinstating the HC Decision (“FC Decision”) [13] There were numerous correspondences between the Seriemas and Dusun Durian (or their solicitors) and the relevant authorities including MMKN towards expediting the redetermination of Seriemas and Dusun Durian’s appeal in light of the reinstatement of the High Court Decision by the Federal Court. [14] The matter was escalated to MMKN and the Impugned Decision was apparently reached by MMKN on or around 24.4.2019. It provides that the Seriemas and Dusun Durian’s Appeal was considered and approved. No further details and/or particulars were provided to shed light on the precise meaning of the Impugned Decision. [15] The relevant excerpt of the Impugned Decision as communicated to the Applicants is reproduced below: “...Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan Negeri (MMKN) ke 10/2019 pada 24.4.2019 telah menimbangkan dan meluluskan permohonan bantahan pampasan izin lalu menaik taraf talian penghantaran 132 Kv dari PMU Olak Lempit ke PMU Banting kepada Seriemas Development Sdn Bhd (dahulunya dikenali sebagai I & P Seriemas Sdn Bhd) dan Dusun Durian Plantations Limited dengan kaedah perintah pampasan izin lalu ini dibayar selaras dengan peruntukan di bawah Seksyen 16(2) ABE 1990 seperti mana yang telah diperintahkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam bertarikh 4 Disember 2013 dan Mahkamah Persekutuan Malaysia bertarikh 28.11.2016...” [16] Hence, the Solicitor for Seriemas and Dusun Durian wrote to the State Legal Advisor’s office on or around 5.7.2019 to request for a meeting between the relevant parties to discuss the follow up actions to the Impugned Decision for the smooth execution thereof. [17] TNB’s solicitors also separately wrote to the 2nd Respondent on 21.8.2019 to request for a clarification meeting on the grounds that the Impugned Decision is vague and unclear. [18] Seriemas, Dusun Durian and TNB are ad idem that the MMKN’s decision dated 24.4.2019 concerning Seriemas and Dusun Durian’s Appeal is uncertain as it can be given no ascertainable meaning. [19] Therefore, a meeting was fix by the State Legal Advisor’s office on 4.9.2019. The meeting was attended by, amongst others, the State Legal Advisor’s office, PDT Kuala Langat's office, the Applicants’ solicitors, and TNB's solicitors. After further discussion with the parties, the State Legal Advisor’s office proposed that a clarification be sought from MMKN on the precise meaning of the Impugned Decision since it was then apparent that the Impugned Decision was unclear. [20] However, parties were informed that this could not be done within the time limit prescribed by the relevant rules for commencement of judicial review application against the Second Decision. [21] Hence Seriemas and Dusun Durian were constrained to commence judicial review proceedings vide Shah Alam High Court Application for Judicial Review No.: BA-25-102-09/2019 (“JR 102”) on 18.9.2019 to have the Second Decision quashed. [22] TNB commenced its own judicial review proceedings vide Shah Alam High Court Application for Judicial Review No.: BA-25-107-10/2019 (“JR 107”) on 1.10.2019 to have Second Decision quashed. Both these judicial review were premised on the Second Decision being unclear and/or ambiguous. [23] On 19.2.2020 MMKN decided that the Second Decision (which had already allowed or approved the Applicant’s Appeal) had been cancelled. In this regard, the relevant excerpt of the Impugned Decision as communicated to the applicants is reproduced below: “2. … keputusan Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan Negeri (MMKN) ke 7/2020 yang diadakan pada 19 Februari 2020 dan telah disahkan oleh MMKN ke 8/2020 bertarikh 4 Mac 2020 yang telah menimbang dan menolak rayuan pemohon untuk permohonan Bantahan Izin Lalu Menaiktaraf Talian Penghantaran 132 KV dari PMU Olak Lempit ke PMU Banting kepada Seriemas Development Sdn Bhd (dahulunya dikenali sebagai I & P Seriemas Sdn Bhd) dan Dusun Durian Plantations Limited dan keputusan Pentadbir Tanah bertarikh 27.5.2009 dan 19.10.2018 dikekalkan.

