Tenaga Nasional Berhad v Segamat District Council (JB-25-04-08/2017)

This is an application for Judicial Review pursuant to Order 53 Rule 2, of the decision of the Full Board Meeting of the Segamat District Council (in Malay it is known as “Majlis Daerah Segamat”) (“SDC”), on 26 April 2017 to re-affirm the assessment rates imposed by the Assessment Rates Committee Meeting of the SDC on 14 March 2017 and 14 April 2017.

The reliefs sought for are as follows: i. A Writ of Certiorari against the decision of the Assessment Rates Committee dated 14 March 2017 and 12 April 2017 which was affirmed by the Full Board Meeting of the Respondent on 26 April 2017 which dismissed the appeal of the Applicant and which decided to affirm the Assessment Rates on the Respondent for all the Electricity Transmission Towers which are found on the Electric Transmission Tower Reserves which was referred by the Respondent as Transmission cables of RSS M.P. 131 ¾ Gemas Bahru, Transmission Cables of RSS M.P. 38 PMU Jementah, Transmission Cables of Paya Lebar Kampung Paya Dalam, Transmission Cables of Paya Dalam to PMU Segamat-Kuantan Highway, Transmission Cables of Gelang Cincin / Jabi, Transmission of MP 111 ¼, PMU Bukit Siput and Transmission Cables of RSS MP 106 ¼ Jalan Segamat / Labis (“the electricity transmission towers”) as contained in the Respondent’s letter dated 16 May 2017 be quashed. November 10, 2021 4 ii. The cost of this application and all incidental costs be Cost in the Cause. iii. Other reliefs that the Court deems fit.

The basis of this application for Judicial Review are as follows: a. The applicant has no proprietary interest in the holdings of the said properties. b. The Application is unable to ascertain which of the transmission towers that are charged with assessment rates because the Respondent failed to give the exact location or particulars of each and every property where the transmission towers are found. c. The rights of the Applicants is only that of wayleave rights pursuant to the Electricity Supply Act 1990. d. The decision of the Respondent to impose Assessment Rates on the Applicant for the Electricity Transmission Towers belonging to the Applicants for the transmission of electricity is ultra vires the Local Government Act 1976. e. The decision of the Respondent to impose Assessment Rates on the Applicant for the Electricity Transmission Towers belonging to the Applicants for the transmission of electricity exceeds the (ultra vires) the jurisdiction of the Respondent and in this instant case, the Respondent acted without any jurisdiction. November 10, 2021 5 f. The Respondent has committed an error of law in making a decision that exceeds its jurisdiction. g. The decision of the Respondent has violated the Rule of Fairness. h. The decision of the Respondent is oppressive and is based on unreasonable consideration and was made wantonly and callously.

The Cause Papers are as follows: i. Notice of Application pursuant to Order 53 Rules of Court 2012 (Enclosure 1). ii. Statement of facts pursuant to Order 53 Rule 3(2) Rules of Court 2012 (Enclosure 2) iii. Affidavit-in-support (Enclosure 3). iv. Affidavit-in-opposition (Enclosure 10). v. Affidavit-in-reply (Enclosure 12)

There was an application for Judicial Review by the same party against the 1st decision of SDC and it was heard by his Lordship, Justice Datuk Wira Ahmad Nasfy. A preliminary objection was raised by the Learned Counsel for the Respondent on the ground that the application should be by way of an appeal and not by way of a judicial review. His Lordship allowed the preliminary objection and there was an appeal against the decision to the Court of Appeal and afterwards before the Federal Court whereby the Federal Court ruled that the correct mode is judicial review and that the Court is not prevented from hearing or deciding based on an application vide November 10, 2021 6 a judicial review. I shall not deal with the procedural matters anymore as the Federal Court has dealt with it very decidedly.

Vide a letter dated 13 November 2014, the Segamat District Council (known in Malay as “Majlis Daerah Segamat”)(“SDC”) i.e. the Respondent served a Notice to Tenaga Nasional Berhad (“TNB”)(which is the Malaysian National Electricity Company) to inform that pursuant to section 141 Local Government Act 1976, an re-valuation exercise of assessment rates has been conducted on all holdings on the entire area under the jurisdiction of the Segamat District Council while new List of the Assessment Rates is ready to take effect on 1 January 2015.

Vide the same letter TNB was informed that the valuation and the new rates that will be levied upon all the holdings of TNB and the Notice listed 198 electrical sub stations, 4 main inlet sub stations, electrical transmission line towers that are found in all 7 high-power electrical transmission line grid and 2 offices and store, all of which are found within the jurisdiction of the Segamat District Council.

TNB’s appeal was only in respect of the Assessment Rates imposed on TNB for the Electrical Transmission Towers (“transmission lines”) within the area where the 7 transmission lines crossed through and are found which are known as Transmission lines of RSS M.P. ¾ Gemas Bahru, Transmission Lines of RSS M.P. 38 PMU Jementah, Transmission Lines of Paya Lebar Kampung Paya Dalam, Transmission Lines of Paya Dalam to PMU Segamat-Kuantan Highway, Transmission Lines of Gelang Cincin / Jabi, November 10, 2021 7 Transmission of MP 111 ¼, PMU Bukit Siput and Transmission Lines of RSS MP 106 ¼ Jalan Segamat / Labis that cuts across the properties , all of which are within the jurisdiction of the SDC.

Vide a Notice dated 13 November 2014 the increase in assessment rates and their respective amounts are as follows: No. Location Increase in value (RM) Rate Yearly Assessment Rate

Transmission cables of RSS M.P. 131 ¾ Gemas Bahru 3,418,720-00 0.30% 10,259-16

Transmission Cables of RSS M.P. 38 PMU Jementah 2,212,760-00 0.30% 6,638-28

Transmission Cables of Paya Lebar Kampung Paya Dalam 11,868,440-00 0.30% 35,605-32

Transmission Cables of Paya Dalam to Segamat-Kuantan Highway 10,862,640-00 0.30% 32,587-92

Transmission Cables of Gelang Cincin / Jabi 2,615,080-00 0.30% 7,845-24

Transmission of MP 111 ¼, PMU Bukit Siput 1,810,440-00 0.30% 5,431-32 November 10, 2021 8

Transmission Cables of RSS MP 106 ¼ Jalan Segamat / Labis 1,609,280-00 0.30% 4,827-84 34,398,360.00 0.30% 103,195.08 [10] Following from that, vide a letter dated 25 November 2014, TNB raised an objection against the increment in valuation as well as the Assessment Rates that was proposed by SDC to be imposed on TNB for the Transmission Towers. [11] Vide a letter dated 17 August 2015, SDC informed TNB that the Assessment Rate Objection Committee No. 14/2015 has met on 28 April 2015 and the Objection Report was tabled on 26 July 2015,earlier decision was re-affirmed by the Full Committee Meeting SDC on 29 July 2015 and the decision made at the meeting was that the SDC will stand by its decision to impose assessment rates on TNB for the Electrical Transmissions Rates for all the Transmission Towers that are found on the property that falls within the jurisdiction of the SDC but decided to reduce the Valuation as well as the Assessment Rates as follows : No. Location Increase in value (RM) Rate Yearly Assessment Rate 1. Transmission cables of RSS M.P. 131 ¾ Gemas Bahru 3,100.000-00 0.30% 9,300-00 November 10, 2021 9

Transmission Cables of RSS M.P. 38 PMU Jementah 1,990,000-00 0.30% 5,970-00 3. Transmission Cables of Paya Lebar Kampung Paya Dalam 10,668,440-00 0.30% 32,005-32 4. Transmission Cables of Paya Dalam to Segamat-Kuantan Highway 9,760,000-00 0.30% 29,280-00 5. Transmission Cables of Gelang Cincin / Jabi 2,350,000-00 0.30% 7,050-00 6. Transmission of MP 111 ¼, PMU Bukit Siput 1,630,000-00 0.30% 4,890-00 7. Transmission Cables of RSS MP 106 ¼ Jalan Segamat / Labis 1,450,000-00 0.30% 4,350.00 30,948,440-00 0.30% 92,845.32 [12] Following from the letter dated 17 August 2015, TNB further sent another letter dated 28 October 2015, seeking for a review of the decision of the increment in valuation as well as the Assessment Rates that was proposed by SDC to be imposed on TNB for the Transmission Towers on the grounds that the Transmission Towers are on properties that are not owned by TNB. TNB further informed that SDC that the rights and interest of TNB on the said properties November 10, 2021 10 are restricted to the right of wayleave pursuant to the Electricity Supply Act 1990 and the responsibility of paying the assessment rates rest upon the respective registered landowners. [13] Upon the invitation of SDC, TNB attended the hearing of the objections at SDC on 20 February 2017 whereby TNB reiterated the rights and interests of TNB on the sites / land is restricted to Wayleave pursuant to the Electricity Supply Act 1990 and the responsibility of paying the assessment rates rest upon the respective registered landowner and not upon TNB. [14] Following this, a letter dated 16 May 2017 informing the decision on the objections against the raise of the assessment rates pursuant to section 142 Local Government Act 1976, was received by TNB in 23 May 2017, was that the Report on the Objections and the hearing of the objections were presented to the Assessment Rates Committee meeting on 14 March 2017 and 12 April 2017 and their decisions were confirmed by a full board meeting of SDC on 26 April 2017. [15] SDC affirmed all previous decisions on the assessment rates to be paid by TNB on all the transmission towers in the Electricity Transmission Line Grid (Exh “TNB-5”). [16] The reason given by SDC was that based on the definition of “building” under the Local Government Act 1976, the transmission towers falls within the meaning of the structures of building. [17] Further, the electricity transmission towers are situated within the jurisdiction of SDC. It is the position of TNB that the exact location November 10, 2021 11 of the high voltage transmission towers cannot be ascertained and the towers cover a large expanse of land. TNB ascertained that the following are the high voltage electricity transmission towers : No. Location of the Transmission Towers based on the details given by SDC High Voltage Electrical Transmission Grid as per TNB Records

RSS M.P. 131 3/4 Gemas Bahru Route Transmission Grid 132kV Segamat – Gemas 2. RSS M.P. 38 PMU Jementah Route Transmission Grid 132kV Segamat – Jementah – Tangkak 3. Paya Lebar Kampung Paya Dalam Route Transmission Grid 132kV Segamat – Gemas Transmission 132kV Segamat – Jementah – Tangkak 4. Paya Dalam Ke PMU Lebuhraya Segamat/Kuantan Route Transmission Grid 132kV Segamat – Gemas & Segamat – Jementah – Tangkak 5. Gelang Chincin/Jabi Route Transmission Grid 132kV Segamat – Bukit Siput – Chaah 6. RSS M.P. 111 1/4 PMU Bukit Siput Route Transmission Grid 132kV Bukit Siput – Yong Peng & Transmission Grid 132kV Segamat – Bukit Besi – Chaah November 10, 2021 12

RSS M.P. 106 1/4 Jalan Segamat/Labis Route Transmission Grid 132kV Segamat – Bukit Besi – Chaah [18] The Electricity Transmission Grid for 132kV Segamat – Gemas is about 31.5 km long, while the Transmission Grid for 132kV Segamat – Bukit – Chaah is more than 44 km and the distance of the transmission grid for 132kV Segamat – Jementah – Tangkak within the administrative zone of SDC exceeds 30 km. The High Voltage Transmission Grid Network along with other installations of the same nature cover a distance of a few hundred kilometres and include hundreds of transmission towers as exhibited as “TNB-6”, “TNB-7” dan “TNB-8” of the affidavit-in-support. THE LAW IN RESPECT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW [19] Judicial Review is provided for under Order 53 Rules of Court 2012. [20] Historically, the basis for judicial review of acts and decisions of public authorities has been the doctrine of ultra vires of excess of jurisdiction. The role of the Court is to keep bodies within their allocated authority of jurisdiction. In judicial review, the Court is concerned with the decision-making process and not with the merits of the decision. Over the years, the scope of Judicial Review has expended to include “Patent error of law”, “natural justice”, and the rules of locus have liberalized (paraphrased from M.P Jain, Administrative Law of Malaysia and Singapore 3rd Edition pages 625-626). November 10, 2021 13 SCOPE OF THE ORDER [21] This order govern ALL application seeking the prerogative writs of mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, certiorari or ‘any others, for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part II of the Constitution, or any of them, or for any purpose’, but is subject to the provisions of Chapter VII of Part 2 of the Specified Relief Act 1950 (on the enforcement of public duties). [Order 53 Rule 1(1) and Rule 1(2)]. MODE OF APPLICATION [22] All application for judicial review (other than for an order of habeas corpus) shall be in Form 109 [Order 53 Rule 2(1)]. [23] An application may be made for any of the reliefs, including declaration, either jointly or in the alternative provided the reliefs are connected with the same subject matter. [Order 53 Rule 2(2)]. [24] A Court is not confined to the relief claimed but may make any order including an order of injunction or monetary compensation. [25] An injunction against the Government must be in accordance with in accordance with Section 29 of the Government Proceeding Act 1948 and Section 54 of the Specific Relief Act 1950. [Order 53 Rule 2(3)]. November 10, 2021 14 LOCUS STANDI [26] Any person who is adversely affected by the decision of any public authority shall be entitled to make the application. [Order 53 Rule 2(4)]. [27] Leave is required to make an application for Judicial Review. An application for judicial review shall not be made without leave of court which must being obtained first. [Order 53 Rule 3(1)]. [28] In R V PANEL FOR TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, EX PARTE DATAFIN [1987] 1 QB 815, the English Court of Appeal held that a privately established panel was amenable to judicial review because it in fact operated as an integral part of a governmental framework for regulating mergers and takeovers, while those affected had no choice but to submit to its jurisdiction. APPLICATION FOR LEAVE [29] Application for leave is make ex parte to a Judge in Chambers, supported by a statement ‘setting out the name and description of the Applicant, the relief sought and the grounds on which it is sought’, and by affidavits verifying the facts relied on. [Order 53 Rule 3(2)]. [30] Notice of the application for leave must be given to the Attorney General’s Chambers not later than three days before the hearing date together with copies of the statement and affidavits. [Order 53 Rule 3(3)]. November 10, 2021 15 [31] In granting leave, the Judge may impose terms as to costs and to the giving of security [Order 53 Rule 3(4)]. [32] No grant of leave shall operate as a stay of proceedings, unless the Judge otherwise so directs. [Order 53 Rule 3(5)]. TIME FOR APPLICATION [33] An application for judicial review shall be made ‘promptly’ and in any event ‘within three months’ from the date when the grounds of application first arose or when the decision is first communicated to the Applicant. [Order 53 Rule 3(6)]. NOTICE IN FORM 110 [34] A sealed copy of the Form 110 together with a copy of the statement and all affidavits shall be served on all persons directly affected by the application not later than14 days before the hearing specified in the Form 110. [Order 53 Rule 4(2)]. [35] In HAZLINDA HAMZAH v. KUMON METHOD OF LEARNING CENTRE [2006] 2 CLJ 933, it is ruled that for certiorari is given, the Applicant must show :

Error in law

The error resulted in an injustice in a broad and general sense. [36] In TELEKOM MALAYSIA BERHAD v. TRIBUNAL TUNTUTAN PENGGUNA & ANOR [2007] 1 CLJ 300, the principles of law governing a judicial review against the decision of a tribunal set up under the law as follow: November 10, 2021 16 “At this juncture, it is appropriate for me to set out the principles governing the grounds for sustaining a substantive notice of motion to challenge a decision-making process by way of certiorari, as follows:

It is neither an appeal nor a review of the decision itself, but a review of the decision-making process of the tribunal to see if there are errors of law on the face of the record;

It is neither feasible nor desirable to attempt exhaustive definition of what amounts to an error of law, for the categories of such an error are not closed;

asks himself the wrong question;

takes into account irrelevant considerations;

omits to take into account certain relevant considerations (an Anisminic error);