Selanjutnya, MMKN bersetuju agar keputusan MMKN ke 10/2019 yang diadakan pada 24 April 2019 yang telah disahkan oleh MMKN ke 11/2049 pada 8 Mei 2019 berhubung perkara ini dibatalkan” [24] Seriemas and Dusun Durian then filed a judicial review to quash the Impugned Decision. [25] The three Judicial Review applications were filed by Seriemas, Dusun Durian and TNB were heard together. They are:

BA-25-102-09/2019 (JR 102)

(ii) BA-25-107-10/2019 (JR 107)

(iii) BA-25-47-06/2020 (JR 47) [26] Succinctly, the Seriemas and Dusun Durian applications for Judicial Review are:

JR 102 - to quash the MMKN’s decision dated 24.4.2019 concerning Seriemas & Dusun’s appeal to the State Authority on the basis that it is void for uncertainty; and

(ii) JR 47 - to quash the MMKN’s decision dated 19.2.2020 concerning Seriemas & Dusun’s appeal to the State Authority on the basis that MMKN had been rendered functus officio. [27] TNB’s application for Judicial Review is:

JR 107 - is also to have the MMKN’s decision dated 24.4.2019 quashed. Principles relating to Judicial Review [28] It is trite law that a decision in relation to the exercise of public duty or function may be reviewed on the grounds of illegality, irrationality, procedural impropriety or disproportionality. What amounts to illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety has been succinctly laid down by Lord Diplock in the case of Council of Civil Service Unions & Ors v Minister of Civil Service [1985] AC 374 which was adopted by the Federal Court in the case of R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145 as follows: “In this context, it is useful to note how Lord Diplock (at pp 410– 411) defined the three grounds of review, to wit, (i) illegality, (ii) irrationality, and (iii) procedural impropriety. This is how he put it: By 'illegality' as a ground for Judicial Review I mean that the decision maker must understand directly the law that regulates his decision making power and must give effect to it. Whether he has or not is par excellence a justiciable question to be decided, in the event of a dispute, by those persons, the judges, by whom the judicial power of the state is exerciseable. By 'irrationality' I mean what can by now be succinctly referred to as 'Wednesbury unreasonableness' (see Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223). It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. Whether a decision falls within this category is a question that judges by their training and experience should be well equipped to answer, or else there would be something badly wrong with our judicial system. To justify the courts' exercise of this role, resort I think is today no longer needed to Viscount Radcliffe's ingenious explanation in Edwards v Bairstow [1956] AC 14, of irrationality as a ground for a court's reversal of a decision by ascribing it to an inferred though undefinable mistake of law by the decision maker. 'Irrationality' by now can stand on its own feet as an accepted ground on which a decision may be attacked by Judicial Review. I have described the third head as 'procedural impropriety' rather than failure to observe basic rules of natural justice or failing to act with procedural fairness towards the person who will be affected by the decision. This is because susceptibility to Judicial Review under this head covers also failure by an administrative tribunal to observe procedural rules that are expressly laid down in the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is conferred, even where such failure does not involve any denial of natural justice.” [29] In the Federal Court case of Akira Sales & Service (M) Sdn Bhd v Nadiah Zee Abdullah and another appeal [2018] 2 CLJ 513; [2018] 3 MLRA 589; [2018] 2 MELR 337; [2018] 2 MLJ 537, the liberal approach on judicial review in R. Rama Chandran v. The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 CLJ 147; [1997] 1 MLJ 145; [1996] 1 MLRA725; [1997] 1 AMR 433 has been accentuated. [30] Further, in the case of Syarikat Kenderaan Melayu Kelantan v. Transport Workers Union [1995] 2 CLJ 748; [1995] 2 MLJ 317, the error of law has been described as follows: “It is neither feasible nor desirable to attempt an exhaustive definition of what amounts to an error of law, for the categories of such an error are not closed. But it may be said that an error of law would be disclosed if the decision-maker asks himself the wrong question or takes into account irrelevant considerations or omits to take into account relevant considerations (what may be conveniently termed an Anisminic error) or if he misconstrues the terms of any relevant statute, or misapplies or misstates a principle of the general law.” [Emphasis added] [31] Premised on the principles relating to a judicial review application, this court will now consider the submissions put forth by parties. Analysis [32] One of the grounds for this judicial review was that there were no reasons given for the decision of MMKN. It was argued by Seriemas that MMKN’s decision 10/2019 dated 24.4.2019 and MMKN’s decision7/2020 dated 19.2.2020 should be quashed. In reply MMKN submitted that Seriemas could seek clarification from MMKN. Therefore, the issue of functus officio dies not arise. [33] In relation to the issue of functus officio, the Federal Court case of Stone World Sdn Bhd v. Engareh (M) Sdn Bhd [2020] 9 CLJ 358, the court stated: “[17] There are limited and discrete situations where the court may make a further order subsequent to its previous sealed order. These situations include:

An amendment of a previous order to reflect the original intention of the court which is evident from the previous and original order, or the body of the judgment of the original order;

(ii) Under the slip rule O. 20 r. 11 of the Rules of Court 2012 (‘the Rules’) to correct a clerical error or a similar form of slip;

(iii) The clarification, supplementing of or amendment of a previous order so as to give effect to the original order under the ‘liberty to apply’ provisions;

(iv) If there is provision in the Rules to amend an original order so as to enlarge time specified. [18] These are well-recognised and accepted categories where the principle of finality as reflected in the rule of functus officio is not violated.” [34] The facts of this case demonstrate that the decision of MMKN dated 24.4.2019 was clarified by the decision of MMKN dated 19.2.2020. This court is therefore satisfied that the issue of functus officio is without merit. [35] Sieremas further submitted that there were no reasons or grounds given by MMKN for the decision of MMKN. Pertaining to this ground, this court observes that this ground was not pleaded. The issue therefore is whether an issue not pleaded can be considered by this court. [36] Pertaining to this ground, this court observes that this issue was not pleaded in the statement. In this regard, this court alluded to the case of Tan Wee Ching v. DA Tong Shi Je Supplies & Services Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2022] 6 CLJ 237 which stated the following: “[49] We are also of the considered opinion that the learned Judicial Commissioner has committed an error of law when he decided on an issue that was not pleaded in the grounds of the application. Order 53 r. 3(2) of the ROC 2012 provides that the grounds of the application must be stated in the statement and the statement may be amended to include new grounds under Order 53 r. 7. Order 53 r. 3(2) reads:

An application for leave must be made ex parte to a Judge in Chambers and must be supported by a statement setting out the name and description of the applicant, the relief sought and the grounds on which it is sought, and by affidavits verifying the facts relied on. [50] The issue of raising a ground not pleaded in the statement of the judicial review application was considered by the Federal Court in Dr A Dutt v. Assunta Hospital [1981] 1 LNS 5; [1981] 1 MLJ 304, where Justice Chang Min Tat FJ (as he then was) held at p. 309: There appears therefore to have been a complete disregard of the procedure prescribed and to be followed by the solicitors for the hospital. No point was however taken by counsel for Dr Dutt at any stage of the proceedings. We have however mentioned them not merely to draw attention to the fact that the new rules, the Rules of the High Court 1980, continue largely the same practice, O. 53 r. 1(2) requiring such a statement, rule 1A limiting the time for such an application, now, to six weeks of the order sought to be quashed and rule 3(1) providing that subject to the discretion of the court, no grounds shall be relied upon and no reliefs sought except those set out in the statement. We have done so also because the same solicitors had previously filed such a statement in its application for prohibition and because as will be seen, this amorphous application enabled the hospital to roam at large, well outside its proper confines. (emphasis added) [51] Justice Chang Min Tat added that the High Court should not have resorted to the affidavit for the grounds on which the application was brought, as the rule was clear that all grounds had to be set out in the statement. [52] In Tuan Sarip Hamid & Anor v. Patco Malaysia Bhd [1995] 3 CLJ 627; [1995] 2 MLJ 442, the Supreme Court held that the grounds and the affidavits must present a complete picture of the case of the applicant: Having said that, we would add that it is a counsel of prudence for a lawyer drafting his application under O. 53 r. 1(2) to ensure that it contains substantial particulars of the facts and matters on which he intends to rely in support of his application. He should also ensure that his affidavit in support of his application is as detailed and comprehensive as the circumstances will permit, and it should exhibit all the documentary exhibits which are truly relevant and upon which he intends to rely. The object of these steps in to ensure that the Court has as complete a picture as is possible right from the start, of the case for the applicant who is seeking judicial review. (emphasis added) [53] Therefore, we find that the learned Judicial Commissioner has erred in law when he decided on an issue not pleaded by the parties. Added to that, he only raised the issue on the day when he delivered the decision, without affording the parties an opportunity to submit on the matter.” [Emphasis added] [37] Having regard to the authorities cited and fact that this ground of no reason was given by MMKN for the decision was not pleaded by Sieremas, this court is of the considered view that this ground is unsustainable as it was not pleaded. By raising this ground now, the respondents are not afforded an opportunity to submit on this ground. [38] The next issue this court will proceed to consider is functus officio. What this argument entails is the question of whether MMKN is allowed to change or alter its previous decision. [39] To understand this issue, this court made reference to the letter dated 12 September 2019 from the Pejabat Daerah/ Tanah Kuala Langat which stated the following: “3. Lanjutan pemakluman tersebut, pihak tuan/puan masing-masing telah mengemukakan surat yang memohon untuk mendapatkan penjelasan lanjut berkaitan keputusan yang telah diputuskan oleh pihak MMKN bertarikh 24.4.2019 tersebut.