misconstrues the terms of the relevant statute; or

misapplies or misstates a principle or general law.” [37] Justice Brightman in CHIEF CONSTABLE OF NORTH WALES POLICE v. EVANS [1982] 1 WLR 1152 has this to say : “Judicial Review is concerned, not with decision, but with the decision-making process. Unless that restriction on the power of the Court is observed, the Court will, in my view, under of preventing the abuse of power be itself guilty of usurping power” [38] In the Supreme Court case of HOTEL EQUATORIAL (M) SDN BHD v. NATIONAL UNION OF HOTEL, BAR & RESTAURANT WORKERS & ANOR [1984] 1 CLJ Rep 155; [1984] 2 CLJ 6; [1984] 1 MLJ 363 speaks thought the judgment of Supreme Court Justice Seah, has this to say : November 10, 2021 17 “... In the exercise of its inherent supervisory jurisdiction over inferior tribunals of limited jurisdiction, the High Court must always remember that it is not sitting as a court of appeal to review the findings of the inferior tribunals. The High Court, it must be observed, has no jurisdiction to consider the merits of the case; its only function is to consider whether the inferior tribunal has performed its duties according to the law. A clear distinction must be maintained between want of jurisdiction and the manner of its exercise. Otherwise, review for jurisdictional error will be equivalent to review on merits. Speaking of the inherent supervisory jurisdiction of the superior court or High Court, Lord Sumner in the case of REX v. NAT BELL LIQUORS LTD [1922] 2 AC 128 said at p156 : ‘That supervision goes to two points: one is in the area of inferior jurisdiction and the qualification and conditions of its exercise; the other is in the observance of the law in the in the course of its exercise...” [39] In DREAMLAND CORPORATION (M) SDN BHD v. CHOONG CHIN SOOI & ANOR [1988] 1 CLJ Rep 39; [1988] 1 CLJ 1; [1988] 1 MLJ 111: “... In the exercise of its inherent supervisory jurisdiction over inferior tribunals of limited jurisdiction, the High Court must always remember that it is not sitting as a court of appeal to review the findings of the inferior tribunals. The High Court, it must be observed, has no jurisdiction to consider the merits of the case; its only function is to consider whether the inferior tribunal has performed its duties according to the law...” [40] In COUNCIL OF CIVIL SERVICE UNIONS V MINISTER FOR THE CIVIL SERVICE [1985] AC 374, Lord Diplock summarised the grounds for reversing an administrative decision by way of judicial review as follows: November 10, 2021 18 i. Illegality. ii. Irrationality (unreasonableness). iii. Procedural impropriety. iv. Legitimate expectation. [41] Under Lord Diplock’s classification, a decision is irrational if it is “so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question could have arrived at it.” This standard is also known as Wednesbury unreasonableness, after the decision in ASSOCIATED PROVINCIAL PICTURE HOUSES LTD V WEDNESBURY CORPORATION [1948] 1 KB 223. [42] Proportionality is a requirement that a decision is proportionate to the aim that it seeks to achieve. For example, an order to forbid a protest march on the grounds of public safety should not be made if there is an alternative way of protecting public safety, such as by assigning an alternative route for the march. [43] Proportionality exists as a ground for setting aside administrative decisions in most continental legal systems and is recognised in England in cases where issues of EU law and human rights are involved. However, it is not as yet a separate ground of judicial review, although Lord Diplock has alluded to the possibility of it being recognised as such in the future. At present, lack of proportionality may be used as an argument for a decision being irrational. [44] A legitimate expectation will arise when a person (or a group or class of persons) has been led by a policy, promise or representation of a November 10, 2021 19 public body to understand that, for example, certain steps will be followed in reaching a decision. [45] Considerations of legitimate expectations: a) When an individual or a group has been led to think that certain steps will apply. b) When an individual or a group relies on a policy or guidelines which govern an area of past executive action. [46] The above principle has been recognized in the case of R V LIVERPOOL CORPORATION, EX PARTE LIVERPOOL TAXI FLEET OPERATORS ASSOCIATION [1972] 2 QB 299. [47] The court may uphold not only a legitimate expectation that a certain procedure would be followed by a public body (“procedural” expectations), but also an expectation of some substantive benefit. In a leading case in 2001 on the latter point, Ms Coughlan, having been badly injured in a car accident, was promised a "home for life" by the health authority when she was transferred from the hospital to a care home. [48] When the authority tried to evict her later, the court held the authority to their promise, since to frustrate Ms Coughlan’s legitimate expectation would be unfair in the circumstances. (see R V. NORTH AND. EAST DEVON HEALTH AUTHORITY, EX PARTE COUGHLAN [2001] QB 213). November 10, 2021 20 [49] The burden of proving misconduct rests with the employer as decided in MILAN AUTO SDN BHD V. WONG SEH YEN [1995] 4 CLJ 449, where the Federal Court ruled “As pointed out by the Court recently in Wong Yuen Hock v. Syarikat Hong Leong Assurance Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 CLJ 344; [1995] 2 MLJ 713, the function of the Industrial court in dismissal cases and reference under s. 20 is twofold, first to determine whether the misconduct complained of by the employer has been established, and secondly whether the proven misconduct constitutes just cause or excuse for the dismissal.” [50] In SAID DHARMALINGAM ABDULLAH V. MALAYAN BREWERIES (MALAYA) SDN BHD [1997] 1 CLJ 646, it is explained, inter alia: In the present case, there is a statutory requirement, to wit, s. 14(1) of the Act, providing for the elementary safeguard of the right to “due inquiry” by the Employer. It follows, that at least, prima facie, a dismissal in breach of s. 14(1) would be void. We are aware of the Supreme Court decision in DREAMLAND CORPORATION (M) SDN. BHD. V. CHOONG CHIN SOOI & ANOR [1988] 1 CLJ Rep 39; [1988] 1 MLJ 111 which held that failure by an employer to hold a pre-dismissal Inquiry could be cured by the hearing before the Industrial Court. Two points are significant in the Dreamland case: first, the court was considering the case of a workman who was in receipt of income of more than RM1,250 per month and, therefore, not employee within the meaning of the Act; November 10, 2021 21 secondly, Counsel on both sides had stood on common ground that the dismissal was justified. The only issues for decision were jurisdictional:

did the Industrial Court have jurisdiction to award compensation to a workman whose dismissal had been upheld by the court? and

did the Industrial Court have jurisdiction to amend the date of dismissal so that the workman was deemed to be in the employment until the date of the award and thereby become entitled to back wages? It follows that Dreamland was a case where it was not open to the workman to rely on a statutory or other requirement which provided or could be interpreted as providing the elementary safeguard of the right to a hearing. Dreamland is, therefore, readily distinguishable on the facts from the present case. Similarly, the Supreme Court decision in WONG YUEN HOCK V. SYARIKAT HONG LEONG ASSURANCE SDN. BHD. [1995] 3 CLJ 344 which endorsed Dreamland, also concerned an employee in receipt of an income of more than RM1,250 per month and, therefore, not an employee within the meaning of the Act. It was thus not open to him to rely upon the statutory right to a pre-dismissal hearing. Hong Leong is, therefore, also readily distinguishable on the facts, from the present case. We note, in passing, the interesting and well researched article by Mr. V. Anantaraman entitled “Procedural Fairness in Dismissal Proceedings in Malaysia” [1996] 2 MLJ cxiii wherein he concludes that “the decisions of the apex courts both in Dreamland and Hong Leong Assurance notwithstanding - it may not be far wrong to conclude that November 10, 2021 22 the case law governing procedural rectitude in dismissal for misconduct is in a state of flux in Malaysia.” Having said that, we must add, that when, as here, a claimant is an employee within the meaning of the Act, he has by s. 14(1) thereof, a statutory right to “due Inquiry” by his employer, and so, the approach of the Industrial Court or for that matter the High Court, in considering the question whether the claimant had been dismissed without just cause or excuse, would be, to examine the decision not just for substance but for process as well. [51] In PELABUHAN TANJUNG PELEPAS SDN BHD v. INDUSTRIAL COURT, MALAYSIA & ANOR [2020] 6 CLJ 111, this was an application for judicial review pursuant to O. 53 Rules of Court 2012 to quash the award handed down by the first Respondent in deciding that the dismissal of the second Respondent was without just cause and excuse. The second Respondent was holding the position of a supervisor in the mobile equipment section in the maintenance and technical service department with the company (‘applicant’). The applicant issued a domestic inquiry notice to the second Respondent. At the domestic inquiry, the second Respondent was given the opportunity to produce evidence and witness to defend himself from the charges levelled against him. The domestic inquiry found the second Respondent not guilty of the charges. Notwithstanding the findings of the domestic inquiry, the management found the second Respondent had lost the necessary trust and confidence to continue in the employment. The applicant was of the opinion that it had no alternative but to terminate the second Respondent's services. The Industrial Court was of the opinion that the applicant had failed to produce any evidence to prove, on a balance of probabilities, the charge framed against the second Respondent and found that the second Respondent's November 10, 2021 23 dismissal was without just cause and excuse. The issues that arose in this application were (i) whether a company may terminate an employee notwithstanding he was found not guilty by the domestic inquiry; (ii) whether the audi partem rule is applicable in the termination of an employment agreement without any termination benefit; and (iii) whether an employee is guilty of an act which he opposed. The High Court ruled that, inter alia, [55] There is, however, a clear distinction between a person serving an office during pleasure and another who served under a contract of service. In the former, borrowing the words of Lord Reid in Ridge’s case “an office is held during pleasure means that the person empowered to dismiss need not have anything against the officer, so he need not give any reason...” but in the latter, the terms of his contract and the employment law (for the time being in force) applies and here, for dismissal from work, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely:

due inquiry be done and

(ii) a finding of misconduct inconsistent with the fulfilment of the express or implied conditions of his service. [56] Mere misconduct is insufficient. It must be misconduct inconsistent with the fulfilment of the express or implied conditions of his service. [52] In TELEKOM MALAYSIA KAWASAN UTARA V. KRISHNAN KUTTY SANGUNI NAIR & ANOR [2002] 3 CLJ 314, the Court ruled:- November 10, 2021 24 “…As such, there is no question of the employer proving that the employee had committed the offence beyond reasonable doubt. There is ample authority for saying that the test is not whether the employee did it but whether the employer acted reasonably in thinking the employee did it. In order for the employer to establish reasonable grounds, they must show that they had made reasonable enquiries and did not form their belief hastily and that they had given employee a fair opportunity to explain himself.” THE ISSUES IN THIS APPLICATION [53] As the procedural issues have been decided by the Federal Court, there is only one issue here which is “Whether the Segamat District Council has the authority to impose the assessment rates on the Electrical High Voltage Transmission Grid that runs across its jurisdiction and the Transmission Towers which are built on the landed properties that are within its local jurisdiction”. [54] To begin with, let us examine the powers of the local authorities. [55] One of source of revenue is provided for under section 39 Local Government Act 1976 (Act 171). I reproduced for ease of reference. 39 Revenue of the local authority The revenue of a local authority shall consist of-

all taxes, rates, rents, licence fees, dues and other sums or charges payable to the local authority by virtue of the provisions of this Act or any other written law; November 10, 2021 25

all charges or profits arising from any trade, service or undertaking carried on the by local authority under the powers vested in it;

all interest on any monies invested by the local authority and all income arising from or out of the property of the local authority, movable and immovable; and