Oleh yang demikian, Pentadbiran ini kini dalam tindakan merujuk semula keputusan MMKN bertarikh 24.4.2019 kepada pihak MMKN untuk mendapatkan penjelasan lanjut maksud keputusan MMKN bertarikh 24.9.2019 tersebut dan Pentadbiran ini akan memaklumkan semula kepada pihak tuan/puan kelak” [Emphasis added] [40] Both TNB and Seriemas were of the view the decision of MMKN dated 24.9.2019 was vague and unclear. Hence, a clarification was sought as to the decision given by MMKN on 24.9.2019. A clarification from MMKN pertaining to the decision on 24.9.2019 was sought as can been seen from the letter dated 12.9.2019. [41] The facts of the case reveal that pursuant to the clarification sought, on 19.2.2020 MMKN decided “untuk menolak rayuan pemohon untuk permohonan Bantahan Izin Lalu Menaiktaraf Talian Penghantaran 132 KV dari PMU Olak Lempit ke PMU Banting kepada Seriemas Developemnt Sdn Bhd.” [42] Succinctly, Seriemas and TNB sought clarification from MMKN as to the decision of MMKN on 24.9.2019. MMKN decided the decision of 24.9.2019 was cancelled (dibatalkan). The 19.2.2020 decision (Decision 2) was to “tolak rayuan pemohon”. It is observed that TNB and Seriemas had sought a clarification from MMKN, yet MMKN had used the words “rayuan”. The word “rayuan” in the view of this court means it is an appeal. An appeal is certainly different from a clarification. The question therefore, is whether the act of MMKN to cancel (batalkan) the decision of 24.9.2019 akin to a clarification of the said decision. [43] It is the considered view of this court that TNB and Seriemas sought a clarification from the 24.9.2019 decision. The decision of 24.9.2019 (decision 1) was clearly stated as approved. The issue is whether MMKN can now use a clarification to reverse or change MMKN’s decision. [44] If there was no clarification sought by TNB and Seriemas on Decision 1, and the matter was brought to the attention of MMKN, would MMKN have changed or reversed the decision. [45] Having regard to the facts of this case, it is the considered view of this court that MMKN cannot use a clarification to change its decision. A clarification sought which in turn ended up having a decision reversed, in the view of this court is stretching the word “clarification” to include changing the decision from which the clarification was sought. This will enable the authority to change its decision while shrouding the change with the term “clarification”. In the view of this court, this could lead to an abuse by MMKN to change its decision when in fact a decision i.e. the approval had been given on 24.9.2019. [46] The next ground put forth is the ground of legitimate expectation. It was argued that Seriemas had a legitimate expectation. To answer this question, perhaps it would be best to first consider what amounts to legitimate expectation. [47] YA Zabariah Mohd Yusof, FCJ in the case of YKK (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v. Pengarah Tanah Dan Galian Johor [2021] 8 CLJ 179: “[95] The courts will generally grant judicial review of an administrative decision premised on legitimate expectation where a public authority has made a representation or promise to the individual within its powers. In other word, the representation and promise must be within the law. In addition, the individual has to show that the representation was a clear and an unambiguous promise, an established practice or a public announcement.” [Emphasis added] [48] In Ambiga Sreenevasan v. Director Of Immigration, Sabah, Noor Alam Khan A Wahid Khan & Ors [2017] 9 CLJ 205, the Court of Appeal held: “[53] The doctrine of legitimate expectation originates from common law principles of fairness. English courts developed this doctrine clearly to encourage good administration and prevent-abuses by decision-makers (see Peter Leyland, Gordon Anthony [2009], Legitimate Expectation; Textbook on Administrative Law (6th ed.), Oxford New York, N.Y: Oxford University Press, pp. 313-330 at 313). Generally, the courts will grant judicial review of an administrative decision based on individual’s legitimate expectation if a public authority has made a representation to the individual within its powers. The individual has to show that the representation was a clear and unambiguous promise, an established practice or a public announcement. This is largely a factual inquiry. (See R v. North and East Devan Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan [2001] QB 213 (CA)); Nadarajah v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1363).”. [Emphasis added] [49] The Court of Appeal in Pentadbir Tanah Dan Daerah Petaling & Ors v. Bandar Utama City Corporation Sdn Bhd & Anor And Another Appeal [2021] 5 CLJ 480 stated the following: “[48] Thus, based on the above cited cases, the principles of legitimate expectation that can be deduced are as follows:

the aggrieved parties must stand in direct relationship – without any go between – with the decision makers;

(ii) legitimate expectation shall not be extended to claiming to get ‘substance’ of the expectation itself;

(iii) legitimate expectation is concern of a right of fair hearing or the opportunity to make representation; and

(iv) the Government and any statutory bodies are entitled to review or reverse any policy for interest of majority.”. [50] The facts in this case indicate that Decision 1 stated in unequivocal terms that “MMKN ke 10/2019 pada 24 April 2019 telah menimbang dan meluluskan permohonan bantahan pampasan izin lalu menaik taraf talian penghantaran 132 KV dari PMU Olak Lempit ke PMU Banting kepada Seriemas Development Sdn Bhd”. [51] Succinctly, this means that Decision 1 was an approval by MMKN to Seriemas. Both TNB and Seriemas were of the same view that there was vagueness with regard to the details of the approval. [52] In the considered view of this court, the words meluluskan mean approval, and there is no vagueness in that. It is clear there was approval by MMKN. Seriemas and TNB sought to obtain a clarification as to the details of the approval. This, in the considered view of this court, does not negate the fact that MMKN had given approval by virtue of Decision 1. [53] Founded on the facts of this case, and the authorities referred to, this court is satisfied that there was a legitimate expectation on the part of Seriemas. Conclusion [54] Founded on the abovementioned reasons, this court makes the following order:

For JR 47 - The decision 2 dated 19 February 2020 is hereby quashed.

(ii) Decision 1 dated 24 April 2019 is remitted to the MMKN for clarification details of 24 April 2019 decision within 30 days of receipt of seal copy of this order

(iii) For JR 102 and JR 107 - Decision 1 dated 24 April 2019 is remitted to the MMKN for clarification details of the 24 April 2019 decision within 30 days of receipt of seal copy of this order

(iv) No order as to costs for all three judicial review applications. Date: 11 January 2023 (SHAHNAZ BINTI SULAIMAN) Judge High Court of Malaya, Shah Alam Counsels: For The Applicant Alvin Dev Singh in JR 102 & JR 47 Tetuan Izral Partnership Respondent’s 5 & 6 Advocates & Solicitors in JR 107 2nd Floor, Wisma Hamzah-KH, No. 1, Leboh Ampang, 50100 Kuala Lumpur clerk@izralpartnership.com +6 03 2078 1139 For The Applicant Hadi Mukhlis Khairulmaini in JR 107 Tetuan Steven Thiru & Sudhar Partnership 3rd Respondent in Advocates & Solicitors JR 102 & JR 47 A1-12-01, Arcoris Mont Kiara, Jalan Kiara, 50482 Kuala Lumpur info@stsp.my +6 03 6411 9000 For the 1st & 2nd Husna Binti Abdul Hadli Respondents KAMAR PENASIHAT UNDANG-UNDANG in JR 47 & JR 102 NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN Respondent 1 – 4 Tingkat 4, Podium Utara, in JR 107 Bangunan Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah, 40512 Shah Alam, Selangor. +6 03 5544 7183