all other revenue accruing to the local authority from the Government of the Federation or of any State or from any statutory body, other local authority or from any other source as grants, contributions, endowments or otherwise. [56] In the Federal Court case of MAJLIS PERBANDARAN SEREMBAN v. TENAGA NASIONAL BHD [2020] 10 CLJ 715, the facts were that the appellant (‘defendant’), in its capacity as a local authority, issued a total of 212 notices of amendment to the valuation list to notify the defendant's intention to impose annual value and assessment rates under s. 144 of the Local Government Act 1976 (‘Local Government Act’) on the 212 pylons belonging to the Respondent (‘plaintiff’) situated within the local authority area of the defendant. This exercise was carried out for the purpose of collecting assessment rates, one of the sources of revenue for the defendant as provided for by s. 39 of the Local Government Act. The plaintiff lodged its objection to the defendant, against the imposition of the annual value and assessment rates. The plaintiff’s objection, however, was rejected by the defendant’s Tax Valuation Appeal Board which led the plaintiff into filing an originating summons against the defendant to challenge, inter alia, notices issued by the defendant pursuant to s. 144 of the Local Government Act. The plaintiff raised a preliminary point, arguing that the rates could not be imposed on any holdings by simply adding these pylons into the November 10, 2021 26 valuation list by way of amendment under s. 144 of the Local Government Act because these pylons had never been imposed with rates prior to this. It was the plaintiff's contention that such pylons must first be listed in the valuation list pursuant to s. 137(1) or (3) of the Local Government Act before the rates could be imposed. The defendant, on the other hand, argued that the plaintiff must first object to the imposition of the rates pursuant to s. 142 of the Local Government Act, before appealing to the Tax Valuation Appeal Board. The defendant also argued that the High Court should also consider the words ‘... or for any other reason whatsoever any rateable holding has not been included in the valuation list’ as appeared in para. 144(1)(a) of the Local Government Act which the defendant posited, signified that the imposition of the rates could still be valid. The High Court, in deciding in favour of the plaintiff, ruled that the imposition of the rates on the pylons must not be allowed as the said pylons were never listed in the valuation list pursuant to the statutory provision provided in s. 137 of the Local Government Act. Hence, this appeal under s. 145(5) of the Local Government Act from the decision of the High Court. The sole issue before the Federal Court was what was the effect of the words ‘or for any other reason whatsoever any rateable holding has not been included in the valuation list’ appearing in para. 144(1)(a) of the Local Government Act. [57] It was held (through the learned judgment of her Ladyship Federal Court Justice Zaleha Yusuf) as follows: [15] To understand this issue of rating and valuations, let us examine the relevant provisions of Act 171. Provisions on rating and valuation can be found in Part XV under the heading of “Rating and Valuation” starting from s. 127. November 10, 2021 27 Section 127 of Act 171 empowers the local authority such as the defendant to impose the annual rate or rates within its local authority. Section 130 of Act 171 provides for the basis of assessment of the rate or rates which may be assessed upon the annual value of holdings or upon the improved value of holdings as the State Authority may determine. Section 133 of Act 171 states that the rate or rates so imposed shall endure for any period not exceeding 12 months. [16] Section 137 of Act 171 talks about the preparation of a valuation list. The valuation list remains in force until it is superseded by a new valuation list which shall be prepared and completed once every five years or within such extended period as the State Authority may determine. Section 141 of Act 171 requires that the notice of the new valuation list to be published once it has been prepared and adopted under s. 137. Section 142 of Act 171 enables any person aggrieved by the valuation list to make objections to the local authority within 14 days before the time fixed for the revision of the valuation list. [17] Section 143 of Act 171, inter alia, requires the local authority to confirm the valuation list on or before 31 December of the year preceding the year in which any valuation list is to come into force, with or without amendment or revision. Although the local authority is not required to hear and determine all objections to the valuation list before confirming it, the local authority is required to hear objections not heard and determined before the valuation list is confirmed as soon as possible, as, until an objections have been heard and determined, the increase in the valuation or new valuation objected to shall not be deemed to be in force and the old rates shall continue to be payable. [18] As can be seen from the above provisions, any local authority, the defendant included, cannot simply impose any November 10, 2021 28 rate of assessment on any holdings without first preparing a valuation list, which list is subject to scrutiny and objection of those affected. [19] Then comes s. 144 of Act 171, the provision of which is in issue before us: s. 144 deals with the amendment to the valuation list. Again, notice must be given to all persons interested in the amendment. Any person aggrieved by the amendment to the valuation list may make objection in writing to the local authority not less than ten days before the time fixed in the notice. Any amendment made in the valuation list shall be confirmed by the local authority. Once it is confirmed, the valuation list with amendment shall remain in force until it is superseded by a new valuation list. See sub-s. 137(2) of Act 171. [20] As alluded to earlier, it was the defendant’s contention that it had the statutory right to amend the existing valuation list under s. 144 of Act 171, to include the 162 pylons belonging to the plaintiff, even though those pylons were never included in the valuation list. It was argued that the decision in SYARIKAT CAHAYA MUDA PERAK was not to be followed as it was not supported by any authority on the interpretation of s. 144 of Act 171. [21] It was further argued by the defendant that the decision in SYARIKAT CAHAYA MUDA PERAK was seriously flawed for the reason that if a holding had already been rated, it was, by necessary implication, already included in the valuation list for rates to be imposed by the local authority. Hence, there was no necessity to amend the valuation list to include such a holding. [22] To support its contention, the defendant cited the same provisions that were examined by us above, namely Part XV of Act 171, ss. November 10, 2021 29 127, 137, 141, 142 and of course 144. The plaintiff also cited the majority decision of this court in TENAGA NASIONAL BHD V. MAJLIS DAERAH DUNGUN [2009] 4 CLJ 385; [2009] 6 MLJ 322 at p. 399 (CLJ); p. 337 (MLJ) para. 26 as follows: [26] By s. 144(1), the valuation officer is empowered, for any of the reasons stated therein, to amend the valuation list at any time. It provides that rates shall be payable in respect of the holding in question in accordance with the valuation list as so amended. Section 144(2) requires the giving, to all persons interested in the amendment, of a time at which the amendment is to be made. Section 144(3) gives the right to make objection in writing to the local authority to any person aggrieved by the amendment on any of the grounds specified in s. 142. Section 144(5) requires the amendment to be confirmed by the local authority. Section 145(1) gives a right of appeal to the High Court to any person dissatisfied with the decision of the local authority on his objection made under s. 144(3) and requires that with the filing of the appeal the amount of the rate appealed against be paid to the local authority. Section 145(5) provides for a further appeal to the Federal Court. Those are all the provisions of the Local Government Act 1976 that constitute the process of amendment of a valuation list. It is a simple and straightforward process. [23] Learned counsel for the defendant emphasised on the last two sentences of the above-quoted passage and further submitted that the “Legislature intended to give a very wide scope to para. 144(1)(a) by including the general words “or for any reason whatsoever”; that the ejusdem generis rule is not applicable to interpret those words as those words do not fall under the same scope of genus as the particular words November 10, 2021 30 “mistake, oversight or fraud” appearing in the preceding part of the paragraph.” [24] As the central issue in this appeal focuses on para. 144(1)(a) of Act 171, we reproduce the said provisions as follows:

(1) Where by reason of:

a mistake, oversight or fraud the name of any person of the particulars of any rateable holding which ought to have been inserted in or omitted from the Valuation List, has been omitted from or inserted in the Valuation List, as the case may be, or any rateable holding has been insufficiently or excessively valued or for any other reason whatsoever any rateable holding has not been included in the Valuation List;

- (f) the Valuation Officer may at any time amend the Valuation List accordingly and rates shall be payable in respect of the holding in question in accordance with the Valuation List so amended. (emphasis added) [25] Paragraph 144(1)(a) as shown above lists down three reasons under which valuation officer is empowered to amend the valuation list at any time. The reasons are:

a mistake, oversight or fraud that the name of any person or the particulars of any rateable holding which ought to have been inserted in or omitted from the November 10, 2021 31 valuation list, has been omitted from or inserted in the valuation list, as the case may be; or

any rateable holding has been insufficiently or excessively valued; or

for any other reason whatsoever any rateable holding has not been included in the valuation list. [26] For the purpose of the appeal before us, it is pertinent to note that the reasons stated in para. 144(1)(a) of Act 171 are relating to “any rateable holding”. The words “rateable holding” and “holding” are defined respectively in s. 2 of Act 171 as follows: “rateable holding” means a holding which is subject to the payment of a rate made and levied under this Act; “holding” means any land, with or without buildings thereon, which is held under a separate document of title and in the case... [27] From the definition section of the words “rateable holding”, we are of the opinion that for a holding to be considered as a “rateable holding”, it must be subject to payment of a rate “made and levied under the Act”. The local authority must first evaluate whether or not the holding in question is subjected to the imposition of rate. Any holding which is not listed in the valuation list is deemed to be considered as being exempted from the imposition of rate. The definition of the phrase “rateable holding” as shown above, in our view, makes it clear that the amendment to the valuation list canonly be made in respect of the properties that have been November 10, 2021 32 subjected to the payment of the rate made and levied when the valuation list or revised valuation list was prepared under sub-ss. 137(1) or (3) of the Act 171 but not otherwise. [28] This view is consistent with the decision of the learned High Court Judge in the case of SYARIKAT CAHAYA MUDA PERAK which was affirmed and upheld by this court on 26 October 2017. It is unfortunate that this court did not give any reason in SYARIKAT CAHAYA MUDA PERAK. We are in full agreement with the view expressed in SYARIKAT CAHAYA MUDA PERAK that before a local authority prepares a valuation list, it is incumbent upon the local authority to go through a process which leads to identifying which holding that rate may be imposed and which holding may be exempted from the imposition of rate. In the case of holdings used exclusively for recreational, social or welfare purposes and not for pecuniary profit, the State Authority may exempt such holdings from payment of all or any rates or may reduce the rate. [29] It is our considered view, the case of MAJLIS DAERAH DUNGUN (supra) cited by the defendant did not assist the defendant in this instance, as the majority decision of this court in that case merely stated what was stipulated in s. 144 of Act 171 without elaborating the effect of the words “or for any other reason whatsoever any rateable holding has not been included in the valuation list”. In MAJLIS DAERAH DUNGUN, the issue was whether the appellant’s (TNB) failure to object under sub-s. 144(3) of Act 171 precluded the appellant from challenging the determination of the annual value and rate on any ground. This court by majority decision delivered by Abdul Aziz Mohamad FCJ held that the door was not closed to the appellant to question the validity of the rates claimed by the Respondent therein. [30] The importance of reading an Act as a whole has been emphasised in many cases. In MARTEGO SDN BHD V. November 10, 2021 33 ARKITEK MEOR & CHEW SDN BHD & ANOTHER APPEAL [2019] 8 CLJ 433 this court referred to the case of RESERVE BANK OF INDIA V. PEERLESS GENERAL FINANCE AND INVESTMENT CO LTD 1987 SCR (2) 1 wherein Chinnappa Reddy J said: Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when the object and purpose of its enactment is known. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute maker, provided by such context its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place. [31] It is beyond dispute that each provision or part of a provision must be read in its immediate context and in the context of the Act as a whole. When words are read in their immediate context, the reader forms an impression as to their meaning. Any impression based on immediate context must be November 10, 2021 34 supplemented by considering the rest of the Act, including all other provisions of the Act and their various structural components. (See Ruth Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of States, 3rd edn, Butterworths). [32] Therefore, we say, s. 144 of Act 171 cannot be read in isolation from the rest of the provisions in Part XV of Act 171. This is because the legislative scheme provided under Part XV under the heading of “Rating and Valuation” reflects the whole scope of the Act and the real intention of the enacting body in dealing with this issue. As such, the court must not only consider one section but all sections in Act 171, including the relation of one section to the other sections, the relation of a section to the general object intended to be secured by the Act. This is in consonance with the doctrine of harmonious construction as explained by this court in PIHAK BERKUASA TATATERTIB MAJLIS PERBANDARAN SEBERANG PERAI & ANOR V. MUZIADI MUKHTAR [2020] 1 CLJ 1, where this court held: [78] In this regard, it would be convenient for us to discuss the doctrine of harmonious constructions. To put it simply, the doctrine of harmonious construction means a statute should be read as a whole and one provision of the Act should be construed with reference to other provisions in the same Act so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. Such an interpretation is beneficial in avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy either within a section or between a section and other parts of the statute. The five main principles of this doctrine/rule are as follows:

the court must avoid a head on clash of seemingly contradictory provisions and they must construe the contradictory provisions so as to harmonise them (see Commissioner of Income Tax v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers [2002] 3 SCC 57, p. 74); November 10, 2021 35

(ii) the provision of one section cannot be used to defeat the provision contained in another unless the court, despite all its efforts, is unable to find a way to reconcile their differences;

(iii) when it is impossible to completely reconcile the differences in contradictory provisions, the courts must interpret them in such a way that effect is given to both provisions as much as possible (see Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain, AIR 1997 SC 1006, pp. 1009, 1010);

(iv) courts must also keep in mind that interpretation that reduces one provision to useless or dead lumber is not harmonious construction (see Commissioner of Income Tax v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers [2002] 3 SCC 57, p. 74); and

to harmonise is not to destroy any statutory provision or to render it fruitless. [79] In a nutshell, the doctrine requires that the legislation be construed in a way which would achieve a harmonious result, and that construction should favour coherence in the law. [33] Having said so, we are of the considered view that any holdings which are not listed in the valuation list are deemed to be exempted from the imposition of rates. Although para. 144(1)(a) of Act 171 allows the valuation officer to amend the valuation list for any other reason whatsoever, that does not mean that the valuation officer can do so without having regard to the specific reasons enumerated in paras. 144(1)(a) to (f) of Act 171. It must be borne in mind that “reasons to amend” are not only found in para. (a) of sub-s. 144(1) but November 10, 2021 36 also in paras. (b) to (f) as well. If the Legislature wishes to give so much room for the valuation officer to amend the valuation list, then we say there is no need to specify reasons as stated in paras. (a) to (f) of sub-s. 144(1). [34] Therefore, we are of the view, that the correct interpretation to the words “or for any other reason whatsoever” is to confine the reasons to reasons of the same class as mentioned in para. 144(1)(a) of Act 171. When general language follows a series or more specific terms, the class of things referred to by the general language may be read down to refer to narrower class of things to which the specific terms all belong. (See Judicial Commission of New South Wales, 'Statutory Interpretation Principles and Pragmatism for a New Age ' (Education Monograph, 2007) at p. 129). [35] The rule of statutory construction or interpretation known as ejusdem generis principle can be expounded through the following dictum of Lord Campbell in R. V. EDMUNDSON [1859] 28 LJMC 213 at p. 215 wherein His Lordship stated the following: I accede to the principle laid down... that, where there are general words following particular and specific words, the general words must be confined to things of the same kind as those specified. [36] In AFFIN BANK BHD V. JAMALUDIN JAAFAR; THE ASSOCIATION OF BANKS IN MALAYSIA & ANOR (INTERVENERS) [2019] 7 CLJ 541, this court referred to the case of TENAGA NASIONAL BHD V. ONG SEE TEONG & ANOR [2010] 2 CLJ 1, wherein Augustine Paul FCJ speaking for this court, had this to say: [44] …My view is that since these preceding words are general words which follow particular and specific November 10, 2021 37 words of one genus then it is presumed to be restricted to the same genus as the particular words. Meaning: the general expression is to be read as comprehending things of the same kind as that designated by the preceding particular expression unless there is something to show that a wider sense was intended - see PUBLIC PROSECUTOR V. PENGURUS HONG TRADING & CO. [1984] 2 CLJ 67; [1984] 2 CLJ (Rep) 415 @ 417: I am further of the view that the words ‘other matter’ found in reg. 3(v)(ii) of the regulation should be read ejusdem generis with “Prussian blue, lead or compounds of lead” which according to the Deputy Public Prosecutor are poisonous or deleterious to the human body. According to a well-established rule of construction of statutes, general terms following particular ones apply only to such persons or things as are ejusdem generis with those comprehended in the language of the legislature. In other words, the general expression is to be read as comprehending things of the same kind as that designated by the preceding particular expressions, unless there is something to show that a wider sense was intended. (emphasis added) [37] We, therefore, agree with learned counsel for the plaintiff’s submission that if the intention of the Parliament was to give the general words “... or for any other reason whatsoever any rateable holding has not been included in the valuation list” an unrestricted and unfettered meaning to embrace all and any reason, it would not have been necessary to enumerate the specific reasons preceding the words and all specific reasons enumerated in s. 144(1)(a) to (f) of the Act. It would have sufficed to use only one compendious expression or November 10, 2021 38 use the general words “... for any other reason whatsoever any rateable holding has not been included in the valuation list” without having to include the other paragraph. [38] Further, we must not forget that the words “for any other reasons whatsoever” in para. 144(1)(a) of Act 171 do not stop just there. Those words follow with the words “any rateable holding”. As we have shown earlier in para. 26, “rateable holding” is defined as a holding which is subject to the payment of a rate made and levied under Act 171. It means, and very clearly too as we have explained in para. 27 that no amendment to the valuation list can be made in respect of the properties unless those properties have been subjected to the payment of the rate made and levied when the valuation list or revised valuation list was prepared under s. 137 of Act 171. [58] The Federal Court concluded that “...for the purpose of imposing annual value and assessment rates on the 162 pylons of the plaintiff, the defendant cannot simply enlist or add those pylons in its valuation list by way of amendment to the valuation list under s. 144 of the Act 171 as the pylons were not rateable holding, that they had never before been imposed with rates and had never been listed in the valuation list under s. 137 of Act 171. Despite the words "or for any other reason whatsoever any rateable holding has not been included in the valuation list", rates cannot be imposed unless the holding is first listed in the valuation list as provided for by s. 137...”. [59] I also noted that in MAJLIS PERBANDARAN SEREMBAN v. TENAGA NASIONAL BHD [2020] 10 CLJ 715, the Federal Court laid down the procedures for re-valuation of the assessment rates which must be comply with. November 10, 2021 39 [60] In our instant application, it is not the procedure that is being challenged but the actual decision of the assessment rates. Although we have a substantive due process that the SDC undergo before coming to the decision on assessment rates, the considerations that were taken into account may be challenged if it is procedural in nature, both in the procedural due process or the substantive due process which in the Common Law Traditions is known as procedural justice and substantive procedural justice of the matter. [61] In Strauss, Peter. “DUE PROCESS”. Legal Information Institute. Retrieved 8 March 2013, it was written that the rights, which apply equally to civil due process and criminal due process, are the following: i. An unbiased tribunal. ii. Notice of the proposed action and the grounds asserted for it. iii. The opportunity to present reasons for the proposed action not to be taken. iv. The right to present evidence, including the right to call witnesses. v. The right to know the opposing evidence. vi. The right to cross-examine adverse witnesses. vii. A decision based only on the evidence presented. viii. Opportunity to be represented by counsel. ix. A requirement that the tribunal prepare a record of the evidence presented. x. A requirement that the tribunal prepare written findings of fact and the reasons for its decision. November 10, 2021 40 [62] In BI-METALLIC INVESTMENT CO. V. STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, 239 U.S. 441 (1915), the Supreme Court held that only politics (the citizen’s “power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule”) controlled the state's action setting the level of taxes; but if the dispute was about a taxpayer's individual liability, not a general question, the taxpayer had a right to some kind of a hearing (“the right to support his allegations by arguments however brief and, if need be, by proof however informal”). This left the state a lot of room to say what procedures it would provide, but did not permit it to deny them altogether. [63] In LONDONER V. DENVER, 210 U. S. 373, at page 385, a local board had to determine “whether, in what amount, and upon whom” a tax for paving a street should be levied for special benefits. A relatively small number of persons was concerned, who were exceptionally affected, in each case upon individual grounds, and it was held that they had a right to a hearing. But that decision is far from reaching a general determination dealing only with the principle upon which all the assessments in a county had been laid. [64] Although these are 2 American cases, but the point is whether we should consider the substantive due process in this regard. [65] As I have said earlier, under Lord Diplock’s classification, a decision is irrational if it is “so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question could have arrived at it.” This standard is also known as Wednesbury unreasonableness, after the decision in ASSOCIATED PROVINCIAL PICTURE HOUSES LTD V WEDNESBURY CORPORATION [1948] 1 KB 223. November 10, 2021 41 [66] Hence it is pertinent to look at section 127 the Local Government Act which provides: “The local authority may, with the approval of the State Authority, from time to time as is deemed necessary, impose either separately or as a consolidated rate, the annual rate or rates within a local authority area for the purposes of this act or for other purposes which it is the duty of the local authority to perform under any other written law.” [67] In MAJLIS DAERAH DUNGUN V. TENAGA NASIONAL BHD [2006] 2 CLJ 1078 the Court of Appeal held: “[33] Thus, pursuant to the provisions of the Act, the local authority’s duty is to impose the annual rate or rates within its local authority area for the purposes of the Act and the duty of an owner of a holding within the local authority area is to pay for the assessment at the rate determined by the local authority” [68] I am keeping in mind, Article 96, Federal Constitution provides that: “No tax or rate shall be levied by or for the purposes of the Federation except by or under the authority of federal law.” [69] Under Article 74, Federal Constitution pertaining to the subject matter of federal and state law it is further provided that:

Without prejudice to any power to make laws conferred on it by any other Article, Parliament may make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the federal List or the November 10, 2021 42 Concurrent List (that is to say, the First or Third List set out in the Ninth Schedule). [70] A reading of the First and Third List as set out in the Ninth Schedule suggest that there is no reference thereto to any matters concerning the purview of local government and by implication thereto no reference is made to any assessments or rates under the Local Government Act 1976. [71] Hence, assessment rates are not federal tax as section 39 of the Local Government Act 1976 provides; “The revenue of a local authority shall consist of-

all taxes, rates, rents, licence fees, dues and other sums or charges payable to the local authority by virtue of the provisions of this act or any other written law” [72] As well as section 40 of the Local Government Act 1976 which states that: “(1) All moneys received by the local authority by virtue of this act or any other written law shall constitute a fund to be called the local Authority Fund and shall, together with all property which becomes vested in the local authority, be under the direction and control of the local authority.” [73] In an earlier case of MAJLIS DAERAH DUNGUN v. TENAGA NASIONAL BHD [2006] 2 CLJ 1078, the facts were that appellant/plaintiff is a local authority within the meaning of the Local Government Act 1976 (‘the Act’). The Respondent/defendant owned and operated the Sultan Ismail Paka Power Station (‘the said November 10, 2021 43 holding’) situated within the jurisdiction of the appellant. The said holding comprised of more than 13 buildings including a power-generating plant. In May 1991, the appellant issued a notice of amendment to the valuation list for the said holding to the Respondent under s. 144 of the Act (‘the said notice’). The Respondent claimed that the said holding was valued by the appellant beyond its rateable value on the grounds that in estimating the annual value of the said holding, the appellant had wrongly taken into account the “machinery” used for generating electricity. [74] The Respondent did not make any payment for the sum claimed but instead conducted negotiations with the appellant. Due to the length of time taken for negotiations, the Respondent made several “interim payments” to the appellant. The Respondent also claimed that the appellant had agreed to abide by the decision of a Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’). The Tribunal in its decision held that plant and machinery should be excluded from calculations. Pursuant to the Tribunal’s decision, the appellant forwarded a revised claim whereby the appellant to a certain extent adopted the Tribunal's decision. The Respondent however was not happy on the ground that the appellant did not comply fully with the principles of the said Tribunal’s decision. The appellant denied that it had agreed to abide by the Tribunal’s decision. The Respondent, relying on the estoppel principle, contended that the appellant had waived its right to revert to its original assessment claim as there were amended assessment bills or claims sent to the Respondent subsequently. [75] The appellant filed this action claiming against the Respondent arrears of rate imposed on the said holding less the interim payments. The Respondent, based on its own valuation of the said November 10, 2021 44 holding, claimed that a lower rate of assessment was payable and counterclaimed against the appellant for a sum which was purportedly overpaid by the Respondent. The Respondent also prayed for a declaration that the said notice was ultra vires and void. The learned High Court judge dismissed the appellant’s claim and the Respondent’s counterclaim with costs. The appellant appealed and the Respondent cross-appealed. [76] The Court of Appeal ruled that [5] It would be convenient at this stage to refer to the relevant statutory provisions of the Act before dealing with the facts leading to the dispute. Section 2 of the Act which is an interpretation provision provides that “local authority” means, inter alia, any District Council. Section 127 of the Act provides that a local authority may impose the annual rate or rates within its local authority area for the purposes of the Act. Section 127, entitled “Power to impose rates”, reads: The local authority may, with the approval of the State Authority, from time to time as is deemed necessary, impose either separately or as a consolidated rate, the annual rate or rates within a local authority area for the purposes of this Act or for other purposes which it is the duty of the local authority to perform under any other written law. [6] Under s. 130 of the Act, a local authority may assess rates upon the annual value of holdings. Section 130, entitled “Basis of assessment of rate”, reads:

Any rate or rates imposed under this Part may be assessed upon the annual value of holdings or upon November 10, 2021 45 the improved value of holdings as the State Authority may determine.

If any rate or rates are assessed upon the annual value of holdings such rate or rates shall not exceed:

thirty five per centum of the annual value in the case of the rates imposed under section 127;

(Deleted);

five per centum of the annual value in the case of the rates imposed under section 132.

If any rate or rates are assessed upon the improved value of holdings such rate or rates shall not exceed:

five per centum of the improved value in the case of rates imposed under section 127;

(Deleted);

one per centum of the improved value in the case of rates imposed under section 132. [7] Section 2 of the Act provides that “holding” means, inter alia, any land, with or without buildings thereon, which is held under a separate document of title. As to the meaning of the words “annual value” s. 2 of the Act provides: “annual value” means the estimated gross annual rent at which the holding might reasonably be expected to let from year to year the landlord paying the expenses of repair, insurance, maintenance or upkeep and all public rates and taxes: Provided that: November 10, 2021 46

...;

in estimating the annual value of any holding in or upon which there is any machinery used for any or all of the following purposes:

the making of any article or part of an article;

(ii) the altering, repairing, ornamenting or finishing of any article;

(iii) the adapting for sale of any article, the enhanced value given to the holding from the presence of such machinery shall not be taken into consideration, and for the purposes of this paragraph “machinery” includes steam engines, boilers or other motive power belonging to such machinery;

...;

...; [8] Section 137 of the Act provides that a local authority shall prepare a valuation list of all holdings within its area and is also entitled to amend from time to time such valuation list pursuant to s. 144 of the Act. Section 137, entitled “Preparation of Valuation List”, reads:

The local authority shall cause a Valuation List of all holdings not exempted from the payment of rates to be prepared containing:

the name of the street or locality in which such holding is situated; November 10, 2021 47

the designation of the holding either by name or number sufficient to identify it;

the names of the owner and occupier, if known;

the annual value or improved value of the holding.

The Valuation List together with the amendments made under section 144 shall remain in force until it is superseded by a new Valuation List.

A new Valuation List which shall contain the same particulars as in subsection (1) shall be prepared and completed once every five years or within such extended period as the State Authority may determine. [9] Section 141 of the Act, entitled “Notice of new Valuation List to be published”, reads:

Where any Valuation List has been prepared or adopted under the provisions of section 137 the local authority shall give notice of the same and of the place where the Valuation List or a copy thereof may be inspected in the Gazette and by way of advertisement in two local newspapers at least one of which is in the national language.

Any person claiming to be either the owner or occupier of a holding included in the Valuation List or the agent of any such person may inspect the Valuation List and make extracts therefrom without charge. November 10, 2021 48

The local authority shall give notice in the same manner of a day not being less than forty-two days from the date of notification in the Gazette when the local authority will proceed to revise the Valuation List and in all cases in which any holding is for the first time valued or the valuation thereon has increased the local authority shall also give notice to the owner or occupier thereof. [10] Section 142 of the Act, entitled “Objections”, reads: Any person aggrieved on any of the following grounds:

that any holding for which he is rateable is valued beyond its rateable value;

that any holding valued is not rateable;

that any person who, or any holding which, ought to be included in the Valuation List is omitted therefrom;

that any holding is valued below its rateable value; or

that any holding or holdings which have been jointly or separately valued ought to be valued otherwise, may make objection in writing to the local authority at any time not less than fourteen days before the time fixed for the revision of the Valuation List. November 10, 2021 49

All objections shall be enquired into and the persons making them shall at such enquiry be allowed an opportunity of being heard either in person or by an authorised agent. (emphasis added) [11]

Where by reason of:

a mistake, oversight or fraud the name of any person or the particulars of any rateable holding which ought to have been inserted in or omitted from the Valuation List, has been omitted from or inserted in the Valuation List, as the case may be, or any rateable holding has been insufficiently or excessively valued or for any other reason whatsoever any rateable holding has not been included in the Valuation List;

any building erected, modified, altered, demolished or rebuilt, or other improvements made upon rateable holding the value thereof has been increased;

any building or part of a building being demolished or any other works being carried out on the rateable holding the value thereof has been decreased; November 10, 2021 50

any rateable holding which has been included in a joint valuation and which in the opinion of the Valuation Officer ought to have been valued separately or otherwise;

the issue of any new titles in respect of any holdings;

any change to the rateable holding effected by any law relating to planning as a result of which the value of the holding has been increased or decreased, the Valuation Officer may at any time amend the Valuation List accordingly and rates shall be payable in respect of the holding in question in accordance with the Valuation List so amended.

Notice shall be given to all persons interested in the amendment of a time, not less than thirty days from the date of service of such notice, at which the amendment is to be made.

Any person aggrieved by the amendment of the Valuation List on any of the grounds specified in section 142 may make objection in writing to the local authority not less than ten days before the time fixed in the notice and shall be allowed an opportunity of being heard in person or by an authorised agent.

Any amendment made under this section may, at the discretion of the local authority, have regard to the level of annual values or improved value prevailing as at or about the time the current Valuation List was prepared. November 10, 2021 51

Any amendment made in the Valuation List in accordance with this section shall be confirmed by the local authority.

Where on account of any amendment in the Valuation List the rate payable in respect of any holding is enhanced, reduced or extinguished, the new rate shall be payable, or the rate shall cease to be payable, from commencement of the next half year or such earlier date as the local authority may determine. (emphasis added) [12] Section 145 of the Act provides that any person who, having made an objection in the manner prescribed by s. 142 or 144, is dissatisfied with the decision of the local authority thereon may appeal to the High Court by way of originating motion provided that with the filing of the originating motion, there shall be paid into the local authority the amount of the rate appealed against. The originating motion shall be filed by the person dissatisfied with the decision of the local authority within fourteen (14) days of the receipt thereof. Section 145, entitled “Appeals”, reads:

Any person who having made an objection in the manner prescribed by section 142 or 144 is dissatisfied with the decision of the local authority thereon may appeal to High Court by way of originating motion: Provided that with the filing of the originating motion there shall be paid into the local authority the amount of the rate appealed against.

The originating motion shall be filed by the person dissatisfied with the decision of the local authority within fourteen days of the receipt thereof. November 10, 2021 52

The local authority shall be the Respondent in any appeal under this section.

Every such appeal shall be heard before the High Court whose decision on questions of fact shall be final and conclusive.

From the decision of the High Court either party may appeal on questions of law to the Supreme Court whose decision shall be final and conclusive.

In any appeal under subsection (5), the provisions of any written law for the time being in force relating to appeals in civil matters from the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court shall apply. (emphasis added) [77] The issue in our application is different in that the centre of the dispute is whether the Transmission Towers which is almost an absolute necessity in the transmission of electricity supply from one part of the country to another falls within the meaning of “building” which may be assessed as “the annual value of holdings or upon the improved value of holdings as the State Authority may determine” as stipulated by section 130 Local Government Act 1976 and which falls within section 127 of the same Act. [78] Keeping in mind, section 130 stipulates- 130 Limitation of assessment rate

Any rate or rates imposed under this Part may be assessed upon the annual value of holdings or upon the improved value of holdings as the State Authority may determine. November 10, 2021 53

If any rate or rates are assessed upon the annual value of holdings such rate or rates shall not exceed -

thirty five per centum of the annual value in the case of the rates imposed under section 127;

(Deleted by Act A865:s.6);

five per centum of the annual value in the case of the rates imposed under section 132.

If any rate or rates are assessed upon the improved value of holdings such rate or rates shall not exceed-

five per centum of the improved value in the case of rates imposed under section 127;

(Deleted by Act A865:s.6)

one per centum of the improved value in the case of rates imposed under section 132. [79] Section 2 of the Act defines the following- “annual value” means the estimated gross annual rent at which the holding might reasonably be expected to let from year to year the landlord paying the expenses of repair, insurance, maintenance or upkeep and all public rates and taxes: Provided that-

in estimating the annual value no account shall be taken of any restrictions or control on rent in so far as it limits the rent which November 10, 2021 54 may be required by a landlord or recovered from a tenant of a holding;

in estimating the annual value of any holding in or upon which there is any machinery used for any or all of the following purposes -

the making of any article or part of an article;

(ii) the altering, repairing, ornamenting or finishing of any article;

(iii) the adapting for sale of any article, the enhanced value given to the holding from the presence of such machinery shall not be taken into consideration, and for the purposes of this paragraph “machinery” includes steam engines, boilers or other motive power belonging to such machinery;

in the case of any land –

which is partially occupied or partially built upon;

(ii) which is vacant, unoccupied or not built upon;

(iii) with an incomplete building; or

(iv) with a building which has been certified by the local authority to be abandoned or dilapidated or unfit for human habitation, the annual value shall be, in the case of subparagraph (i), either the annual value as hereinbefore defined or ten per centum of the open market value thereof at the absolute discretion of the Valuation Officer, and in the case of subparagraphs (ii), (iii) and (iv) the annual value shall be ten per centum of the open market value thereof as if, in relation to subparagraphs (iii) and (iv), it were vacant land with no buildings thereon and in all cases the local authority may, with the approval of the State Authority, reduce such percentages to a minimum of five per centum; November 10, 2021 55

where in respect of any particular holding, in the opinion of the Valuation Officer, there is insufficient evidence to base a valuation of annual value upon, the Valuation Officer may apply such methods of valuation as in his opinion appears appropriate to arrive at the annual value; [80] First, it must be noted that the definition of “annual value” means the estimated gross annual rent at which the holding might reasonably be expected to let from year to year ...” [81] Second, the meaning of “holding” is that “holding” means any land, with or without buildings thereon, which is held under a separate document of title and in the case of subdivided buildings, the common property and any parcel thereof and, in the case of Penang and Malacca “holding” includes messuages, buildings easements and hereditaments of any tenure, whether open or enclosed, whether built on or not, whether public or private, and whether maintained or not under statutory authority;” [82] Since “holding” is defined (in an exhaustive manner) as “any land, with or without buildings thereon...” [83] Thirdly, the definition of “building” includes any house, hut, shed or roofed enclosure, whether used for the purpose of human habitation or otherwise, and also any wall, fence, platform, underground tank, staging, gate, post, pillar, paling, frame, hoarding, slip, dock, wharf, pier, jetty, landing-stage, swimming pool, bridge, railway lines, transmission lines, cables, redifussion lines, overhead or underground pipelines, or any other structure, support or foundation;” November 10, 2021 56 [84] I cannot ignore the fact that the definition of building is non exhaustive (by the usage of the word “includes”) and following that there are many matters which are among them “…transmission lines, cables, redifussion lines, overhead or underground pipelines, or any other structure, support or foundation;” [85] Looking at the literal meaning of the case, I found that “annual value” is dependent upon what constitutes “holding” while “holding” means “any land, with or without buildings thereon”, and “building” includes “…transmission lines, cables, redifussion lines, overhead or underground pipelines, or any other structure, support or foundation;” [86] I am of the view that “transmission lines, cables, redifussion lines etc” may be taken into account in deciding the “annual value” of the land. [87] The next issue is whether the applicant (TNB) is liable to pay for the “assessment rates” above and beyond the “annual value” if there had not been for the presence of “…transmission lines, cables, redifussion lines, overhead or underground pipelines, or any other structure, support or foundation;” [88] Section 163 of the Act is of not much assistance in that it is confined to “buildings situated on State land or on land reserved for a public purpose and not occupied by the Federal or State Governments the local authority, with the approval of the State Authority,”. November 10, 2021 57 [89] The Court of Appeal in this very case as reported as TENAGA NASIONAL BHD v. MAJLIS DAERAH SEGAMAT [2021] 5 CLJ 833 ruled that – [22] Section 163(1) of the Act expressly sets out that in the case of buildings situated on State land or on land reserved for a public purpose, the local authority may impose the rates referred to in s. 127 on any such buildings, and the occupiers of such buildings shall be liable to pay the said rates. Section 163(2) of the Act states that the provisions of Act with regards to rates shall apply to any rate imposed under subsection (1) except that in the application of the provisions, references to a “holding” shall be deemed to be references to a “building”, and references to the “owner” of a holding shall be deemed to be references to the “occupier” of a building. [23] Section 163 is applicable for rates to be imposed by the local authority if the “building” is situated on State or reserved land. In our appeal, the list attached to the Respondent's notice dated 13 November 2014 informing the appellant that the Respondent had prepared a new valuation list of the appellant's holdings pursuant to s. 141 of the Act did not state that the pylons are situated on the State Land or on the reserved land. It merely sets out that the pylons are located on hundreds of locations where the status of the lands were obviously unknown/privately-owned lands within the area administered by the Respondent. Therefore without stating the status of land, whether it is State or reserved land, the Respondent cannot use s. 163 of the Act to mount its claim. [90] I am bound by the learned judgment stated above. November 10, 2021 58 [91] However, it must be noted that TNB comes on the land by virtue of the Electricity Supply Act 1990. [92] TNB is a licensee within the meaning of section 2 Electricity Supply Act 1990 which states that a “licensee” means a person licensed under section 9;” Section 9 reads as follows: 9 Licence required for use of installations: terms, conditions and contents of licences

Subject to any exemptions as may be granted, no person, other than a supply authority, shall-

use, work or operate or permit to be used, worked or operated any installation; or

supply to or for the use of any other person electricity from any installation, except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a licence as may be prescribed authorizing the supply or use, as the case may be.

Licences may be granted by the Commission with the approval of the Minister upon payment of such fees and upon such terms and conditions as appear to be requisite or expedient having regard to the duties imposed by section 4. …. [93] In the case of EASY VISTA SDN BHD v. TENAGA NASIONAL BHD [2021] 1 CLJ 453, the Court of Appeal held that “[125] In so far as the purpose of s. 11 is concerned, we agree with the November 10, 2021 59 enunciation by the Court of Appeal in TNB V. TEOBROS (supra) that, “s. 11 of the Act, and its ten sub-sections were legislatively enacted to provide a mechanism for a licensee under the Act to obtain a right to enter land to construct electricity pylons and/or lay electricity cables, to protect the rights of the owners and occupiers of the land who are affected by such a right of entry.” [94] The decision in EASY VISTA SDN BHD (supra) is that entry of TNB onto private land for the purpose stated in section 11 Electricity Supply Act 1990 cannot be stopped and at best, the owner may demand compensation and / or rental and that too is subjected to the Electricity Supply Act 1990. [95] As I have stated earlier that the annual value of an alienated land is subject (among others) presence of buildings on that land and “buildings” include “transmission lines”. [96] The Local Government Act 1976 grant power to the local authorities to determine annual value and from then on the assessment rates. [97] Since the land owners has lost control over their lands (which was taken over by the licensee pursuant to s.11 Electricity Supply Act 1990), they have nothing except legal ownership and that too by virtue of section 340 National Land Code 1965/2020, are they to bear the assessment rates and if the assessment rate exceed rentals paid, then not only the registered land owners lost the enjoyment of their lands, they also lost the profits or returns for the rental of the lands to TNB. In my view, this may be plain cruelty. November 10, 2021 60 [98] The Learned Counsel for the Applicant argued that TNB is a mere wayleave of the land pursuant to section 11 Electricity Supply Act

It is further argued that the applicant has no proprietary interest in the holdings of the said properties. The Application is unable to ascertain which of the transmission towers that are charged with assessment rates because the Respondent failed to give the exact location or particulars of each and every property where the transmission towers are found. [99] Further the Court’s attention was drawn to the argument that the rights of the Applicants is only that of wayleave rights pursuant to the Electricity Supply Act 1990. The decision of the Respondent to impose Assessment Rates on the Applicant for the Electricity Transmission Towers belonging to the Applicant for the transmission of electricity was being argued as being ultra vires the Local Government Act 1976. [100] Learned Counsel further said that the decision of the Respondent to impose Assessment Rates on the Applicant for the Electricity Transmission Towers belonging to the Applicant for the transmission of electricity exceeds the (ultra vires) the jurisdiction of the Respondent and in this instant case, the Respondent acted without any jurisdiction. [101] It was also argued that the Respondent has committed an error of law in making a decision that exceeds its jurisdiction. The decision of the Respondent has violated the Rule of Fairness. The decision of the Respondent is said to be oppressive and is based on unreasonable consideration and was made wantonly and callously. November 10, 2021 61 [102] Hence it is a “mere occupier” of the said lands where the Transmission Towers stand and do NOT own the lands. These lands being alienated lands are neither state nor federal land and hence s.163 Local Government Act 1976 does not apply. [103] Under normal circumstances, this argument is not without force because the duty of registered land owners are among others, to pay assessment rates (or any other rates or taxes under the law). [104] However a licensee within the meaning of section 9 Electricity Supply Act 1990 is different from the other “run-of-the-mill” tenants. [105] The Applicant, unlike other “normal” tenants, may compel the registered landowners to open their lands and utilised the lands which is subject only to compliance with the Electricity Supply Act 1990. [106] The reason is obvious. Electricity is not a mere human need, it is a national need and no civilisation on earth now may operate without electricity supply. I have no quarrel with that, given the need of the humankind as well as the country. But the “compelling power” to render registered landowners almost always, to the Applicant by the invocation of section 11 Electricity Supply Act 1990. [107] With that in mind, what is left to the registered landowners if they are to bear any increase in assessment rates. It is a de facto acquisition of the enjoyment of their alienated lands and yet, in the same breath, they are made to pay the rates. November 10, 2021 62 [108] Hence the arguments that mere occupier of the land therefore, cannot sustain. TNB is an occupier of land that has the force of section 11 Electricity Supply Act 1990 behind them. [109] I agree that the Respondent must state clearly which are the lands where the transmission towers are situated and where the electricity supply transmission grids would run. This must be done in clear terms and only then the proper assessment rates may be determined. CONCLUSION [110] Having read the cause papers, the written submissions and after giving our most anxious consideration, I find no fault in the decision of the Respondent to impose the additional assessment rates on the applicant and I dismissed this application. [111] I found that the Respondent has properly exercise its powers in re-evaluating the annual rates as well as the assessment rates on the transmission towers belonging to the Applicant and imposing them on the Applicant. [112] For the reason aforesaid, I dismissed this application with cost. Dated the 10th November 2021 at Muar in the State of Johore. t.t. AWG ARMADAJAYA BIN AWG MAHMUD Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya Muar Johor Darul Ta’zim November 10, 2021 63 Curia Advisari Vult Counsels: For the Applicant : Gurmel Singh a/l Jit Singh For the Respondent : Mohd Radzi bin Yatiman Solicitors: For the Applicant Messrs Kenth Partnership Advocates and Solicitors Suite J-03-07, Solaris Mont’ Kiara 2 Jalan Solaris 50480 Kuala Lumpur. [Ref No. : KP/GS/5189/17/TNB/MDS(JR)] For the Respondent Messrs Rahim & Lawrnee Advocates and Solicitors No. 124-125 Tingkat 1 Jalan Sia Her Yam 85000 Segamat Johor. [Ref. No. : RL/CA-MPS/01-2018/TNB(MP)/ry] Hearing Date : 18th July 2021, 3rd August 2021, 8th September 2021. Decision Date : 10th November 2021. LEGISLATURE : November 10, 2021 64 ➢ sections 2, 9, 11, 12 dan 16, Electricity Supply Act 1990 (Act 447). ➢ Sections 2, 39, 127, 130, 137 ,141, 163 Local Government Act 1976 (Act 171). ➢ Order 53 rules 2, 3, 4 & 5 and Order 92 Rule 4 Rules of Court 2012 ➢ Section 29, 39, 40 of the Government Proceeding Act 1948 ➢ Section 54 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 ➢ Article 74, 96, Federal Constitution LITERATURE : ➢ M.P Jain, Administrative Law of Malaysia and Singapore 3rd Edition pages 625-626 ➢ Strauss, Peter. “DUE PROCESS”. Legal Information Institute. Retrieved 8 March 2013 CASES REFERRED TO : ➢ TENAGA NASIONAL BHD v. MAJLIS DAERAH SEGAMAT [2021] 5 CLJ 833 ➢ EASY VISTA SDN BHD v. TENAGA NASIONAL BHD [2021] 1 CLJ 453 ➢ MAJLIS DAERAH DUNGUN v. TENAGA NASIONAL BHD [2006] 2 CLJ 1078 ➢ TENAGA NASIONAL BHD V. MAJLIS DAERAH DUNGUN [2009] 4 CLJ 385; [2009] 6 MLJ 322 ➢ PUBLIC PROSECUTOR V. PENGURUS HONG TRADING & CO. [1984] 2 CLJ 67; [1984] 2 CLJ (Rep) 415 ➢ BI-METALLIC INVESTMENT CO. V. STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, 239 U.S. 441 (1915), ➢ LONDONER V. DENVER, 210 U. S. ➢ MAJLIS DAERAH DUNGUN V. TENAGA NASIONAL BHD [2006] 2 CLJ 1078 ➢ MAJLIS PERBANDARAN SEREMBAN v. TENAGA NASIONAL BHD [2020] 10 CLJ 715 ➢ R V PANEL FOR TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, EX PARTE DATAFIN [1987] 1 QB 815 ➢ HAZLINDA HAMZAH v. KUMON METHOD OF LEARNING CENTRE [2006] 2 CLJ 933 November 10, 2021 65 ➢ TELEKOM MALAYSIA BERHAD v. TRIBUNAL TUNTUTAN PENGGUNA & ANOR [2007] 1 CLJ 300 ➢ CHIEF CONSTABLE OF NORTH WALES POLICE v. EVANS [1982] 1 WLR 1152 ➢ HOTEL EQUATORIAL (M) SDN BHD v. NATIONAL UNION OF HOTEL, BAR & RESTAURANT WORKERS & ANOR [1984] 1 CLJ Rep 155; [1984] 2 CLJ 6; [1984] 1 MLJ 363 ➢ REX v. NAT BELL LIQUORS LTD [1922] 2 AC 128 ➢ DREAMLAND CORPORATION (M) SDN BHD v. CHOONG CHIN SOOI & ANOR [1988] 1 CLJ Rep 39; [1988] 1 CLJ 1; [1988] 1 MLJ 111 ➢ COUNCIL OF CIVIL SERVICE UNIONS V MINISTER FOR THE CIVIL SERVICE [1985] AC 374 ➢ ASSOCIATED PROVINCIAL PICTURE HOUSES LTD V WEDNESBURY CORPORATION [1948] 1 KB 223 ➢ R V LIVERPOOL CORPORATION, EX PARTE LIVERPOOL TAXI FLEET OPERATORS ASSOCIATION [1972] 2 QB 299. ➢ R V. NORTH AND. EAST DEVON HEALTH AUTHORITY, EX PARTE COUGHLAN [2001] QB 213 ➢ MILAN AUTO SDN BHD V. WONG SEH YEN [1995] 4 CLJ 449 ➢ SAID DHARMALINGAM ABDULLAH V. MALAYAN BREWERIES (MALAYA) SDN BHD [1997] 1 CLJ 646, ➢ PELABUHAN TANJUNG PELEPAS SDN BHD v. INDUSTRIAL COURT, MALAYSIA & ANOR [2020] 6 CLJ 111 ➢ TELEKOM MALAYSIA KAWASAN UTARA V. KRISHNAN KUTTY SANGUNI NAIR & ANOR [2002] 3 CLJ 314